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Abstract
The development of information technologies and the reduction of trade barriers have fos-
tered the international fragmentation of production and the expansion of knowledge networks.
Globalization has stimulated an unprecedented economic growth across the globe, shifting the
balance in the world economy, with a decline of developed countries and the rise of emerging
economies. The response of ﬁrms in mature economies to global competition is an increased
engagement in internationalization and innovation strategies. In this thesis we investigate
ﬁrst how trade protectionism might not be an eﬃcient instrument to prevent the negative
eﬀects of international competition, ﬁnding mixed eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on
Chinese products, with temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but a negative impact
on importers and long-run perverse eﬀect on productivity. Second, we analyse the role of
innovation in fostering the international performance of ﬁrms. Our results show that R&D
investment, innovation and outsourced R&D improve the export performance of European
ﬁrms, exporting more products and accessing new and more diﬃcult foreign markets. Only
by investing in innovation European ﬁrms will be able to positively internalise the external-
ities linked to globalization, increasing human capital and the stock of knowledge, boosting
productivity and creating new value-added jobs.
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Introduction
Since the end of World War II, and especially in the last two decades, both developed and
developing countries have experienced increasing ﬂows of international trade and capital and,
to a smaller extent, population migration and cultural interconnections. In particular, the
development of new information technologies (IT) and the reduction of distance and cultural
barriers have not only fostered the international fragmentation of production, but have con-
tributed to the expansion of complex networks of goods, services and knowledge transactions.
As shown in Figure 1, global trade in goods and capital ﬂows have grown faster than global
income since 1980, also thanks to the key role played by the GATT, and its successor the
WTO, which have successfully integrated the world economy now including more than 160
countries representing 96.4% of global trade.
However, although globalization has stimulated an unprecedented economic growth across
the globe by creating jobs, reducing prices and decreasing the income gap between developed
and developing countries, the same phenomenon, and especially international trade, has also
brought economic, political, and social disruption in diﬀerent regions. The recent global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 has shown how local country-speciﬁc economic recessions could rapidly
spread around the world given the interconnection of the global economy, with devastating
eﬀects in terms of trade reduction, jobs and businesses destruction.
1
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However, the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis have not been evenly distributed
globally, highlighting the presence of asymmetric shocks aﬀecting diﬀerently the participants
in the global market. For instance, even though global trade ﬂows collapsed by almost 20%
in 2009, the volume of both imports and exports in most developing countries exceeded their
pre-crisis peak after a few years, with East-Asia, and China in particular, leading this expan-
sion. On the contrary, many developed countries, and especially Europe, have experienced
serious economic diﬃculties since 2008 with slow economic growth and declining productivity
(UNCTAD 2012).
Figure 1: Growth rate of world GDP, international trade and foreign direct investment between 1980 and 2014.
Note: Elaboration based on UNCTAD data between 1980 and 2014.
The global crisis and the uneven trade recovery have reinforced the ongoing shift in bal-
ance in the world economy, with a change in the distribution of exports and foreign direct
investment (FDI) across countries, a relative decline of developed countries and the rise of
developing economies. In 2014 the value of total merchandise exports from all countries of
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the world was $19 trillion, of which the share of developed countries was only 56% down from
65% in 2005, rapidly eroded by increasingly active developing countries. As shown in Figure
2, this trend has been mainly driven by China, the world largest merchandise exporter in
2014, with a share of world exports jumping in almost 30 years from less than 1% to more
than 12% in 2014, outweighing the EU (11%) and ahead of the United States (8%) and Japan
(4%) (UNCTAD, 2016).
Figure 2: Total exports of the EU, USA, Japan and China between 1980 and 2014 (USD billion).
Note: Elaboration based on UNCTAD data between 1980 and 2014.
The shift in global balance is also visible in the changing distribution of export destina-
tions, with an increased importance of the "South-South" trade among developing countries,
particularly relevant in Asia and linked to the emergence of global supply chains. This
phenomenon has been possible thanks to the reduction of international transport and com-
munication costs, the rapid exchange of knowledge and technologies across the world, the
lowering of duties and non-tariﬀ barriers to trade and foreign investment and also to the
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availability of low-cost and highly skilled labour force in developing countries which have al-
lowed a rising proportion of global production of goods and services to be produced globally
and traded across borders rather than produced and sold at home (UNCTAD 2012).
However, at a time many developed countries experienced signiﬁcant economic diﬃcul-
ties, characterised by high level of unemployment, ﬁscal austerity and complaints of unfair
international competition, several economists have stressed the contradictions of globaliza-
tion, where "the rules of the game have been largely set by the advanced industrial countries
- and particularly by special interests within those countries - and, not surprisingly, they have
shaped globalization to further their own interests. They have not sought to create a fair set
of rules, let alone a set of rules that would promote the well-being of those in the poorest
countries of the world" (Stiglitz 2002). After the beginning of the economic crisis the debate
about the "globalization race" has become increasingly popular, highlighting in particular
the growing pressure experienced by developed countries from the international competition
of emerging economies who are able to produce and export quality-goods at lower prices. In
fact, corroborating the Heckscher-Ohlin model predictions, we have seen in recent decades a
focus of countries' comparative advantages based on the relatively abundant endowments of
factors of production, with a re-shaping of industrial organizations especially in developed
countries where the low-tech, low-skill sectors have suﬀered from competitive pressure of
low-cost labour force in developing countries, with a consequent loss of jobs due to produc-
tion lines being shut-down or outsourced abroad. However, the economic and technological
development have pushed emerging countries towards the edge of the technological frontier
and the high-end of the production function, reducing the productivity gap with developed
countries and increasing the competitive pressure by challenging them even in the production
of high-tech merchandises and services.
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Nevertheless, the response to globalization should not be the recurrence to economic pro-
tectionism as predicted by many economists and recently advocated by politicians, aﬀected
industries and trade unions. On the contrary, as stressed by Schumpeter, capitalism is by
its own nature an evolutionary system which is never static, and has continuously developed
thanks to its "fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion [...]
the gale of creative destruction which replace in whole or in part inferior innovations across
markets and industries, simultaneously creating new products including new business models,
and in so doing destroying the lead of the incumbents" (Schumpeter 1942). More speciﬁcally,
in order to survive and to maximize the beneﬁts related with the competitive globalization
race it is "the opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational devel-
opment [...] the same process of industrial mutation [...] that incessantly revolutionizes the
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new
one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in" (Schumpeter 1942).
The implications for the economic development of mature economies is that only countries
with a highly-skilled labour force, continuously investing in research and development (R&D)
activities and able to access new foreign markets thanks to the incessantly introduction of new
innovative products and processes - replacing and destroying the old products and industrial
productive processes - will be able to maximize the beneﬁts deriving from globalization and
to integrate successfully in the global markets. Thanks to continuous endogenous investment
in technology and knowledge, mature economies will be able to fully specialise in high-tech
and high-end manufacturing and service industries, positively internalizing the externalities
linked to globalization by using in their productive processes intermediate inputs imported
from low labour cost countries and then open new outlet markets for the exports of their
innovative products.
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In this thesis we investigate the previously mentioned predictions for the case of Euro-
pean countries which are a particularly suitable case study given the lively academic and
non-academic debate about the consequences of globalisation and free-trade and their role in
the ampliﬁcation of the economic recession, the loss of jobs and the erosion of salaries and
welfare state (Strauss-Kahn 2004; Barba Navaretti et al. 2010; Hijzen et al. 2011; Chang
et al. 2012; Corcos et al. 2012; Mion and Zhu 2013).
In the ﬁrst chapter we investigate whether trade protectionism, and in particular anti-
dumping (AD) measures, are an eﬃcient instrument to prevent the negative eﬀects of in-
ternational competition from developing countries. In fact, over the previous few decades,
there is an increasing pressure to introduce protectionist measures, especially by developed
countries, through the adoption of anti-dumping duties and non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) to
trade. Although dumping strategies might have a negative eﬀect on international competi-
tion, economists and political scientists question to what extent anti-dumping measures are
related to "unfair" trade (Zanardi 2006; Evenett and Vermulst 2005; Nelson 2006; Conconi
et al. 2015). A lively economic and political literature has analysed anti-dumping policies,
both from a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, in order to shed a light on the real eﬀect
of these measures on trade ﬂows and on industrial output. Most of the theoretical literature
has predicted that anti-dumping policies are for the most part welfare reducing, and cause
signiﬁcant distortions in trade ﬂows, with gains for protected producers which are smaller
than the costs in terms of consumers welfare and loss of comparative advantage. It has been
proven that the imposition of unsubstantiated AD duties has a negative eﬀect on trade vol-
umes due to externalities associated with trade destruction, diversion and trade deﬂection.
As a consequence, with the disruption of trade ﬂows and the alteration of imported inputs
prices, anti-dumping duties aﬀect in turn industrial sectors and individual ﬁrms performance
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both in the domestic and in the trade-partner markets, improving the performance of the least
productive ﬁrms, and with a reallocation of resources from more to less productive industries.
We provide a comprehensive economic analysis of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese
products, speciﬁcally looking at the impact on trade ﬂows and at the contrasting eﬀects
of these AD duties on the performance of all the categories of aﬀected ﬁrms, including for
the ﬁrst time both domestic producers and importers. We focus on the EU anti-dumping
measures imposed on Chinese products both for the increasing role played by China in in-
ternational trade and for the peculiarity of the EU anti-dumping framework. This is the
ﬁrst study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of AD measures at the product,
sector and ﬁrm-level, in particular analysing for the ﬁrst time the diﬀerent ﬁrm-level impact
on importers and producers.
Our results suggest that EU anti-dumping measures successfully target Chinese dumped
products, pushing for an increase in the level of prices and decreasing imports from China
which are in turn substituted by a larger domestic production and by goods imported from
other extra-EU countries. Domestic producers are more protected by the unfair dumping
competition, experiencing a higher employment growth and a survival probability, but at the
cost of a lower productivity. At the same time, a smaller number of importers, but larger
in size relatively to domestic producers, are negatively aﬀected by AD measures, forced to
divert their imports after the increase of intermediate input prices, and losing productivity
with a consequent negative impact on total employment and survival rate. The overall result
is a mixed eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products, deﬁnitely bringing a
temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but with a negative impact on importers and a
long-run distorted eﬀect reducing the productivity gap between Chinese and European ﬁrms.
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In the second and third chapters instead we analyse the impact of R&D and technological
development on the performance of ﬁrms in developed countries, in particular through the
above mentioned process of creative destruction which might allow mature economic systems
to create continuously new comparative advantages and to remain competitive in a globalised
economy creating new innovative products and opening new foreign markets.
In chapter 2 we analyse the key role played by innovation and technological development
in enhancing ﬁrms' productivity and trade performance. A substantial literature has estab-
lished that diﬀerences in ﬁrm performance are partially explained by the ability of ﬁrms to
be successful innovators, which further increases productivity and survival rates (Grossman
and Helpman 1994a; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Huergo and Jaumandreu 2004; Griﬃth et al.
2006; Aw et al. 2011; Van Long et al. 2011; Hallak and Sivadasan 2013). Particularly
relevant in this regard is the impact of innovation on international trade, and the diﬀerent
ways in which R&D activities aﬀect ﬁrm export performance. Identifying the determinants
of ﬁrm export performance is increasingly relevant to fully understand the trade patterns un-
observable at the aggregate level. More recently, the economic performance of new emerging
countries underlines the importance of productivity-enhancing activities, such as investment
in innovation, as key drivers of ﬁrms' ability to successfully compete in international markets,
to underpin sustainable economic growth and to create new job opportunities.
In particular, in chapter 2 we investigate the role played by innovation in improving the
international trade performance of ﬁrms, taking into account diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrms innova-
tion and export strategies. Our main contribution is to decompose the eﬀect of innovation on
exports taking into account not only total exports and the probability of being an exporter
but also the extensive and intensive margins of trade, such as the average value of ﬁrm's
shipments, the number of varieties exported and the number of destinations served by each
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ﬁrm. In this way we are able to establish whether innovation activities improve exporters'
performance creating new trade links, enriching ﬁrms' product mix and opening new export
markets, or if they support the intensiﬁcation of existing ﬂows.
This chapter also assesses the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of innovation on export performance,
by simultaneously taking into account innovation input and output measures. Measures of
R&D output may be more accurate in identifying the connection between innovation and ex-
port performance, providing a direct link to connect investment in R&D and the commercial
adoption of an innovation. At the same time, by measuring investment in R&D it is possi-
ble to evaluate the overall eﬀect of ﬁrms' R&D eﬀorts on exports performance, taking into
account the possible eﬀect of R&D which do not result in the introduction of new products,
processes or patents.
We ﬁnd that diﬀerent trade margins respond in diﬀerent ways to innovation activities.
Total investment in R&D has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect across diﬀerent trade mar-
gins, increasing total exports through the export of more products and the targeting of more
countries. The introduction of innovative products helps ﬁrms to export new varieties to
new foreign markets while innovation plays a marginal role in improving the average value
of shipments abroad. In particular, the positive eﬀect of innovation on ﬁrms trade margins
seems to be mainly driven by small and medium domestic ﬁrms exporting within the EU
relatively small volumes, or exporting to extra-EU countries.
Finally, in the third chapter we investigate the role played by R&D outsourcing in in-
creasing the degree of internationalisation of ﬁrms in mature economies, improving their total
exports and accessing new foreign markets. Globalization along with the development of new
IT have contributed to the expansion of R&D transactions and the creation of internation-
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ally integrated innovation networks. Cross-border collaboration between research centres is
a wide-spread phenomenon, mainly due to the increasing degree of specialisation of laborato-
ries around the world which have became research leaders in high-tech and high-added value
niches. In particular, private ﬁrms have gradually evolved from closed innovation systems
to open and networked structures, as shown by the increasing share of external innovating
activities both in developed and developing countries, leading to a new global distribution of
R&D as suggested by Chesbrough (2006) "open innovation" paradigm.
In the last 20 years the total value of external R&D activities in the EU has grown 20
time faster than R&D spending in general, with some companies conducting less than 10% of
their R&D in-house, becoming "hunters and gatherers" rather than originators of technology.
Nowadays more than 70% of European ﬁrms have outsourced part of their R&D activities,
opening collaborations not only with organizations located in countries at the edge of the
technological frontier, but increasingly oﬀshoring towards developing countries (European
Commission, 2014). Generally, the innovation capability of manufacturing sectors is becom-
ing an increasingly important issue in high-wage developed countries, considered as one of
the main drivers of the economic recovery and of the improvement of the comparative ad-
vantage in respect to newly emerging countries. Most of the policy attention on this topic
has focused on a speciﬁc subcategory of manufacturing ﬁrms, mainly dynamic innovators in
high-tech industries dedicating large resources to internal R&D projects. However, recently a
growing literature has stressed the relevance of the evolving industrial re-organisation taking
place in low-tech manufacturing industries, dedicating an increasing amount of resources to
the development of R&D projects in order to challenge the competition from low-cost coun-
tries (Hansen and Winther 2014).
Chapter 3 contributes to the empirical literature by assessing the impact of external R&D
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activities on ﬁrms export performance. This topic is relatively under researched with few
theoretical predictions and limited empirical evidence. We consider externalised R&D to
be a key strategy for internationalized ﬁrms, undertaken to achieve both supply-driven and
demand-driven objectives. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical contribu-
tion to provide evidence on the role played by external R&D activities in improving ﬁrms'
export performance, looking both at domestic and foreign owned companies, both in the high
and in the low-tech industries.
We take into account several measures of ﬁrms external R&D activities, considering both
tasks outsourced within or outside the group boundaries, both domestically and internation-
ally. First, we study whether outsourced activities substitute or have a complementary eﬀect
with internal R&D on exports, analysing the sustainability of innovative external eﬀorts and
ﬁrms' internal resources. Second, we examine the diﬀerent eﬀects of outsourced R&D activ-
ities on several indicators of ﬁrms export performance in order to assess the role played by
each external innovation activity in increasing the value of total exports and in improving
ﬁrms market access.
Our results show how complementarity does take place between internal and external
R&D activities, demonstrating how in-house capabilities still persist once ﬁrms start ex-
ternalizing, and how this joint eﬀect helps ﬁrms to improve their export performance. In
addition, we ﬁnd that oﬀshoring R&D activities abroad and outside the group boundaries is
a particularly relevant strategy in order to improve ﬁrms terms of trade, speciﬁcally increas-
ing the value of total exports and pushing ﬁrms towards more diﬃcult markets. These results
seem to be particularly relevant for domestic ﬁrms in low-tech industries, which might use
external knowledge not available in-house provided by foreign agents at the edge of the tech-
nological frontier in order to increase total exports and their presence in foreign and distant
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markets. Taken together these results show clearly how external R&D plays a signiﬁcant role
in improving ﬁrm's participation in global networks, demonstrating how these strategies are
mainly driven by market-demand factors such as customizing products to foreign markets'
needs or increasing ﬁrms' global footprint.
From this economic analysis of the changing patterns of international trade and the im-
pact on ﬁrms behaviour it is possible to derive key policy implications about the potential
ways to foster the economic growth of mature European countries. European ﬁrms should
be positively engaged in innovating activities and international markets in order to face the
challenge of the competitive pressure from developing countries. The solution is to increase
investment in human capital and knowledge to boost productivity growth and the creation
of new jobs. Only by continuously investing in R&D activities and expanding international
operations European ﬁrms will be able to follow a creatively destructive process, replacing
the obsolete products and productive processes and being completely open and integrated
in the global value chains of knowledge and production to fully exploit the beneﬁts deriving
from globalization.
Chapter 1
EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese
products: A curse or a blessing for
European ﬁrms?
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Abstract
Despite growing trends of international trade ﬂows, the last two decades have been
characterized by an increasing recurrence to protectionist measures, especially
through the adoption of anti-dumping (AD) duties. Dumping strategies might have
a negative eﬀect on international competition but previous literature has frequently
questioned to what extent anti-dumping measures have actually to do with unfair
trade, raising concerns about the possible protectionist abuse of this trade defence
instrument. In this chapter we provide a comprehensive economic analysis of the
EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products, looking at their impact on trade
ﬂows and at the contrasting eﬀects of these AD duties on the performance of both
domestic producers and importers. Our results suggest that EU anti-dumping
measures successfully target Chinese dumped products, increasing their prices and
consequently decreasing imports from China, which are in turn substituted by
a larger domestic production and by goods from other extra-EU countries. On
the contrary, EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese product have mixed results
on ﬁrms' performance, bringing a temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but
negatively aﬀecting importers with a perverse long-run negative eﬀect especially in
terms of productivity.
JEL classiﬁcation: F13; D22; F14; L25.
Keywords: anti-dumping; China; European Union; ﬁrm heterogeneity; trade
diversion.
A draft of this chapter had previously been submitted to the RES 2016 PhD Meeting and Job
Market, the European Trade Study Group Conference 2015 and the Chinese Economic Association
2015 Conference and is available at: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/
download.cgi?db_name=RESPhDConf2016&paper_id=198.
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1.1 Introduction
The last decades have witnessed an increasing degree of globalization and interdependence
characterised by growing trends of international trade thanks to the lowering of import tar-
iﬀs, to a decrease of transportation and IT costs and the inclusion of major trade partners
in the WTO system. Nevertheless, especially after the economic crisis in 2008, it has been
noticed an increasing recurrence to protectionist measures both by developed and develop-
ing countries, especially through the adoption of anti-dumping (AD) duties, one of the few
exceptions to free trade allowed in the WTO framework (Vandenbussche and Zanardi 2008;
Moore and Zanardi 2011). Dumping strategies refer to ﬁrms which export products at a
price lower than the price usually charged in their own home market or at a lower price than
the cost of production. Dumping is frequently considered as an anti-competitive strategy de-
veloped to unfairly knock-out of the market international competitors who cannot face such
intense price-competition for prolonged periods. Once the competitors have left the market,
the dumping ﬁrms are able to set their own monopolistic price since they no longer face any
competitive pressure.
According to the WTO rules, governments could impose temporary extra duties on tar-
geted products imported from dumping countries in order to bring prices closer to the "normal
value".1 The imposition of anti-dumping measures is conditional on the demonstration that
a dumping strategy is taking place and that is causing a "material" injury to the competing
domestic industry. Although dumping strategies might have a negative eﬀect on interna-
tional competition, economists and political scientists have always questioned to what extent
anti-dumping measures have actually to do with "unfair" trade (Zanardi 2006; Evenett and
Vermulst 2005; Nelson 2006; Conconi et al. 2015). Calculating the extent of product dumping
and evaluating the relevant economic impact on the aﬀected industry might be a particularly
1Article VI of the GATT 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement.
CHAPTER 1. EU ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CHINESE PRODUCTS 16
challenging task, leaving room for political leverage. Increasing concerns have been raised
about the possible protectionist abuse of this trade defence instrument, especially in devel-
oped countries where governments could take anti-dumping actions just in order to defend
their mature industries from the aggressive competition of imports from emerging countries.
A lively economic and political literature analyses anti-dumping policies, both from a
theoretical and an empirical point of view, in order to shed a light on the real eﬀect of
these measures on trade ﬂows and on industrial output.2 Most of the theoretical literature
predicts that anti-dumping policies are in most of the cases welfare reducing, causing sig-
niﬁcant distortions in trade ﬂows and with gains for protected producers which are smaller
than the costs in terms of consumers welfare and loss of comparative advantage (Gallaway
et al. 1999; Blonigen and Park 2004; Bown and Crowley 2007; Ruhl 2014; Wu et al. 2014).
Moreover, many empirical studies test these predictions highlighting that only in very few
cases the imposition of anti-dumping measures is supported by sound empirical evidences
(Dutt and Mitra 2002; Knetter and Prusa 2003; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Blonigen 2006).
It has been proven that the imposition of unsubstantiated AD duties has a negative eﬀect
on trade volumes due to externalities associated with trade destruction, diversion and trade
deﬂection (Durling and Prusa 2006; Bown and Crowley 2006; Vandenbussche and Zanardi
2010; Egger and Nelson 2011; Besedes and Prusa 2013). As a consequence, with the disrup-
tion of trade ﬂows and the alteration of imported inputs prices, anti-dumping duties aﬀect
in turn industrial sectors and individual ﬁrms performance both in the domestic and in the
trade-partner markets. The majority of the empirical papers conclude that AD protection
aﬀects the market structure of domestic producers, especially improving the performance of
the least productive ﬁrms, and lead to a reallocation of resources from more to less produc-
tive industries (Konings and Vandenbussche 2005; Konings and Vandenbussche 2008; Pierce
2For a comprehensive survey of the literature on anti-dumping see e.g. Nelson (2006), Zanardi (2006),
Blonigen and Prusa (2015).
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2011).
Following the previous literature, this chapter provides a comprehensive economic anal-
ysis of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products. Speciﬁcally, we will look at the
impact on trade ﬂows and at the contrasting eﬀects of these AD duties on the performance
of all the categories of aﬀected ﬁrms, including both domestic producers and importers. The
focus of this investigation is on the EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products for the
increasing role played by China in international trade and for the peculiarity of the EU
anti-dumping framework. China is nowadays the largest source of imports for the EU, with
total value of almost e280 billions in 2013, and it has become as well the largest target of
EU anti-dumping measures after the 2004 EU enlargement as shown in Table 1.1 (European
Commission, 2015). At the same time the EU is the world ﬁrst initiator of anti-dumping
cases against China, mainly due to its large bilateral trade deﬁcit and for the loss of com-
parative advantage of its manufacturing industries vis-à-vis Chinese competitors (Cheong
2007; Rovegno and Vandenbussche 2011). From Figure 1.1 it is possible to notice indeed
that despite a decreasing trend in the overall number of products investigated for dumping
by the EU during the period 1999-2007, the share of Chinese products investigated over the
total has been continuously increasing during the same period, especially after China's WTO
accession in 2001, accounting for almost 80% of the total number of products investigated by
the EU in 2007. The extent of the coverage of EU AD measures on China is evidently very
large also in terms of volumes: in 2013 over 7% of China's total exports to the EU were under
anti-dumping examination (Bown and Reynolds 2015). In addition, because of its peculiar
characteristics the EU anti-dumping procedure is particularly prone to political and discre-
tionary decisions more based on protectionist reasons rather than technical aspects, especially
when considering anti-dumping duties on products imported from emerging countries such
as China which put under a tough competitive pressure the domestic European industries
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(Evenett and Vermulst 2005; De Bievre and Eckhardt 2010; Nordstrom 2011; Van Aken 2012).
Table 1.1: Composition of EU AD investigations by country (1999-2007).
China India S.Korea Taiwan R.Asia Russia E.Europe M.E.A. L.America ROW Total
1999 12 5 7 8 16 1 13 3 1 4 70
2000 7 4 2 0 3 3 12 1 0 1 33
2001 2 4 1 1 2 2 10 4 1 2 29
2002 4 1 0 1 6 5 5 3 1 3 29
2003 3 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 9
2004 10 1 3 3 12 3 2 4 1 2 41
2005 8 1 1 1 8 1 3 2 1 1 27
2006 12 1 2 3 7 3 6 3 0 3 40
2007 8 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 14
Total 66 19 16 17 57 19 56 20 5 17 292
Note: Statistics based on the World Bank Global Antidumping Database for the period 1999-2007 considering all anti-
dumping investigations launched by the EU against third-countries.
Given the heterogeneous productive structure of European countries, our analysis of AD
measures on Chinese products is particularly interesting since it takes into account the over-
all eﬀect on the domestic industry, considering both the impact at the product-level on the
bilateral trade ﬂows and the eﬀect at the micro-level on sectors and ﬁrms performance. First,
using trade data at the HS-6 digit product-level for the period 1999-2007 we are able to assess
the eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese product on import ﬂows. Our product-
level analysis would not be restricted just to the bilateral ﬂows between the EU and China,
but would investigate as well the possible externalities in terms of trade destruction, diversion
and deﬂection. More speciﬁcally, we consider the eﬀects on total imports, on the intra-EU
trade and at the trade relationships with the rest of the world considering the consequences
both on prices and volumes.
Secondly, following the previous literature we are interested in estimating the overall eco-
nomic eﬀect on the EU industries protected by the imposition of higher duties on the import
of dumped Chinese products (Pauwels et al. 2001; Vandenbussche and Wauthy 2001; Crow-
ley 2006). Using 4-digit industry-level data for almost 270 European manufacturing sectors
covering the period 1999-2007 we analyse the eﬃciency of anti-dumping duties in protecting
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Figure 1.1: EU anti-dumping investigations on China and the rest of the world (1999-2007).
Note: Elaboration based on the World Bank Global Antidumping Database for the period 1999 to 2007 considering all anti-
dumping investigations launched by the EU against third-countries products. Share of Chinese products measured as the ratio
between number of EU investigations against Chinese products and the total number of EU anti-dumping proceedings against
third-countries.
European producing sectors, estimating the impact of AD measures on the performance of
these industries in terms of total production, employment, labour productivity, total exports,
investment in R&D and the overall number of European ﬁrms operating in these sectors.
Finally, we present a comprehensive micro-level analysis of the impact of these AD mea-
sures on ﬁrms performance, not only for the protected domestic producers as done by the
previous literature, but looking as well at the repercussions of AD duties for domestic im-
porters of the targeted products. Using ﬁrm-level data from France we are able to identify
the producers in each of the industries protected at the NACE-4 digit level, comparing the
eﬀect of the AD measures for ﬁrms in the protected industries with other French companies
in unaﬀected sectors (the control group) before and after the imposition of anti-dumping
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duties. Similarly, using ﬁrm-product-level import data from the French Custom Agency
we can identify French ﬁrms that import dumped products from China, and estimate the
eﬀect of higher duties on intermediate inputs on their performance. In this way, we can
assess the eﬀect of AD duties on the performance of both French producers and importers,
considering speciﬁcally the impact on ﬁrms' productivity, employment growth, total export,
R&D investment and on survival rate. We perform additional in-depth investigations and
several robustness checks to estimate the heterogeneous eﬀect across sub-samples of ﬁrms.
We diﬀerentiate between exporters and non-exporters, multi and single-product ﬁrms. We
also check whether the impact of AD duty varies across the productivity distribution of
producers and importers. In addition, using the investigation reports released by the Euro-
pean Commission, we look speciﬁcally at the cases in which French producers and importers
have petitioned in favour or against the imposition of EU AD duties on Chinese products to
brieﬂy analyse the role played by lobbying activities in serving industrial strategic objectives.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study providing a comprehensive analysis
of the eﬀect of AD measures at the product, sector and ﬁrm-level, in particular analysing for
the ﬁrst time the diﬀerent ﬁrm-level impact on importers and producers.
Looking at the product-level imports, we ﬁnd that EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese
products cause an overall trade destruction eﬀect, substantially decreasing EU total imports
at the HS-6 digit level due to a generalized increase in the price of dumped products. This
impact is mainly driven by a sudden drop in imports volumes of targeted products from
China which decrease by almost 70% in the following 2 years. However, the overall impact
is partially mitigated by a trade diversion eﬀect with an increase of imports from the rest of
the world. Overall these results show how anti-dumping measures on Chinese products push
towards an overall increase of targeted goods prices, bringing to a substitution of Chinese
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imports with more expensive imports from the rest of the world.
The sector-level analysis corroborates the ﬁndings published by previous literature. After
the imposition of AD measures on Chinese products, European producers are more protected
and experience an increase in the domestic production, a stabilisation of total employment
and of the number of ﬁrms operating in the sectors, but at the cost of a decrease in labour
productivity in comparison with unprotected industries.
Finally, the ﬁrm-level analysis highlights a contrasting eﬀect of anti-dumping measures
on French ﬁrms' performance. On the one hand, we ﬁnd evidence that anti-dumping mea-
sures successfully protect domestic producers from the unfair competition of dumped Chinese
products, especially for the least competitive ﬁrms, increasing by 5% the probability of pro-
ducers survival and relatively supporting the employment growth with almost 20,000 new
jobs created in 3 years, despite a drop in their total factor productivity. On the other hand,
anti-dumping measures decrease French importers performance, negatively aﬀecting the most
productive ﬁrms and lead to a drop of their productivity by 5% on average, cutting down
almost 15,000 jobs in 3 years and reducing the surviving probability of importers by 7.5%.
These ﬁrm-level eﬀects are particularly signiﬁcant in the cases in which the European Com-
mission registered the petition of French producers or importers, suggesting that industrial
lobbying is eﬀective in protecting the interests of domestic producers while does not appear
to play any role in preventing the negative impact for importers.
The results are consistent across speciﬁcations and robust to diﬀerent checks on selection
bias and endogeneity issues. Speciﬁcally, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score
matching (DID-PSM) technique in order to select from the sample of untreated observations
suitable control groups. Moreover, to cast out any endogenity issue we test the overall good-
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ness of the matching procedure, providing as well additional alternative estimation techniques
which corroborate our main results. In addition, we use diﬀerent deﬁnitions of importers and
producers to control for selection bias and possible overlap between these two categories.
Taken together, our results suggest that EU anti-dumping measures successfully target
Chinese dumped products, pushing for an increase in the level of prices and decreasing im-
ports from China which are in turn substituted by a larger domestic production and by
goods from other extra-EU countries. In this way, French producers are more protected
by the unfair dumping competition, experiencing a higher employment growth and survival
probability, but at the cost of a lower productivity. At the same time, a smaller number of
French importers, but larger in size relatively to domestic producers, are negatively aﬀected
by AD measures, forced to divert their imports after the increase of intermediate input prices,
and losing productivity with a consequent negative impact on total employment and survival
rate. The overall result is a mixed eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products,
deﬁnitely bringing a temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but with a negative impact
on importers and a long-run distorted eﬀect reducing the productivity gap between Chinese
and European ﬁrms.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we present a review of the
economic literature on anti-dumping measures and their consequences on trade ﬂows and ﬁrm
performance. Section 3 describes the data used and presents some preliminary statistics. In
section 4 we explain the methodology applied for the estimation of the main model and of
the alternative controls. Section 5 presents the empirical ﬁndings and the robustness checks
discussing the results. Finally, section 6 concludes this chapter and presents some policy
implications.
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1.2 Literature Review
A lively economic and political literature analyses anti-dumping policies, both theoretically
and empirically, in order to shed a light on the real eﬀect of these measures on trade ﬂows
and on the performance of productive systems. Most of these studies agree that dumping
strategies do not seem to constitute much of a problem for international competition, having
marginal side-eﬀects on trade ﬂows. However, anti-dumping policies aﬀect aggregate trade
ﬂows in a much greater proportion, with a wide degree of politicization and protectionism
abuse involved (Nelson 2006). In the next sections, we review the existing literature on this
topic, taking into consideration both the economic and the political studies on anti-dumping
policies. We look ﬁrst at the theoretical predictions regarding the motivations and the ob-
jectives of the AD measures before moving to the empirical analysis of the eﬀects of these
duties on trade ﬂows and the performance of aﬀected industrial sectors and individual ﬁrms.
1.2.1 Economic Literature
The economic literature develops and tests general equilibrium models of international trade
in order to predict and assess the welfare eﬀects of anti-dumping and other protectionist mea-
sures, usually ﬁnding evidence of a negative impact on consumers and competition (Zanardi
2006). Most of the economic studies focus on few topics, mainly analysing the impact on
trade ﬂows at the aggregate level or looking alternatively at the pricing strategies and the het-
erogeneous response of aﬀected sectors and ﬁrms to anti-dumping measures at the micro-level.
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The Macro-level Analysis
A ﬁrst strand of the theoretical literature models how anti-dumping policies aﬀect world trade
ﬂows. Firstly, Prusa (2001) shows how on average AD duties cause the value of product-level
imports to fall by 30 - 50 % with respect to the pre-initiation phase, not only because of the
imposition of duties, but also for the cases in which they have been rejected. Starting from
this preliminary analysis, Bown and Crowley (2007) look at the aggregate eﬀect on trade
relations, predicting that the imposition of AD duties might cause a signiﬁcant distortion
in world trade ﬂows. Testing their model using US anti-dumping duties against Japan, the
authors ﬁnd evidence of trade deﬂection and depression with an overall negative eﬀect on
trade ﬂows. Similarly, Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) test empirically the eﬀect of AD
duties on aggregate world trade ﬂows using a gravity model approach. The authors show that
anti-dumping measures have trade chilling eﬀects on aggregate import volumes that spill over
also at a more aggregate level to similar products. However, their impacts are heterogeneous
across sectors, mainly driven by a few sectors such as iron and steel, textiles, chemicals and
agriculture. In addition, the authors look at the diﬀerences across countries, focusing in par-
ticular on the "new users", countries that have just recently adopted and implemented the
AD legislation such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey and China. Their analysis shows that
"new users" experience even a stronger negative impact on aggregate imports as a result of
the imposition of AD measures, substantially oﬀsetting the increase in trade volumes derived
from the recent trade liberalizations adopted. Egger and Nelson (2011) also base their analy-
sis on a gravity model framework in order to establish an empirical baseline for the analysis of
deviations from trade patterns equilibrium. More speciﬁcally, the authors develop a theoret-
ical model formalizing the causal links between anti-dumping measures and trade patterns,
comparing the overall welfare eﬀects across the main sectors targeted by AD policies and
diﬀerent countries in terms of development. Their results show a negative but modest eﬀect
of anti-dumping measures on aggregate trade volumes and welfare, with stronger eﬀects in
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the case of new developing country using AD policies.
Using detailed country-product data other papers investigate instead the externalities
associated with anti-dumping measures, by examining their impact not only on trade de-
struction, but also on trade diversion and deﬂection towards third countries. For instance,
Durling and Prusa (2006) look at the market of a particular homogeneous product such as
the hot-rolled steel which has been the subject of numerous anti-dumping complaints. Using
a detailed database of bilateral trade at the 6-digit HS level, the authors ﬁnd strong evidence
of trade destruction, but little or no proof of trade deﬂection and diversion. Nevertheless,
their results present some evidence of a possible protectionist abuse of the AD policy. In fact,
anti-dumping measures by deﬁnition should have a country-product speciﬁc nature, being
imposed just in the case in which ﬁrms exporting a speciﬁc good from a speciﬁc country have
been found to carry on dumping strategies. On the contrary, the rapid emergence of hot-
rolled AD cases in diﬀerent countries seems to have little to do with anti-dumping protection
according to the authors, providing a clear evidence of a protectionist abuse in retaliation to
AD measures imposed by trading partners. Looking at a speciﬁc case study, Cohen-Meidan
(2013) studies the imposition of anti-dumping duties in the cement industry ﬁnding evidence
of regional variation in their impact on domestic prices, sales and imports. Analysing US
duties imposed on diﬀerent trade partners the author shows that just in some cases these
led to imperfect substitution with other imports, increasing domestic prices and production,
linking the variation across regions to the high exit costs hysteresis. Besedes and Prusa (2013)
instead analyse a richer panel dataset of imports of products involved in US anti-dumping
cases to look at the overall eﬀect at the product-level over time. The authors ﬁnd evidence
of a strong reduction of imports, highlighting how the ﬁrst phase of the AD investigation
usually has a stronger detrimental eﬀect than the ﬁnal imposition of duties. Moreover, their
results demonstrate how despite their country-product-speciﬁc nature, AD duties in reality
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impose signiﬁcant externalities also on the trade ﬂows of non-targeted country-product pairs,
thus widening the scope of anti-dumping policies.
The Micro-level Analysis
Starting from the ﬁrst seminal papers on ﬁrms strategic responses to endogenous protection
(Viner 1923; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1976; Eaton and Grossman 1986; Dixit 1988; Fis-
cher 1992), another strand of theoretical works examine the dynamic problems regarding the
imposition of anti-dumping duties, looking both at the implications for policy-makers and
aﬀected ﬁrms.
Cheng et al. (2001) for instance theorize ﬁrms pricing strategies in reaction to the im-
position of AD duties, exploring the design of optimal incentive-compatible measures and
considering the weight given to domestic ﬁrms' proﬁt and foreign ﬁrms pricing strategies.
In another paper Blonigen and Park (2004) highlight the key role played by ex-ante ex-
pectations in determining the price strategy. The authors show indeed that the pattern of
AD duty recalculations mostly depends on the ex-ante expectations of exporting ﬁrms on
the possible imposition of AD duties by importing countries. The main prediction of their
model stresses that the certain enforcement of AD duties can perversely contribute to more
aggressive dumping behaviour. In an uncertain enforcement framework instead, ﬁrms will
choose prices which lead to a decreased probability of being aﬀected by an anti-dumping
investigation.
More recently Ruhl (2014) and Wu et al. (2014) develop a general equilibrium welfare
analysis to assess ﬁrms pricing strategies, the reaction to anti-dumping investigations and
the overall eﬀect on aﬀected industries and consumers. In a calibrated model Ruhl (2014)
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estimates that the U.S. anti-dumping policy has an aggregate impact equivalent to a 6% tariﬀ
uniformly applied to all ﬁrms, with an overall welfare cost not only linked to higher prices
charged after the imposition of the anti-dumping duties, but also to higher prices that all
exporters optimally charge in order to minimize the probability of being accused of dumping.
Wu et al. (2014) instead in their paper study the welfare implications for exporters of paying
anti-dumping duties or of raising their product price to the normal market value. The au-
thors ﬁnd that welfare-maximizing AD duties crucially depend on the product market value:
if considerably high, the optimal rate should fully reﬂect the dumping margin, otherwise it
should be set lower than that.
Another part of the economic literature studies the impact of anti-dumping policies at
the sectoral-level, in particular focusing on the real eﬀectiveness in protecting aﬀected in-
dustries and on the possible use of AD measures as an instrument of industrial policy. For
instance, Pauwels et al. (2001) develop a dynamic model of imperfect competition to analyse
the particular eﬀect of EU anti-dumping duties on ﬁrm behaviour and compared it with US
measures. The authors highlight how the strategic behaviour of European ﬁrms widely diﬀers
from US companies aﬀected by anti-dumping duties. In particular, US anti-dumping policy
seems to be more eﬀective than European one in determining the dumping margin protec-
tion, thus performing better in terms of domestic welfare and in terms of protecting domestic
value added and employment. In addition, they argue that anti-dumping strategies cannot
be considered as a strategic trade policy, given that the level of protection is endogenously
determined by the ﬁrms involved. In another theoretical paper Vandenbussche and Wauthy
(2001) instead show how EU anti-dumping policies may negatively aﬀect European producers
through reversals of quality ranking. Using a two-stage model for an industry characterized
by vertical product diﬀerentiation where quality choice is determined before price competi-
tion takes place, the authors show that EU anti-dumping policies protect domestic ﬁrms at
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the price competition stage, but might negatively aﬀect domestic ﬁrms once the eﬀect on
quality choice is taken into account.
As previously stressed, frequently anti-dumping duties might have been used not as a way
to protect domestic sectors by a material injury of dumped imported products, but simply as
a tool of industrial policy to boost productivity and investment in infant or mature sectors. In
this regard, Crowley (2006) develops a model for the analysis of the use of anti-dumping du-
ties for industrial technology adoption. In this paper the author shows that country-product
speciﬁc tariﬀs could have positive welfare eﬀect, inducing both domestic and foreign ﬁrms to
invest more in R&D activities as a response to tariﬀ increase and accelerating in this way the
introduction of new innovations. On the contrary, broadly-applied tariﬀ like safeguards can
accelerate technology adoption by import-competing ﬁrms, but will slow-down the adoption
for foreign exporters of cheap goods. Similarly, Miyagiwa and Ohno (2007) look at the rela-
tionship between dumping strategies and innovation in R&D intensive industries. According
to the authors innovative ﬁrms may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal
the introduction of new technologies. If exporters have a poor reputation for innovation
or introduced cost-cutting process innovations, such actions lead to sales below cost. As a
consequence, anti-dumping duties reduce the costs of signalling, protecting domestic ﬁrms,
but raising the proﬁt for foreign ﬁrms in the pre-duty period.
A recent strand of the empirical literature focuses instead on the ﬁrm-level response to
anti-dumping duties, mainly looking at the eﬀect on exporters and producers. Konings and
Vandenbussche (2005) in their ﬁrst seminal ﬁrm-level study test whether AD protection af-
fects the market power of domestic producers. Using a panel of around 4,000 European ﬁrms
protected by AD duties, the authors estimate markups before and after the ﬁlling of a case
with a ﬁxed-eﬀect model to control for potential endogeneity of AD ﬁlings. Their results show
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evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of AD protection on domestic markups, except
for the cases in which import diversions played a signiﬁcant role. Moreover, in a following
paper the authors use instead a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach in order to compare the
productivity of ﬁrms protected by anti-dumping measures with those unaﬀected (Konings
and Vandenbussche 2008). Their results show evidence of a general improved productivity
for ﬁrms in protected EU industries. However, when controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity in
terms of productivity levels, the authors ﬁnd that laggard ﬁrms initially distant from the ef-
ﬁciency frontier have signiﬁcant productivity gains during the protection period, while ﬁrms
with initial high productivity levels experience productivity losses as a result of the AD pro-
tection.
In a related work Pierce (2011) uses plant-level data about US manufacturers to describe
the eﬀect of temporary AD duties on the performance and behaviour of protected produc-
ers. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching technique and quantity-based
output data, the author demonstrates how inﬂated prices and mark-ups could artiﬁcially bias
the estimation of the eﬀect of AD measures on productivity. On the contrary, these results
provide evidence of a negative impact of AD measures on protected ﬁrms. First, after the
imposition of higher duties US manufacturers show a fall of physical productivity. Secondly,
thanks to the AD protection low-productivity plants keep on producing the protected prod-
ucts, slowing the reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive ﬁrms.
Finally, Lu et al. (2013) expand the ﬁrm-level analysis estimating empirically the eﬀect of
AD investigation on targeted exporters. Using monthly export data the authors investigate
how Chinese exporters react to US anti-dumping measures. The authors demonstrate that
the substantial negative impact on export volume at the HS-6 digit product-level is essentially
driven by a decrease in the number of exporters. In addition, they ﬁnd that the most aﬀected
ﬁrms are mainly the least productive, single-product and direct exporters which are forced to
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leave the market. On the contrary, surviving Chinese exporters become larger, more produc-
tive and multi-market-product oriented during the AD period by acquiring the market-shares
of dropping exporters, thus increasing the competition pressure on US manufacturers once
the temporary anti-dumping duties would be eventually removed.
1.2.2 Political Economy Literature
A growing part of the literature look at the political economy of anti-dumping, particularly
focusing on the institutional aspects and highlighting the discretionary politicization of the
implementation mechanism.3 In this regard, two main streams of research have been fol-
lowed, the ﬁrst looking at the factors inﬂuencing protectionism in a country and the second
focusing particularly on the political determinants of the anti-dumping decisions.
Dutt and Mitra (2002) look at the impact of inequalities in determining trade barrier
levels. Within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the authors test the predictions of the median-
voter approach to trade policy determination that an increase in inequality raises trade barri-
ers in capital-abundant economies and lowers them in capital-scarce economies, as predicted
in Mayer (1984). Using cross-country data on inequality and capital-abundance, the authors
ﬁnd support for this prediction, controlling for the eﬀects of political rights and level of ed-
ucation. Similarly, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) investigate the determinants of protectionism
with a micro-level analysis based on a factor endowments model which takes into considera-
tion the distribution of human capital and of socio-economic factors. Their results show that
pro-trade preferences are signiﬁcantly correlated with the individuals' level of human capi-
tal. Preferences over free trade are also correlated with trade exposure, individuals' relative
economic status, but also non-economic determinants play an important role in explaining
3For a comprehensive review of the political economy literature see e.g. Blonigen and Prusa (2003) and
Nelson (2006).
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the variation in preferences over trade, such as nationalism and attachment to local values.
A second strand of the literature instead focuses more speciﬁcally on the political and
economic determinants of anti-dumping measures. Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Blonigen
(2006) for instance look at the relationship between anti-dumping procedures and macroe-
conomic factors, ﬁnding evidence of a signiﬁcant impact of GDP growth and exchange rates
ﬂuctuations on the probability of starting an anti-dumping investigation. These authors
stress also the importance of previous experience with AD procedures for a particular in-
dustry in order to successfully apply for a temporary protection against dumped products.
From their results it is evident that industries which have already applied for anti-dumping
protection are more likely to be successful in their new AD application, highlighting the
role played in this regard by knowledge of legal AD procedures and suggesting a possible
inﬂuence of powerful lobbies on political decisions. Evenett (2006) uses a duopoly model to
identify the circumstances under which dumping is entirely eliminated and the eﬀects on the
proﬁtability of import-competing and foreign ﬁrms. The author concludes that US political
amendments on AD procedures created distortions in trading patterns, generating price ﬂoors
for domestic ﬁrms and paradoxically increasing the volume of imports. Prusa and Skeath
(2002) instead look at the economic and strategic motives for AD ﬁlings by countries. Using
a non-parametric method the authors ﬁnd considerable evidence supporting the prediction
that AD policies may have been used for strategic motivations, suggesting that the surge in
AD activity cannot be solely explained by increasing unfair trading practices.
Other recent studies develop new models estimating the inﬂuence of political partisanship
on anti-dumping protection, and also testing empirically the political bias of the AD proce-
dures. For instance, Avsar (2014) empirically examines the inﬂuence of political partisanship
on anti-dumping protection, showing that both anti-dumping initiations and the probability
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of an aﬃrmative outcome usually increase when there is a left-wing government in power.
These results further prove the political bias in AD policies even though these measures
should be considered as an administrative protection. Aquilante (2014) studies the determi-
nants of US ITC4 commissioners' votes on AD procedures using newly collected micro-level
data on the ITC ﬁnal votes and on several individual-level characteristics of commissioners.
The author stresses how the decisions of commissioners crucially depend on their political
aﬃliation (selection eﬀect) and on the trade policy interests of key senators within the same
political party (pressure eﬀect), varying according to the petitioning sectors involved and the
states where these aﬀected industries are located.
The EU Case
Within the political economy analysis, the EU case raises a lively debate in the literature
given its particular institutional framework for the AD policy (Nita and Zanardi 2013). In
the next sections we ﬁrst present the peculiarities of the EU anti-dumping mechanism before
a review of the key political economy literature related to this topic.
The EU Anti-dumping Mechanism Since the European Economic Community (EEC)
Rome Treaty in 1957, the trade policy and trade-defence system in the EU is an exclusive
power delegated from the Member States to the European Commission (EC) which is fully
responsible for the management of the anti-dumping policy as well. According to the EU
legislation, the European Commission is obliged to open an anti-dumping proceeding after
receiving a complaint from a group of European producers representing at least 25% of total
EU production of the product concerned. In exceptional cases the European Commission
4The United States International Trade Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial Federal agency with
broad investigative responsibilities on matters of trade, including the investigations of the eﬀects of dumped
and subsidized imports on domestic industries.
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can also start an investigation on its own initiative. The complaint should not be opposed by
EU companies accounting for a larger production volume than the complainants, and should
contain evidence of price dumping (e.g. invoices, price oﬀers, publications in specialised press,
oﬃcial statistics, etc.) for products imported from non-EU countries which are causing injury
to the domestic industry.
In accordance with EU law, the Commission launches an investigation within 45 days
by publishing a Notice of Initiation in the EU Oﬃcial Journal, specifying the product un-
der investigation, the country/countries to be investigated and the rights and obligations
of interested parties to the proceeding. The European Commission is then responsible for
investigating the allegations of dumping, inquiring exporters in the countries concerned, pro-
ducers, importers and users in the EU. Exporters from economies in transition5 may also
receive speciﬁc claim forms which they can ﬁll in to show that they are operating under mar-
ket economy principles in order to avoid the penalizing AD investigation procedures applied
to non-Market Economy Status countries. Market Economy Status (MES) is a technical
status applied to countries. To satisfy the MES criteria prices, costs and inputs have to
be determined by supply and demand, ﬁrms must follow one clear set of basic accounting
records, production costs and ﬁnancial tools must not be subject to signiﬁcant distortions and
exchange rate conversions must be carried out at market rates. The absence of these condi-
tions suggests a serious lack of transparency in commercial accounting standards and possible
serious state intervention in production, exchange rate controls or commercial ﬁnance. These
conditions mean it is not possible to accurately determine the genuine costs of production
in the economy since these are distorted by the absence of market conditions. The WTO
law requires in this situation that an analogue country of similar productive capacity to be
used to model costs in market economy conditions, but it has been frequently suggested that
5At present these countries are the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Albania, Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Mongolia.
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non-granting MES to a country makes ﬁnding of dumping strategies inevitable (European
Commission 2015).
Once companies have replied to the questionnaires, the data is veriﬁed by case oﬃcers,
inspecting records at the companies premises, comparing and verifying the data provided by
all participating parties and consulting the EU Member States as well. In particular, the
investigation should examine whether a dumping is taking place from the country/countries
concerned, if a material injury has been suﬀered by the EU industry, to what extent the
dumped import price undercuts the Community producers' price, the existence of a causal
link between dumped imports and the injury and ﬁnally if it would be against the economic
interests of the EU to impose AD measures in terms of possible negative eﬀects for importers
and ﬁnal consumers.
If within 9 months the investigation shows evidence that there is a dumping strategy by
non-EU exporters causing a material injury to the domestic industry in question the Eu-
ropean Commission could impose countervailing duties, usually in force for a maximum of
6 months. Alternatively, the Commission could continue the investigation to look for new
evidence or could just terminate the investigation without imposing duties. All parties have
the right to comment on the provisional ﬁndings and receive disclosure of the essential facts
forming the basis for the provisional ﬁndings.
As it is possible to notice, the European Commission is responsible for the whole inves-
tigation process. It has also become the only decision-making body, opening anti-dumping
proceedings and eﬀectively imposing the preliminary and ﬁnal duties. However, the EU
Council of Member States retained the power to block the Commission proposals when it
comes to the most important decision of imposing deﬁnitive duties. Thereafter, not the
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European Commission, but the EU Council has the authority to decide whether to impose
deﬁnitive measures by achieving a qualiﬁed voting majority.
The Commission must impose measures or close the case within 15 months of the ini-
tiation of the investigation. The measures usually take the form of ad-valorem duties, but
could also be speciﬁc duties or price undertakings. The duties are paid by importers in the
EU and collected by the national customs authorities of the EU countries concerned. Ex-
porting producers may also oﬀer "undertakings" agreeing to sell at a minimum price, and if
accepted, anti-dumping duties will not be collected on imports. An assessment is made to
evaluate the level of duty needed to remove the injurious eﬀects of dumping. Measures are
generally imposed for 5 years and may be subject to review if the circumstances of exporters
have changed or if new exporting producers request an accelerated review.6
The Political Economy Literature on the EU Case Already from a quick overview
of the EU anti-dumping mechanism it is possible to notice its complexity and the potential
room for discretionary decision and political abuse of this trade defence instruments for pro-
tectionist purposes. First of all, part of the literature points out the complex and somehow
contradictory interaction between the diﬀerent EU institutions playing a role in the deﬁnition
of the AD procedure. For instance, Evenett and Vermulst (2005) analyse the increasing role
played by Member States in the EU anti-dumping system, showing how this increased par-
ticipation of national governments has pushed towards a higher degree of politicization in the
AD decisions, contradicting the supposedly neutral and technical mechanism which should
be mainly driven by the "technocratic" European Commission. In addition, Davis (2009)
shows that anti-dumping measures have little to do with "unfair" trade especially in the EU,
6For a comprehensive review of the EU anti-dumping regulation please refer to the Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1225/2009 of the 30th of November 2009 (L 343/51).
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providing evidence on how the current EU anti-dumping regulations support the introduc-
tion of AD measures especially when the target of the investigations are exporters from Asian
emerging countries in sectors where European ﬁrms comparative advantage is declining. By
carefully analysing the information available about the 332 anti-dumping cases carried out
by the EU between 1998 and 2008, the author identiﬁes three main empirical tendencies.
First, Asian emerging countries have been the favoured target of EU anti-dumping duties,
China and Vietnam in particular. Secondly, targeted products are mainly concentrated in
few sectors where European production is declining, in particular raw materials, chemicals,
steel and textiles, representing together more than 70% of the products investigated. Finally,
most of the investigations initiated have resulted in the adoption of deﬁnitive measures, al-
most in 65% of the cases, with the imposition of AD duty levels which are signiﬁcantly higher
than bound tariﬀs, in particular in the case of higher-end sectors.
In their study, De Bievre and Eckhardt (2010) review the role played by diﬀerent interest
groups, considering both public authorities such as the European Commission and Member
States, and private actors as producers, importers and retailers. The main ﬁnding of this
study is that a wide reform of the EU trade defence instruments in favour of retailers and con-
sumers has failed despite a declining support among European ﬁrms which have outsourced
their production abroad and a rise in organisational capacity among importers and retailers.
This failure should be ascribed to the increasing power of the traditional group of anti-
dumping users, the European heavy manufacturing producers, massively mobilised against
any change in the status quo. The authors stress that sector consolidation of market power
in few manufacturing companies and the geographical industrial concentration of EU indus-
tries in dominant countries played a key role in improving the capacity of import-competing
ﬁrms to lobby against possible losses in trade defence, supported as well by accommodating
Member States and parts of the European Commission opposing the attempted reform of
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the EU AD procedure.
Given the complex interactions between the diﬀerent actors involved, part of the literature
focuses its attention on the Member States voting pattern within the EU Council on anti-
dumping decisions, highlighting the contrasts and the wide internal oppositions between EU
countries usually more interested by their national interests rather than the protection of the
Community's economic prosperity (Heisenberg 2005; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; Trzaskowski
2009; Van Aken 2012). Using a unique dataset based on Member States votes collected by
the Swedish delegate during the EU Council meetings, Nordstrom (2011) demonstrates how
the usual voting pattern within the EU Council is strongly correlated with national trade
policy preferences, showing a clear distinctions between northern-European liberal countries
and southerner states usually more protectionists. Secondly, the author shows how macroe-
conomic conditions also matter. In fact, national Governments seem to be more likely to
support anti-dumping petitions especially when unemployment is rising in some of the EU
industries that have mainly suﬀered from international competition and the ﬁnancial crisis,
such as heavy manufacturers in South-European countries. In addition, this work presents
some evidence of Member States apprehension in supporting measures which could negatively
aﬀect their national industries. In particular, possible retaliations against EU exporters and
negative welfare eﬀects for importers and consumers reduce the likelihood of governments
support to the imposition of AD duties. These ﬁndings highlight the need to take into con-
sideration the possible controversial eﬀects of anti-dumping measures on diﬀerent agents in
the market and across heterogeneous EU productive systems.
These arguments are supported by the empirical literature looking at the role played by
lobbying in inﬂuencing the EU anti-dumping policy (Grossman and Helpman 1994b; Veugel-
ers and Vandenbussche 1999; Wittig, 2011). In particular, Nielsen and Svendsen (2012)
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trace the interest groups actions back to the sectors of origin, demonstrating how lobbying
eﬀorts of domestic industries have inﬂuenced the political position of national Governments
in voting for the adoption of EU anti-dumping policy, in particular in the case of intense
petitioning carried out by import-competing companies. Moreover, De Bievre and Eckhardt
(2011) argue that producers groups are constantly more successful in lobbying their govern-
ments towards the support of AD measures for the protection of domestic industries. On
the other hand, importers and retailers, but also outsourcers and consumers, have a smaller
political weight in lobbying the national and EU authorities, failing to challenge producers
mobilization eﬀorts with arguments on the possible negative consequences on large parts of
the EU economy. However, in two recent studies, Eckhardt (2011, 2013) looks closely at the
political mobilization and inﬂuence of import-dependent ﬁrms in the context of the EU trade
defence policy, particularly focusing on the case of unfair import competition from China.
Firstly, these studies highlight how EU anti-dumping investigations against Chinese textile
goods have experienced a rapid increase after the end of the quota regime in 2005, providing
evidence of a substitution eﬀect between trade liberalization and anti-dumping measures and
how trade defence instruments might be abused for protectionist reasons, as stressed by pre-
vious studies (Moore and Zanardi 2011). Secondly, analysing some EU anti-dumping disputes
concerning the import of bicycles, clothes and footwear from China, the author argues that
under speciﬁc conditions import-dependent ﬁrms have been recently increasingly relevant in
the economic analysis of trade defence eﬀects, becoming particularly successful in mobilizing
politically and in defending their anti-protectionist trade interests. In particular, the lob-
bying power of import-dependent companies seems to have increased in the case of retailers
operating in some ﬁnal goods sectors (i.e. food and clothes) which in recent years have expe-
rienced an industrial reorganisation with the consolidation of market power in the hands of a
small number of large enterprises. However, an increasing number of European producers in
the last decades have outsourced labour-intensive operations to low-cost countries, mainly in
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Asia. These European producers turned eventually into importers, experiencing trade defence
measures as a burden rather than a blessing, increasingly relying on imports from a relatively
limited number of countries, most notably China. As a result, for many European import-
dependent companies it is no longer possible to switch easily to suppliers in other countries
when facing trade restrictions on Chinese imports. The author stresses how this problem is
magniﬁed in the case of import-dependent manufacturers for which imports from China are a
key input in their process of production and for which the collective lobbying action capacity
still lacks given the high fragmentation of intermediate users across sectors and EU countries.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the EU anti-dumping measures on
Chinese products, considering the possible impact on trade ﬂows between the EU and China,
on the European sectors protected and on the performance of French import-competing and
import-dependent ﬁrms. The next sections present a summary of the data used at each level
of analysis and some preliminary statistics about the products and sectors involved in the
EU anti-dumping investigations on Chinese imports, and the distribution and relative per-
formance of French ﬁrms producing or importing the aﬀected products.
1.3.1 AD Measures Data
We collected information about all anti-dumping proceedings carried out by the EU dur-
ing the period 1999-2007 on China and other trade partners from the Global Antidumping
Database (GAD) of the World Bank (Bown 2015). This dataset records all measures and
duties adopted in the world from 1980 to 2014, providing detailed information about the anti-
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dumping procedures, such as the products concerned classiﬁed at the HS-8 digit level, the
dates of initiation and conclusion, the outcome of the investigations, the value of AD duties
imposed and the length of the measures. For our analysis we collected just the information
about the EU anti-dumping cases against China during the period 1999-2007. We focus
on this sample period ﬁrstly in order to be consistent with the time frame of the ﬁrm-level
data and secondly in order to exclude from our analysis any possible statistical disturbance
related with the surge in trade protectionism experienced after the beginning of the global
economic crisis in 2008 (Vandenbussche and Viegelahn 2011; Bown and Crowley 2013). We
then complement this dataset by collecting detailed information on the EU anti-dumping
cases on Chinese products from the investigation reports of the European Commission. In
this way, we obtain for most of the cases further detailed information about the EU Member
States voting pattern, the nationality of the European ﬁrms petitioning for AD protection
and about the presence of ﬁnal users and major importers in each EU country. As a result,
this analysis considers 46 diﬀerent EU anti-dumping procedures against Chinese imports be-
tween 1999 and 2007, with an overall number of 46 targeted products imported from China
and almost 32 diﬀerent EU sectors at the NACE 4-digit level protected by anti-dumping
duties.
1.3.2 Macro-level Analysis
For the analysis on the aggregate trade-ﬂows we use data at the product-level on European
imports from China, on intra-EU trade and on imports from the rest of the world. This
data provided by the Eurostat COMEXT database presents bilateral import data at the HS6
product-level, including information about the total value in Euros and the volume measured
in hundreds of kilos. Consequently, from this data it is possible to derive import prices for
all country-product combinations.
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For the sector-level analysis we use data from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics
(SBS) database from which we have extrapolated industry-level data at the 4-digit NACE
rev.1.1 level about European manufacturing sectors. In particular, this dataset provides in-
formation about industrial productivity in terms of added-value (measured as the net income
from operating activities after adjusting for subsidies and indirect taxes) and labour produc-
tivity (measured as the ratio between turnover and total employment), employment growth,
investment intensity (measured as the ratio between total investment and turnover), overall
value of production in the sector, total turnover, number of ﬁrms operating in the industry,
total investment in R&D activities and the export and import values. These data will be
particularly useful not only to investigate the eﬀect of anti-dumping duties on protected Eu-
ropean sectors, but will be used as well to estimate the likelihood that an import-competing
sector receives protection. Thanks to these datasets we gathered together information about
270 diﬀerent EU manufacturing sectors at the NACE 4-digit level across 9 years in terms of
total production, investment, employment, productivity and trade strategies and about the
import ﬂows into the EU of almost 6,000 products at the HS 6-digit level.
We start our macro-level analysis by looking at the relationship between trade ﬂows and
anti-dumping cases between the European Union and China. Figure 1.2 presents the number
of anti-dumping proceedings started by the EU against Chinese products and the growth
rate of the import penetration of Chinese goods in the EU, calculated as the share of imports
from China over total extra-EU imports, for each year in the period 1990-2014.
From this ﬁgure we note that the number of anti-dumping cases opened by the EU against
Chinese products has been quite variable during this period, but has consistently followed
the growth rate of Chinese import penetration into the EU market during this period. In
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Figure 1.2: EU AD proceedings against China and growth of import penetration of Chinese goods in the EU market (1990-2014).
Note: Elaboration based on the World Bank Global Antidumping Database and the Eurostat COMEXT data on bilateral
imports for the period 1990-2014. EU-CN AD cases presents the overall number of anti-dumping investigations started by
the EU against Chinese products per year. EU-CN import penetration is measured as the annual growth rate of the overall
penetration ratio of Chinese imports over total imports in the EU (EU-12 until 1995, EU-15 until 2004, EU-25 until 2007, EU-27
until 2013 and EU-28 in 2014).
particular, the peak in 1999 could be explained by a rush of European industries in claiming
anti-dumping protection by the EU before the trade liberalisation which would have followed
the entry of China in the WTO. Actually, it is possible to notice that after China joined the
WTO in 2001, the growth rate of Chinese import penetration in the EU has continuously
increased until the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2007, followed as well by an
increasing number of anti-dumping cases launched by the EU against Chinese products. This
evidence seems to support the argument stressed by some previous studies that anti-dumping
measures have little to do with unfair pricing competition, serving instead as an instrument
of trade defence and protectionist policy.
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We focus now on the Chinese import penetration in the EU market, in order to identify a
relationship between penetration of Chinese goods and categories of Chinese products mostly
aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures. Figure 1.3 shows the products most imported in Eu-
rope from China both in terms of total value and import penetration, deﬁned as the share
of imports from China over total imports from outside the EU for each category of products
at the HS-4 digit level.
It is possible to notice that in terms of absolute value, the most imported products from
China into the EU are data processing machines and televisions followed by imports of printed
circuits and other electrical equipments parts. The remaining list of top imports from China
includes a large number of ﬁnal consumer goods, such as toys, garments and other plastic
goods. When considering instead the top list of products with the highest import penetration
from China the picture changes drastically. Figure 1.3 shows that the sector of entertainment
articles has the higher import penetration, with almost 60% of all these products imported
into the EU from China. At the same time we notice that products with the highest import
penetration from China are more heterogeneous than in terms of import value, including
intermediate inputs, machineries but also ﬁnal goods. The Chinese import penetration in
the EU market for these products is on average close to 40%. In addition, as we will see later,
most of these products which have experienced a strong import penetration from China have
been as well aﬀected by EU anti-dumping investigations, including among others chemicals,
ﬁnal consumer goods, industrial machineries, ceramics, garments and other intermediate in-
puts.
In Table 1.2 we present an overview of the EU anti-dumping cases against Chinese prod-
ucts between 1999 and 2007, looking at the number of products involved, their sectoral
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Figure 1.3: EU imports of Chinese products by import penetration rate and total value (1999-2007).
Note: Elaboration based on the Eurostat COMEXT database on EU bilateral imports averaged over the period 1999-2007.
Total import value at the HS-4 digit level expressed in millions of Euro. Import penetration deﬁned as the share of EU imports
from China over total EU imports for each product category at the HS-4 digit level. All monetary values deﬂated using 2010 as
a base year.
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distribution, the ﬁnal outcome, the average duty imposed and the petition activity of French
ﬁrms. It is possible to notice that most of the cases focused on few sectors producing interme-
diate inputs, mainly chemicals, metals, machineries and telecommunication equipments. Out
of 46 total applications almost 32 were ﬁnally successfully approved, 11 withdrawn by the
European Commission because of the lack of evidence, and just 3 of them were not approved
by the EU Council of Member States. In particular, even if most of the cases were focused
on the chemical sector, most of the products aﬀected were textile goods, followed then by
chemical and metal products.
As previously stressed, most of the products targeted were intermediate goods used as
inputs in the production of ﬁnal goods in Europe. Just in few cases, the EU investigated
for dumping Chinese ﬁnal goods, especially consumption white-goods, textiles, electronic
and ITC products. This is a recent phenomenon, since anti-dumping investigations have
usually been focused mainly on intermediate inputs and semi-processed goods. In the last
years instead the EU started to target increasingly ﬁnal and consumption products especially
from China. This is probably due to the surge of EU imports of Chinese consumption goods
after China's WTO accession in 2001, and the subsequent negative shock suﬀered by EU
industries. This evidence might suggest a protectionist abuse of AD measures by European
countries, in particular in the case of AD duties on ﬁnal products imposed to protect the
domestic industries which were unable to compete against the ﬂood of cheap Chinese con-
sumer goods in the European single market (Moore and Zanardi 2011; Blonigen and Prusa
2015). Nevertheless, it is possible to notice that the highest anti-dumping duties have been
imposed to protect intermediate input sectors, in particular the metal industries followed by
agro-food and electrical machineries sectors. Speciﬁcally, metal products have been found to
be particularly dumped by Chinese ﬁrms, not surprisingly given the monopoly hold by China
in the production of rare earths and of other raw metals.
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Thanks to the European Commission investigation reports it is possible to identify in
most of the cases the voting pattern of Member States in the EU Council and the companies
or industrial associations petitioning in favour or against the adoption of the anti-dumping
measures.7 Thus, in Table 1.2 we show for each industry how many times the Member States
did not ﬁnd an unanimous agreement in the EU Council on the imposition of anti-dumping
duties and the number of cases in which at least a French ﬁrm petitioned for the imposition of
AD measures against Chinese goods and when the European Commission identiﬁed at least a
French importer lobbying against the trade defence instrument. First, it is possible to notice
that in 14 cases the European Commission has been lobbied by French import-competing
ﬁrms for the imposition of anti-dumping duties against Chinese imports, mainly in the case
of chemical products (4 cases), metals (2) and telecommunication equipments (2). On the
contrary, in just 6 cases the European Commission has identiﬁed major import-dependent
ﬁrms based in France, again most of them in AD investigations concerning chemical prod-
ucts (2), metals, industrial machineries and electronic equipments. Furthermore, only in 14
of the EU anti-dumping proceedings against Chinese imports the EU Member States did
not ﬁnd an unanimous agreement, imposing ﬁnal duties just thanks to a simple majority.
As stressed by the previous literature, also in the case of AD proceedings against Chinese
imports the voting pattern in the EU Council is particularly steady, with Estonia, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands frequently voting against the
imposition of anti-dumping duties. Interestingly, France instead never abstained or voted
against the imposition of AD duties on Chinese imports, not in even in the case in which
the European Commission identiﬁed major import-dependent French ﬁrms and no French
company petitioned in favour of the adoption of the trade defence measure. This evidence
7In 3 out of 46 EU-China anti-dumping cases the European Commission has not provided detailed in-
formation about the outcome of the investigation, the lobbying activity of European industries and the
voting pattern in the EU Council because of conﬁdentiality issues related to possible retaliation by Chinese
authorities against Member States and single European companies.
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seems to support the ﬁndings of the previous literature which argue that producers are con-
stantly more successful than import-dependent ﬁrms in lobbying their governments towards
the support of AD measures for the protection of domestic industries, in particular in the
EU case (De Bievre and Eckhardt 2011; Eckhardt 2011; Eckhardt 2013).
Figure 1.4 presents a preliminary evidence of the eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on
Chinese imports by comparing the trends of import ﬂows at the HS-6 digit level for goods
aﬀected or unaﬀected by EU AD measures on Chinese products. In this ﬁgure we analyse the
average imports of aﬀected or unaﬀected Chinese products to the EU from three years before
to three years after the imposition of the anti-dumping measure at time t = 0, normalizing
the average values to 1 for time t = 0. For the unaﬀected products we consider time t = 0 as
the median year in our sample. It is possible to notice that after the imposition of AD mea-
sures at time t = 0 the imports of aﬀected products from China drastically decreased while
the imports of remaining unaﬀected products continued to increase. It is possible to notice
as well that, before the introduction of the AD duties, aﬀected imports from China have on
average a higher value than unaﬀected products, highlighting how goods with a relatively
higher import value from China are more likely to be aﬀected by AD duties.
For a more in-depth investigation of this diﬀerent import pattern of aﬀected and unaf-
fected Chinese products, we disentangle Chinese imports to the EU in Figure 1.5 by looking
at the import prices and volumes. Also in this case, we analyse the import prices and volumes
of aﬀected and unaﬀected Chinese products to the EU from three years before to three years
after the imposition of the anti-dumping measure at time t = 0. The Eurostat COMEXT
database reports both trade values in Euros and volumes in hundreds of kilos. The import
price is calculated by dividing the value with the reported volume. Prices and volumes are
then normalized to 1 for time t = 0, the year of the imposition of the anti-dumping measure.
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Figure 1.4: EU imports of Chinese goods aﬀected or unaﬀected by anti-dumping measures (import value).
Note: Elaboration based on the Eurostat COMEXT database on EU bilateral imports for the period 1999-2007. Average total
EU import value from China at the HS-6 digit level from three years before to three years after the imposition of the anti-
dumping measure at time t = 0, normalizing the average values to 1 for time t = 0. For unaﬀected products we consider time
t = 0 as the median year in our sample.
For the unaﬀected products we consider time t = 0 as the median year in our sample. After
the imposition of the anti-dumping duty the price of aﬀected goods imported from China
increases signiﬁcantly, on average above 3% of the pre-duty level, slowing down the overall
volume of goods imported. On the contrary, the price of unaﬀected Chinese goods does not
change widely, marginally decreasing but remaining stable overall across the whole period.
Nevertheless, we notice a continuous increase in the volume of imported products that are not
aﬀected by EU anti-dumping proceedings. Taken together, these preliminary product-level
statistics suggest that EU AD duties seem to successfully target Chinese dumped products,
making the imports of targeted goods from China more expensive, with a drastic drop in
terms of volume in comparison to unaﬀected products. Targeted products from China might
be substituted in turn by a larger domestic production and other extra-EU imports.
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Figure 1.5: Prices and volumes of EU imports of Chinese goods aﬀected or unaﬀected by anti-dumping measures.
Note: Elaboration based on the Eurostat COMEXT database on EU bilateral imports for the period 1999-2007. Average EU
import prices and volumes from China at the HS-6 digit level from three years before to three years after the imposition of the
anti-dumping measure at time t = 0, normalizing the average values to 1 for time t = 0. For unaﬀected products we consider
time t = 0 as the median year in our sample. Imports volume expressed in hundreds of kilos. The import price is calculated by
dividing the imports value and volume as reported by the Eurostat COMEXT database.
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Furthermore, using the sector-level data of the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics
(SBS) database it is possible to have a ﬁrst look at the eﬀect of the EU anti-dumping mea-
sures imposed on Chinese goods on domestic industries. In Table 1.3 we compare the relative
performance of EU sectors at the 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 which have been protected or not by
AD measures on Chinese imports before and after the imposition of these duties. We used
two complimentary methods to identify the protected sectors in the EU market. First, to
determine which sectors produce certain goods, and so to link product-speciﬁc AD duties
with the domestic import-competing industries producing them, we used the correspondence
tables between products and sectoral classiﬁcations provided by the United Nations Statistics
Division and the conversion table between HS and ISIC classiﬁcations provided by Hoekman
et al. (2002). In addition, we have used the European Commission investigation reports
which report also the industrial classiﬁcation of ﬁrms petitioning for the adoption of each
AD measure.
Table 1.3 presents the diﬀerences in sectoral performance before and after the adoption
of AD duties in terms of total export value, labour productivity measured as the ratio of
turnover on total employment, average size in terms of total employment, number of ﬁrms
operating in the sector, value added measured as the gross income from operating activities
after adjusting for subsidies and taxation, and total investment in R&D. First, it is possible
to see that EU AD measures on Chinese products between 1999 and 2007 have protected 21
sectors, almost 10% of all manufacturing industries in Europe. Protected sectors are smaller
in terms of number of operating ﬁrms despite employing on average a larger number of em-
ployees in respect to unaﬀected industries. Moreover, when looking at sectoral performance it
is possible to notice that protected sectors export on average more than unaﬀected industries,
showing as well a higher industrial productivity both in terms of added-value per worker and
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Table 1.3: Sector-level characteristics of European industries protected or not by EU AD measures against Chinese products
(1999-2007)
Non-protected Protected
Pre Post Pre Post
No. Firms 1,080 1,086 712 698
(3409) (3476) (841) (826)
Added Value 6.964 6.931 7.667 7.550
(1.742) (1.449) (1.226) (1.284)
Labour Prod. 22.795 22.795 23.011 23.203
(1.361) (1.334) (1.253) (1.206)
Tot. Employment 17,038.21 16,264.93 21,568.68 21,452.6
(25,146.84) (24,535.33) (21,341.96) (20,386.79)
Tot. R&D 2.829 2.902 3.466 3.124
(2.304) (2.413) (2.066) (1.908)
Export Value 20.772 20.775 21.677 21.847
(1.822) (1.787) (1.336) (1.301)
No. Sectors 174 174 21 21
Note: Statistics based on the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database
about all European manufacturing sectors at the 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 level in the period
1999-2007. The statistics presented for each variable refer to the average value in the
periods before and after the imposition of anti-dumping duties in protection to the Eu-
ropean sectors. For unaﬀected sectors we consider the periods preceding or following the
median year in our sample. To identify the protected sectors we link product-speciﬁc AD
duties with the domestic import-competing industries producing those aﬀected goods,
using the correspondence tables between products and sectoral classiﬁcations provided
by the United Nations Statistics Division and the conversion table between HS and ISIC
classiﬁcations created by Hoekman et al. (2002). The statistics show the average number
of ﬁrms operating in the sectors, the logarithm of the average added-value measured as
the net income from operating activities after adjusting for subsidies and indirect taxes,
the average labour productivity measured as the ratio between turnover and total em-
ployment, the average number of employees in the sectors, the logarithmic value of R&D
investment and the logarithm of the average export value in the industries. All monetary
values have been deﬂated using 2010 as a base year.
of labour productivity and investing more on average in R&D activities in comparison to
unaﬀected industries.
1.3.3 Micro-level Analysis
The second part of this analysis focuses on the impact that anti-dumping measures have on
the performance of European ﬁrms at the micro-level. To carry out this investigation we
use French data at the ﬁrm-product-level over the period 1999-2007. The motivations for
focusing our attention on France as a speciﬁc case study of the micro-level impact of EU AD
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measures towards Chinese dumped products are threefold. First, France is the third largest
importer of Chinese products in the EU after Germany and the United Kingdom, mainly
importing intermediate inputs rather than consumption goods (Eurostat, 2014). Secondly,
France is the second most active Member State in the EU in terms of anti-dumping proce-
dures. Table 1.4 presents the distribution of European ﬁrms complaining to the European
Commission about dumping strategies across diﬀerent Member States.
Table 1.4: Home countries of most active complainant industries in the EU (1999-2007)
Ranking Country Share Ranking Country Share
1 Germany 47.5% 11 Luxembourg 4.0%
2 France 42.9% 12 Ireland 3.5%
3 Italy 41.9% 13 Slovenia 3.5%
4 Spain 35.4% 14 Sweden 3.5%
5 UK 21.7% 15 Slovakia 3.0%
6 Netherlands 16.2% 16 Greece 2.5%
7 Austria 10.6% 17 Portugal 2.5%
8 Belgium 5.6% 18 Finland 1.5%
9 Denmark 5.1% 19 Czech Rep. 0.5%
10 Poland 4.5% 20 Hungary 0.5%
Note: Statistics based on the European Commission investigation report for the
period 1999-2007. The table presents the distribution of European ﬁrms com-
plaining to the European Commission about dumping strategies across diﬀerent
Member States. The share represents the number of cases in which at least one of
the petitioning ﬁrms belonged to the correspondent Member State over the total
number of EU anti-dumping cases.
It is possible to notice that in almost 43% of the cases at least a French ﬁrm was peti-
tioning for the introduction of anti-dumping measures, second just to German companies.
Moreover, the voting pattern of Member States during the EU Council on anti-dumping de-
cisions presented in the political economy literature indicates that French governments have
been among the main supporters of AD measures in the EU Council after Portugal regard-
less of the political party in power, voting in favour of the introduction of new duties in
97% of cases, and never voting against them (Heisenberg 2005; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006;
Trzaskowski 2009; Nordstrom 2011; Van Aken 2012). Finally, ﬁrm-level data about all EU
Member States are still poor, with diﬀerent deﬁnition of key variables and not providing a
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comprehensive coverage of the full sample of European companies. On the contrary, by using
the French ﬁrm-level data we cover all manufacturing companies in France with more than
20 employees. In addition, thanks to the extremely detailed transaction-level trade dataset
we are able to precisely identify the products and the origin of French ﬁrms imports at the
HS-8 digit level.
To carry out the ﬁrm-level analysis on the eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on produc-
ers and importers, we merged two diﬀerent micro-level datasets on French ﬁrms for the period
1999-2007. First, ﬁrms' characteristics are obtained from the Annual French Business Sur-
vey (Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise - EAE) surveyed by the National Institute of Statistics
and Economic Studies (INSEE). This database provides detailed balance sheet information
for all French ﬁrms with more than 20 employees, including total output, domestic and for-
eign sales, number of employees, salaries paid, cost of intermediate inputs, capital stock and
R&D expenditure. Second, to analyse importers' activity and export behaviour, we used
transaction-level imports data collected by the French Customs Agency which provides in-
formation about trade ﬂows origin or destination country, HS-8 product-level categorization,
value and weight of manufacturing imports and exports. This dataset includes all intra-EU
shipments over e100,000, and all extra-EU imports over e1,000, covering more than 90% of
French total manufactured goods imported.8 Merging these two databases together, our ﬁnal
sample is an unbalanced panel containing comprehensive data about 30,000 French manu-
facturing ﬁrms over 9 years across 503 diﬀerent sectors at the NACE 4-digit level in terms of
their sector of production and import strategies.9
8During this period the threshold for intra-EU exports has changed considerably. Initially, it was equal to
almost e 38,000 euros until 2001 when it was increased to e 100,000. Finally, it was moved to e 150,000 in
2006. For extra-EU exports the threshold has not been changed during the whole period. Nevertheless, these
threshold changes do not aﬀect the quality of our analysis since it has been demonstrated in the previous
literature that small exporters account for a relatively small share of the overall French exports (Mayer and
Ottaviano 2007).
9Less than 6,000 observations have been dropped from the ﬁnal sample because of missing information
about the key variables of interest, mismatch of export variables between the balance sheet and the custom
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As previously stressed, thanks to this detailed ﬁrm-level data it is possible to precisely
identify both French producers protected as well as French ﬁrms importing dumped Chinese
goods aﬀected by the EU anti-dumping measures. First, the EAE balance sheet database
indicates the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level industrial classiﬁcation of all French ﬁrms. In this
way, by using the correspondence tables between products and sectoral classiﬁcations pro-
vided by the United Nations Statistics Division and by Hoekman et al. (2002) as previously
explained, we are able to identify all French import-competing ﬁrms part of the domestic
sectors protected by the EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese products. Secondly, using the
exhaustive transaction-level trade dataset, we are able to precisely identify French import-
dependent ﬁrms aﬀected by the imposition of EU AD duties on Chinese goods. In particular,
the ﬁrm-product-level imports data collected by the French Customs Agency provides infor-
mation about the HS-8 digit-level product classiﬁcation, the transaction value, volume and
the country of origin of all products imported by French manufacturers. By merging this
dataset with the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) of the World Bank it is possible to
precisely identify all French ﬁrms which have imported the targeted dumped products from
China and from other trade partners, recording in this way the import behaviours of French
ﬁrms before and after the imposition of EU anti-dumping measures.
We start our ﬁrm-level analysis looking ﬁrst in Figure 1.6 at the industrial distribution of
French producers and importers aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products
across the diﬀerent 2-digit level sectors.
From Figure 1.6 it is possible to notice that the sectoral composition widely diﬀers be-
tween producers and importers. In particular, the diagram shows that more than 40% of
agency datasets or because of single observations available.
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Figure 1.6: Industrial distribution of French producers and importers aﬀected by EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese products.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE and Custom Agency database on French ﬁrms over the period 1999-2007. Distribution of
French producers and importers in each manufacturing industry at the NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level over total number of producers
and importers. Producers deﬁned as ﬁrms part of the domestic sectors at the NACE rev.1.1. 4-digit level protected by EU
anti-dumping duties on Chinese products. Importers deﬁned as ﬁrms which have imported the targeted dumped products from
China at the HS-8 digit level.
French ﬁrms protected by AD duties produce metal or plastic products, each of these two
sectors accounting for almost 25% of the total number of protected French import-competing
ﬁrms. Another important sector frequently protected by EU AD measures against Chinese
imports is the chemical industry which accounts for almost 14% of French producers pro-
tected. As previously discussed, this is one of the sectors which has been more active in the
submission of protection petitions in the case of Chinese dumped products and accounts for
a large number of producers in France. The remaining import-competing protected ﬁrms
seem instead to be mainly located in the sectors for the production of optical and precision
instruments, industrial machineries and the industry of basic metals.
The number of French import-dependent ﬁrms aﬀected by AD measures on Chinese prod-
ucts instead seems to be more evenly distributed across diﬀerent sectors. In fact, most of
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the aﬀected importers are manufacturers of furniture and other ﬁnal consumer goods, more
than 10% each. This evidence might reﬂect the recent increase in AD measures imposed
on ﬁnal goods imported from China. At the same time, it might indicate that most of the
goods imported from China and aﬀected by EU AD duties are widely used by French man-
ufacturers as intermediate inputs for the production of a large and heterogeneous group of
ﬁnal goods. This indicates a possible evidence that EU AD measures on Chinese imports
might have a particularly signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on a large number of consumers.
The rest of French importers aﬀected by EU AD measures on Chinese products seem to be
mainly focused in the sectors for the production of industrial machineries, the manufacture
of metal products, the production of chemical and other plastic goods and ﬁnally in the
garment industry, all accounting for less than 10% of the total. Of particular relevance is
the garment sector which has experienced a massive import penetration from China in the
last decade after the "multi-ﬁber" agreement expired at the end of 2004. This phenomenon
suggests again that AD measures might have been used by the EU as an instrument of trade
defence to replace tariﬀ barriers and import quotas (Moore and Zanardi 2011; Eckhardt 2013).
Table 1.5 presents some preliminary statistics about the performance of French ﬁrms,
taking into consideration import-competing producers protected by anti-dumping duties,
import-dependent ﬁrms importing the targeted products and the remaining ﬁrms completely
unaﬀected by the imposition of EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products. First, note
that during the sample period just a few hundreds of importers have been aﬀected by higher
anti-dumping duties, while at the same time almost 3,500 domestic producers have been
protected from the unfair competition of dumped-products. Secondly, Table 1.5 shows that
importers of dumped products from China are on average larger and more productive in
terms of TFP10 then the rest of our sample, paying higher salaries, investing more in R&D
10To have a consistent measure of TFP we followed the De Loecker (2007) approach, which is an extension
of the standard Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, taking into consideration the heterogeneity in terms of
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activities and being as well active exporters towards foreign markets.
Table 1.5: Firm-level characteristics of French producers and importers aﬀected or not by EU AD duties against Chinese products
(1999-2007).
Importers Producers Untreated
Pre Post t-test Pre Post t-test Pre Post t-test
No. Firms 406 397 3,363 3,593 27,083 30,659
Employment 396 388 134 134 128 120
(998.96) (964.47) 3.928 (432.93) (376.65) 0.788 (746.64) (711.73) 3.232
Av. Salary 27,005 27,337 24,653 25,056 24,559 25,240
(8,373) (7,936) 2.885 (7,135) (7,407) 2.123 (8,496) (9,905) 4.117
log(TFP) 4.934 4.901 4.437 4.505 4.409 4.436
(0.778) (0.738) 0.338 (0.558) (0.575) 4.810 (0.597) (0.626) 2.398
R&D Inv. 2,442.37 3,622.57 640.32 639.41 608.13 594.26
(21,060) (29,819) 0.349 (8,536) (8,512) 1.876 (13,292) (13,435) 2.475
Tot. Exports 49,948.98 54,309.34 11,050.03 12,705.97 10,906.04 10,938.65
(197,665) (179,554) 1.871 (83,989) (74,856) 3.125 (240,525) (234,062) 3.795
Note: Statistics based on the Annual French Business Survey (EAE) for the period 1999-2007. Producers deﬁned as French ﬁrms
belonging to the sectors protected by EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese products identiﬁed by using the correspondence tables
between products and sectoral classiﬁcations provided by the United Nations Statistics Division and by Hoekman et al. (2002).
Importers identiﬁed as all French ﬁrms which have imported from China the targeted dumped products according to the transaction-
level Customs Agency dataset. We consider as untreated all the remaining French manufacturing ﬁrms not included in the previous
two categories. The statistics presented for each variable refer to the average value in the periods before and after the imposition of
EU anti-dumping duties against Chinese products. For unaﬀected ﬁrms we consider the periods preceding or following the median
year reported in the dataset. The table presents summary statistics about the yearly average number of ﬁrms in each category, the
average number of employees per ﬁrm, the average annual salary paid in Euro, the average ﬁrm productivity estimated as the log of
total factor productivity following the De Loecker (2007) approach, the average investment in R&D activities and the average value
of exports in thousands of Euro. T-test reports the t-value of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the values before and
after the imposition of the AD measures is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 (critical value for signiﬁcance at the 10% level above 120
degrees of freedom=1.645). All monetary values have been deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for
France in 2000 as a baseline.
In addition, it is interesting to notice the diﬀerence in terms of performance for aﬀected
ﬁrms before and after the imposition of AD measures on Chinese products. For instance,
producers after being protected by an anti-dumping measure register a stable level of em-
ployment, paying higher salaries but show a lower level of investment in R&D activities.
On the contrary, importing ﬁrms facing higher import duties experienced a decrease in their
productivity between exporters and domestic ﬁrms and between innovators and non-innovators as explained
in the appendix AT.1. In our TFP estimation we have used value added as a proxy for output, including
in the estimation total employment as a measure for labour, the total costs of intermediate input as costs
of production, an export dummy equal to 1 for exporters or 0 otherwise, and total investment in tangible
and intangible assets such as R&D. Once estimated and logged, we remove the top and bottom percentiles
without any signiﬁcant loss of observations, following the ISGEP (2008) approach in order to mitigate the
eﬀect of outliers on our analysis.
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total employment and productivity, despite an increasing amount of resources dedicated to
R&D activities, while they keep a stable level of salaries paid. In addition, total exports
of ﬁrms in both categories do not seem to be aﬀected by the imposition of AD measures,
increasing in proportion even more for aﬀected importers rather than for domestic producers.
Furthermore, it is particularly interesting to compare the productivity distribution of import-
dependent, import-competing and unaﬀected French ﬁrms. In fact, it is possible to note that
the level of productivity widely diﬀers between the three groups. While the level of TFP for
import-competing and unaﬀected ﬁrms is quite similar both before and after the imposition
of the anti-dumping measures, aﬀected import-dependent ﬁrms are characterised by higher
levels of TFP in comparison to the other two groups, almost 10% larger on average. As a
result, EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products seem to protect import-competing
ﬁrms characterised by low levels of productivity, while imposing higher duties on the import
of Chinese intermediate inputs of production used by highly productive import-dependent
ﬁrms. Overall, these preliminary statistics show some ﬁrst clues about the key role played
by productivity in the ﬁrm-level analysis of anti-dumping measures. In the next section we
will take into account this evidence in our model to properly estimate the ﬁrm-level eﬀect
of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products on import-dependent and import-
competing French manufacturers.
1.4 Methodology
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the eﬀect on the overall European economy of EU anti-
dumping duties imposed on Chinese products. In particular, we would like to identify the
impact of these anti-dumping measures on trade ﬂows and on the performance of European
protected sectors. At the ﬁrm-level, we will use France as a case study for the rest of the
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EU, estimating the eﬀect of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French import-
competing producers and on import-dependent manufacturers. Speciﬁcally, we are interested
in comparing the diﬀerences before and after the introduction of AD duties for observations
aﬀected or not by the imposition of these measures. However, this kind of estimation is not
straightforward. As previously discussed in the literature, the imposition of anti-dumping
measures is not an exogenous and randomized treatment, but is very likely aﬀected by a
number of endogenous factors inﬂuencing the political AD decision process.
In this regard, our analysis might be aﬀected by two diﬀerent sources of bias, as described
by Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) and Pierce (2011). The ﬁrst is a selection bias in which
observations aﬀected by an AD duty are diﬀerent from those which have not been involved
in these procedures. For instance, all products and domestic sectors which are subject to a
strong import competition from China are more likely to be protected by AD measures, and
as we have seen earlier, most of the EU-China anti-dumping cases have been concentrated
in a few speciﬁc sectors, namely metals, chemicals and machineries. Another source of bias
might refer to the political decision by the European Commission and the Member States of
whether to impose or not anti-dumping measures based on factors other than the technical
trade defence aspects, such as productivity, employment growth and other macroeconomic
trends. Secondly, since we are not working on a natural experiment, the counterfactual of
not being treated for an observation which instead has been aﬀected by the imposition of AD
duties is not observable, making it even harder to assess the real impact of the imposition of
AD measures while controlling for other relevant factors.
Hence, in order to properly estimate the causal eﬀect of EU anti-dumping duties against
Chinese products we apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching technique
at the product, sectoral and at the ﬁrm-level (Lechner 2002; Leuven and Sianesi 2003). A
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number of related studies use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation technique to analyse the
causal relationship between protection and performance (e.g. Konings and Vandenbussche
2005; Konings and Vandenbussche 2008; Lu et al. 2013). The aim is to assess the average
treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), in other words to estimate the diﬀerence of the out-
come variable between the observations which have been aﬀected by anti-dumping measures
(the treatment) and similar ones which instead have not been treated. To compare the dif-
ferences before and after the imposition of the AD duties we rescale the time periods in order
to consider time t = 0 as the time in which the observations have been aﬀected by the intro-
duction of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products. Based on that, we measure
the growth rate of the outcome variables over the following three years in comparison to the
pre-treatment period, in order to assess the eﬀect of AD measures in the years following the
imposition. We deﬁne yt as the outcome variables for all the observations at time t and yt+n
for the following n periods. The causal eﬀect of AD duties on the outcome variables at time
t+ n can be though identiﬁed as the diﬀerence between:
y1t+n − y0t+n (1.1)
where the subscripts denote whether the observations have been aﬀected by the AD treat-
ment at time t or not. Thus, y0(t+n) represents the outcome for an observation at time t + n
which has not been aﬀected by an anti-dumping duty at time t. We investigate the impact of
anti-dumping duties on a number of outcome variables for each level of analysis. In particu-
lar, at the product-level we will estimate the eﬀect of the imposition of AD duties on all EU
imports volume and prices from China, and we will test as well possible trade diversion and
defection eﬀects looking at volumes and prices of EU imports from other extra-EU countries
and for the intra-EU trade. At the sectoral level instead, the outcome variables of interest
will be the overall value of production in the European sectors protected by anti-dumping
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measures, their turnover, the employment growth, their labour productivity, the survival
rate of ﬁrms in these sectors and the export performance. Finally, we will investigate the
impact of AD duties on import-competing and import-dependent French companies, using
ﬁrm-level outcome variables such as TFP, total employment, ﬁrm investment in R&D, export
performance and their survival rate. Since we are interested in identifying the diﬀerences in
the outcome variables after the introduction af an anti-dumping measure, we can express the
average eﬀect that treated observations would have experienced if they had not been aﬀected
by AD duties as:
τATT = E
(
y1t+n − y0t+n | St = 1
)
= E
(
y1t+n | St = 1
)− E (y0t+n | St = 1) (1.2)
in which τ represents the expected eﬀect on outcome y of the AD treatment in the
post-treatment period, relative to the eﬀect of no treatment for the same observation. The
fundamental problem is that only one of the two possible outcomes in the previous equa-
tion is observed, whether the observation has been aﬀected by an anti-dumping measure
or not, while the counter-factual for the same observation could not be observed. Since
E
(
y0t+n | St = 1
)
is not observable, we will construct at each level of analysis a suitable con-
trol group by considering instead the eﬀect of no treatment on similar observations which
have not been aﬀected by AD duties, E
(
y0t+n | St = 0
)
.
Following Pierce (2011) we decide to use a propensity score matching technique in order
to select from the sample of untreated observations suitable control groups for which the
distributions of observed characteristics are as close as possible to the distribution of treated
observations before the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, controlling in this way for
the diﬀerent sources of bias that we have previously considered. Matching methods allow to
correct the endogeneity bias thanks to the construction of valid control groups at each level
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of analysis based on the observable diﬀerences between treated and untreated observations.
Since we want to estimate the impact of EU anti-dumping measures against imports from
China at the product, sectoral and ﬁrm-level, we build a treatment and a control group at
each of these levels.
To identify the treated observations at the product-level we use data on all imported
goods in the EU at the HS 6-digit level distinguishing between diﬀerent origins. The treat-
ment group will consists of products imported from China and targeted during our period of
interest by EU anti-dumping duties. For the sector-level analysis instead we use data about
all EU manufacturing sectors at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level. In this case, the treated
group will consist of all domestic sectors at 4-digit-level which have been protected against
the import penetration of speciﬁc dumped products from China. To determine which sec-
tors produce certain goods, and so to link product-speciﬁc AD duties with the European
industries producing them, we used the correspondence tables between products and sectoral
classiﬁcations provided by the United Nations Statistics Division and the conversion table
between HS and ISIC classiﬁcations provided by Hoekman et al. (2002). Finally, as pre-
viously discussed, we use detailed French ﬁrm-transaction-level data to identify the treated
groups for import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms. In particular, to identify the
group of treated French producers protected by EU anti-dumping against Chinese products
we use the correspondence tables between products and sectoral classiﬁcations provided by
the United Nations Statistics Division and by Hoekman et al. (2002) as previously explained
to identify all French import-competing ﬁrms part of the protected domestic sectors. To build
instead the treatment group of French import-dependent ﬁrms aﬀected by EU AD duties on
Chinese goods we use the detailed transaction-level imports data collected by the French
Customs Agency which allows to precisely identify all French ﬁrms which have imported the
targeted dumped products from China and from other trade partners.
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In order to build consistent control groups to be compared with the treated observations
we apply a propensity score matching (PSM) approach as introduced by Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin (1983) and Heckman et al. (1997). The aim of matching techniques is to select from the
sample of untreated observations a control group for which the distribution of observed char-
acteristics in the pre-treatment period is as similar as possible to the distribution of treated
observations (Becker and Ichino 2002). In this way, it is possible to correct the endogeneity
bias thanks to the construction of valid control groups based on the observable diﬀerences
between treated and untreated observations and to identify the causal eﬀect of anti-dumping
measures. The ﬁrst step is to estimate the probability for an observation of being aﬀected
(treated) by the introduction of anti-dumping measures, the so called propensity score, based
on a set of observable characteristics. We use a logit model to estimate the propensity score
of all observations at each level of analysis, using in turn several sets of covariates at the
product, sector and ﬁrm-level.
At the product-level, we estimate the probability of being subject to an EU anti-dumping
measure against Chinese goods by considering a set of product and macro-level variables.
First, the product-level propensity score will be conditional on the import penetration of
each speciﬁc product at the HS-6 digit level imported from China to the EU IP (China)pt−1,
measured as the ratio between import value from China over total imports, and on the num-
ber of previous anti-dumping investigations started by the European Commission on each
product at the HS-6 digit level Npt−1 as suggested by Blonigen (2006). In this way we will
compare treated and untreated products which have experienced similar imports penetrations
from China and have analogous record of anti-dumping investigations. Moreover, following
Knetter and Prusa (2003) as extra controls we include a year and a HS-2-digit product
dummy in order to account for possible macro-level shocks:
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AD(Product)pt = β0 + β1IP (China)pt−1 + β2Npt−1 + kp + kt + ξpt (1.3)
In order to carry out the sector-level analysis, we estimate the probability for EU sec-
tors at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level to be protected by EU anti-dumping measure against
unfair Chinese competition. The variables used to predict this probability include import
penetration from China suﬀered by each sector IP (China)st−1, measured as the value of
Chinese imports over total imports in the sector, the sector-level added-value per worker
AVst−1, measured as the net income from operating activities after adjusting for subsidies
and indirect taxes over total employment, the investment intensity Invst−1, measured as the
ratio between investment in ﬁxed assets and total output, and the employment growth in
the sector ∆Emplst−1. In this way, following Pierce (2011) we will compare industries which
have experienced similar levels of import competition from China while taking into account
as well some measures of performance to detect any possible evidence of recession and eco-
nomic crisis at the sectoral level. In addition, we include the number of petitions submitted
by each sector to the European Commission about anti-dumping investigations Nst−1 and
industry and year dummies:
AD(Sector)st =β0 + β1IP (China)st−1 + β2∆Emplst−1 + β3AVst−1 + β4Invst−1+
β5Nst−1 + ks + kt + ξst
(1.4)
Finally, we estimate the probability of being aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures
against Chinese goods at the ﬁrm-level both for French producers and importers. Since the
identiﬁcation of the two treated groups relies on diﬀerent techniques, also the estimation of
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the ﬁrm-level propensity score for the two groups will be separated. For the import-competing
ﬁrms, as previously explained, thanks to the French ﬁrm-level EAE balance sheet database we
are able to precisely identify all the ﬁrms belonging to protected sector at the NACE rev.1.1
4-digit level. Thus, we will be able to compare the performance of import-competing ﬁrms
vis-à-vis other similar French producers which have not been protected by EU AD duties on
Chinese products. The estimation model used to predict this probability score follows the one
presented in the above equation, considering the import penetration from China suﬀered by
French sectors at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit-level IP (China)st−1, the employment growth in
these industries ∆Emplst−1, the investment intensity Invst−1 measured as the ratio between
investment and total output and the added-value per worker of the sector in which French
ﬁrms operate AVst−1 in order to take into account the industry-level factors which aﬀect the
decision for the imposition of AD duties. Also in this case we include the number of ﬁling
cases submitted to the European Commission about anti-dumping investigations Nst−1 and
industry and year dummies:
AD(Producers)it =β0 + β1IP (China)st−1 + β2∆Emplst−1 + β3AVst−1 + β4Invst−1+
β5Nst−1 + β6Emplit−1 + β7TFPit−1 + β8Expit + ki + kt + ξit
(1.5)
In addition, to build a precise control group for import-competing ﬁrms, in the matching
process we include ﬁrm-level variables in order to also take into account ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics when comparing treated and untreated ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁrm
size in terms of total employment Emplit−1, total factor productivity TFPit−1 and the export
status Expit.
With regard to import-dependent ﬁrms, we follow a diﬀerent approach to estimate the
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probability for French importers to be aﬀected by the imposition of EU anti-dumping duties
on the imports of certain goods from China. In particular, the likelihood for an import-
dependent ﬁrms of being aﬀected by anti-dumping measure depends on the kind of products
imported from China, the sector in which ﬁrms operate, the import strategy followed and
other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. For these reasons in the propensity score estimation model
for import-dependent ﬁrms we included product, sector and ﬁrm-level variables to take into
account of all the possible factors inﬂuencing the probability for a French importer to be
aﬀected by EU AD measures on Chinese products. At the product-level, we take into ac-
count the import penetration of the product imported from China at the HS-8 digit level
IP (China)pt−1, measured as the ration between import value from China to the EU over
total imports, and on the number of previous anti-dumping investigations started by the
European Commission on these products at the HS-6 digit level Npt−1. In addition, we in-
clude ﬁrm-level variables in order to take into account of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics which
could aﬀect the probability of each single French ﬁrm to be targeted by EU anti-dumping
measures on imported products from China. In particular, we consider ﬁrm size in terms
of total employment Emplit−1, total factor productivity TFPit−1, the export status Expit
and the value of ﬁrms total imports Impit−1 in order to accurately match similar treated
and untreated French ﬁrms based on their characteristics and also in terms of their import
behaviours. Finally, we include year and industry dummies at the NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level
in order to take into account of any sector-speciﬁc factor concerning French manufacturing
industries and any other time varying eﬀect:
AD(Importers)it =β0 + β1IP (China)pt−1 + β2Npt−1 + β3Emplit−1 + β4TFPit−1+
β5Expit + β6Impit−1 + kt + ksξit
(1.6)
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In Table 1.6 we present the results of the propensity score estimations at the product,
sector and ﬁrm levels. In the ﬁrst column, it is possible to note that products at the HS-6
digit level have a higher probability of being targeted by EU anti-dumping duties if they have
registered a large import penetration from China in the recent years and if they have been
already part of previous EC anti-dumping investigations. From columns 2 and 3 it is evident
that also a strong import penetration of Chinese goods at the sectoral level increases the
likelihood for those industries to be protected by EU anti-dumping duties. Moreover, also at
the sectoral level the number of previous petitions increases the probability of anti-dumping
measures adoption, corroborating the previous predictions about the importance for Euro-
pean industries of lobbying experience in order to decrease the cost of ﬁling petitions and to
improve the likelihood of successful applications (Blonigen 2006).
In addition, other industry-level characteristics seem to aﬀect the probability for a sector
to be protected. In particular, it appears that more productive sectors are less likely to be
protected by anti-dumping measures while a decrease in the number of workers employed
in the sectors signiﬁcantly increases the probability of AD duties adoption. Also the sector-
level analysis supports the previous argument that the imposition of anti-dumping measures
is aﬀected by factors other than the pure dumping strategy of exporters. From this evidence
it seems that the EU is using anti-dumping duties as a sort of protectionist measure in order
to protect the most vulnerable European sectors which are more exposed to the import com-
petition of Chinese goods and are hence experiencing decreasing levels of productivity and
employment. Column 4 instead shows the probability for French ﬁrms to be aﬀected by the
imposition of AD duties on their imports from China. Also in this case the penetration ratio
and the previous AD investigations of Chinese goods imported by French manufacturers seem
to increase the probability of being aﬀected by EU anti-dumping duties. In addition, also
importers ﬁrm-level characteristics matter, since large, more productive and internationalised
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Table 1.6: Propensity score estimation at the product, sector and ﬁrm-level (French producers and importers).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU Product-level EU Sector-level Firm-level Firm-level
French Producers French Importers
IP (China)pt−1 4.428*** 3.811***
(0.766) (0.587)
FilingCasept 1.258*** 0.042**
(0.113) (0.021)
IP (China)st−1 3.089** 7.398***
(1.695) (0.299)
FilingCasest 0.418*** 0.452***
(0.097) (0.020)
∆Employmentst−1 -0.482** -0.057***
(0.249) (0.006)
AddedV aluest−1 -2.187** -0.174***
(0.849) (0.006)
Inv.Int.st−1 0.009 0.071***
(0.027) (0.005)
Tot.Employmentit−1 0.269*** 0.231***
(0.031) (0.082)
TFPit−1 0.159*** 0.150
(0.061) (0.155)
Exporterit 0.570*** 1.420***
(0.068) (0.339)
Tot.Importsit−1 0.427***
(0.048)
Observations 21,642 1,065 25,036 27,654
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes No No No
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes
Note: The estimation model used is a logit with ﬁxed-eﬀects. Unreported year, product (HS 2-digit) or industry (NACE
rev.1.1, 2-digit) dummies are included. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In the ﬁrst column the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the product imported in the EU has been subject to
an anti-dumping duty on Chinese goods at time t = 0 and 0 otherwise. In column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if a EU industry at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level has been protected by EU anti-dumping measure against
Chinese goods and 0 otherwise. In column 3 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a French ﬁrm belongs to one
of the protected sectors at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level and 0 otherwise. In column 4 instead the dependent variable is
a dummy equal to 1 if a French ﬁrm has imported one of the aﬀected products from China at the HS-8-digit level during
the anti-dumping period and 0 otherwise. The regressors at the product-level are the import penetration at the HS-6 digit
from China to the EU measured as the ration between import value from China over total EU imports as reported in the
Eurostat COMEXT database, and the number of previous anti-dumping investigations started by the European Commis-
sion on each product at the HS-6 digit level as reported in the EC Investigation Reports. At the industry-level the control
variables at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit level include the import penetration from China measured as the value of Chinese
imports over total imports as reported in the COMEXT database, the added-value per worker measured as the net income
from operating activities after adjusting for subsidies and indirect taxes over total employment, the investment intensity
measured as the ratio between investment in ﬁxed assets and total output, and the annual employment growth as reported
in the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database and the number of petitions submitted to the European
Commission about anti-dumping investigations. The ﬁrm-level control variables include French ﬁrms total employment,
the log of total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, an export dummy equal to 1 if
the ﬁrms is an exporter and 0 otherwise and the log value of ﬁrms total imports as reported in the Annual French Busi-
ness Survey (EAE) and the Custom Agency Trade database. All control variables except the number of petitions ﬁlled
and the export dummy are lagged one year.
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companies have a higher probability to be aﬀected by the imposition of AD duties on their
imports from China.
After estimating the probability of being aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures on Chi-
nese goods at each level of analysis, we proceed by matching within each category the un-
treated and treated observations based on the estimated propensity scores. In particular, we
are interested in matching untreated observations which have estimated probabilities which
are as close as possible to those of the observations actually aﬀected by AD duties on Chi-
nese products. Moreover, imposing a common support condition we will drop the treated
observations whose propensity scores are larger or smaller than the maximum or minimum
of those never aﬀected. Diﬀerent matching algorithms have been proposed in the literature,
mainly varying in terms of how the neighbourhood of control individuals is built around the
treated observations, providing diﬀerent solutions to the trade-oﬀ between matching quality
and variance (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). In this chapter we apply a Kernel matching
technique with a strict bandwidth of 0.01 to match just observations for which the distance
between their propensity scores is the smallest possible. The Kernel matching estimator
associates to the outcome yit of treated individual i a matched outcome given by a kernel-
weighted average of the outcome of comparable non-treated observations, where the weight
given to non-treated j is in proportion to the closeness between i and j. In other words, using
the Kernel technique we are able to down-weight the contribution to the outcome of non-
treated individuals which are farer from the treated observations within a certain range (i.e.
bandwidth) of the propensity score distribution. Using a weighted smoothed matching esti-
mator, like the Kernel, presents several advantages in respect to other matching procedures,
particularly in reducing the median standardized bias between treated and control groups.
In addition, it permits to exploit as much information as possible in matching observations
from the control group, gaining in this way in precision without losing anything in terms of
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matching quality (Leuven and Sianesi 2003; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Standard errors
have been bootstrapped with 500 repetitions for heteroskedasticity consistency, taking into
account the additional source of variability introduced by the estimation of the propensity
score in the Kernel matching process (Heckman et al. 1997; Abadie and Imbens 2011).
In order to verify the consistency of the construction of the control groups and the overall
quality of the matching procedure, we run several balancing tests to examine the distribution
of the propensity score and the quality and the precision of the matching algorithm. To check
the propensity score balancing we calculate the mean diﬀerences across the treatments and
the control groups for a set of observable characteristics comparing them before and after
the matching. Even if diﬀerences between the treated and the control groups are expected
before matching, these diﬀerences should be signiﬁcantly reduced after the matching has
taken place. In Tables A.1.4, A.1.5, A.1.6 and A.1.7 in the appendix we present several
tests assessing the comparability of the two groups at each level of analysis, in particular
testing whether the covariates used to control the probability of being aﬀected by EU anti-
dumping measures are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the treated and the control groups,
and presenting the achieved percentage reduction in the standardised bias after the matching
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) the bias after the
matching procedure between treated and untreated observations should not exceed the 25%
threshold in order to deliver a consistent matching. As it is possible to notice also in Figure
A.1.1 the kernel matching technique substantially reduces the bias for most of the regressors,
and none of the absolute standardized bias exceed 25%. Also the variance ratios between
treated over non-treated indicate a good balance for most of the covariates, with none of
them being of particular concern for the quality of the matching. These results indicate that
there are no systematic diﬀerences in the observables characteristics between treated and
control groups, demonstrating that the matching procedure satisﬁes the balancing property
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and that the conditional independence assumption is not violated, assigning the appropriate
controls to treated observations (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). In addition, in Figure A.1.2
in the appendix we check whether the propensity scores for the four diﬀerent levels of analysis
are balanced across the diﬀerent groups of treated and control observations (Imbens 2004;
Garrido et al. 2014). From Figure A.1.2 it is possible to notice that the probability of being
aﬀected by EU anti-dumping measures for treated and untreated observations has a similar
density distribution, demonstrating how the probability of being treated is suﬃciently bal-
anced between aﬀected and unaﬀected observations.
The combination of matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences techniques is likely to increase
the quality of our empirical analysis. In particular, basing the matching procedure on a
number of observable characteristics we are able to compare closely related observations,
characterized by similar macro and micro-level factors, and to tackle the endogeneity related
to the selection bias (Blundell and Dias 2009). Secondly, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tech-
nique should remove the eﬀects of common shocks and provide a robust estimation of the
causal eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products at the product, sector
and ﬁrm-level for import-competing and import-dependent manufacturers. In particular, at
the product-level we will look at the eﬀect on the growth of trade volumes and prices for
aﬀected products imported in the EU from China and from the rest of the world for the fol-
lowing 3 years after the entry into force of the AD duties with respect to the pre-treatment
level. For the sector analysis instead we will consider the eﬀect of the protection provided by
EU anti-dumping duties against Chinese goods on the performance of European industries,
focusing speciﬁcally on the sectoral total output, the number of ﬁrms operating in the market,
the employment growth, the industrial productivity in terms of added-value per worker and
the innovative eﬀorts of European manufacturing sectors. Moreover, at the ﬁrm-level, we will
analyse the eﬀect of AD measures on the performance of both French import-competing and
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import-dependent ﬁrms, estimating the impact on total factor productivity, on employment
growth, total R&D investment and on the survival rate in the market of these ﬁrms.
1.5 Empirical Findings
1.5.1 Product-level analysis
We start by looking at the eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products
on import ﬂows, considering both the impact on volumes and on prices. In addition, we
decompose the analysis of import ﬂows considering not only the bilateral trade relationship
between the EU and China, but also looking at the spillover eﬀect on intra-EU trade and on
imports from the rest of the world. As stressed by the previous literature, the imposition of
AD duties might cause a signiﬁcant distortion not only for the aﬀected bilateral trade rela-
tionship, but for trade ﬂows in general with possible eﬀects of trade deﬂection and distortion
(Konings et al. 2001; Bown and Crowley 2007; Vandenbussche and Zanardi 2010). Table 1.7
presents the impact of AD duties against Chinese goods on the growth of EU import ﬂows,
looking both at the impact on volume and prices and comparing the eﬀect for products at the
HS-6 digit-level aﬀected or not by the EU anti-dumping measures on imports from China,
on intra-EU trade and on imports from the rest of the world for the following 3 years after
the imposition of these duties.
As expected, the import volume of Chinese products targeted by EU anti-dumping mea-
sures is negatively aﬀected after the imposition of AD duties, and it is reduced by almost
86% in 3 years in respect to the pre-antidumping period. Looking at the eﬀect on prices it
is possible to notice that the negative impact on volumes is mainly due to a surge of import
prices of Chinese products, increasing by 10% on average in 3 years, suggesting that EU anti-
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Table 1.7: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on EU import ﬂows (volume and prices)- ATT eﬀects with
Kernel matching.
PRICE VOLUME
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
CHINA
ATT 0.0485* 0.0737* 0.102** -0.448*** -0.779*** -0.869**
b.s.e. (0.0245) (0.0438) (0.0487) (0.109) (0.233) (0.322)
INTRA-EU
ATT 0.0138 0.0170 -0.0593 -0.0806 0.0415 0.0281
b.s.e. (0.0447) (0.0473) (0.0745) (0.0634) (0.177) (0.303)
ROW
ATT 0.0941*** 0.159*** 0.148** -0.0563 0.0350** 0.0293*
b.s.e. (0.0358) (0.0569) (0.0658) (0.0561) (0.0176) (0.0173)
TOTAL IMPORT
ATT 0.0621* 0.0625* 0.0324 -0.101* 0.00561 -0.00798
b.s.e. (0.0365) (0.0300) (0.0508) (0.0593) (0.189) (0.310)
Treated 63 63 63 63 63 63
Control 17,765 17,765 17,765 21,642 21,642 21,642
Note: estimation based on Eurostat COMEXT import data between 1999 and 2007. ATT ef-
fect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching
procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of products included in the common treated and
control groups is reported. The dependent variables are the growth of the annual import prices
and volumes from China to the EU, for the intra-EU trade, for imports from the rest of the
world excluding China and intra-EU trade and for total imports to the EU of the products at
the HS-6 digit-level aﬀected by EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports. We report the
ATT eﬀects of the impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on EU import volumes
and prices against products which have not been aﬀected for the following three years after the
imposition of the anti-dumping duty.
dumping duties have eﬀectively targeted Chinese dumped products, increasing their import
prices and pushing them up to a fairer market-level and drastically reducing the volume of
Chinese goods imported in the EU single market.
Then, we estimate the impact of these AD duties on intra-EU trade, on ﬂows from the
rest of the world (ROW) and on EU total imports to investigate whether the import ﬂows
of products aﬀected by EU AD measures on Chinese imports from other countries have suf-
fered from any indirect eﬀect. First, we notice that intra-EU trade has not been aﬀected by
anti-dumping measures on Chinese products, not showing any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
aﬀected and unaﬀected products in terms of prices and volumes. On the contrary, the im-
position of AD duties on Chinese products seems to marginally increase by almost 3% the
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import volumes from the rest of the world in the following 2 years after the entry into force of
these measures, despite a signiﬁcant 15% increase in the import prices of aﬀected goods from
these countries. This is a clear evidence of trade diversion linked to the imposition of EU AD
measures against China, with a shift of EU imports away from Chinese dumped products to
more expensive imports from other extra-EU countries. In addition, by analysing the overall
impact on EU total imports we ﬁnd evidence as well of a trade distortion eﬀect linked to
a general increase of import prices for products aﬀected by EU AD duties against China.
Nevertheless, the higher prices do not seem to disrupt the overall volume of EU imports after
a marginal reduction of 10% in the ﬁrst year.
To sum up, EU anti-dumping duties successfully targeted dumped Chinese products,
pushing their import price towards market-levels and decreasing the volume of imports from
China. Intra-EU trade does not seem to be statistically aﬀected by the imposition of these
AD duties, while extra-EU imports experience a signiﬁcant increase despite a general growth
in import prices, highlighting a trade diversion eﬀect of EU anti-dumping measures on Chi-
nese goods.
1.5.2 Sectoral-level analysis
After the estimation of the impact on EU trade ﬂows at the product-level, we are interested
in analysing whether EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products have been successful
in protecting the domestic European industries from the "material injury" caused by the
unfair competition of dumped Chinese products. In Table 1.8 we present the results of the
DID-PSM estimation of the impact of EU AD duties against Chinese products on the do-
mestic protected industries, looking at the overall number of ﬁrms operating in these sectors,
the employment growth, the overall domestic production, turnover, labour productivity and
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Table 1.8: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on EU manufacturing industries - ATT eﬀects with Kernel
matching.
Tot. Production No. Firms
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
ATT 0.0961*** 0.0979*** 0.0386 -0.00825 -0.0181 0.00375
b.s.e. (0.013) (0.0126) (0.0313) (0.00921) (0.0164) (0.0244)
Tot. Employment Turnover
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
ATT 0.0427** 0.00760 -0.00779 0.234* 0.114 0.229
b.s.e. (0.0220) (0.0329) (0.0696) (0.129) (0.243) (0.475)
Added-Value Tot. R&D
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
ATT 0.0499* 0.0646* 0.0530 0.0545 -0.201 -0.394
b.s.e. (0.0288) (0.0347) (0.0424) (0.160) (0.188) (0.257)
Treated 21 21 21 21 21 21
Untreated 174 174 174 174 174 174
Note: estimation based on the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database between
1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity
score Kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of European industries at
the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit-level included in the common treated and control groups is reported.
The dependent variables are the growth of sectoral output value, the number of ﬁrms operating
in the sectors, the growth of total employment, of sectoral turnover, of industrial productivity
in terms of added-value per worker measured as the net income from operating activities after
adjusting for subsidies and indirect taxes over number of employees and the growth rate of R&D
investment in the industry. We report the ATT eﬀects of the impact of EU AD measures against
Chinese products on EU industries against unprotected sectors for the following three years after
the imposition of the anti-dumping measure.
sectoral investment in R&D.
First, it is possible to notice that after the imposition of anti-dumping measures the
import-competing industries in Europe registered a signiﬁcant growth of total production,
almost 10% larger than the pre-duty period. Also total employment and the industrial
turnover of EU protected sectors increase after the entry into force of higher duties on Chi-
nese products, but just with a short-term signiﬁcant eﬀect in the year immediately following
the imposition of these AD measures. However, despite the introduction of AD duties the
number of ﬁrms surviving in the protected industries does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in respect
to unaﬀected sectors, suggesting an ineﬃciency of the AD measures in protecting injured
sectors and in preventing European companies from shutting down as a result of the Chinese
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import competition. Nevertheless, the overall domestic supply increases in order to compen-
sate for the drop of imports from China which now face higher duties, highlighting how EU
AD measures at least successfully helped domestic industries by relaxing the Chinese import
penetration, boosting the overall production and slightly increasing the levels of employment
in the EU.
Finally, we can analyse the eﬀect of AD measures on sectoral labour productivity, mea-
sured as added-value per worker, and total investment in R&D. From Table 1.8 it is possible
to notice that the introduction of anti-dumping duties marginally increases the productivity
of protected industries by almost 6% in two years, mainly due to the overall increase of do-
mestic sectors total output. On the contrary, after the introduction of AD measures these
sectors have not increased their investment in R&D in comparison to unprotected industries.
Apparently, domestic sectors do not proﬁt from the protection provided by higher duties on
Chinese products to invest in R&D activities which could help especially European mature
industries to face and challenge the import competition of China and other rapidly emerging
countries.
1.5.3 Firm-level analysis
We focus now on the micro-level analysis of the EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese
goods, evaluating both the ﬁrm-level impact on producers and on importers of the targeted
products. As previously explained, we use French ﬁrm-level data and the product-sector cor-
respondence tables provided by the United Nations Statistics Division and by Hoekman et al.
(2002) to identify French producers of the aﬀected goods which are part of the industries pro-
tected by AD duties at the NACE rev.1.1. 4-digit level. Then, using transaction import data
from the French Custom Agency we can identify as well the manufacturing ﬁrms importing
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the targeted products from China at the HS-8 digit-level, estimating in this way the eﬀect
of higher duties on intermediate inputs on their performance. We provide for the ﬁrst time
a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of this trade policy on the whole sample of domestic
ﬁrms aﬀected, not only protected import-competing producers but also import-dependent
ﬁrms which were using and exploiting cheap products imported from China. Applying a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score matching, we compare the impact
of AD measures on targeted ﬁrms in respect to unaﬀected companies (the control group)
before and after the imposition of the anti-dumping duties. In this way we can assess the
eﬀect of the anti-dumping duty on ﬁrms' performance, looking speciﬁcally at the impact
on ﬁrms' productivity, on employment growth, R&D investment, total exports and on the
survival rate of ﬁrms in the market measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm
is still present in the database in the following years and 0 otherwise. Table 1.9 presents
the results of the estimation of the impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on
French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms.
First, notice that EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports seem to have an
opposite and contrasting eﬀect on French producers performance. On the one hand, AD
duties successfully protect domestic producers from the unfair competition of dumped Chi-
nese products, mainly increasing the probability of producers survival rate and reverting the
negative trend in employment in these ﬁrms which register an employment growth of 6%
two years after the entry into force of the anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless, the EU AD
duties do not improve the export performance of French producers and similarly does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁrms propensity toward R&D investment, despite the opportunity given
by these measures to be protected from Chinese import competition and to dedicate more
resources on industrial and production re-organization. On the other hand, the AD protec-
tion from Chinese dumped products comes at the cost of a sharp decrease of producers' total
CHAPTER 1. EU ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CHINESE PRODUCTS 79
Table 1.9: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms -
ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
PRODUCERS IMPORTERS
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.0465*** -0.0379** -0.0256 -0.125** -0.0921** -0.0771
b.s.e. (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0540) (0.0427) (0.0756)
Tot. Employment
ATT -0.0217** 0.00797 0.0600*** -0.0398* -0.0899** -0.00193
b.s.e. (0.00771) (0.0102) (0.0128) (0.0227) (0.0416) (0.0570)
Tot. R&D
ATT -0.0179 -0.0584 0.0618 -0.00986 0.0486 -0.163
b.s.e. (0.0619) (0.0692) (0.0894) (0.194) (0.188) (0.314)
Tot. Exports
ATT -0.190 -0.0432 0.319 -0.145* -0.199** -0.148
b.s.e. (0.149) (0.240) (0.247) (0.0734) (0.0871) (0.100)
Survival Rate
ATT -0.0642*** 0.106*** 0.260*** -0.0496*** -0.0707*** -0.00210
b.s.e. (0.00415) (0.0105) (0.0144) (0.0119) (0.0184) (0.00690)
Treated 3262 3038 1449 403 382 102
Control 18871 18871 16960 27,251 27,251 24,423
Note: estimation based on EAE and Custom Agency data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect esti-
mated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure.
Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms included in
the common treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables are the growth in ﬁrm-
level productivity measured as total factor productivity following the De Loecker (2007) approach, the
growth in the number of full-time employees, the growth of R&D investment, the increase of exports
value and the probability of surviving in the market measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the ﬁrm is still present in the database in the following years and 0 otherwise. Producers deﬁned as
all French ﬁrms belonging to the sectors protected by EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese products
identiﬁed using the correspondence tables between products and sectoral classiﬁcations provided by
the United Nations Statistics Division and by Hoekman et al. (2002). Importers deﬁned as all French
ﬁrms which have imported targeted dumped products from China at the HS-8 digit level according to
the transaction-level Customs Agency dataset. We report the ATT eﬀects of the impact of EU AD
measures against Chinese products on French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms against
unaﬀected companies for the following three years after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures.
factor productivity which decline by almost 4% in the following two years. As stressed in the
previous literature, this phenomenon might be explained by a lack of competition pressure
from China which could deteriorate a persistent trend of declining productivity for mature
manufacturing industries in developed countries (Pierce 2011).
These ﬁrm-level results of the impact of AD duties on domestic producers follow the theo-
retical predictions and the empirical ﬁndings of the previous literature on this topic (Konings
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and Vandenbussche 2005; Pierce 2011). We can now investigate for the ﬁrst time the impact
of EU anti-dumping measures on the importers of Chinese dumped products, thanks to the
disaggregated French ﬁrms transaction-level import data. For this analysis we consider as
treated those ﬁrm which have imported dumped products from China then used as interme-
diate inputs in their productive process, so not considering pure traders. The imposition of
AD measures increases the duty to be paid for the import of these targeted products from
China, so we expect EU AD measures to negatively aﬀect French importers which would face
an increased cost of imports and of inputs of production, thus making it more diﬃcult to
cover the average variable costs of production.
As expected, Table 1.9 shows that anti-dumping measures generally reduce French im-
porters performance, negatively aﬀecting their productivity, consistently reducing their total
employment and diminishing the probability of surviving in the market. In particular, the
increase in the cost of inputs of production negatively aﬀects import-dependent ﬁrms total
factor productivity, strongly decreasing importers productivity by almost 10% in the follow-
ing 2 years. As a consequence, it would become more diﬃcult for French importers to cover
their costs of production, forcing some ﬁrms to reduce the amount of labour force employed
in the production process by 9% after two years and pushing some others to drop out of the
market as highlighted by the signiﬁcant negative impact on the survival rate, at the average
rate of 6% in the two years following the entry into force of the AD duties. In addition, the
aggravation of importers performance aﬀects as well their total exports reduced by almost
20% in 2 years, as expected from the theoretical predictions (Ruhl 2014, Wu et al. 2014),
while we do not ﬁnd any evidence of impact on investment in R&D activities.
However, we expect the impact of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products
on producers and importers to vary across the distribution of French ﬁrms depending on
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factors which have not been taken into account so far. First of all, some ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics could play a role in the variation of the magnitude of the AD measures impact
for individual ﬁrms which are more or less exposed to these trade policy shocks and their
eﬀects. Secondly, the overall impact of AD duties on French import-competing and import-
dependent ﬁrms could be inﬂuenced by the particular characteristics of these measures, for
instance depending on the type of product targeted and the lobbying activity of domestic
ﬁrms petitioning in favour or against the adoption of anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods.
Finally, the impact on domestic ﬁrms would not be limited just to the intensive margins, the
eﬀect on their ﬁrm-level performance, but will as well aﬀect the extensive margins, in other
words the allocation of resources across ﬁrms which could decide to stop the production of
dumped products or might substitute imports of these targeted goods from China.
In the next sub-section we provide an in-depth analysis of the micro-level eﬀect of AD
measures on import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms by exploiting the richness of our
datasets. First, we will diﬀerentiate our analysis based on several ﬁrms characteristics, esti-
mating the impact of AD duties according to their export status, the variety of product-mix
supplied and the productivity distribution of ﬁrms. Secondly, we will look at the variabil-
ity of the AD measures applied, analysing the impact on French producers and importers
of AD measures applied on intermediate or ﬁnal goods, and considering whether the Euro-
pean Commission AD investigation has been supported by French producers or opposed by
import-dependent ﬁrms. In this way we will be able to take into account the presence of
relevant national interests in the analysis of the eﬀect of AD measures on domestic ﬁrms.
Finally, we will investigate the eﬀect on the extensive margins of trade, considering not only
continuing importers but also those ﬁrms who stopped the import of dumped products after
the imposition of AD duties, in order to provide a complete picture of the impact of these
measures on domestic import-dependent ﬁrms.
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1.5.4 Heterogeneous Eﬀects
We start this section of robustness checks examining the impact of AD measures on import-
competing and import-dependent ﬁrms performance by diﬀerentiating between several ﬁrms
characteristics, speciﬁcally looking at the diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters
and then estimating the impact on single and multi-product ﬁrms. The aim is to understand
whether exporters and multi-product ﬁrms are more or less exposed to these trade policies
measures. Following the previous theoretical predictions and empirical evidence (Konings
and Vandenbussche 2013; Blonigen and Prusa 2015), we would expect non-exporters and
single-product producers to proﬁt from the protection of AD duties to close their produc-
tivity and technological gaps with respect to ﬁrms at the hedge of the productivity frontier.
On the contrary, import-dependent ﬁrms that focus just on the domestic market or just
in the production of one good should be more exposed to a price increase of the inputs
of production. Since we are not able to identify the overall number of goods produced by
companies, we deﬁne ﬁrms as multi-product if they export more than one good at the HS-6
digit level according to the Custom Agency trade dataset. Thus, the analysis of single and
multi-product ﬁrms will be just focused on exporters. Table 1.10 presents the results of the
DID-PSM estimation of the impact of AD measures on French import-competing exporters,
non-exporters, single and multi-product ﬁrms.
First of all, from Table 1.10 it is possible to notice that our empirical results follow just
partially the theoretical predictions. In fact, exporting producers seem to beneﬁt the most
from the protection of EU AD measures against Chinese products, showing both an increase
in the likelihood of remaining in the market of 12% on average after 3 years and as well in
the growth of the labour force employed by 2% in the year of adoption. Nevertheless, as in
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the general case, the protection comes at the price of a lower productivity in terms of TFP,
almost 3% lower two years after the imposition of AD duties. For non-exporters instead the
introduction of AD duties does not play any signiﬁcant role except for the probability of
surviving in the sector, on average 15% higher in the following three years. Interestingly,
the picture is particularly puzzling when analysing the impact on import-competing single
and multi-product exporters. Indeed, despite a positive eﬀect on the survival rate which is
15% higher after 3 years, the introduction of AD duties negatively aﬀects the productivity
of multi-product exporters as in the general case, while having a positive impact on the level
of employment growing by 3% after three years. On the contrary, single-product producers,
despite a signiﬁcant increase in the survival probability, do not show any change in their
performance as a result of the protection of EU AD duties on Chinese products.
Table 1.11 presents instead the micro-level analysis of the eﬀect of EU anti-dumping mea-
sures against Chinese goods on import-dependent exporters, non-exporters, single and multi-
product ﬁrms. As predicted by the theoretical literature, multi-product import-dependent
exporters are the category of French ﬁrms which have mostly suﬀered the introduction of
AD measures. In fact, after the imposition of higher duties on inputs from China these
ﬁrms, which are usually larger and more productive, experience a decrease in their total fac-
tor productivity by almost 10% in the following two years, with a 10% decline in their total
employment and a 5% lower probability of maintaining the operations in their sectors. More-
over, import-competing multi-product exporters seem to suﬀer particularly in terms of export
performance, with a sharp decrease in their total exports by almost 40% two years after the
entry into force of anti-dumping measures. Thus, these results show how targeted products
imported from China have been used by French importers mainly as inputs of production for
other goods which are then re-exported towards foreign markets. As a consequence, it ap-
pears that EU AD duties on Chinese products negatively aﬀect in particular the largest and
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most productive import-dependent ﬁrms which use cheap dumped products from China as
inputs for the production of their exporting goods. We further investigate the heterogeneous
impact on French ﬁrms of EU AD measures against Chinese products by looking at the eﬀect
across the productivity distribution of French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms
in Table 1.12.
Table 1.12 presents the estimation of the eﬀect of AD duties on import-competing ﬁrms
performance across the four quartiles of the productivity distribution of French producers.
First, notice that anti-dumping measures seem to have a diﬀerent eﬀect across the productiv-
ity distribution. On the one side, these trade defence instruments seem to be more eﬀective
in protecting the least productive producers, increasing their productivity, the level of em-
ployment and the surviving probability. On the contrary, the negative eﬀect on TFP seems
to be particularly strong for producers in the upper quartile of the distribution, registering
on average a decrease of 9% in terms of productivity. These results added a further insight to
the general analysis of domestic import-competing ﬁrms, showing a shift in the allocation of
resources from more to less productive ﬁrms after the introduction of the AD protection. The
eﬀect on import-dependent ﬁrms performance across the productivity distribution shown in
Table 1.13 seems to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Table 1.13 shows how only the most productive import-dependent ﬁrms in the fourth
quartile seem to be negatively aﬀected by the imposition of anti-dumping duties, especially
in terms of TFP decreased in two years by almost 20%, total employment dropped by 30%
and probability of surviving which is almost 5% lower after three years. On the contrary,
the least productive ﬁrms among French importers seem to be better oﬀ 3 years after the
introduction of AD measures. These ﬁrms experience a marginally positive impact in terms
of productivity and survival rate, managing to increase their overall employment and the
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investment in R&D activities during the period in which the AD duties are in force.
We focus now on the second part of our robustness analysis, by looking at the heteroge-
neous eﬀect on import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms based on the characteristics
of the AD measures applied. We ﬁrst investigate the diﬀerent eﬀect of AD measures applied
on intermediate or on ﬁnal goods. Table 1.14 presents the results of these estimations diﬀer-
entiating between the impact of AD duties imposed on intermediate or ﬁnal goods for both
French import-dependent and import-competing ﬁrms.
From Table 1.14 it is possible to notice that for both producers and importers just AD
duties imposed on intermediate goods imported from China seem to have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms performance, further corroborating the results previously estimated
for the general case with an overall positive eﬀect for producers and a negative impact on
importers. This evidence highlights how anti-dumping measures are still mostly eﬀective if
imposed on imports of dumped intermediate products, despite the recent proliferation of AD
duties imposed by the EU on ﬁnal goods imported from China. In addition, it is possible to
notice a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between producers and importers. As a matter of fact, most of
the French import-competing ﬁrms protected by AD duties among producers are companies
supplying ﬁnal goods, highlighting how AD duties are eﬀective in protecting just a small
number of intermediate goods producers in France. On the contrary, most of the French
importers aﬀected by higher AD duties are specialized in the import of intermediate goods,
the category for which the AD negative eﬀect is strongest. As a result, these ﬁndings stress
that the imposition of AD measures on Chinese products has an overall positive eﬀect on a
small number of French producers of intermediate goods, while has a negative eﬀect on most
of importers which import intermediate goods from China to be used as inputs of production,
with negative consequences for productivity, total employment and export performance as
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previously demonstrated.
Thanks to the data collected from the investigation reports provided by the European
Commission, we are able to analyse the eﬀectiveness of EU AD duties on Chinese prod-
ucts diﬀerentiating between the cases in which the measures have been supported or op-
posed by French ﬁrms. It is possible to estimate in this way the impact of AD measures
on French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms when diﬀerent national interests
were involved. Table 1.15 presents the estimation of the impact of EU AD measures against
Chinese products on French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms depending on the
lobbying activity in favour or against the imposition of the AD duties. In the case of French
import-competing ﬁrms, we distinguish whether the EU anti-dumping measures has been
required by French ﬁrms or not. When looking instead at French import-dependent ﬁrms
we take into account whether the EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese imports have been
opposed by French importers or not, as reported in the European Commission investigation
reports.
First, it is possible to notice from Table 1.15 that in almost half of the cases investigated
by the EU there was at least a French petitioner who ﬁlled in a complaint to the European
Commission for a material injury suﬀered from the import of Chinese dumped products.
Secondly, as expected, this analysis conﬁrm the general results for French import-competing
ﬁrms just in the case in which there were French petitioners lobbying in favour of the AD
duties during the investigation, showing how EU AD measures are strongly linked with the
protection of national interests rather than the re-establishment of a fair international com-
petition.
Moreover, the European Commission in the AD reports includes as well whether major
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importers or ﬁnal users from the domestic European industries were involved in the investi-
gation and have lobbied against the introduction of higher duties on imports. Thanks to this
information, it is possible to evaluate the overall eﬀect of anti-dumping measures on domestic
importers, diﬀerentiating between the cases in which relevant French import-dependent ﬁrms
have lobbied the EC or not. Interestingly, Table 1.15 shows how there is very little diﬀerence
in the impact of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese goods on French importers in
the two sub-samples, except for a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the surviving probability in
the cases in which French import-dependent ﬁrms have petitioned against the adoption of
these duties. These important results stress once more the overall negative impact of higher
duties on French importers, despite the lobbying activity of import-dependent ﬁrms and the
material injury evaluation of the European Commission. As a result, these ﬁndings have high-
lighted how the political discretion could play a key role in the eﬀectiveness of anti-dumping
duties, in particular when the lobbying activity of domestic import-competing ﬁrms success-
fully protects the national protectionist interests. On the contrary, the negative impact of
anti-dumping measures on import-dependent ﬁrms seems to be widespread across the two
sub-samples, demonstrating how the lobbying activity of French importers is not eﬀective
and fails to prevent a material injury to the French import-dependent industry despite the
interests of this category should have been taken into account by the EC investigation.
So far, in the case of French import-dependent ﬁrms, we have investigated the impact of
EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese products just on the performance of importers
which were importing the dumped products from China at the moment of adoption of the
AD duty. We want to analyse now also the eﬀect on the extensive margin, considering the
performance of those ﬁrms who stopped to import "dumped" products from China after the
imposition of the AD duties, in order to provide a complete picture of the impact of these
measures on the domestic import-dependent ﬁrms. In Table 1.16 we estimate the impact of
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EU AD measures against Chinese products on French import-dependent ﬁrms diﬀerentiating
between continuing importers which have imported "dumped" Chinese goods even after the
imposition of AD duties, and ﬁrms who stop importing once the measures entered into force.
Table 1.16: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French import-dependent ﬁrms: diﬀerence between
continuing and dropping importers - ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Continuing Importers Droppers
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.123** -0.111*** -0.0298 -0.130*** -0.0970*** -0.0664
b.s.e. (0.0608) (0.0399) (0.0636) (0.0452) (0.0351) (0.0650)
Tot. Employment
ATT -0.0464** -0.119** -0.0690 -0.0474** -0.107** -0.0879**
b.s.e. (0.0210) (0.0524) (0.0433) (0.0233) (0.0428) (0.0392)
Tot. R&D
ATT -0.0155 0.111 -0.141 -0.0827 0.0918 -0.342
b.s.e. (0.175) (0.175) (0.338) (0.180) (0.148) (0.315)
Tot. Exports
ATT -0.208 0.0829 0.636* -0.250** -0.0317 0.230
b.s.e. (0.129) (0.272) (0.366) (0.104) (0.196) (0.407)
Survival Rate
ATT -0.0528*** -0.0631*** -0.135*** -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.00761
b.s.e. (0.00138) (0.0137) (0.0371) (0.0115) (0.0164) (0.0116)
Treated 372 354 183 140 134 44
Untreated 26255 26255 23491 9561 9561 8234
Note: estimation based on EAE and Custom Agency data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect estimated
using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped
standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The number of French ﬁrms included in the common treated and control groups is reported. The depen-
dent variables are the growth in ﬁrm-level productivity measured as total factor productivity following
the De Loecker (2007) approach, the growth in the number of full-time employees, the growth of R&D
investment, the increase of exports value and the probability of surviving in the market measured by a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is still present in the database in the following years and 0 otherwise.
French import-dependent ﬁrms which have kept importing Chinese goods after the imposition of the EU
anti-dumping measures are included in the sub-sample ContinuingImporters. Import-dependent ﬁrms
which have instead stopped importing the aﬀected products from China after the imposition of the EU AD
measures are included in the Droppers sub-sample. We report the ATT eﬀects of the impact of EU AD
measures against Chinese products on French ﬁrms against unaﬀected companies for the following three
years after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures.
Notice from Table 1.16 that the negative eﬀect on import-dependent ﬁrms is consistent
across the two sub-samples, demonstrating how AD duties are disruptive also for import-
dependent ﬁrms who do not import dumped products from China any more. As previously
shown, anti-dumping measures on Chinese products not only aﬀects imports from China
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increasing the dumped goods prices, but push for a general increase in the level of prices of
targeted products, with negative externalities aﬀecting imports from the rest of the world.
To analyse these externalities, in Table 1.17 we investigate further the eﬀect on French
droppers distinguishing between import-dependent ﬁrms which after the imposition of AD
duties decided to switch the import source of dumped products from China to other countries
and ﬁrms who stopped importing the dumped goods preferring to substitute them with other
intermediate inputs or switched to domestic suppliers.
It is possible to notice that ﬁrms who stopped to import the dumped products suﬀered
only a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in terms of total employment in respect to continuing im-
porters. Nevertheless, French ﬁrms who switched imports source from China to another third
country seem still to experience a reduction in the overall level of employment, total exports
and total R&D but only in the same year of the AD duties imposition, with a particularly
signiﬁcant negative impact on the probability of surviving decreased by 10% after two years.
This evidence corroborates the hypothesis of the presence of negative externalities on inter-
national trade ﬂows related to the imposition of AD measures on Chinese products, not only
aﬀecting continuous importers of Chinese dumped goods but also other import-dependent
ﬁrms who moved their sourcing to other foreign suppliers.
Finally, as a further robustness check we use a diﬀerent deﬁnition of import-competing
and import-dependent ﬁrms in order to control for possible overlaps between these two cate-
gories. As a matter of fact, in the previous estimations we might have included French ﬁrms
which were at the same time domestic producers and importers of the products targeted by
EU anti-dumping measures against China. To estimate consistently the eﬀect of these anti-
dumping measures on the two categories, we show in Table 1.18 the results of the estimations
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Table 1.17: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French import-dependent ﬁrms: diﬀerence between dropping
China and dropping product - ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Dropping China Dropping Product
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.0749 -0.0148 -0.0270 -0.0746 -0.0601 -0.0990
b.s.e. (0.0459) (0.0500) (0.0994) (0.0633) (0.0633) (0.0722)
Tot. Employment
ATT -0.0242 -0.0802* -0.105 -0.0513* -0.0753* -0.126**
b.s.e. (0.0262) (0.0485) (0.0652) (0.0282) (0.0453) (0.0629)
Tot. R&D
ATT -0.635* -0.215 -0.498 -0.135 0.0507 -0.120
b.s.e. (0.326) (0.295) (0.420) (0.356) (0.436) (0.122)
Tot. Exports
ATT -0.316** 0.0717 -0.293 -0.356* -0.211 -0.0510
b.s.e. (0.153) (0.297) (0.486) (0.202) (0.250) (0.312)
Survival Rate
ATT -0.0119*** -0.104*** 0.0189 -0.0510 0.00343 0.00735
b.s.e. (0.00279) (0.0120) (0.0169) (0.201) (0.00515) (0.0140)
Treated 94 91 39 44 42 26
Untreated 8629 8629 7433 2221 2221 1443
Note: estimation based on EAE and Custom Agency data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect esti-
mated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure.
Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of French ﬁrms included in the common treated and control groups
is reported. The dependent variables are the growth in ﬁrm-level productivity measured as total
factor productivity following the De Loecker (2007) approach, the growth in the number of full-
time employees, the growth of R&D investment, the increase of exports value and the probability
of surviving in the market measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is still present in
the database in the following years and 0 otherwise. French import-dependent ﬁrms which have
stopped importing the aﬀected products from China after the imposition of the EU AD measures
but have switched to another foreign supplier are included in the sub-sample DroppingChina.
Import-dependent ﬁrms which have instead stopped importing the aﬀected products from abroad
after the imposition of the EU AD measures are included in the DroppingProduct sub-sample.
We report the ATT eﬀects of the impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French
ﬁrms against unaﬀected companies for the following three years after the imposition of the anti-
dumping measures.
after dropping from our sample those ﬁrms which are both producers and importers at the
same time.
Notice from Table 1.18 that the general ﬁndings are corroborated by this robustness check
analysis, identifying a signiﬁcantly stronger impact on the two categories. In particular, the
imposition of EU anti-dumping measures against dumped products from China seems to
negatively aﬀect especially the productivity of French import-dependent dropping by 8% on
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Table 1.18: Impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French ﬁrms: net eﬀect dropping overlapping observations
- ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Importers Producers
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.0993** -0.0741* -0.0529 -0.0361 -0.0287 0.000838
b.s.e. (0.0456) (0.0384) (0.0653) (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0189)
Tot. Employment
ATT -0.0511** -0.109*** -0.0896* -0.0160* 0.00644** 0.0525***
b.s.e. (0.0233) (0.0407) (0.0508) (0.00906) (0.00328) (0.0125)
Tot. R&D
ATT -0.355 -0.0370 -0.191 -0.118 -0.100 0.0253
b.s.e. (0.246) (0.174) (0.354) (0.0956) (0.0993) (0.0975)
Tot. Exports
ATT -0.127* -0.216* -0.180* -0.242** -0.0177 -0.203
b.s.e. (0.066) (0.129) (0.0927) (0.120) (0.186) (0.349)
Survival Rate
ATT -0.0436*** -0.0305** -0.0402** -0.0331 0.0657*** 0.0966***
b.s.e. (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0188) (0.0224) (0.0105) (0.00649)
Treated 361 341 190 3263 3039 1397
Untreated 26188 26188 23407 18871 18871 16960
Note: estimation based on EAE and Custom Agency data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect esti-
mated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure.
Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of French ﬁrms included in the common treated and control groups is
reported. The dependent variables are the growth in ﬁrm-level productivity measured as total factor
productivity following the De Loecker (2007) approach, the growth in the number of full-time employ-
ees, the growth of R&D investment, the increase of exports value and the probability of surviving in the
market measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is still present in the database in the fol-
lowing years and 0 otherwise. After the deﬁnition on French import-competing and import-dependent
ﬁrms as previously explained, we have dropped from the two samples the overlapping observations
which at the same time are both included in the protected sectors at the NACE rev.1.1. 4-digit level
and have imported Chinese products aﬀected by EU AD measures. We report the ATT eﬀects of the
impact of EU AD measures against Chinese products on French ﬁrms against unaﬀected companies for
the following three years after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures.
average in two years, while the negative impact on producers TFP does not appear to be
statistically signiﬁcant once we removed the overlapping observations. In addition, employ-
ment grows for import-competing ﬁrms in the protected industries by 5% after three years,
while drops in the same period by almost 9% for import-dependent ﬁrms. Despite the AD
protection, total investment in R&D activities do not seem to change in the following years,
while the increased cost of inputs of production negatively aﬀects also the export perfor-
mance of French importers, reducing their total exports by almost 18% in three following
years. As previously stressed, the overall eﬀect is an increasing survival rate for domestic
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import-competing ﬁrms, which increases the probability of staying opened by 9% after three
years, while French importers seem to be more likely to exit the market, more than 4% higher
three years after the entry into force of AD duties.
To conclude, the general welfare analysis of the impact of EU anti-dumping measures
against Chinese imports on French ﬁrms is mixed. First, the imposition of AD measures has
an overall positive eﬀect on the survival rate of French ﬁrms, more likely to to stay operative
in the market by 8% after 2 years despite a negative impact on a small number of import-
dependent ﬁrms. The overall protection eﬀect in terms of employment is almost negligible:
the larger negative impact on a small number of import-dependent ﬁrms causing the loss of
almost 18,000 jobs three years after the imposition of AD duties is almost compensated by
the small increase of employment in a larger number of protected import-competing ﬁrms,
creating more than 20,000 new job opportunities. French ﬁrms R&D investment does not
change as a result of EU AD duties, while import-dependent exports are reduced by almost
21% in three years time, losing foreign sales contracts for a value of more than e4,121 million.
Finally, as previously shown, EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports negatively
aﬀect the productivity of both import-competing and import-dependent French ﬁrms, with
an aggregate drop of almost 4.2% of French ﬁrms TFP in the three years following the en-
try into force of these AD duties and a perverse long-run negative eﬀect which reduces the
productivity gap between French ﬁrms and their international competitors from emerging
countries.
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1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed the eﬀectiveness of European anti-dumping measures on
Chinese products, investigating whether they constitute a curse or a blessing for European
ﬁrms. Using product, sector and ﬁrm-level data from the EU and France we provided a
comprehensive analysis of this trade-defence instrument, considering the impact on EU trade
ﬂows, on protected European industries and on the performance of French import-competing
and import-dependent ﬁrms.
At the product-level, we found that EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products cause
an overall trade destruction eﬀect. This impact is mainly driven by the drop in imports vol-
ume of targeted products from China, partially compensated by a trade diversion eﬀect with
an increase of imports from the rest of the world despite a surge in the price of imported
products. Overall these results show how anti-dumping measures on Chinese products push
towards an overall increase of targeted goods prices, bringing to a substitution of Chinese
imports with imports from the rest of the world and an increase in the domestic production.
In addition, EU anti-dumping measures seem to be successful in protecting the European
industries from the material injury caused by the unfair competition of dumped Chinese
products. In particular, with a stable number of ﬁrms operating in these sectors, total em-
ployment increases after the entry into force of higher duties, stimulating as well the overall
European production and the productivity in terms of added-value per worker.
Thanks to the ﬁrm-level analysis we found evidence that anti-dumping measures suc-
cessfully protect French producers from the unfair competition of dumped Chinese products,
increasing the probability of surviving in the market and supporting the employment growth,
despite a drop in their total factor productivity. Nevertheless, these anti-dumping measures
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decrease French import-dependent ﬁrms performance, negatively aﬀecting their productivity
and consistently reducing their total employment and the probability of surviving in the
market.
In particular, we found that EU AD measures protect the least productive French produc-
ers, while negatively aﬀecting especially the most productive multi-product exporters which
were importing dumped products from China to use them as cheap inputs in their production
process, reducing in particular their export performance. Moreover, our results stressed that
for both import-competing and import-dependent French ﬁrms just AD duties imposed on
intermediate goods imported from China had a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on their perfor-
mance, highlighting how anti-dumping measures are mostly eﬀective if imposed on imports of
dumped intermediate products, despite the recent proliferation of AD duties imposed by the
EU on ﬁnal goods imported from China. Finally, diﬀerentiating between AD investigations
supported or opposed by French petitioners we have shown how the political discretion and
the lobbying activity of ﬁrms could play a role in the eﬀectiveness of anti-dumping duties,
successfully protecting the petitioning import-competing ﬁrms but failing to avoid the nega-
tive eﬀect for import-dependent ﬁrms.
Our results are consistent across speciﬁcations and robust to diﬀerent checks. Taken
together, the results suggest that EU anti-dumping measures successfully target Chinese
dumped products, pushing an increase in the level of prices and decreasing import volumes
from China which are in turn substituted by a larger domestic production and by imported
goods from other extra-EU countries. European producers seem to be more protected by the
unfair dumping competition, experiencing a higher employment growth and larger domestic
production. At the same time, larger European importers are negatively aﬀected by AD mea-
sures, forced to divert their imports to other extra-EU countries at higher prices, and losing
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productivity with a consequent negative impact on total employment, export performance
and survival rate. The aggregate impact of EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese prod-
ucts on French import-dependent and import-competing ﬁrms is mixed, deﬁnitely bringing a
temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but with a negative eﬀect on importers and high-
lighting a large degree of politicization in the management of this trade defence instrument.
CHAPTER 1. EU ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CHINESE PRODUCTS 102
Appendix A1
Figure A.1.1: Propensity scores regressors bias between observations in the treated and control groups before and after the
kernel matching technique
1. Product-level
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2. Sector-level
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3. Firm-level: Producers
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4. Firm-level: Importers
Note: Propensity scores for the level of analysis (product-level, sector-level, producers and importers ﬁrm-level) estimated using
a logit model. Kernel matching technique applied with a 0.01 bandwidth and imposing a common support condition. Treated
observations are in the common support if their propensity score is lower than the maximum and higher than the minimum
score of the control units.
CHAPTER 1. EU ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CHINESE PRODUCTS 106
Figure A.1.2: Density distribution of propensity scores for observations in the treated and control group
1. Product-level
2. Sector-level
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3. Firm-level: Producers
4. Firm-level: Importers
Note: Propensity scores for the level of analysis (product-level, sector-level, producers and importers ﬁrm-level) estimated using
a logit model.
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Table A.1.1: Product-level variables summary statistics.
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. No.Firms
Chinese Imp. Penetration 0.050 0.1094159 0 0.989 81,627 6,279
No. Fil. Cases 0.0842 0.365 0 6 81,627 6,279
Val. Imp. China 1980 17300 0 1690000 81,627 6,279
Val. Intra-EU 27400 151000 0 7720000 81,627 6,279
Val. Imp. ROW 14600 197000 0 27500000 81,627 6,279
Val. Tot. Imports 44100 298000 0 31100000 81,627 6,279
Price Imp. China 2614.08 293574 0 60800000 81,627 6,279
Price intra-EU 7390.02 859593 0.579 202000000 81,627 6,279
Price Imp. ROW 10334 751447 0 132000000 81,627 6,279
Price Tot. Imp. 2299.6 780878 0.0832 88200000 81,627 6,279
Vol. Imp. China 5.93 69.24 0 89,700 81,627 6,279
Vol. Intra-EU 200.05 20,000 0 1,170,900 81,627 6,279
Vol. Imp. ROW 235.87 68,700 0 5,649,000 81,627 6,279
Vol. Tot. Imp. 441.86 88,367 0 6,409,000 81,627 6,279
Note: Statistics based on the Eurostat COMEXT data and on the Global Anti-dumping Database for the period
1999-2007. The ﬁgures refer to EU bilateral import data at the HS6 product-level on European imports from
China, on intra-EU trade and on imports from the rest of the world. Import value at the expressed in million of
Euro. Import penetration deﬁned as the share of EU imports from China over total EU imports for each product
at the HS-6 digit level. Imports volume expressed in million of kilos. The import price is calculated by dividing
the imports value and volume as reported by the Eurostat COMEXT database. Filling cases refer to the num-
ber of previous anti-dumping investigations started by the European Commission on each product at the HS-6
digit level, as reported in the EC Investigation Reports. All monetary values deﬂated using 2010 as a base year.
Table A.1.2: Sector-level variables summary statistics.
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. No.Firms
Chinese Imp. Penetration 0.103 0.151 0 0.849 2,281 243
Employment Growth -0.792 6.345 -10.0 15.5 2,281 243
Added-value 29.592 10.359 -159.9 61.3 2,281 243
No. Fil. Cases 0.385 2.591 0 89 2,281 243
Export value 3740 7700 0.315 88300 2,281 243
Import value 349000 7700 0.1477 120000 2,281 243
Investment. Int. 12.25 102.12 -476.5 627.4 2,281 243
Tot. Production 17000 28100 3.284 403000 2,281 243
No. Firms 1060.58 3407.89 2 49173 2,281 243
Tot. Employment 16491.18 24026.92 0 188241 2,281 243
Turnover 3058.28 7477.36 -154.5 151145.1 2,281 243
Tot. R&D 126.96 373.88 0 2612 2,281 243
Labour Prod. 55.07 26.883 -39.4 289.60 2,281 243
Note: Statistics based on the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database about all European
manufacturing sectors at the 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 level in the period 1999-2007. The statistics show the
average number of ﬁrms operating in the sectors, the logarithm of the average added-value measured as
the net income from operating activities after adjusting for subsidies and indirect taxes, the average labour
productivity measured as the ratio between turnover and total employment, the average employment growth
and the average number of employees in the sectors, the investment intensity measured as the ratio between
investment in ﬁxed assets and total output, the logarithmic value of R&D investment, the logarithm of the
average export and import value in the industries, the overall physical output and the turnover in thousand
of Euro, the import penetration from China measured as the value of Chinese imports over total imports in
the sector and the number of petitions submitted to the European Commission about anti-dumping investi-
gations. All monetary values have been deﬂated using 2010 as a base year.
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Table A.1.3: Firm-level variables summary statistics.
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs. No.Firms
Tot. Employment 127.61 708.40 1 111907 211,889 36,694
Av. Salary 25,049 9,280 525.28 935,072 211,889 36,694
TFP 4.450 0.618 -1.863 8.942 211,889 36,694
Tot. R&D 656.16 13524.38 0 1,628,152 211,889 36,694
Tot. Exports 10,985 207,577 0 27,100,000 211,889 36,694
Pr. Exporter 0.72 0.44 0 1 211,889 36,694
Tot. Imports 45,132 503.007 0 64,500,000 211,889 36,694
Survival Rate 0.94 0.22 0 1 211,889 36,694
Note: Statistics based on the Annual French Business Survey (EAE) for the period 1999-2007. The
summary statistics refer to the yearly average number of employees per ﬁrm, the average annual
salary paid in Euro, the average ﬁrm productivity estimated as the log of total factor productivity
following the De Loecker (2007) approach, the average investment in R&D activities and the average
value of exports and imports in thousands of Euro, the probability of being an exporter measured
with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has registered positive foreign sales and 0 otherwise,
and the survival rate measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is still present in the
database in the following years and 0 otherwise. All monetary values have been deﬂated using OECD
production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline.
Table A.1.4: Matching balancing test at the product level
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Red. Bias t p>|t| var. residuals
IP (China)pt−1 Unmatched 0.1341 0.0480 72.3 6.28 0.000 2.17
Matched 0.1341 0.1315 2.1 97.1 0.08 0.934 0.94
No.F il.Casespt−1 Unmatched 1.190 0.0762 164.1 25.44 0.000 2.35
Matched 1.1904 0.9475 8.69 69.2 1.6 0.112 0.96
SampleStat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 MeanBias Med.Bias B R %bad
Unmatched 0.197 190.18 0.000 81 63.9 195.7 3.4 50
Matched 0.0369 6.49 0.166 23 19.6 45.9 0.65 0
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching tech-
nique. Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and
after the implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the co-
variates included in the logit model before and after the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of the matching
procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample com-
pared to those in the unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index
of the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present summary statis-
tics regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on
raw or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covari-
ates. In addition, we present the mean and median bias as indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally,
the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched
non-treated groups, the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index, while
the last column shows the percentage of covariates orthogonal to the propensity score before and after the matching algorithm.
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Table A.1.5: Matching balancing test at the sector level
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Red. Bias t p>|t| var. residuals
IP (China)st−1 Unmatched 0.2084 0.0989 59.1 3.76 0.000 1.59
Matched 0.1836 0.1358 25.8 56.4 0.87 0.391 0.91
∆Employmentst−1 Unmatched 9.497 8.861 51.0 2.23 0.025 0.77
Matched 9.444 9.282 13 74.59 0.47 0.640 0.74
AddedV aluest−1 Unmatched 3.345 3.375 -8.80 -0.41 0.680 0.9
Matched 3.3411 3.3166 7.2 18.39 0.21 0.832 0.56
Invest.Int.st−1 Unmatched 14.923 12.032 3.9 0.14 0.891 0.36
Matched 15.050 14.425 0.8 78.40 0.22 0.826 0.62
No.F il.Casesst−1 Unmatched 6.000 0.246 46.9 15.62 0.000 1.79
Matched 1.954 1.805 1.2 97.4 0.17 0.867 0.76
SampleStat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 MeanBias Med.Bias B R %bad
Unmatched 0.162 42.63 0.000 34.6 36.7 55 69.55 14
Matched 0.021 1.32 0.987 8.4 7.2 34.1 1.26 0
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching tech-
nique. Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and
after the implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the co-
variates included in the logit model before and after the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of the matching
procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample com-
pared to those in the unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index
of the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present summary statistics
regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw
or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In
addition, we present the mean and median bias as indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally, the Rubin's
B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched non-treated
groups, the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index, while the last
column shows the percentage of covariates orthogonal to the propensity score before and after the matching algorithm.
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Table A.1.6: Matching balancing test at the ﬁrm-level for French producers
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Red. Bias t p>|t| var. residuals
ImportPenetrationst−1 Unmatched 0.216 0.080 88.6 62.44 0.000 1.9
Matched 0.214 0.147 23.4 51.0 15.17 0.098 0.89
∆Employmentst−1 Unmatched -1.791 -0.464 -23.9 -11.32 0.000 0.21
Matched -1.509 -2.150 11.6 51.7 4.349 0.152 0.41
AddedV aluest−1 Unmatched 30.780 31.991 -16.3 -8.32 0.000 0.52
Matched 30.768 29.079 22.8 -39.29 9.35 0.277 0.69
InvestmentIntst−1 Unmatched 13.88 11.65 5.9 2.54 0.010 0.14
Matched 13.986 15.334 -3.6 39.5 -6.04 0.111 0.53
Tot.Employmentit−1 Unmatched 4.168 3.926 24.9 14.26 0.000 1.01
Matched 4.188 4.374 -19.2 23.1 -6.77 0.133 0.63
TFPit−1 Unmatched 4.458 4.392 11.1 6.14 0.000 0.87
Matched 4.469 4.561 -15.5 -39.4 -5.74 0.562 0.73
Exporterit−1 Unmatched 0.842 0.683 38.20 19.93 0.000 0.62
Matched 0.849 0.869 -4.8 87.4 -2.34 0.109 1.13
No.F il.Casesst−1 Unmatched 4.331 0.360 38.0 47.88 0.000 14.78
Matched 1.865 2.002 -1.3 96.5 -1.65 0.289 0.94
SampleStat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 MeanBias Med.Bias B R %bad
Unmatched 0.17 3998.45 0.000 30.2 24.4 65.2 0.91 50
Matched 0.045 413.51 0.000 17.3 13.5 51 0.54 3
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the logit model before and after the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of the matching procedure.
Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample compared to those
in the unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of the propensity
score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present summary statistics regarding the whole
sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw or matched samples
and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In addition, we present
the mean and median bias as indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally, the Rubin's B shows the absolute
standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched non-treated groups, the Rubin's R is
the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index, while the last column shows the percentage of
covariates orthogonal to the propensity score before and after the matching algorithm.
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Table A.1.7: Matching balancing test at the ﬁrm-level for French importers
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Red. Bias t p>|t| var. residuals
ImportPenetrationpt−1 Unmatched 0.238 0.080 100.1 27.18 0.000 1.94
Matched 0.207 0.199 5.0 95.0 0.62 0.532 1.05
Tot.Employmentit−1 Unmatched 4.904 4.033 75.8 17.82 0.000 1.98
Matched 4.905 4.953 -4.2 94.5 -0.46 0.646 0.73
TFPit−1 Unmatched 4.901 4.408 73.40 16.43 0.000 1.74
Matched 4.912 4.993 -12.2 83.3 -1.54 0.124 1.06
Exporterit−1 Unmatched 0.971 0.687 81.59 12.6 0.000 0.16
Matched 0.970 0.964 1.7 97.9 0.46 0.647 0.84
Tot.Importsit−1 Unmatched 15.348 6.656 171.4 25.38 0.000 0.81
Matched 15.31 15.304 -0.5 99.6 -0.18 0.854 0.42
No.F il.Casespt−1 Unmatched 5.543 0.41258 37.5 37.86 0.000 83.29
Matched 2.109 2.238 -0.9 97.5 -0.24 0.808 4.25
SampleStat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 MeanBias Med.Bias B R %bad
Unmatched 0.320 1350 0.000 90 78.7 195.1 0.51 33
Matched 0.021 23.32 0.001 10.19 3.4 35.1 1.27 3
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the logit model before and after the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of the matching procedure.
Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample compared to those
in the unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of the propensity
score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present summary statistics regarding the whole
sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw or matched samples
and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In addition, we present
the mean and median bias as indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally, the Rubin's B shows the absolute
standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched non-treated groups, the Rubin's R is
the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index, while the last column shows the percentage of
covariates orthogonal to the propensity score before and after the matching algorithm.
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Abstract
Innovation and technological development have always played a key role in enhanc-
ing ﬁrms' productivity and overall economic growth. One important but relatively
little researched area is the relationship between innovation and international
trade and the ways in which R&D activities improve export performances. This
chapter contributes to the existing literature by assessing the impact of innovation
on ﬁrms' international trade performance, disentangling this eﬀect looking at the
impact on the extensive and intensive margins of trade. In addition, we take
into account both input and output measures of innovation by controlling for
R&D expenditure and indicators of product and process innovation. Applying a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to French export data at the ﬁrm-product level
we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of past investment in R&D on exports. In particular, our
results suggest that R&D activities increase both total exports and the probability
of being an exporter. Secondly, ﬁrms that introduce product innovation tend to
improve their export performance particularly by increasing the number of products
exported and countries served. Overall, from our analysis it appears clearly that
R&D is an essential activity for French ﬁrms to improve their performance in
highly competitive foreign markets.
JEL classiﬁcation: D22, D24, F14, F23, F61, O31, O33
Keywords: ﬁrm heterogeneity, innovation, export, productivity, trade margins
A draft of this chapter had previously been submitted to the CEPII 2015 Confer-
ence on Firm Heterogeneity, the 13th GEP Annual Postgraduate Conference, the Italian
Trade Study Group Conference 2013 and the European Trade Study Group Conference 2013
and is available at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/documents/conferences/2013-14/
13th-post-graduate-conference/papers/vanino.pdf.
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2.1 Introduction
Innovation and technological development have always been considered central to enhance
ﬁrms' productivity and trade performance. A substantial literature has established that dif-
ferences in ﬁrm performance are partially explained by the ability of ﬁrms to be successful
innovators, which further increases productivity and survival rates (Grossman and Helpman
1994a; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Huergo and Jaumandreu 2004; Griﬃth et al. 2006; Aw
et al. 2011; Van Long et al. 2011; Hallak and Sivadasan 2013). Particularly relevant in this
regard is the impact of innovation on international trade, and the diﬀerent ways in which
research and development activities aﬀect ﬁrm export performance. Even though this re-
lationship has been widely analysed in the theoretical literature, often with very diﬀerent
predictions, few empirical studies have investigated the impact of R&D activities on export
ﬂows, especially at the ﬁrm level (Cassiman et al. 2010; Caldera 2010; Chen 2013; Becker
and Egger 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni 2015). Identifying the determinants of ﬁrm export
performance is increasingly relevant to fully understand the trade patterns unobservable at
the aggregate level. Particularly nowadays, the extraordinary economic performance of new
emerging countries underlines the importance of productivity-enhancing activities, such as
investment in innovation, as key drivers of ﬁrms' ability to successfully compete in interna-
tional markets, to underpin sustainable economic growth and to create new job opportunities.
In this chapter we investigate the role played by innovation in improving the international
trade performance of ﬁrms, taking into account diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrms innovation and ex-
port strategies. Our main contribution is to decompose the eﬀect of innovation on exports
taking into account not only total exports and the probability of being an exporter but also
the extensive and intensive margins of trade. Using transaction-level data we deﬁne the in-
tensive margin of trade as the average value of ﬁrm's shipments, while as extensive margin
we consider three diﬀerent dimensions, looking at the number of varieties exported, the num-
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ber of destinations served by each ﬁrm and at the average number of products exported by
French ﬁrms to each foreign market. In this way it is possible to establish whether innovation
activities improve exporters' performance creating new trade links, enriching ﬁrms' product
mix and opening new export markets, or if they support the intensiﬁcation of existing ﬂows.
This chapter also assesses the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of innovation on export perfor-
mance, by simultaneously taking into account innovation input and output measures. This
approach presents a number of advantages. First, measures of R&D output may be more
accurate in identifying the connection between innovation and export performance, providing
a direct link connecting investment in R&D and the commercial adoption of an innovation.
At the same time, by measuring investment in R&D it is possible to evaluate the overall
eﬀect of ﬁrms' R&D eﬀorts on exports performance, taking into account the possible eﬀect
of R&D which do not result in the introduction of new products, processes or patents.
Our analysis is based on export data at the transaction level and detailed information
on French ﬁrms' innovation eﬀorts for the period 1999-2007. Such rich data allow to inves-
tigate the eﬀects of innovation on trade ﬂows across industries and countries. This chapter
explores the role of innovation on the capacity of French ﬁrms to increase their export per-
formance controlling for a wide range of ﬁrm characteristics, and taking into consideration
possible endogeneity concerns. We employ a range of econometric approaches including dy-
namic ﬁxed-eﬀects models, a generalized method of moments (GMM) and propensity score
matching techniques to provide a rigorous investigation to the causality debate. This study
is particularly relevant for a mature industrialized country such as France which is facing
increasing competition in international markets from new emerging countries. Moreover,
France is an interesting case study given the lively internal debate on globalisation and its
consequences which has stimulated academic and non-academic discussions on its role in the
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economic crisis, particularly opposing the supporters of free trade and the advocates of na-
tional protectionism1.
To brieﬂy summarise our results we ﬁnd that diﬀerent trade margins respond in diﬀerent
ways to innovation activities. For instance, total investment in R&D has a positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect across diﬀerent trade margins, increasing total exports through the export of
more products and the targeting of more countries. The introduction of innovative products
helps ﬁrms to export new varieties to new foreign markets while innovation plays a marginal
role in improving the average value of shipments abroad. In particular, the positive eﬀect of
innovation on ﬁrms trade margins seems to be mainly driven by small and medium domestic
ﬁrms exporting within the EU relatively small volumes or exporting to extra-EU countries.
Taken together, our ﬁndings show how diﬀerent innovation activities have diﬀerent and some-
times contrasting eﬀects on various measures of export performance. Our analysis suggests
that policy makers should pay particular attention to the role played by innovation as a
driver of internationalization and that policies to encourage innovation and trade should be
looked at considering the diﬀerent trade margins.
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of
the theoretical and empirical literature. In section 3 the data sources are presented showing
the descriptive evidence from an overview of French ﬁrms' innovating and exporting strate-
gies over our period of analysis. Section 4 describes our methodological approach. Section 5
presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
1For a review of this topic see Strauss-Kahn 2004; Barba Navaretti et al. 2010; Hijzen et al. 2011; Chang
et al. 2012; Corcos et al. 2012; Mion and Zhu 2013.
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2.2 Literature Review
The last ten years has witnessed a growing literature that examines the export performance
of ﬁrms in order to fully understand the evolution of changing trade patterns and to identify
the drivers of international competitiveness that are otherwise unobservable at the country
or industry level (Bernard et al. 2003, Bernard et al. 2006, Bernard et al. 2007; Melitz
2003; Costantini and Melitz 2007; Yeaple 2005). The competitive threat from new emerging
countries has served to highlight the importance of productivity-enhancing activities as key
drivers of ﬁrms ability to successfully compete in international markets (Bekes et al. 2011;
Mayer and Ottaviano 2007; Mion and Zhu 2013). In the following sections we provide a com-
prehensive review of the previous literature on the relationship between international trade
and innovation, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We will then look at
the diﬀerent eﬀects of input and output measures of innovations on ﬁrms' performance and
focusing ﬁnally our attention on the literature examining ﬁrm trade margins.
2.2.1 Theoretical Background
A recent strand of the theoretical literature examines the potential linkage between ﬁrms'
engagement in innovation activities and export performance in order to identify the source
of exporter heterogeneity. Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) for instance theorize that anticipation
of future trade cost reductions induce ﬁrms to start innovating to be prepared for tougher in-
ternational competition. Similarly, Rubini (2010), Vannoorenberghe (2011) and Atkeson and
Burstein (2010) show that international trade does matter for innovation, highlighting how
improved access to foreign markets promotes ﬁrms' investment in R&D activities. Several
studies using ﬁrm-level data ﬁnd evidence of a positive correlation between exporting and
ﬁrm innovation eﬀorts, demonstrating how trade cost reductions increase the proﬁtability of
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investment in R&D which in turn drives more productive ﬁrms to enter new foreign markets
(Parisi et al. 2006; Harrison et al. 2008; Bøler et al. 2012; Crespo 2012).
The Impact of Trade on R&D
One of the main theoretical perspectives stresses that international activities such as for-
eign investment, imports or exports, could push some ﬁrms to innovate more, triggering a
learning-by-exporting eﬀect. In fact, it could be easier for internationalized ﬁrms to access
diﬀerent sources of knowledge not available in the domestic market, especially through the in-
teraction with foreign customers, partners or suppliers, facilitating in this way a bidirectional
exchange of knowledge across borders. De Loecker (2011) for example emphasizes how the
previous theoretical literature might have failed to identify the right direction of the causal
link between innovation and exports, not decomposing the aggregate productivity growth
into within-ﬁrm productivity gains due to innovation and between-ﬁrm productivity gains.
Looking at the entry and exit patterns from export markets, many studies ﬁnd evidence of
learning-by-exporting phenomena and ﬁrm-level adjustments to trade liberalization, further
corroborating the idea that a reduction in trade costs related to trade liberalization could
induce exporters to upgrade their products and ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to introduce new tech-
nologies (Bustos 2011; Iacovone and Javorcik 2012)2.
Nevertheless, several studies identify diﬀerent caveats to the learning-by-exporting theory.
For instance, Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) while investigating the causal link between exports
and productivity gains identify the crucial role played by previous investment in R&D in or-
der to improve ﬁrms export performance anticipating future trade liberalization. In addition,
2For an extensive treatment of the empirical literature on this topic see for instance Grossman and Helpman
(1994a); Clerides et al. (1998); Dai and Yu (2013); Movahedi and Gaussens (2013); Salomon and Shaver
(2005); Van Beveren and Vandenbussche (2009); Damijan et al. (2010); Bratti and Felice (2012).
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Movahedi and Gaussens (2013) focusing on a sample of French small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) identify a relevant learning-by-exporting eﬀect only for persistent and experienced
exporters. Similarly, Girma et al. (2008) do not ﬁnd any proof of this phenomenon for new
exporters and for ﬁrms with a low exposure to foreign markets, especially for companies
based in mature developed economies.
The Interdependence of Trade and R&D
Another strand of the theoretical literature analyses the existence of an interdependence be-
tween exports and R&D activities. Particularly relevant in this regard are Aw et al. (2008)
and Aw et al. (2011) studies which propose a structural model of the interdependency between
R&D, exports and productivity. Their theoretical framework presents a two-way relationship,
in which, on one hand innovation increases ﬁrms' productivity with the ﬁrm self-selecting
into export markets, and on the other hand participation in international activities which
increases the return on R&D investment. The model suggests a complex interconnection
between the two phenomena within ﬁrms' boundaries, with a strong cross-persistence of pro-
ductive ﬁrms in both export and R&D activities, during which past R&D investment increase
the propensity to export and vice versa. Using ﬁrm and plant-level data the authors develop
an empirical model which can be estimated in two stages. After constructing a measure of
productivity, in the second stage the authors estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of
the decision to export and to invest in R&D, conditional on the export markets shocks and
the marginal distribution of productivity. The results show that both activities are found to
have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms productivity, driving in turn more ﬁrms to self-select into both
activities. In addition, thanks to a simulation the authors demonstrate that an expansion
of the export market seems to increase both exporting and R&D investment, generating a
gradual ﬁrm productivity improvement (Aw et al. 2011).
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Several other studies ﬁnd empirical evidence to support this complementarity. For in-
stance, Bellone et al. (2009) consider export intensity and two diﬀerent measures of R&D
outcomes, process and product innovation, for a sample of French ﬁrms and found that
R&D and exports are complementary strategies, which if implemented together improve ce-
teris paribus ﬁrms' performance both in terms of productivity, innovation and total exports.
Similarly, Harris and Moﬀat (2011) considering contemporaneously these two strategies ﬁnd
evidence of both learning-by-exporting phenomenon and a large impact of R&D expenditure
on the probability of being an exporter. Finally, Esteve-Pérez and Rodriguez (2013), follow-
ing Aw et al. (2011), ﬁnd a strong cross-persistence of small and medium Spanish ﬁrms in
both export and R&D activities, highlighting the key role played by previous R&D invest-
ment in increasing the propensity to export, which in turn improves ﬁrms' ability to innovate
and absorb new technologies from foreign markets.
The Impact of R&D on Trade
Alternative economic theories look instead at the impact of R&D on trade based on the
Melitz (2003) and Grossman et al. (2006) open economy growth models, starting from the
key hypothesis of innovation-driven exports. From dynamic models with heterogeneous ﬁrms
à-la-Melitz (2003) we know that investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets leads to the selection of
more productive ﬁrms into international markets, with innovation considered a key determi-
nant of a ﬁrm's export propensity. Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) for example extend the previous research and consider both export and innovation
activities as endogenous joint dynamic decisions, building models in which ﬁrms face un-
certainty and sunk costs both for starting to export and to innovate. In these models the
performance of heterogeneous ﬁrms is endogenous and aﬀected by innovation decisions at the
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ﬁrm level, introducing a trade-oﬀ between current costs and possible future returns in terms
of export performance. In order to identify this link between innovation and export deci-
sions, Caldera (2010) derives a theoretical framework building on the Bustos (2011) model
of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Using data on exports and the product and process innovation of
Spanish ﬁrms, the empirical analysis conﬁrms the theoretical predictions that show how pro-
cess innovation indirectly helps export performance by reducing marginal costs, while the
introduction of new products directly aﬀects ﬁrms' export propensity by increasing the de-
mand for their products in existing and new markets. Similarly, Ferguson (2012) develops a
model of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms where ﬁrms compete with each other by investing in
R&D. Firm-level data for the Swedish manufacturing industries validate the model predic-
tions as industries with high rates of R&D intensity are characterized by a larger number of
exporters, showing as well how these sectors are usually less sensitive to trade costs. Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013) extend the previous theories by developing a model of international
trade incorporating two diﬀerent sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity, considering both process and
product productivity, the ﬁrst deﬁned as the traditional productivity, while the second con-
sidered as ﬁrms' ability to introduce innovative products. Distinguishing between these two
diﬀerent sources of ﬁrm productivity and assuming decreasing trade costs when quality is
increasing, the model considers export performance as conditional to the ability of ﬁrms to
upgrade their product quality and to reduce costs of production. They ﬁnd empirical sup-
port for their model for manufacturing plants in developed and developing countries. Overall,
these trade theories seem to suggest that export premium may be mainly driven by previous
investment in R&D activities, especially when they result in a product innovation.
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2.2.2 Innovation Strategies
A number of studies, using ﬁrm-level data, test empirically the theories described above,
ﬁnding evidence of a linkage connecting ﬁrms' innovation eﬀorts and export performance,
demonstrating how ﬁrms more prone to invest in R&D activities might enhance their pro-
ductivity and hence improve their capacity to engage in international trade. In this section
we present the growing empirical literature which analyses the link between innovation and
trade performance, in particular focusing on the diﬀerent measures of innovation used in the
economic literature so far.
The ﬁrst strand of the empirical literature investigates this relationship taking into con-
sideration input measures such as workers training and total investment in R&D. Aw and Lee
(2009) for instance applying a random-eﬀect estimation on micro-level data of the electronic
industry in Taiwan ﬁnd that investment in R&D and skill upgrading improves ﬁrm productiv-
ity by reinforcing the self-selection process of more productive ﬁrms into export participation.
Cassiman and Golovko (2007) instead explore the innovation-productivity-export link using a
non-parametric approach for a panel of Spanish ﬁrms. Their results demonstrate the key role
played by previous ﬁrm's investment in R&D in explaining the positive export-productivity
association for a sample of small innovators. Similarly, Egger et al. (2014) compare the ﬂex-
ible relationship between foreign sales, productivity and R&D using both a semi-parametric
and a log-linear approach with French ﬁrm-level data. They do not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
results between the two approaches, highlighting the robustness of the positive link between
R&D investment and exports.
A second and larger strand of the literature focuses on the impact of R&D output mea-
sures on ﬁrms' exports, in other words considering the impact of the introduction of process
and product innovation or the total number of patents registered. This approach has a num-
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ber of advantages. First, trade theories often consider the adoption of a new technology
as a suitable measure to estimate the eﬀect of R&D on export performance, since only the
introduction of a product innovation rather than R&D investment is considered to have a
direct impact on international trade (Hallak 2006; Hallak and Sivadasan 2013). Secondly,
several empirical studies show that measures of patents and product innovation are much
more closely associated with the value and the signiﬁcance of innovation, which in turn is
more relevant for international trade (Trajtenberg 1990; Jaﬀe et al. 2000; Hall et al. 2001).
Nevertheless, just considering number of patents and innovations introduced could underes-
timate the real impact of ﬁrms' R&D eﬀorts, since these measures do not take properly into
account the possible innovations introduced but not registered as patents, and neglect as well
the role of R&D investment in upgrading workers skills and ﬁrm productivity (Aw and Lee
2009).
Cassiman et al. (2010) for example deepen the analysis of the innovation-export link con-
sidering both product and process innovation measures, but ﬁnd evidence of the important
role played only by product innovation in explaining ﬁrm self-selection into export markets.
Testing for diﬀerences in the probability distribution of starting to export between innovators
and non-innovators for a sample of Spanish ﬁrms, the authors identify two diﬀerent channels
through which the introduction of a new product aﬀects ﬁrms' export strategy. First, product
innovation has a direct positive eﬀect on exporters, increasing the demand for the new good
abroad and opening new foreign markets. Secondly, successful product innovation increases
the likelihood of the ﬁrm to start exporting, since fostering productivity-enhancing invest-
ment activates indirectly the exporters' self-selection mechanism. Becker and Egger (2013)
improve the econometric analysis taking into account the endogeneity of the link connecting
R&D and foreign sales and providing a rigorous empirical analysis of the eﬀects of new prod-
uct and process innovations on export propensity at the ﬁrm level. Considering innovations
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as an endogenous "treatment" and adopting a matching technique approach to innovations
and export propensity for German ﬁrm-level data, the authors ﬁnd a greater importance
of product innovation relative to process innovation for the decision of starting to export.
These results are in line with the new trade theory predictions where product innovation is
the key factor explaining market entry while process innovations should just help secure a
market position. Similarly, Palangkaraya (2013) adopts a comparable approach using Aus-
tralian small and medium enterprises data. The results show that exports and innovation are
positively linked but depends on the industry and the type of R&D activity. For instance,
the joint adoption of product and process innovations has a positive eﬀect on export par-
ticipation especially in the manufacturing industry, while to a lesser extent previous export
experience may lead to innovation in particular in the services industry. However, other ﬁnd-
ings in the literature point out instead the relevance of process innovation for ﬁrms' export
performance, especially related to possible extra-productivity growth (Huergo and Jauman-
dreu 2004; Mairesse 2008). For instance Parisi et al. (2006) using micro-level data on Italy
highlight how process innovations not only have a signiﬁcant impact on productivity, but
this R&D activity can further improve export performance by facilitating the absorption of
new technologies from foreign markets.
Building on Caldera (2010), Lo Turco and Maggioni (2015) further expand this approach
dissecting the impact of innovation on ﬁrms' export participation and testing the relationship
between diﬀerent innovation strategies and various exporting markets with diﬀerent prefer-
ences towards product quality and costs. Using a propensity score matching approach in a
multiple treatment framework, the authors ﬁnd that a joint adoption of both product and
process innovations encourages Turkish ﬁrms to start exporting. Moreover, as predicted by
previous theoretical models (Caldera 2010; Hallak and Sivadasan 2013) product innovation
seems to have a larger positive eﬀect especially for exports towards low income countries.
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On the contrary, Turkish ﬁrms should jointly implement product and process innovations in
order to increase their exports towards developed countries, not only increasing the product
mix quality but also reducing their production costs.
Recently, even policy-based research using micro-level data emphasize a causal eﬀect con-
necting innovation and exports and stress the importance of ﬁrm-level performance in terms of
productivity and innovating activities to support countries export performance. Rubini et al.
(2012) for instance, using cross-sectional data for the main European countries demonstrate
how removing diﬀerent obstacles such as trade barriers, innovation costs and tax distortions
will positively aﬀect ﬁrms' decisions over these activities enhancing ﬁrms growth. Building
on the Haaland and Kind (2008) trade model, the authors demonstrate that the returns from
reducing the cost of innovation has a much greater impact on ﬁrms' growth than reducing
trade costs, suggesting that countries should focus on promoting innovation investment in
order to improve ﬁrms' export performance. Moreover, Altomonte et al. (2013) analysing a
cross-country sample of European ﬁrms show how innovation is the main channel through
which productivity growth happens in the EU, identifying a casual link between innovating
activities and ﬁrms' internationalization. Their results suggest that policy makers should fo-
cus on the promotion of innovation investment in order to increase ﬁrms' sales abroad rather
than engaging in diﬃcult, costly and long trade negotiations.
2.2.3 Innovation and Trade Margins
The literature analysed so far focuses on measuring the impact of R&D activities on ﬁrms'
total exports and trade participation, neglecting other relevant aspects of ﬁrms' trade per-
formance. In fact, some recent studies analyse the impact of ﬁrms' endogenous activities
on diﬀerent export dimensions, namely trade margins. The trade literature identiﬁes two
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON TRADE MARGINS 127
categories of margins, the intensive and the extensive margins of trade.3
One strand of the literature in this area looks at the relationship between the quality
of exported goods and the margins of trade. Building on Krugman (1979) model, Hallak
(2006) identiﬁes the role played by quality upgrading investment on the demand side, pre-
dicting that high income countries tend to import more from countries producing high-quality
goods. Montinari et al. (2013) instead explain ﬁrm-level heterogeneity based on the impact
of innovation inputs and outputs on trade margins. Developing a model of ﬁrms' export
margins from Luttmer (2007) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) the authors predict two
diﬀerent dynamics driving ﬁrm exports. On the one hand, the intensive margin appears be
correlated with exogenous shocks in the demand side, i.e. preference towards high-quality
products, as previously demonstrated by Hallak (2006). On the other hand, the extensive
margin of trade depends mainly on investment in R&D and their ability to introduce new
process and product innovations. Their model emphasizes the key role of innovation as a
fundamental strategy not only to develop ﬁrms' portfolio of export products, but also to
increase the number of foreign markets supplied.
Following the previous literature, it is possible to disaggregate total exports of ﬁrms
into diﬀerent margins of trade, the number of products exported, the number of foreign
markets supplied and the average value of each product shipped to each country (Berthou
and Fontagne 2008). Thus, total exports for ﬁrm i at time t, Xit, is the result of the product
between the extensive and intensive margins of trade, Eit and Iit:
3The intensive margin refers to the average value of individual shipments, for all products exported by a
ﬁrm to diﬀerent countries. The extensive margin instead has been diﬀerently deﬁned across the literature,
representing the number of exporters per country at the aggregate level, measuring the number of products
exported (the product-mix), of foreign markets supplied at the ﬁrm-level or the average number of products
exported to each foreign market (see for instance Chaney 2008; Bernard et al. 2009; Bernard et al. 2010).
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Xit = Eit × Iit =
N∑
g=1
K∑
k=1
ngnkgpgkqgk (2.1)
where the ﬁrm-level intensive margin Iit is calculated as the average value (pitgkqitgk) of
all the nit shipments of products g exported by ﬁrm i towards countries k at time t:
Iit =
∑
pitgkqitgk
nit
(2.2)
The ﬁrm-level extensive margin Eit instead has been usually decomposed in product
extensive margin and country extensive margin:
Eit = ng × nk (2.3)
where ng is the product extensive margin, in other words all the diﬀerent products git
exported by ﬁrm i at time t, while nk is the country extensive margin deﬁned as the number
of destinations kit served by ﬁrm i at time t:
ng =
∑
git nk =
∑
kit (2.4)
In this way it is possible to decompose ﬁrms' export ﬂows into the extensive and inten-
sive margins of trade, accounting for the value of shipments per product and per exporting
market in order to establish which of these speciﬁc margins are more relevant for exports'
performance and how are aﬀected by R&D activities.
However, to analyse the impact of innovation on the margins of trade it is necessary
to identify how diﬀerent kinds of innovation interact with ﬁrms' trade margins. According
to previous trade theories, investment in innovation can aﬀect ﬁrms' export performance in
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diﬀerent ways. First, investing in R&D activities increases the probability of producing new
products which directly expands the total number of varieties exported (Krugman 1979):
ng = n(ωi)ϕi (2.5)
where the product extensive margin of trade is function of ﬁrm i product innovations ωi
and proportional to ﬁrm productive eﬃciency ϕi.
Second, investment in innovation could help exporters to improve their country extensive
margin, increasing the number of markets served with each product. As suggested by Hal-
lak (2006), the number of countries served by each product depends on the quality of the
product exported θgk and on the preference of each country k towards quality γk. Previous
theories have predicted that high-quality goods would be shipped to countries with higher
income, while low-quality products to countries with a diﬀerent aggregate structure of pref-
erences. Building on these theoretical predictions, we expect the country extensive margin
to be positively aﬀected by R&D activities in two ways. First, total investment in R&D vi
could reduce the trading cost of shipments towards country k τk, mainly due to an increase in
ﬁrms' human capital and managerial skills, but also by using R&D investment to improve the
knowledge stock of ﬁrms about the marketing and operational strategies to apply in order to
enter new foreign markets. Secondly, R&D activities might also improve the value of exports
θg, by improving the processes of production, introducing high added-value new products or
increasing the quality of existing goods. As a consequence, the number of countries served
nk would be function of the diﬀerent levels of quality of the exported products θ
γk
g and of the
cost of trading cost τk which may be mitigated by investment in R&D vi:
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nk = n
(
θγkg
) vi
τk
(2.6)
Finally, following Caldera (2010) it is possible to express the intensive margin, deﬁned as
the export value of each shipment pgkqgk of good g to country k, as a function of country k
aggregate expenditure Ek, price index Pk, the country's preference towards quality of good
g θγkg , ﬁrm i production eﬃciency
ϕi
cg
and of exporting cost τk:
pgkqgk = Ek
[
Pk
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
ϕi
cg
)
τ−1k
]σ−1
θγkσ(1−α)g (2.7)
Note that ﬁrms' intensive margin is expected to be positively aﬀected by R&D activities
in two diﬀerent ways. First, as we have seen before, ﬁrms' innovation could improve the
quality of products exported θγkg increasing the value of each shipment and aﬀecting in a
direct way the intensive margin. Second, process innovation and investment in R&D could
aﬀect, in an indirect way, the intensive margin of trade. By improving ﬁrms' productivity
and the productive eﬃciency, R&D activities could reduce the overall costs of production of
good g ϕi
cg
, increasing the markup charged for each shipment (Grossman and Helpman 1991;
Eaton and Kortum 2002).
Only a small number of empirical studies test the previous theoretical predictions on
R&D, product innovation and trade margins. Hummels and Klenow (2005) for instance
analyse whether big exporting countries tend to export a wide range of goods, large quan-
tities or higher quality, comparing their results with previous trade model predictions. The
authors ﬁnd that the extensive margin accounts for the larger part of export growth, while
the intensive margin plays a relatively small role in driving developed countries exports. Al-
varez and Fuentes (2011) instead, using a rich dataset of Chilean ﬁrms, study the evolution
of the intensive margin when ﬁrms start to export. Entering international markets is usually
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associated with a higher value than average, consistent with the idea that new exporters
introduce new and high-quality product in order to compete internationally, even though
this phenomenon is not found to persist over time. More recently, Chen (2013) directly links
R&D activities and trade margins, trying to understand whether innovation aﬀects exporters'
performance expanding the product mix or increasing the value of products already exported.
Employing a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach using aggregate data at the
industry-level for US imports and the total number of patents registered as proxy for innova-
tion, Chen (2013) ﬁnds that innovation has a positive eﬀect on both extensive and intensive
margins, especially improving the quality of exports and leading to a higher intensive margin
which is driven by the demand-side.
2.3 Data Description
French data at the ﬁrm level has been employed for this chapter. The motivation for study-
ing France is twofold. First, France is the second largest exporter in the EU after Germany
(10.2% of total extra-EU exports), even if registering a net trade deﬁcit of e 7,150 billion
in 2014 (Eurostat, 2015). Moreover, as pointed out in several EFIGE4 studies on European
ﬁrms, EU countries seem to be remarkably similar from a ﬁrm-level perspective, especially
when taking into account exports behaviour (Mayer and Ottaviano 2007; Bekes et al. 2011;
Rubini et al. 2012). Second, France devotes considerable resources to research and develop-
ment activities (approximately e 48 billion in 2014 which represents 2.26% of GDP) ranking
second in the EU for total investment in R&D and sixth as a share of GDP (Eurostat, 2015).
Speciﬁcally, more than 55% of total investment is carried out by the private sector, investing
4EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) is a project funded by European Commission under the
7th Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities Framework Programme designed to help identify the internal
policies needed to improve Europe's external competitiveness.
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in 2014 around e 31 billion and employing 1.5% of the national total labour force, ranking
third among all European countries. Considering innovation outcomes, France ranked eighth
worldwide for the number of patents issued, with a total ﬁgure of 43,060 patents granted
in 2013 (WIPO, 2015). Firms' R&D activities and their subsequent impact on productivity
are generally similar across the continent, highlighting how comparable dynamics are taking
place in Europe regarding ﬁrms' export and innovation strategies (Griﬃth et al. 2006; Al-
tomonte et al. 2013).
In our analysis we combine data from four comprehensive datasets for the period 1999-
2007. First, ﬁrms' characteristics are obtained from the Annual French Business Survey
(Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise - EAE) surveyed by the National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies (INSEE). This data provides detailed balance sheet information for all
French ﬁrms with more than 20 employees (almost 200,000 ﬁrms over 9 years) for the man-
ufacturing (22.26%), service (73.23%) and agriculture (4.51%) sectors. Firm characteristics
include total output, domestic and foreign sales, number of employees, salaries paid, cost
of intermediate inputs, capital stock and investment in both tangible and intangible assets.
This data has been then merged with the LiFi survey on the ﬁnancial relationships between
enterprises (Enquête sur les Liasisons Financières entre sociètés) created by INSEE to iden-
tify all the ﬁnancial relationships in which French ﬁrms are involved and to provide useful
information about foreign ownership, whether they are part of a French or a foreign owned
group and their position in the group hierarchy.
Second, to analyse exporters' activity, we used ﬁrm-product-level exports data collected by
the French Customs Agency which provides information about destination country, 8-digit-
level product, value and weight of manufacturing exports. The information are available
for all export transactions of manufacturers exporting at least e 100,000 within the EU or
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON TRADE MARGINS 133
above e 1,000 outside the EU, covering more than 90% of French total manufactured goods
exported.5 Since the Custom Agency data takes into account only trade in goods the anal-
ysis in this chapter will be focused just on the manufacturing industry, removing also pure
trading ﬁrms.6
In addition, because the Custom Agency data takes into account only large transactions
within the EU plus all the extra-EU exports above e 1,000, in order to carry on a com-
prehensive analysis of French exporters we rely on the EAE dataset to measure ﬁrms' total
exports and their participation in foreign trade. In this way it is also possible to include
small intra-EU transactions and small exporters. Meanwhile, a disaggregated analysis on
the margins of trade will focus only on the data from the Custom Agency on large intra-EU
exports and on all extra-EU transactions. For completeness, we provide robustness checks
using the Custom Agency data to calculate the value of total exports. In this way, comparing
the EAE and the Custom Agency (CA) data we are able to compare the diﬀerent impact
of innovation on the whole sample of exporters and just on the sample of ﬁrms exporting
large shipments within the EU and to non-EU countries, isolating the eﬀect on ﬁrms just
exporting small shipments to the rest of the EU.
A ﬁnal dataset allows us to analyse ﬁrms' innovating propensity by merging the previ-
ous sample with the annual survey on the resources devoted to R&D activities (Enquête
annuelle sur les moyens consacrés à la R&D) collected by the French Ministry of Education
5During this period the threshold for intra-EU exports has changed considerably. Initially, it was equal to
almost e 38,000 euros until 2001 when it was increased to e 100,000. Finally, it was moved to e 150,000 in
2006. For extra-EU exports the threshold has not been changed during the whole period. Nevertheless, these
threshold changes do not aﬀect the quality of our analysis since it has been demonstrated in the previous
literature that small exporters account for a relatively small share of the overall French exports (Mayer and
Ottaviano 2007).
6Pure trading ﬁrms are companies usually in the services sector specialised in global business-to-business
(B2B) transactions with a strong logistic organization, which do not use the bought goods as input of
manufacturing production, but with the ﬁnal purpose of re-selling and delivering those products to potential
customers such as ﬁnal consumers, businesses or public authorities.
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and Research. This data consists of over 7,000 ﬁrms that perform R&D activities and invest
more than e350,000 on innovation and a sample of the remaining companies that dedicate
fewer resources to R&D. The dataset provides a comprehensive description of French ﬁrms
innovating activities, reporting the overall internal and external resources dedicated to R&D,
the number of employees working in the R&D department, public funds and tax rebates re-
ceived from the government and other public institutions, the number of patents held by the
company and a further measure of R&D output considering whether ﬁrms have introduced
a product or a process innovation in each year. The main problem with this dataset is that
some holding companies could report the total investment in R&D performed by the whole
group. This could aﬀect our results both overestimating the eﬀect of R&D on the export
performance of that particular ﬁrm and in addition not considering that other partners could
take advantage of R&D done by other aﬃliates part of the same group.
In order to control for this possible bias, and given that the survey focuses mostly on large
innovators, we also compare these data with the information about investment in intangible
assets such as R&D that are included in the EAE dataset. When comparing the two datasets,
it can be noted that some ﬁrms reporting investment in R&D in a given year in the EAE
dataset were not included in the R&D survey, especially for ﬁrms investing small amounts
in innovation and hence are not included in this survey. Conversely, it is also noteworthy
that the contrary was true, with cases in which ﬁrms included in the R&D survey were not
reporting any investment in innovation in the EAE dataset. For these reasons, we base our
analysis just on the information about innovating activities collected by the R&D survey
which is considered a more reliable source given the quality of the data collected, both for
the value of R&D investment and for the measures of R&D output. Furthermore, we dropped
from the sample all the observations in which ﬁrms report an investment in R&D in the EAE
dataset but which were not present in the R&D survey. In a later robustness check we report
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the eﬀect of R&D investment on total exports and ﬁrm's participation to foreign markets
using the value of R&D investment included in the EAE dataset rather than the variable
from the R&D survey. In this way we are able to compare the eﬀect of using the two diﬀerent
sources of data, and to analyse the variations in the results when dropping from the whole
sample the observations with incoherent information from the two diﬀerent datasets. Using
the total R&D variable from the EAE dataset is mainly consistent with the results we found
when using the R&D survey data, and it is robust across speciﬁcations sequentially pulling
out from the sample the incoherent observations.
After merging the four datasets we remove from our sample all the inconsistent obser-
vations and the coding errors, such as missing or incomplete data, negative values for total
employment or average salary or with contrasting information across the diﬀerent datasets.
All the monetary values are expressed in Euros after applying the Euro-Franc ﬁxed conver-
sion rate for the years 1999 and 2000, and have been deﬂated using OECD production price
indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Our ﬁnal sample is an unbal-
anced panel with almost 150,000 observations and contains comprehensive data about 35,000
French manufacturing ﬁrms over 9 years, approximately 28,000 exporters, and exhaustive
description on the innovation strategies of almost 5,000 French ﬁrms. In addition, thanks to
the Custom Agency data we are able to provide more detailed data on the trade margins of
almost 17,000 French exporters about number of products exported, destinations served and
average value of shipments, of which more than 3,700 are innovators as well.
In the following tables we present some summary statistics about the performance, export
strategies and R&D activities of French ﬁrms in our ﬁnal sample. We start with the ﬁrst
two tables in which we show a preliminary comparison between all the ﬁrms present in our
sample in Table 2.1 and those included as well in the Custom Agency dataset in Table 2.2
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Table 2.1: Firm performance by exporting and innovating status over the period 1999-2007 (all ﬁrms in our sample).
ALL FIRMS Exporters Non-Exporters All Firms
Nb. of Firms 28,467 15,338 35,583
Employment 156 60 129
Av. Salary (EUR) 25,766 23,040 25,006
Tot. Sales (EUR th.) 39,982 9,526 31,489
Tot. Investment (EUR th.) 1,328 329.67 1,050
log(TFP) 4.509 4.281 4.446
Cash-ﬂow 0.036 0.032 0.035
R&D Intensity 0.61% 0.10% 0.52%
Export Intensity 22.21% 0.00% 16.01%
INNOVATORS Exporter Non-Exporter All Firms
Nb. of Firms 4,761 396 4,989
Employment 545 208 531
Av. Salary (EUR) 30,306 27,089 30,171
Tot. Sales (EUR th.) 153,359 39,511 148,594
Tot. Investment (EUR th.) 5,241 1,900 5,101
log(TFP) 4.888 4.702 4.880
Cash-ﬂow 0.051 0.060 0.051
R&D Intensity 5.34% 13.22% 5.67%
Export Intensity 37.97% 0.00% 36.39%
Note: Statistics based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data, average from year 1999
to 2007. Employment calculated as average number of full-time employees. Average
salary represents average annual salary of full-time employees in Euro. Total sales
calculated as average total sales (domestic+foreign) in thousands of Euro. Total
investment calculated as average of ﬁrm total investment in ﬁxed tangible assets in
thousands of Euro. Productivity calculated as log of total factor productivity follow-
ing the De Loecker (2007) approach. Cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm
net income and total sales. R&D and export intensities calculated as the ratio of
ﬁrm total investment in R&D or total exports over total sales. All monetary values
deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in
2000 as a baseline.
for which we have information about their trade margins. In these two tables we focus in
particular on ﬁrms' performance considering ﬁrst the whole sample and then focusing just
on innovators, discriminating according to their status as exporters or non-exporting ﬁrms.
The tables report diﬀerent measures of ﬁrms' performance, including employment, the aver-
age salary paid, ﬁrms' total sales, total investment in ﬁxed capital, total factor productivity
(TFP), ﬁrm's cash-ﬂow and the R&D and export intensities deﬁned as ratio over total sales.
In both tables innovating ﬁrms appear to be larger in terms of employment and also pay
higher wages, register larger total sales and tend to invest more in ﬁxed capital. Moreover,
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Table 2.2: Firm performance by exporting and innovating status over the period 1999-2007 (only ﬁrms matched with CA data).
ALL FIRMS Exporters Non-Exporters All Firms
Nb. of Firms 16,947 13,086 27,865
Employment 178 54 138
Av. Salary (EUR) 26,296 22,719 25,141
Tot. Sales (EUR th.) 46,897 7,815 34,277
Tot. Investment (EUR th.) 1,540 242.73 1,121
log(TFP) 4.596 4.250 4.484
Cash-ﬂow 0.046 0.030 0.041
R&D Intensity 0.61% 0.10% 0.52%
Export Intensity 24.76% 0.00% 16.77%
INNOVATORS Exporter Non-Exporter All Firms
Nb. of Firms 3,719 236 3,919
Employment 566 170 555
Av. Salary (EUR) 30,455 26,185 30,340
Tot. Sales (EUR th.) 162,223 32,991 158,759
Tot. Investment (EUR th.) 5,373 1,298 5,264
log(TFP) 4.920 4.611 4.912
Cash-ﬂow 0.056 0.054 0.056
R&D Intensity 4.71% 20.18% 5.12%
Export Intensity 38.90% 0.00% 37.85%
Note: Statistics based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data, average from year 1999
to 2007. Employment calculated as average number of full-time employees. Average
salary represents average annual salary of full-time employees in Euro. Total sales
calculated as average total sales (domestic + foreign) in thousands of Euro. Total
investment calculated as average of ﬁrm total investment in ﬁxed tangible assets in
thousands of Euro. Productivity calculated as log of total factor productivity follow-
ing the De Loecker (2007) approach. Cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm
net income and total sales. R&D and export intensities calculated as the ratio of
ﬁrm total investment in R&D or total exports over total sales. All monetary values
deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in
2000 as a baseline.
innovators show a higher export propensity accounting for larger total exports in relation to
total sales. In addition, it is clear that exporting ﬁrms outperform non exporters according
to all indicators, being larger, more productive, investing more and paying higher salaries.
On the contrary, it is not possible to notice any relevant diﬀerence in terms of cash-ﬂow, cal-
culated as the ratio between ﬁrms net income and total sales, which is used to measure the
liquidity available for companies activities. Comparing exporters and non-exporters within
the sub-sample of innovators the results are even more striking. Firms who innovate and
export at the same time show on average the best performance according to all indicators,
consistent with the trade theories of super-productive ﬁrms self-selecting into exporting and
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innovating activities. However, non-exporting innovators appear to have a higher propensity
towards R&D investment than exporters in both samples. This phenomenon might be related
to the speciﬁc case of big French state-owned groups which operate in high-tech intense sec-
tors but are mainly oriented towards the domestic market such as nuclear energy, transports
and infrastructures equipment, microelectronics, recycling, processed food and defense.
These summary statistics appear to show that innovation is clearly correlated with ﬁrm
performance. Even if exporters show a better performance in both samples, the predominance
of non-exporting innovators over the average general exporters may indicate the possibility
that the returns from R&D investment could be in general greater than the returns from
being an exporter. In addition, the ﬁgures suggest that ﬁrms who innovate have an advan-
tage in foreign markets with respect to non-innovating exporters. These phenomena suggest
that innovation could be a complementary strategy with exports, which if implemented could
have a strong correlation with ﬁrms' export performance. Finally, comparing Tables 2.1 and
2.2 we can stress again that our analysis should not suﬀer from a sample-selection bias when
focusing on trade margins. In fact, it is possible to notice that the two samples are very
similar in terms of ﬁrm productivity, export performance and innovating strategy, with ﬁrms
included in the Custom Agency dataset slightly larger in terms of employment and total sales
but not showing any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of export and R&D intensities.
In Figure 2.1 we focus more on ﬁrm productivity summarising the (TFP) distribution
of all the ﬁrms in our sample according to their export and innovation status. To have a
consistent measure of TFP we followed the De Loecker (2007) approach, which is an ex-
tension of the standard Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, taking into consideration the
heterogeneity in terms of productivity between exporters and domestic ﬁrms and between
innovators and non-innovators as explained in the appendix AT.1. In our TFP estimation we
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have used value added as a proxy for output, including in the estimation total employment
as a measure for labour, the total costs of intermediate input as costs of production, an
export dummy equal to 1 for exporters or 0 otherwise, and total investment in tangible and
intangible assets such as R&D. Once estimated and logged, we remove the top and bottom
percentiles without any signiﬁcant loss of observations, following the ISGEP (2008) approach
in order to mitigate the eﬀect of outliers on our analysis.
Figure 2.1: TFP cumulative distribution of French ﬁrms according to exporter and innovator status.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data, average from year 1999 to 2007. All monetary values deﬂated
using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Log(TFP) calculated following the
De Loecker (2007) approach taking into consideration the heterogeneity in terms of productivity between exporters and domestic
ﬁrms. Innovators are ﬁrms included in the Annual Survey on the Resources Devoted to R&D Activities collected by the French
Ministry of Education and Research and having invested more than e350,000 on innovation per year or being part of a sample of
companies dedicating fewer resources to R&D. Firms not included in this dataset are considered to be non-innovators. Exporters
are ﬁrms that report having sold abroad manufactured products during the year as declared for tax purposes in the EAE dataset.
Firms Classiﬁcation: Inn (0) Exp (0): Firms neither innovating nor exporting; Inn (0) Exp (1): Non-innovating Exporters; Inn
(1) Exp (0): Non-exporting Innovators; Inn (1) Exp (1): Innovating Exporters.
Notice in graph 2.1 that the cumulative distributions of exporting-innovators in our gen-
eral sample always lays to the right of the distribution, meaning that for any percentile
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exporting-innovators are characterised by higher productivity than other ﬁrms. It is in-
teresting as well to compare the productivity of ﬁrms which are alternatively exporters or
innovators. From the graph it is possible to identify how the total factor productivity of non-
exporting innovators strictly dominates the TFP distribution of non-innovating exporters,
laying always to the right except for the very bottom percentiles where there is almost no
diﬀerence between the two distributions. This evidence seems to suggest a stronger corre-
lation between productivity and innovation rather than exports, identifying a precise TFP
distribution ranking according to the innovation and exporting strategies followed by ﬁrms.
Figure 2.2 provides a further evidence of the correlation between export and R&D perfor-
mance in France from a geographical perspective, presenting the quantile distribution of the
interaction between R&D and export intensities across regions and departments, where ﬁrms'
export and R&D intensities are measured as the ratio of total exports and R&D investment
over total sales clustered by administrative body.7 A strong relationship between R&D and
exports is apparent from the darkly shaded areas in the two maps. In particular, both export
and R&D intensities seem to be particularly high in the Ile-de-France, the region surround-
ing Paris, where most of the multinational enterprises (MNEs) and of research centres are
located (IFA 2012), or in Alsace, the region bordering Germany, consistent with a cluster of
exporters and innovators near high-income trade partners. Finally, it is possible to observe
diﬀerent concentration points around the cities of Lille, Lyon, Nantes and Toulouse where
very large industrial clusters are located (aeronautics, transports, chemicals, agro-food and
energy).
7Metropolitan France is divided in three diﬀerent levels of administration: the national level, 22 regions
and 96 departments. French regions have been oﬃcially created by the Law of Decentralisation on the 2nd
of March 1982, which also gave regions their legal status. Region's primary responsibility is the management
of public schools, infrastructural spending, public transport, research and assistance to private business. The
main responsibility areas of the 96 departments instead include social policies and welfare, local transports,
and maintenance of local infrastructure.
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Figure 2.2: Quantile distributions of the interaction between R&D and Export intensities across departments and regions in
France.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data, average from year 1999 to 2007. All monetary values deﬂated
using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. R&D#Export intensity represents
the interaction between R&D and export intensities at the departmental and regional level in France. R&D and export intensities
calculated as the ratio of total investment in R&D or total exports over total sales.
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Moreover, Figure 2.3 shows that a small number of speciﬁc sectors are responsible for
most of the export and R&D intensity in France. In particular, the leading sectors are com-
puters and ITC equipment with the highest intensity both in terms of R&D and exports,
followed by optical and precision instruments, electrical machineries, chemicals and transport
equipment. In addition, the motor vehicle industry exhibits a high propensity towards export
and innovation, even if the production is clustered in a restricted number of ﬁrms.
Figure 2.3: Cumulative export and R&D intensities across France manufacturing sectors.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data, average from year 1999 to 2007. Manufacturing sectors
according to the NACE rev.1 2-digit level industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price
indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. R&D and export intensities calculated as the ratio of ﬁrm total
investment in R&D or total exports over total sales.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the evolution of the number of French exporters and of their
total exports in our sample of ﬁrms included in the EAE dataset during the period studied.
Note that in France 40% of largest exporters (those with more than 50 employees) account
for more than 95% of French total exports in terms of value, once again corroborating the
theory that aggregate exports are mainly driven by a small number of large exporters, the
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so called "happy few" (Mayer and Ottaviano 2007). This sample provides a comprehensive
picture of French exporters activity, and based on the previous evidence we can safely reject
any concerns about possible selection bias. Even if we are mainly focusing on ﬁrms with
more than 20 employees the previous ﬁndings have shown how these top exporters account
for more than 90% of France total exports, representing the core of French exporters.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the export performance of ﬁrms included in our sample
collected from the Custom Agency dataset. We present the trend from 1999 to 2007 for
the total value of exports and the number of French exporters, the average value of exports
by ﬁrm, the total number of shipments made, their average value (the intensive margin),
the average number of countries served and the average number of products exported. We
provide detailed information on the trade margins of almost 17,000 exporters in total, 10,500
exporters on average per year, less than 15% of the overall sample of exporters registered by
the Custom Agency, but accounting on average for more than 57% of total exports over our
sample period. Focusing on innovators the ﬁgures are even more striking. Even though the
3,700 exporters in our innovating ﬁrms sample represent just 2.3% of total number of ex-
porters, they are responsible for almost 35% of total French exports, giving a comprehensive
illustration of France's total exports.
Table 2.3 provides an additional insight on the average trade performance of exporters in
our sample per year. In fact, exploiting the Custom Agency data we are able to calculate at
the ﬁrm-level three diﬀerent trade margins, considering both the intensive margin, calculated
as average value of shipments for each exporter, and the extensive margins distinguishing be-
tween the number of diﬀerent products exported, the number of foreign markets served by
French exporters and the average number of products exported to each foreign market. Also in
this case we compare the general and the innovating samples. First, innovators tend to export
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of French manufacturing exporters according to ﬁrms' size and export value.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE data, average from year 1999 to 2007. Firms Classiﬁcation (EU Recommendation 2003/361):
Small: employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million; Medium: employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million; Large: employees
> 250, turnover > EUR 2 million.
Figure 2.5: Time series of number of exporters and of total exports value in French manufacturing sectors between 1999 and
2007.
Note: Elaboration based on EAE data from year 1999 to 2007. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price
indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline.
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more products to more countries, two times larger than non-innovators exporters, registering
a higher average value per shipment as well. In addition, it is interesting to notice that while
the extensive margins of French exporters have marginally improved in general during the
period 1999-2007, the same is not true for French innovators in our sample which have expe-
rienced a small decrease in the number of destinations and products exported. Nevertheless,
the intensive margin has increased substantially during the same period, both in the general
and in the innovators sample. This evidence might suggest that French innovators during
this period have decided to focus their attention just on a small number of products and
in exporting to a relatively smaller number of foreign markets, but dedicating instead their
resources in improving the quality of products and to increase the average value of shipments.
However, while we acknowledge an increase both in the total value of exports and the
total number of exporters part of our samples in the Custom Agency dataset, previously
in Figure 2.5 we have noticed a marginal decrease in the total number of French exporters
present in our sample in the EAE dataset during the same period despite the overall value
of France's total exports has steadily increased. These apparently contradictory phenomena
could be explained by a slow growth in the average value of exports but a stronger increase
in the number of shipments per ﬁrm exporting more products to more countries, consistent
with an increase in total exports despite a reduction of the number of exporters. Secondly, we
need to keep in mind that as previously stressed only large transactions within the EU plus
all the extra-EU exports above e 1,000 are registered by the Custom Agency in France, while
the EAE dataset includes all ﬁrms with more than 20 employees. Thus, these just apparently
contradictory phenomena might be explained with a decrease in the numbers of French ﬁrms
exporting small shipments in favour of an intensiﬁcation of the export participation of large
ﬁrms with an intense export activity.
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We now focus on R&D activities. Table 2.4 analyses the behaviour of French innovating
ﬁrms according to various indicators of ﬁrms' R&D strategy and activity, discriminating by
export status. In particular, we analyse the resources dedicated by French ﬁrms to R&D
activities, the number of workers and researchers employed in the R&D department, the av-
erage salary paid to researchers, the amount of public funds received to stimulate innovative
activities and diﬀerent measures of R&D output, namely the number of patents registered
and the frequency of new product or process innovations. First, it appears that even if ex-
porters invest signiﬁcantly larger funds in innovating activities relative to non-exporters they
surprisingly register a lower R&D intensity ratio than innovating non-exporting ﬁrms. This
fact might be explained by the second term of the ratio, total sales, that as we have seen
before are on average higher for exporters. Another explanation could be the high propensity
toward investment in R&D shown by certain state-owned business groups which are instead
mainly oriented towards the internal market as previously stressed. In fact, looking at the
industrial distribution of export and R&D intensities in Figure 2.3 we can remark that some
of the top sectors in terms of R&D investment register a very low propensity towards ex-
ports, such as the production of coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel, the agro-food sector or
the publishing industry. Secondly, exporters seem to be more capable than non-exporters in
attracting funds provided by public authorities to sustain private ﬁrms R&D activities. One
of the possible reasons explaining this issue might be related with the requirement by pub-
lic authorities to form international co-operations and joint-ventures to access public R&D
funding, especially in the case of EU funding projects. Exporters in this case might have a
relative comparative advantage in securing these funds, exploiting in particular the interna-
tional knowledge network of foreign suppliers, customers and partners.
Moreover, it is possible to identify that exporters are generally more successful than
non-exporters in translating R&D investment into new innovations, both in terms of new
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Table 2.4: R&D indicators for French ﬁrms in our sample over the period 1999-2007 according to export status.
All Firms Exporters Non-Exporters
Tot. R&D Investment 7,880.24 8,149.77 1,710.08
R&D Intensity 5.67% 5.34% 13.22%
Employment in R&D 53 55 13
No. Researchers 27 28 6
Av. Salary Researchers 39,867 41,210 21,084
R&D Public Funding 1,079.36 1,125.16 235.07
No. Patents 8.82 9.14 1.56
Freq. Product Inn. 67.97% 68.33% 59.55%
Freq. Process Inn. 54.73% 54.80% 53.13%
Note: Statistics based on R&D Survey data, average from year 1999 to 2007.
Total R&D investment in thousands of Euro. R&D intensity calculated as av-
erage ratio of ﬁrms total investment in R&D over total sales. Employment in
R&D considers the average number of full-time personnel employed in the R&D
departments. No. researchers is the average number of researchers employed by
French ﬁrms in the R&D department. Average salary takes into consideration
just the yearly salary paid to researchers. R&D public funding calculated as the
average funds received by French, foreign and international public authorities
to stimulate private ﬁrms innovative activities in thousand of Euro. Number
of patents considers the average number of patents registered at the national
(INPI), European (EPO) or US (USPTO) patent oﬃce. Freq. Product and Pro-
cess Innovation reports the average frequency of the introduction of new product
or process innovations in French ﬁrms during the period of interest. All mone-
tary values deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level
for France in 2000 as a baseline.
products introduced and total patents granted. In addition, exporters on average employ
more researchers and personnel in their R&D activities, paying as well higher wages. The
possibility for exporters to attract high-skilled expertise oﬀering higher salaries translates
generally in a considerable larger number of patents registered by exporters in respect to
non-exporting ﬁrms, while the ﬁgures relative to product and process innovations conﬁrm
this trend but with a smaller magnitude. Possibly also for these reasons, patent activity
seems to be driven by exporters which may be more interested in protecting their property
rights when operating in foreign markets than non-exporting ﬁrms developing new products
just for the internal market.
Finally, in Figure 2.6 we further investigate the relationship between export and inno-
vation strategies by plotting a measure of ﬁrms' R&D propensity (the total investment in
R&D) on the horizontal axis and several margins of trade on the vertical axis (namely total
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Figure 2.6: Correlation between trade margins and R&D total budget.
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Note: Elaboration based on EAE dataset, R&D survey and Custom Agency data from year 1999 to 2007. Total Exports
calculated as ﬁrm total foreign sales according to the EAE dataset. Intensive Margin calculated as the average value of ﬁrm
shipments abroad from CA dataset. Product and country extensive margins are count variables for the number of products
exported or number of foreign markets served by each exporter according to the CA dataset. All monetary values deﬂated using
OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline.
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exports, the extensive and the intensive margins of trade).
Looking at ﬁrms' total exports and at the intensive margin of trade, we observe a strong
positive relationship between those two measures of trade on the one hand and ﬁrms' total
R&D expenditure on the other. The distribution of French ﬁrms' total exports seems to
increase when R&D funds are larger. This suggests the presence of a self-selection mecha-
nism which clusters very few productive ﬁrms in the top distribution of R&D and export
intensities. In particular it appears that investment in innovation is principally correlated
with the value of total exports and the average value of exported products, consistent with
the trade theory predicting an improved export performance driven by an increase in exports
value consequent to investment in R&D (Hallak 2006; Montinari et al. 2013). Moreover, it
is possible to identify a similar trend also observing the relationship between R&D expendi-
ture and the country extensive margin. French ﬁrms seem to export to a larger number of
destinations when their investment in R&D increases.
2.4 Methodology
In this chapter we focus on the impact of R&D activities on export performance at the ﬁrm
level. First, in order to understand whether ﬁrms who innovate obtain an export premium we
investigate the impact of R&D activities on the probability of being an exporter and on the
volume of exports. Second, we disentangle the eﬀect of innovation on exports by examining
the impact of R&D on the extensive and the intensive margins of trade. This way of pro-
ceeding bring two main advantages. First, it enables us to establish whether diﬀerent R&D
activities improve exporters' performance by creating new trade links, for instance exporting
new products and opening new export markets, or intensifying the existing ﬂows increasing
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the average value of exports. We would be able, in this way, to identify the most important
margins through which R&D activities aﬀect exports growth.
2.4.1 Innovation Measurement
To measure the innovating strategies of French ﬁrms we also disaggregate the eﬀect of R&D
activities by including diﬀerent measures of innovation. In the previous literature either mea-
sures of R&D input or output have been used as proxies for ﬁrms' innovation capabilities.
This approach has both advantages and drawbacks. The most popular innovation indica-
tor used so far is total R&D expenditure, a variable collected at regular intervals and easily
comparable across countries thanks to the international harmonized standards. Nevertheless,
the evaluation of total R&D budget could be misleading if not properly compared with the
results of this investment (Mohnen and Hall 2013). In addition, R&D expenditure tends to
underestimate the real innovative eﬀort of ﬁrms not considering other informal R&D activ-
ities such as product design, market analysis or training of employees, especially for small
ﬁrms (Kleinknecht et al. 2002).
Recently, several empirical studies look at measures of R&D output such as the number of
patents or innovation introduced thanks to new indicators available in recent innovation sur-
veys based on ﬁrm assessment. On the one hand these indicators represent a direct measure
of successful innovation, evaluating the innovations introduced into the market and generat-
ing a cash-ﬂow (Kleinknecht et al. 2002). On the other hand considering just R&D output
measures could alter the estimation of innovation eﬃciency given the complexity of patent
application procedures and the subjective assessment on product and process innovations8.
8For an exhaustive review of this issue see e.g. Wakelin (1998); Kleinknecht et al. (2002); Cassiman and
Golovko (2007); Chen (2013); Becker and Egger (2013).
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In addition, not including total R&D expenditure means we would underestimate the overal
eﬀect of innovation on total exports, in particular not considering the possible positive eﬀect
of R&D investment which has not resulted in the introduction of a new innovation but which
have had anyhow improved ﬁrms' stock of knowledge and of human capital.
Hence, we include in our model both measures of R&D input and output, in order to take
into account both aspects of the same phenomenon. Including both R&D expenditure and
product and process innovations raises possible collinearity concerns. In fact, as shown in
Table A.2.3 in the appendix, the correlations between R&D input and output measures are
relatively high, in particular between investment in R&D and product innovation variables,
ranging between the 71% and 77%. However, Kleinknecht et al. (2002) using factor analysis
demonstrate that there is little correlation between the various R&D indicators, arguing that
they represent diﬀerent aspects of the innovation eﬀort. In particular, the results of the
factor analysis suggest that there is a clear diﬀerence between two groups of indicators. On
the one side total R&D expenditure and patent applications appear to describe the same
process, while on the other side the authors group together diﬀerent measures of R&D out-
put indicators. According to the authors, diﬀerent innovation indicators present their own
strengths and weaknesses depending on what is being investigated, but each should be taken
into account in order to identify the contribution of all the diﬀerent eﬀects of the overall
R&D eﬀorts on ﬁrm performance. In our results we show the robustness of our decision to
include both R&D input and output measures in the estimation of the eﬀect of innovation
on export performance.
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2.4.2 Baseline Model
We employ a range of diﬀerent econometric techniques to estimate the role of innovation on
exports performance. In order to assess the impact of diﬀerent innovation activities on trade
margins while controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity we follow the previous literature and begin
with a basic model given by:
Xit = α0 + α1Zit−1 + α2Rit−1 + α3Iit + kj + kt + it (2.8)
In the above speciﬁcation the dependent variable Xit represents all the diﬀerent mea-
sures of export performance of ﬁrm i at time t, such as total exports, exporter status and
extensive and intensive margins of trade. Zit−1 is a vector of ﬁrm i speciﬁc indicators of size
and performance at time t − 1, such as size in terms of employment, average wages, total
investment, cash-ﬂow, share of foreign ownership and TFP. The key explanatory variables
are Rit−1 and Iit. Rit−1 represents the lagged measures of ﬁrm i total investment in R&D,
linking past total expenditure in R&D with present trade performance. The decision to lag
ﬁrms' total investment in R&D is corroborated by previous literature and anecdotal evi-
dence which shows how investment in R&D usually takes longer to complete and to generate
returns (Cassiman and Golovko 2007; Aw and Lee 2009). Iit expresses the diﬀerent indica-
tors of ﬁrm i innovation output: in the main speciﬁcations those will be represented by two
dummy variables taking a value equal to one when ﬁrm i introduces a new product or process
innovation at time t and 0 otherwise. The R&D output measures are not lagged in the main
speciﬁcation since the variable in the data denotes the introduction of a new product during
the year ready to be sold, as well as the introduction of a new process used in the same year
(for example to cut down the costs of production). We assumes that these two variables
immediately aﬀect ﬁrms' export performance, especially for very large multi-products ﬁrms
which characterize our sample and continuously introduce innovative products (Becker and
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Egger 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni 2015). Year kt and industry ﬁxed eﬀects at the NACE
2-digit-level kj are included in all speciﬁcations in order to account for any year and industry
speciﬁc characteristics and to capture macroeconomic dynamics. In addition, we distinguish
between ﬁrms according to size and ownership structure, in order to estimate the diﬀerent ef-
fect R&D activities might have on the sub-samples of small, large, domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
To estimate the diﬀerent parameters we use a ﬁxed-eﬀect panel model to consider the
within-ﬁrm variation. In particular, for the extensive margins of trade we apply a panel
ﬁxed-eﬀects poisson regression model given the count nature of the data. In fact, in both
the product and the country extensive margins the observations have only positive integer
categorical values where the count represents the number of items belonging to each category
(Hilbe 2011). In addition, for the product-country extensive margin we apply a panel OLS
model since we are looking at the average number of products exported to each foreign market
served by ﬁrm i. Finally, in order to analyse export status and the role played by innovation
in inﬂuencing this strategy, we use a ﬁxed-eﬀect logit model which has been proven to be
the best estimation strategy for binary choice models, explicitly controlling for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity across time (Wooldridge 2005a; 2005b). Including ﬁxed-eﬀect in our logit
model will result in the estimation of the impact of innovations just on those ﬁrms which
have switched from non-exporters to exporters or vice-versa, dropping out ﬁrms with a stable
status throughout the period and reducing signiﬁcantly the number of observations.
In further appendix tables discussed later we also present two alternative estimation pro-
cedures. Following a ﬁxed-eﬀects approach we have focused only on the within ﬁrm variation.
But it might be the case that the variation across ﬁrms is random and has an inﬂuence on
the dependent variables, namely the diﬀerent trade margins. For this reason, we decided to
implement a random-eﬀects model as a robustness check to estimate the diﬀerent eﬀect of
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innovating activities across ﬁrms in our sample. Diﬀerent estimating techniques have been
applied according to the dependent variables, always including year and industry dummies.
To estimate the impact of innovation on ﬁrms' total exports, the intensive margin and the
product-country extensive margin we have used a random eﬀects panel tobit due to the cen-
sored structure of the dependent variables. For the country an product extensive margins
instead a panel poisson regression has been applied given the count nature of these variables.
In addition, in order to analyse the role played by innovation in inﬂuencing ﬁrms to engage
in export, we have used a random-eﬀect probit to estimate binary choice models controlling
for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity across time.
In addition, we implement a dynamic system GMM instrumenting the possible endoge-
nous variables with their three-periods lagged values plus the total amount of public resources
used to fund the R&D activities. We consider the variables measuring innovation as prede-
termined and therefore not correlated with the error term but expected to inﬂuence ﬁrm's
export performance. System GMM has been found to be more eﬃcient compared with diﬀer-
ence GMM, particularly in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Arellano and Bond 1991). To
evaluate the overall goodness of ﬁt of the GMM models we report the Sargan and the Hansen
tests of overidentifying restrictions which present an evaluation of exogeneity of the subset
of instruments. In addition, we test for the presence of ﬁrst and second order serial auto-
correlation, which is inconsistent with predetermined variable regressions (Windmeijer 2006).
2.4.3 Matching Method
However, following the previous literature on this topic, we are concious of possible endo-
geneity problems aﬀecting the analysis on innovation and trade. Hence, in order to prop-
erly identify the causal link connecting innovation and export performance, we make use of
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a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) propensity score matching (PSM) technique in a multiple
treatment approach (Lechner 2002; Leuven and Sianesi 2003). In particular, we are interested
in comparing the export performance of ﬁrms before and after they start innovating with re-
spect to non-innovators. Matching methods allow to correct the endogeneity bias thanks to
the construction of valid control groups based on the observable diﬀerences between innova-
tors and non-innovators. A range of related studies apply matching techniques to analyse
the causal relationship between innovation and exports (e.g. Caldera 2010; Lo Turco and
Maggioni 2015; Becker and Egger 2013; Damijan and Kostevc 2015; Boermans and Roelfsema
2015). The main diﬀerence with the previous studies is that we follow a multiple treatment
approach, taking into consideration both R&D input and output measures in order to es-
timate the impact of innovation on export performance. In addition, we control for ﬁrms
previous export performance, matching treated and control group ﬁrms with similar export
behaviour in order to adjust the estimation bias related to the reverse causality issue. Fi-
nally, we analyse the impact of diﬀerent R&D activities on a number of export performance
variables, namely the trade margins, estimating the eﬀect of R&D activities on the value of
exports, the product mix of exporters and their foreign-market access.
As previously discussed, one of our main contributions to the existing literature is the es-
timation of the impact of both R&D input and output measures on ﬁrm export performance.
Hence, we consider a set of multiple endogenous innovating "treatments" a which ﬁrms might
perform. We consider innovation as an incremental process in which ﬁrms, conditional on
an initial investment in R&D, could introduce a new product, a new process or both. The
ﬁrst innovation treatment considers the case in which a ﬁrm has invested in R&D activities
for the ﬁrst time (Rd). Even if the introduction of an innovation does not take place after
the expenditure in R&D, research and development activities may still improve ﬁrm stock
of knowledge or its human capital, resulting in a positive eﬀect for the export performance.
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Secondly, investment in R&D may result in two diﬀerent positive outcomes. We then con-
sider separately the case in which after an investment in R&D the ﬁrm introduces a product
innovation (Pd) and the case in which instead the investment in R&D resulted in a process
innovation (Pc). Finally, in the last treatment we consider the case in which after an invest-
ment in R&D the ﬁrm successfully introduced both a product and a process innovation in
the same year (PdPc). Thus, our categorical variable a could take a value equal to 0 if a ﬁrm
does not innovate and Rd, Pd, Pc or PdPc if it performs one of the innovation treatments
for the ﬁrst time.
Each of the previous treatments consider only ﬁrms which perform one of the innovating
activities for the ﬁrst time, in order to isolate the eﬀects on export performance after ﬁrms
start innovating. To accurately identify the treatments, we ﬁrst drop all the ﬁrms which have
undertaken R&D activities since the beginning of our sample period. Then, we rescale the
time periods in order to consider time t = 0 as the time in which a ﬁrm performs one of
the treatments or as the median year for non-innovators. Based on t = 0 observations, we
measure the growth of ﬁrms' export performance variables over the next three years, in order
to assess the eﬀect of the diﬀerent types of innovating treatments on ﬁrm trade margins in the
following period. We then drop the subsequent observations of treated ﬁrms after the ﬁrst
treatment at time t = 0 so that a ﬁrm cannot be matched with itself or could be erroneously
included in the control group after being treated.
The aim of our analysis is to assess the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT)
for each treatment, in other words to estimate the diﬀerence in export performance between
ﬁrms which have implemented one of the innovative treatments and similar ﬁrms which in-
stead have not started any R&D activity or have implemented a diﬀerent treatment. In this
way it is possible to compare the eﬀect of each kind of treatment not only against untreated
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ﬁrms, but also with respect to other kinds of R&D activities. We deﬁne yit as ﬁrm i export
performance at time t and yi(t+n) as the export performance at n periods later. The causal
eﬀect of innovative activities on the export performance of ﬁrm i at time t+ n can be iden-
tiﬁed as the diﬀerence between:
yai(t+n) − y0i(t+n) (2.9)
where the subscripts denote the innovation treatments a undertaken by ﬁrm i at time t
or 0 for ﬁrms who have never innovated. Thus, y0i(t+n) represents the export performance of
ﬁrm i at time t+ n if it had not performed any innovative treatment at time t. Since we are
interested in identifying the diﬀerences in export performance after a ﬁrm starts innovating,
we can express the average eﬀect on export performance that new innovators would experi-
ence if they had not performed any R&D activity as:
τATT = E
(
yai(t+n) − y0i(t+n) | Sit = a
)
= E
(
yai(t+n) | Sit = a
)− E (y0i(t+n) | Sit = a) (2.10)
in which τ represents the expected eﬀect on outcome y of treatment a in the post-
treatment period, relative to the eﬀect of no treatment 0 for the same ﬁrm. We are interested
in assessing the average treatment eﬀect for each of the treatments a, that is the diﬀerence
in the outcome a ﬁrm would have experienced if it had not performed treatment a. The
fundamental problem is that only one of the two possible outcomes in the previous equa-
tion is observable, whether the ﬁrm decides to perform or not an innovating activity, while
the counter-factual for the same ﬁrm could not be observed. Since E
(
y0i(t+n) | Sit = a
)
is
not observable, we construct a control group by considering instead the eﬀect of no treat-
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ment or of a diﬀerent innovative treatment on similar ﬁrms which actually implemented the
innovating activity that has to be compared or have not innovated at all, E
(
y0l(t+n) | Slt = 0
)
.
In order to build a consistent control group to be compared with the treated ﬁrms we ap-
ply a matching approach as introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Heckman et al.
(1997). The aim of matching techniques is to select from the sample of untreated ﬁrms a con-
trol group for which the distribution of observed characteristics in the pre-innovation period
is as similar as possible to the distribution of treated ﬁrms (Becker and Ichino 2002). The
ﬁrst step is to estimate the probability that a ﬁrm undertakes each of the innovating treat-
ments at time t, the so called propensity score, based on a set of observable characteristics.
The multinomial logit model that we use to estimate the propensity score for undertaking
the diﬀerent innovating treatments is given by:
Pr (Innit) =β0 + β1Emplit−1 + β2Salaryit−1 + β3TFPit−1 + β4Expit−1+
β5Invit−1 + β6Cashflowit−1 + β7Groupit + kj + kt + kr + it
(2.11)
Following the previous literature, we use as explanatory variables of the probability of
implementing an innovating treatment a set of ﬁrms characteristics including lagged values of
total employment, average salary, total factor productivity, total investment, cash-ﬂow and
group aﬃliation. We also include industry (2-digit NACE rev.1 industries), year and region
dummies (Becker and Egger 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni 2015). In addition, because of pos-
sible complementarity between export and innovation, we also include ﬁrms' previous export
performance to explain their propensity towards diﬀerent innovating activities. Our purpose
is to mitigate the problems related to reverse causality so to avoid that any potential impact
of innovation on exports in the DID estimation might be driven by previous performance in
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international markets. This mean that our matching procedure will be able to draw from the
control group ﬁrms with an export performance similar to treated ﬁrms, in order to level oﬀ
the contribution of the so called "learning-by-exporting" phenomenon.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the multinomial logit used to estimate the propensity
score. As expected, most of the variables have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prob-
ability of undertaking one of the four treatments. It is interesting to note that only the
probability of introducing a new process innovation behaves in a diﬀerent way compared
to the probabilities of undertaking one of the other treatments. In particular, TFP has a
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect only on total investment in R&D and on the joint adoption of
both new product and process innovations. On the contrary, average salary and cash-ﬂow
despite been signiﬁcant for the probability of the other three treatments, do not seem not
to be relevant for the introduction of new processes. Moreover, previous export performance
has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of undertaking any of the possible
treatments, highlighting the importance of previous international experience as a driver of
innovation.
The next stage is to employ the propensity scores obtained from the previous model
to match treated and control observations. We decided to match ﬁrms within each 2-digit
NACE sector and for each year in order to create more homogeneous control groups instead
of matching across the entire sample of French manufacturing ﬁrms (Girma et al. 2004;
De Loecker 2007). In this way, we take into account the large variance in the probability
and the eﬀect of starting an innovating activity on export performance across diﬀerent man-
ufacturing industries, considering as well any time-variant shocks which might have aﬀected
ﬁrms across diﬀerent industries. After obtaining the propensity score for a ﬁrm starting an
innovating activity, we force the matching by multiplying each score by a new industry-year
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Table 2.5: Multinomial logit estimation to estimate the propensity score
Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D Pd Pc PdPc
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.625*** 0.628*** 0.550*** 0.805***
(0.0638) (0.0561) (0.0790) (0.0429)
Av.Salaryt−1 1.171*** 0.939*** 0.339 1.341***
(0.238) (0.211) (0.297) (0.160)
TFP t−1 0.504* 0.0354 0.0895 0.443*
(0.306) (0.115) (0.165) (0.239)
Exportt−1 1.140*** 1.351*** 1.003*** 1.459***
(0.150) (0.144) (0.176) (0.111)
Tot.Investmentt−1 0.0712** 0.139*** 0.212*** 0.138***
(0.0302) (0.0279) (0.0413) (0.0210)
Cash− flowt−1 1.779*** 1.631*** -0.0188 1.833***
(0.578) (0.552) (0.704) (0.411)
ForeignGroupt 0.551*** 0.599*** 0.427** 0.506***
(0.157) (0.134) (0.184) (0.0998)
FrenchGroupt 0.845*** 0.742*** 0.750*** 0.716***
(0.128) (0.114) (0.151) (0.0843)
No. of Firms 26,479 26,479 26,479 26,479
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between
1999 and 2007. The estimator used is a multinomial logit. Unreported
year, region and industry (NACE rev.1, 2-digit) dummies are included.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. The dependent variables R&D, Pd, Pc and PdPc denotes the
possible innovating treatments of investing in R&D, introducing a prod-
uct innovation, a process innovation or to jointly introduce a product
and a process innovation respectively and are equal to 1 if ﬁrms have
been tretaed for the ﬁrst time and 0 otherwise. As regressors, total
employment is the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is
the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost
over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor pro-
ductivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach. Export
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ﬁrm reports positive foreign sales and
0 otherwise, total investment is the log of total investment in ﬁxed tan-
gible assets, cash-ﬂow is calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income
and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy vari-
ables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and
0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP,
export, total investment and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign
and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variables.
identiﬁer only if the ﬁrm belongs to that industry and if the treatment occurred in that
year.9 Following the previous literature which have used this matching procedures, in Figure
A.2.1 and Figure A.2.2 in the appendix we checked whether the propensity score for the four
diﬀerent treatments is balanced across the two diﬀerent groups of treated and control ﬁrms
(Imbens 2004; Garrido et al. 2014). From Figure A.2.1 it is possible to observe that the
9As additional robustness check we estimated as well the ATT eﬀect of innovating treatments on ﬁrm
export performance not forcing the matching between treated and control observations to be within industry
and year. The results, available on request, are robust and consistent with the analysis presented in this
chapter.
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probability of performing the four innovative treatments for treated ﬁrms follows the same
density distribution of the ﬁrms in the untreated group. In addition, Figure A.2.2 shows
how the mean propensity score is equivalent in the treatment and in the comparison group
in all the cases of the four diﬀerent treatments, demonstrating that the probability of being
treated is evenly balanced between innovating and non-innovating ﬁrms.
After assessing the distribution of the propensity score, we then match the untreated ﬁrms
which have an estimated propensity score as close as possible to that of the new innovators,
imposing a common support condition by dropping the treated ﬁrms whose propensity scores
are higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum of those persistent non-innovators.
Diﬀerent matching algorithms have been proposed in the previous literature, mainly varying
in terms of how the neighbourhood of control individuals is built around the treated obser-
vations, providing diﬀerent solutions to the trade-oﬀ between matching quality and variance
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). In our main speciﬁcation, we apply a Kernel matching tech-
nique with a strict bandwidth of 0.01 to match ﬁrms that are part of the same industry and
which performed the treatment in the same year and for which the distance between their
propensity scores is the smallest possible. The Kernel matching estimator associates to the
outcome yit of treated ﬁrm i a matched outcome given by a kernel-weighted average of the
outcome of comparable non-treated ﬁrm, where the weight given to non-treated ﬁrm j is in
proportion to the closeness between i and j. In other words, using the Kernel technique we
are able to down-weight the contribution to the outcome of non-treated individuals which are
further from the treated ﬁrms within a certain range (i.e. bandwidth) of the propensity score
distribution. Using a weighted smoothed matching estimator like the Kernel one presents
several advantages in respect to other matching procedures, particularly in reducing the me-
dian standardized bias between treated and control groups. In addition, it permits to exploit
as much information as possible in matching ﬁrms from the control group, gaining in this
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way in precision without losing anything in terms of matching quality (Leuven and Sianesi
2003; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). As a robustness check, we have also employed diﬀerent
matching procedures yielding very similar results. In Tables A.2.17-A.2.26 in the appendix
we present the results of the nearest neighbour matching 1-to-1 without replacement as an
alternative robustness check. In addition, in Tables A.2.27-A.2.29 in the appendix we present
the estimation results applying a propensity score matching technique in a single treatment
approach, considering the diﬀerent treatments as unrelated to each other and calculating
separately the propensity scores and their average treatment eﬀect for each case.
In order to verify the consistency of the construction of the two groups, we run several
balancing tests to examine the quality of our propensity score matching. To check this bal-
ancing we calculate the mean diﬀerences across the treatments and the control groups for
a set of observable characteristics comparing them before and after the matching has taken
place. Even if diﬀerences between the treated and the control group are expected before
matching, these diﬀerences should be signiﬁcantly reduced after matching. In Tables A.2.4,
A.2.5, A.2.6 and A.2.7 in the appendix we present several tests assessing the comparability
of the two groups for each combination of treatments, in particular testing whether the co-
variates used to control the probability of starting an innovative activity are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the treated and the control group and the achieved percentage reduction
in the standardised bias after the matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). According to
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) the bias after the matching procedure between treated and
untreated observations should not exceed the 25% threshold in order to deliver a consistent
matching. Figure A.2.3 in the appendix shows the reduction in bias for most of the regressors
following the kernel matching technique, where none of the absolute standardized bias exceed
25%. Also the variance ratios between treated over non-treated indicate a good balance for
most of the covariates, with none of them being of particular concern for the quality of the
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matching. These results indicate that there are no systematic diﬀerences in the observables
characteristics between the treated and the control groups, demonstrating that the matching
procedure satisﬁes the balancing property and that the conditional independence assumption
is not violated and assigning the appropriate controls to treated observations (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1985; Damijan and Kostevc 2015).
In this way we are able to estimate the growth of the trade margins premium for ﬁrms
who started innovating for the subsequent 3 years with respect to the pre-treatment level and
to compare it with the corresponding growth for non-innovators. The combination of match-
ing techniques and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences is likely to increase the quality of our empirical
analysis on the causal eﬀect of innovation on export performance. In particular, matching
within each 2-digit industry and considering previous export performance we are able to
compare closely related ﬁrms, characterized by similar productive structures and export sta-
tus. Secondly, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences should remove the eﬀects of common shocks and
provide a robust estimation of the innovative treatment eﬀect on the export performance dif-
ferential between innovators and non innovative ﬁrms (Blundell and Dias 2009). In addition,
following previous studies on the link between innovation, exports and ﬁrm size (Caldera
2010; Damijan et al. 2010; Movahedi and Gaussens 2013; Damijan and Kostevc 2015), and
to be consistent with our ﬁxed-eﬀect model, we provide also the results of the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimation dividing the population of French ﬁrms in sub-samples according
to their size in terms of employees and their group aﬃliation. This procedure will allow us
to test whether the eﬀect of R&D activities on export performance varies according to the
size and the ownership of the ﬁrm. Finally, we use bootstrapped standard errors with 500
repetitions in the Kernel matching technique in order to yield heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors which take into account the additional source of variability introduced by
the estimation of the propensity score and by the matching process (Heckman et al. 1997;
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Abadie and Imbens 2011).
2.5 Results
The main contribution of this chapter to the existing literature on the role of innovation in
improving the international trade performance is to decompose this eﬀect taking into account
not only total exports and the probability of being an exporter but also the extensive and
intensive margins of trade. For the ﬁrst time, we establish whether innovation activities
improve exporters' performance creating new trade links, enriching ﬁrms' product mix and
opening new export markets, or if they support the intensiﬁcation of existing ﬂows. In ad-
dition, we assess as well the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of innovation on export performance,
by simultaneously taking into account both innovation input and output measures. We are
able to identify in this way the direct connection between new innovations and their com-
mercial adoption in international markets and as well to evaluate the indirect eﬀect of ﬁrms'
R&D investment on exports performance. In the next section we analyse the eﬀect of ﬁrms
R&D activities on the standard measures of export performance, ﬁrm total exports and the
probability of being an exporter. Secondly, we focus on the impact of innovations on ﬁrm
trade margins, considering the role played by R&D activities in increasing the value of ﬁrm
shipments, the number of product exported and of foreign markets served. Finally, using
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) propensity score matching (PSM) technique in a multiple
treatment approach we will be able to properly identify the causal link connecting innovation
and export performance, comparing the export performance of ﬁrms before and after they
start innovating with respect to non-innovators (the ATT eﬀect).
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2.5.1 Total Exports and Probability of Exporting
The ﬁrst step is to analyse the eﬀect of ﬁrms' innovation activities on the probability of
being an exporter. All the following estimations include ﬁrm-year ﬁxed-eﬀects and control
for a number of ﬁrm characteristics and measures of performance. Moreover, we have disag-
gregated the sample according to the degree of foreign ownership and ﬁrm size in terms of
employees.10 In particular, we divide ﬁrms into small, medium and large enterprises accord-
ing to the European Commission deﬁnition.11 Following the previous literature, we expect
innovation activities to have a consistently diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrms' export performance not
only across diﬀerent margins, but also in respect to their size and ownership structure, due
to the diﬀerent possibilities ﬁrms might have to exploit economies of scale, of scope and to
internalise positive externalities related to their participation to domestic or foreign business
groups (Cassiman and Golovko 2007; Movahedi and Gaussens 2013; Esteve-Pérez and Ro-
driguez 2013; Palangkaraya 2013). Table 2.6 presents results of the impact of innovation on
the probability of being an exporter using a panel logit model with ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Overall, we ﬁnd that in general total investment in R&D has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the probability of being an exporter. However, total R&D seems to be particularly
relevant for the export participation of domestic and small-medium enterprises, while it does
not appear to play any role in increasing the probability of being an exporter for large and
foreign ﬁrms. This evidence is consistent with recent studies on the export participation of
ﬁrms which have highlighted how R&D only has a signiﬁcant impact on the internationaliza-
tion of SMEs (Cassiman and Golovko 2007; Palangkaraya 2013; Esteve-Pérez and Rodriguez
10Following the INSEE guidelines we deﬁne a ﬁrm as foreign-owned if at least 10% of the equity is controlled
by a foreign company.
11According to the EU Recommendation 2003/361 it is possible to categorize ﬁrms according to their size in
terms of employees and total revenues (micro: employees < 10, turnover ≤ EUR 2 million; small: employees
< 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million; medium: employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million; large: employees
> 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
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Table 2.6: The impact of innovation on the probability of a ﬁrm to be an exporter (EAE data).
Prob. Exporter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0747*** 0.0929*** 0.0599 0.153*** 0.103*** -0.00881
(0.0231) (0.0281) (0.0463) (0.0517) (0.0371) (0.0448)
ProductInn.t 0.400** 0.400** 0.241 -0.0741 0.846*** 0.381
(0.169) (0.199) (0.350) (0.294) (0.277) (0.397)
ProcessInn.t -0.0368 -0.0533 0.359 -0.0267 -0.386 0.372
(0.174) (0.204) (0.374) (0.319) (0.266) (0.437)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.630*** 0.650*** 0.538** 0.363*** 0.815*** -0.120
(0.0694) (0.0739) (0.231) (0.101) (0.138) (0.406)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0813 0.0639 0.183 0.108 -0.0574 -0.540
(0.108) (0.115) (0.398) (0.133) (0.232) (0.827)
TFP t−1 0.184*** 0.213*** 0.0121 0.127* 0.225* 0.220
(0.0606) (0.0654) (0.183) (0.0753) (0.125) (0.316)
Cash− flowt−1 -0.00379 -0.0185 0.230 -0.0544 0.390 0.354
(0.201) (0.220) (0.554) (0.254) (0.401) (0.858)
ForeignGroupt 0.104 0.0785 -0.193 0.558
(0.0998) (0.136) (0.177) (0.649)
FrenchGroupt 0.00172 -0.000376 0.00955 0.00845 -0.829
(0.0473) (0.0486) (0.0559) (0.104) (0.596)
Observations 38,573 35,112 2,584 26,517 8,721 1,090
No.F irms 6,166 5,694 473 4,486 1,452 177
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. The
estimator used is a panel logit with year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable probability of being an exporter
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ﬁrm reports positive foreign sales and 0 otherwise. The main re-
gressors are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if
ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey.
As control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average
salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number
of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker
(2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while
foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French
business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and
cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the
dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we
estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 in-
cludes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results
of the estimation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤
250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
2013; Movahedi and Gaussens 2013; Altomonte et al. 2013). Turning to product innovation,
it also seems to play a key role in increasing the export probability for domestic and medium-
sized ﬁrms. Hence, French ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to export once they introduce new products.
On the contrary, product innovation may not be particularly relevant for foreign owned com-
panies which may already be large multi-product exporters (Cassiman and Golovko 2011).
Interestingly, process innovation does not appear to have any inﬂuence on the probability
of exporting. Looking at the control variables, it is possible to note that total employment
has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of exporting for all ﬁrms except the
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largest ones. Total factor productivity increases as well the likelihood of exporting in the
general sample, but this phenomenon seems to be mainly driven by the eﬀect on domestic
small-medium enterprises. On the contrary, the average salary paid, ﬁrm cash-ﬂow and the
ownership structure do not seem to inﬂuence ﬁrm probability of being an exporter.
Table 2.7: The impact of innovation on ﬁrm level total exports (EAE data).
Tot. Exports (EAE) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0174*** 0.0200*** 0.0149** 0.0227** 0.0183*** 0.0104*
(0.00420) (0.00548) (0.00634) (0.0111) (0.00617) (0.00575)
ProductInn.t 0.0724** 0.0636* 0.0530 -0.0362 0.109** 0.0541
(0.0304) (0.0385) (0.0485) (0.0687) (0.0437) (0.0455)
ProcessInn.t 0.0369 0.0469 0.0505 0.116 -0.0358 0.0562
(0.0320) (0.0406) (0.0502) (0.0756) (0.0458) (0.0464)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.628*** 0.619*** 0.661*** 0.387*** 0.615*** 0.407***
(0.0231) (0.0265) (0.0500) (0.0378) (0.0401) (0.0598)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0988*** 0.0887** 0.137* 0.0737 0.0270 -0.0317
(0.0366) (0.0412) (0.0830) (0.0487) (0.0671) (0.113)
TFP t−1 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.107*** 0.121*** 0.141*** 0.0312
(0.0177) (0.0204) (0.0359) (0.0244) (0.0314) (0.0454)
Cash− flowt−1 0.204*** 0.188*** 0.292** 0.102 0.362*** 0.455***
(0.0544) (0.0620) (0.114) (0.0702) (0.107) (0.156)
ForeignGroupt 0.0950*** 0.0846* 0.0174 0.110
(0.0281) (0.0467) (0.0422) (0.101)
FrenchGroupt 0.0384** 0.0339* 0.0300 0.0399 -0.0182
(0.0166) (0.0175) (0.0214) (0.0293) (0.0953)
Observations 152,681 129,350 23,331 89,106 49,324 14,251
No.F irms 29,467 26,395 5,367 19,846 10,445 2,800
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. The estimator
used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable total exports is the log of total foreign sales
as reported by ﬁrms in the EAE dataset. The main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D in-
vestment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation
or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables we included total employment as
the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the
ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor produc-
tivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between
ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1
if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employ-
ment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies
refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the
second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group.
Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the
results of the estimation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employ-
ees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
In Table 2.7 we present the estimation of the impact of innovation on total exports us-
ing the EAE data. Previous investment in R&D increases total exports for all ﬁrms in the
sample. In addition, we ﬁnd that product innovation plays a signiﬁcant role in increasing
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ﬁrms' total sales abroad, although this is driven mainly by domestic and medium sized ﬁrms.
Process innovation remains generally insigniﬁcant. This evidence is consistent with previous
ﬁndings showing how eﬃciency-enhancing activities such as process innovations play a key
role in exploiting economies of scale, but may not be relevant in improving ﬁrms' export
performance (Mayer and Ottaviano 2007; Corcos et al. 2012; Aw et al. 2011; Rubini et al.
2012). Most of the covariates seem to play a signiﬁcant role in explaining total exports. In
particular, total employment and the average salary have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
total exports for both domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Total factor productivity as well plays a
signiﬁcant role in improving total export, but not for large ﬁrms, while cash-ﬂow seems to
be particularly relevant for medium and large ﬁrms. Also the aﬃliation to a business group
increases foreign sales, in particular for small ﬁrms which are foreign-owned.
The next stage is to proceed using the richer trade data provided by the Customs Agency
(CA) which allows us to calculate the ﬁrm-level trade margins. As a ﬁrst step, in Table
2.8 we present the estimation of the impact of innovation on total exports using now the
Customs Agency trade data as our right-hand side variable. There are a number of notable
diﬀerences between Table 2.8 and Table 2.7. In particular, R&D investment has only a small
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on total exports, playing a role just for foreign and large ﬁrms.
In addition, the introduction of product innovations does not have a signiﬁcant impact on
total exports. Conversely, using the Customs data, process innovation appears to have a
positive eﬀect on total exports of ﬁrms in our sample. One explanation for the inconsistency
in the results between the two diﬀerent sources of data may be explained by the structure of
the two datasets. As previously discussed, while the EAE dataset provides the value of total
exports for all French manufacturing ﬁrms with more than 20 employees, the Custom Agency
database instead reports just the intra-EU shipments with values greater than e100,000 or
the extra-EU shipments above e1,000. For this reason, when looking at the Customs Agency
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variable of total exports we are considering only large exports. It could be argued that small
shipments to high-income countries should have higher degree of product diﬀerentiation and
a larger share of added value embedded in their production in order to be proﬁtable for a
ﬁrm to export (Head and Ries 2001; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007; Bernard et al. 2007).
Table 2.8: The impact of innovation on ﬁrm level total exports (Customs Agency data).
Tot. Exports (CA) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00529 0.00457 0.00711* -0.00190 0.00488 0.00761*
(0.00441) (0.00597) (0.00416) (0.0124) (0.00628) (0.00423)
ProductInn.t 0.000576 -0.0104 0.0163 -0.0776 0.0276 0.0312
(0.0317) (0.0417) (0.0388) (0.0781) (0.0439) (0.0328)
ProcessInn.t 0.0584* 0.0597 0.0436 0.105 0.0402 0.0235
(0.0333) (0.0444) (0.0400) (0.0871) (0.0463) (0.0331)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.794*** 0.803*** 0.788*** 0.599*** 0.665*** 0.640***
(0.0279) (0.0338) (0.0442) (0.0506) (0.0461) (0.0473)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.292*** 0.342*** 0.00813 0.309*** 0.151** -0.0414
(0.0446) (0.0529) (0.0734) (0.0641) (0.0765) (0.0892)
TFP t−1 0.0844*** 0.0840*** 0.0885*** 0.0295 0.171*** 0.0342
(0.0204) (0.0248) (0.0307) (0.0303) (0.0344) (0.0344)
Cash− flowt−1 0.173*** 0.118 0.435*** 0.0123 0.425*** 0.133
(0.0650) (0.0773) (0.105) (0.0893) (0.126) (0.114)
ForeignGroupt 0.00721 0.0222 -0.00123 0.0913
(0.0329) (0.0594) (0.0470) (0.0838)
FrenchGroupt 0.00438 -0.00253 -0.0329 0.0689** 0.0630
(0.0203) (0.0224) (0.0280) (0.0336) (0.0787)
Observations 102,894 85,617 17,277 57,042 34,566 11,286
No.F irms 21,832 19,483 3,850 14,507 7,522 2,146
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and
2007. The estimator used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable total exports is the
log of the sum of total foreign sales of a ﬁrm in a year including all the intra-EU shipments over e
100,000 and extra-EU over e 1,000 as collected by the French Custom Agency. The main regressors
are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has
introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control
variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the
log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees,
TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach,
cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French
group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and
0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one
year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst
column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms
which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign
business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees <
50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large
ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
To investigate the source of this discrepancy between the two sources of data we present
the estimated eﬀect of innovation across diﬀerent quantiles of total exports, using both EAE
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Table 2.9: The impact of innovation across diﬀerent quantiles for ﬁrm level total exports (EAE data).
Tot. Exports (EAE) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.10 .25 .50 .75 .90
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.834*** 0.306*** 0.0529*** 0.0302*** 0.0288***
(0.00110) (0.0139) (0.00883) (0.00507) (0.00435)
ProductInn.t 1.446*** 1.231*** 0.579*** 0.272*** 0.118**
(0.0104) (0.132) (0.0838) (0.0481) (0.0513)
ProcessInn.t 0.319*** 0.183 0.0818 0.0708 0.0601
(0.0109) (0.138) (0.0877) (0.0503) (0.0432)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.212*** 1.336*** 1.386*** 1.114*** 0.975***
(0.002) (0.0267) (0.0170) (0.00976) (0.00838)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.998*** 1.182*** 2.358*** 1.853*** 1.695***
(0.006) (0.0784) (0.0499) (0.0286) (0.0246)
TFP t−1 0.339*** 0.161** 0.738*** 0.873*** 0.793***
(0.005) (0.0649) (0.0413) (0.0237) (0.0203)
Cash− flowt−1 0.195*** -0.479** -0.982*** -1.039*** -0.840***
(0.0176) (0.223) (0.142) (0.0814) (0.0698)
ForeignGroupt -0.952 2.856*** 1.555*** 1.011*** 0.775***
(0.519) (0.0655) (0.0417) (0.0239) (0.0205)
FrenchGroupt -0.294 0.113** 0.607*** 0.347*** 0.234***
(0.355) (0.0448) (0.0285) (0.0164) (0.0141)
Observations 152,681 152,681 152,681 152,681 152,681
No.F irms 29,467 29,467 29,467 29,467 29,467
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
The estimator used is a panel quantile regression with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Ro-
bust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
dependent variable total exports is the log of total foreign sales as reported by ﬁrms
in the EAE dataset. The main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D invest-
ment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process
innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables we in-
cluded total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the
log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number
of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the
De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income
and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if
ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables
total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign
and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable.
and the Custom Agency data as dependent variables, in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Our linear OLS
regressions show the eﬀect of innovation on the outcome variable based on the conditional
mean function. With a quantile regression instead we can provide a richer analysis, describ-
ing the full relationship between innovation and export performance at diﬀerent points in the
conditional distribution of total exports and not just at the mean.
In Tables 2.9 and 2.10 we compare the eﬀect of R&D activities on ﬁrms' total exports at
diﬀerent quantiles. The results are consistent with the previous results: using both sources
of data we ﬁnd that both the eﬀect of R&D investment and the impact of product innovation
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON TRADE MARGINS 173
Table 2.10: The impact of innovation across diﬀerent quantiles for ﬁrm level total exports (CA data).
Tot. Exports (CA) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.10 .25 .50 .75 .90
Tot.R&Dt−1 1.399*** 0.0568** 0.0086 0.001 0.0016
(0.00768) (0.0256) (0.0118) (0.00511) (0.00435)
ProductInn.t 3.770*** 2.307*** 0.482*** 0.195*** 0.0771*
(0.0767) (0.255) (0.118) (0.051) (0.0434)
ProcessInn.t 0.083 -0.0471 0.0834 0.0533 0.0541
(0.081) (0.270) (0.124) (0.0539) (0.0459)
Tot.Employmentt−1 2.456*** 2.273*** 1.455*** 1.098*** 0.933***
(0.225) (0.0457) (0.0295) (0.0114) (0.00956)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.214*** 2.531*** 2.996*** 1.728*** 1.348***
(0.0231) (0.152) (0.0981) (0.0380) (0.0317)
TFP t−1 0.312*** 0.878*** 0.896*** 0.770*** 0.694***
(0.0484) (0.0755) (0.0488) (0.0189) (0.0158)
Cash− flowt−1 0.645*** 0.739* 0.975*** -0.248** -0.419***
(0.145) (0.390) (0.252) (0.0977) (0.0816)
ForeignGroupt 4.896*** 6.274*** 2.287*** 1.163*** 0.905***
(0.497) (0.116) (0.0752) (0.0291) (0.0243)
FrenchGroupt 0.239*** 0.475*** 1.342*** 0.489*** 0.313***
(0.0562) (0.0800) (0.0517) (0.0200) (0.0167)
Observations 102,894 102,894 102,894 102,894 102,894
No.ofF irms 21,832 21,832 21,832 21,832 21,832
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data be-
tween 1999 and 2007. The estimator used is a panel quantile regression with ﬁrm and
year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable total exports is the log of the sum of total
foreign sales of a ﬁrm in a year including all the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000
and extra-EU over e 1,000 as collected by the French Custom Agency. The main
regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy vari-
ables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise
as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables we included total employment as
the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee
calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is
the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007)
approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales,
while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of
a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employ-
ment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French
group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable.
on total exports decrease in terms of magnitude and in terms of statistical signiﬁcance as
ﬁrms' total exports increase in volume. Especially in the case of the Customs Agency data it
is possible to notice that total R&D has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect just in the ﬁrst quar-
tile of small exporters, which are largely under-represented in this database. Moreover, in
Table 2.9 process innovations seem to be statistically signiﬁcant just for exporters in the ﬁrst
quantile, exporting small volumes, while the positive eﬀect disappears after the ﬁrst quartile,
further corroborating the hypothesis that innovation mainly aﬀects the export performance
of small exporters.
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Secondly, we decided to deepen our analysis by looking at the diﬀerent impact of inno-
vation on the EAE total exports variable in the sample of ﬁrms which are matched between
the EAE and the Custom Agency datasets and in the sample of ﬁrms which instead were not
merged between the two datasets. From Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 it is possible to notice
that the diﬀerent R&D variables have a much larger positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
unmatched sample of ﬁrms only present in the EAE dataset rather than on the matched
sample, providing a further evidence that R&D activities seem to be particularly relevant for
ﬁrms exporting small shipments, i.e. those not included in the Custom Agency database.
Finally, as a further robustness check we exploit the diﬀerence in the thresholds for the
inclusion of shipments in the datasets in order to compare the eﬀect of innovation on total
exports distinguishing between intra-EU shipments (included if worth more than e100,000)
and extra-EU exports which instead have a much lower threshold for the inclusion into the
Custom Agency data (all the shipments above e1,000). In this way we will be able to check
within the same database (i.e. the Customs Agency dataset) whether smaller extra-EU ship-
ments are more aﬀected by innovating activities.
The immediate observation from Table 2.13 is that innovation does not have any signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on intra-EU exports (when only large shipments above the e100,000 threshold are
considered) while we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect when looking at extra-EU exports
which consider everything exported above e1,000 in value. This phenomenon is even more
evident when diﬀerentiating between only intra-EU exporters and pure extra-EU exporters in
Table 2.14, comparing the eﬀect on total exports.12 Again, note that R&D activities do not
play any signiﬁcant role in improving export performance for pure intra-EU exporters, while
12In Tables A.2.8 and A.2.9 in the appendix we provide as well these estimations for the diﬀerent trade
margins leading to consistent results.
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Table 2.11: Impact of innovation on total exports for ﬁrms which are matched between the EAE and the CA datasets.
Matched Firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Exports (EAE) General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00692*** 0.00761** 0.0062 0.0048 0.0051 0.00668**
(0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.00654) (0.0039) (0.00339)
ProductInn.t 0.0041 -0.0142 0.0267 -0.0320 0.0037 0.0173
(0.0193) (0.0246) (0.0306) (0.0443) (0.0288) (0.027)
ProcessInn.t 0.0436** 0.0583** 0.02632 0.0677 0.0321 0.221
(0.0203) (0.0261) (0.0315) (0.0493) (0.0304) (0.0273)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.556*** 0.546*** 0.587*** 0.399*** 0.449*** 0.425***
(0.0169) (0.0197) (0.0346) (0.0285) (0.03) (0.0386)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.176*** 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.088
(0.0246) (0.0280) (0.0538) (0.0327) (0.0454) (0.0696)
TFP t−1 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.0946*** 0.0641*** 0.147*** 0.0651**
(0.0127) (0.0149) (0.025) (0.0174) (0.0232) (0.030)
Cash− flowt−1 0.160*** 0.129*** 0.336*** 0.0519 0.307*** 0.268***
(0.0398) (0.0456) (0.083) (0.0507) (0.0833) (0.095)
ForeignGroupt 0.0339* 0.024 0.0207 0.0373
(0.0200) (0.0336) (0.0308) (0.069)
FrenchGroupt 0.0237* 0.0241* 0.0106 0.0583*** 0.0111
(0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0158) (0.0221) (0.0648)
Observations 102894 85618 17277 57042 34566 11286
No.F irms 21832 19483 3850 14507 7522 2146
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. The estimator
used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable total exports is the log of total foreign sales
as reported by ﬁrms in the EAE dataset. The main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D in-
vestment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation
or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables we included total employment as
the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the
ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity
calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net
income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is
part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average
salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t
like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we
estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms
that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation
for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50
million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
they have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on total exports for ﬁrms exporting only outside the
EU. Taken together all these results shed a light on the puzzling diﬀerences using the EAE or
the Customs Agency dataset, corroborating the previous ﬁndings in the literature according
to which innovating activities mainly aﬀect the trade performance of small ﬁrms exporting
to more diﬃcult markets (Cassiman and Golovko 2007; Palangkaraya 2013; Movahedi and
Gaussens 2013).
The results found so far on the impact of innovation on exports for the manufacturing
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Table 2.12: Impact of innovation on total exports for ﬁrms which are just present in the EAE dataset.
Unmatched Firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Exports (EAE) General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0389*** 0.0339*** 0.0432** 0.0245 0.0442*** 0.0183
(0.0099) (0.0128) (0.0174) (0.0241) (0.0148) (0.0178)
ProductInn.t 0.297*** 0.268*** 0.330** 0.01709 0.340*** 0.252
(0.0791) (0.0972) (0.15) (0.16) (0.115) (0.160)
ProcessInn.t -0.0362 -0.0937 0.0911 -0.0290 -0.1189 -0.0041
(0.0834) (0.0998) (0.163) (0.167) (0.12) (0.171)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.380*** 0.361*** 0.431*** 0.237*** 0.245*** 0.505***
(0.0391) (0.0424) (0.111) (0.0543) (0.0742) (0.162)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0398 0.0274 0.114 0.0507 -0.122 -0.259
(0.0511) (0.0541) (0.171) (0.0602) (0.112) (0.247)
TFP t−1 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.185** 0.0753* 0.120* 0.299**
(0.0319) (0.0348) (0.088) (0.0393) (0.0638) (0.129)
Cash− flowt−1 0.155* 0.135 0.1789 0.128 0.365* 1.212**
(0.0872) (0.0949) (0.24) (0.102) (0.188) (0.492)
ForeignGroupt 0.215*** 0.130* 0.148* 0.408*
(0.0480) (0.0713) (0.078) (0.215)
FrenchGroupt 0.0647** 0.0581** 0.0736** 0.0159 0.2429
(0.0253) (0.0260) (0.0301) (0.0518) (0.203)
Observations 63041 56908 6133 43982 16304 2751
No.F irms 16195 15071 2012 12269 4704 773
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. The es-
timator used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable total exports is the log
of total foreign sales as reported by ﬁrms in the EAE dataset. The main regressors are the one-
year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced
product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables
we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log
of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees,
TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach,
cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French
group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and
0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one
year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst
column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms
which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign
business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees <
50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large
ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
sector are consistent with the evidence for all the other industries reported in Tables A.2.10
and A.2.11 in the appendix. As previously explained, since the Custom Agency data takes
into account just trade in goods we decided to consider just the manufacturing sectors to
carry on a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of innovation across the diﬀerent margins of
trade. However, not using the Custom Agency data it is still possible to provide an analysis
of the impact of R&D activities on total exports and the probability of being an exporter
for all the other industries (agriculture, mining and services) adding to our sample almost
100,000 ﬁrms more, most of them part of the service industry. Tables A.2.10 and A.2.11
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Table 2.13: The impact of innovation on total exports intra-EU or extra-EU (CA data).
Total Exports Intra-EU
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0057 0.0015 0.00613 -0.0161 0.0068 0.012
(0.0068) (0.00909) (0.00952) (0.0192) (0.00971) (0.00845)
ProductInn.t 0.0254 -0.0176 0.1019 -0.156 0.0772 0.0448
(0.0511) (0.0669) (0.074) (0.13) (0.0718) (0.0671)
ProcessInn.t 0.0242 0.00216 0.0609 0.107 -0.0560 0.0686
(0.0538) (0.0712) (0.0763) (0.145) (0.0759) (0.0677)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.934*** 0.957*** 0.880*** 0.790*** 0.897*** 0.544***
(0.0508) (0.0627) (0.0876) (0.104) (0.0819) (0.0986)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.365*** 0.451*** -0.0256 0.378*** 0.314** -0.0785
(0.0765) (0.0922) (0.136) (0.122) (0.122) (0.179)
TFP t−1 0.151*** 0.168*** 0.089 0.170*** 0.190*** -0.0703
(0.0366) (0.0447) (0.0621) (0.0573) (0.0607) (0.0755)
Cash− flowt−1 0.292** 0.226* 0.396* 0.303* 0.13 -0.0806
(0.114) (0.136) (0.207) (0.165) (0.22) (0.238)
ForeignGroupt 0.0846 -0.0627 0.169** 0.230
(0.0575) (0.111) (0.0806) (0.179)
FrenchGroupt 0.0028 -0.0062 -0.0182 0.0262 0.194
(0.0393) (0.0435) (0.0589) (0.0601) (0.170)
Observations 102,894 85,617 17,277 57,042 34,566 11,286
No.F irms 21,832 19,483 3,850 14,507 7,522 2,146
Total Exports Extra-EU
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0180** 0.0095 0.0334** 0.0208 0.0043 0.0290**
(0.00864) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0212) (0.0136) (0.0147)
ProductInn.t 0.166** 0.162** 0.108 0.019 0.214** 0.15
(0.0649) (0.0804) (0.117) (0.143) (0.101) (0.117)
ProcessInn.t -0.0371 0.0087 -0.0709 0.0085 -0.0025 -0.138
(0.0684) (0.0856) (0.121) (0.16) (0.106) (0.118)
Tot.Employmentt−1 1.065*** 0.964*** 1.252*** 0.859*** 0.853*** 1.354***
(0.0645) (0.0754) (0.139) (0.114) (0.115) (0.172)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.244** 0.305*** -0.0855 0.349*** 0.138 -0.434
(0.0972) (0.111) (0.216) (0.134) (0.171) (0.313)
TFP t−1 0.063 0.0199 0.116 0.0347 0.0621 0.0138
(0.0465) (0.0537) (0.0985) (0.0632) (0.085) (0.132)
Cash− flowt−1 0.017 -0.0582 0.322 -0.171 0.274 0.315
(0.145) (0.163) (0.328) (0.181) (0.308) (0.415)
ForeignGroupt 0.110 0.0521 0.145 0.332
(0.0731) (0.123) (0.113) (0.313)
FrenchGroupt 0.0379 0.070 -0.0022 0.130 0.200
(0.0499) (0.0523) (0.065) (0.0843) (0.296)
Observations 102,894 85,617 17,277 57,042 34,566 11,286
No.F irms 21,832 19,483 3,850 14,507 7,522 2,146
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and
2007. The estimator used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables total exports
intra and extra-EU are the log of the sum of total foreign sales to intra or extra-EU countries of
a ﬁrm in a year including alternatively all the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 or all extra-EU
exports over e 1,000 as collected by the French Custom Agency. The main regressors are the one-
year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced
product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables
we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of
wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees, TFP
is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach,
cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French
group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and
0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one
year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst
column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms
which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign
business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees
< 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and
large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
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Table 2.14: The impact of innovation on total exports of ﬁrms exporting just within or extra-EU (CA data).
Only Intra-EU Exports
Total Exports
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0177 -0.0167 0.120* -0.0458 0.105** -0.0918*
(0.0240) (0.0270) (0.0631) (0.0418) (0.0457) (0.0502)
ProductInn.t 0.0849 -0.0448 -0.0523 -0.151 0.402 -0.219
(0.158) (0.167) (0.664) (0.254) (0.296) (0.396)
ProcessInn.t -0.0190 -0.114 0.769 -0.145 0.289 -0.0419
(0.174) (0.179) (0.781) (0.261) (0.316) (0.507)
Observations 36,388 34,015 2,373 27,354 8,184 850
No.ofF irms 10,750 10,163 893 8,523 2,679 289
Only Extra-EU Exports
Total Exports
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0564** 0.0463 0.0790 0.0953** -0.0591 0.113*
(0.0260) (0.0301) (0.0537) (0.0430) (0.0400) (0.0599)
ProductInn.t 0.124 0.104 0.0711 -0.180 0.152 1.348***
(0.161) (0.174) (0.458) (0.245) (0.260) (0.429)
ProcessInn.t 0.101 0.0679 0.262 0.362 0.0537 1.776***
(0.169) (0.181) (0.472) (0.262) (0.242) (0.517)
Observations 36,339 34,282 2,057 27,813 7,738 788
No.ofF irms 10,843 10,327 795 8,745 2,573 272
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between
1999 and 2007. The estimator used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
dependent variable total exports is the log of the sum of total foreign sales of ﬁrms in a
year exporting just within or outside the EU. Total exports could alternatively include
all the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 or all the extra-EU exports over e 1,000 as
collected by the French Custom Agency. The main regressors are the one-year lags of
total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced
product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As un-
reported control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of
employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total
labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor produc-
tivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the
ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two
dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0
otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are
lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the depen-
dent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column
we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group.
Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5
and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR
10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms
(employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
in the appendix supports the results discussed previously for the manufacturing industry:
total investment in R&D has a positive eﬀect on total exports even for ﬁrms in the service
sectors, especially for domestic and medium-sized companies. The introduction of new prod-
uct innovations seems to be particularly relevant for ﬁrms in the service industry, increasing
the total value of exports for all ﬁrms across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Process innovation
instead does not have any eﬀect on the trade performance of service ﬁrms, similarly to the
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previous analysis on the manufacturing sectors. When looking at the probability of being an
exporter it is possible to notice that R&D investment plays a signiﬁcant role in increasing
ﬁrm probability of being an exporter only for medium-size companies. Moreover, neither the
introduction of new products nor of new process innovations seem to play any role in improv-
ing ﬁrm probability of being an exporter. Focusing on the agriculture and mining sectors it
is possible to notice that R&D activities do not improve the export performance of the small
number of French ﬁrms in our sample in any way, except for a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of
total investment in R&D on total exports of small-sized ﬁrms. These results seem to suggest
a similar eﬀect of innovation on the export performance of manufacturing and service ﬁrms,
especially regarding the particularly positive impact of product innovation on total exports.
However, given the limitation of the Custom Agency data just to manufacturing goods, we
are not able to further analyse this relationship looking as well at the impact of innovation
on the trade margins of services ﬁrms.
As a further robustness check in Table A.2.12 in the appendix we present as well the
estimations of the impact of innovation on export performance including our R&D variables
separately and then together. The results suggest that collinearity between the diﬀerent
R&D variables should not be a concern. On the contrary, each of these variables explains
a diﬀerent aspect of the same phenomena as suggested by previous literature (Kleinknecht
et al. 2002; Mohnen and Hall 2013) and identiﬁes a diﬀerent eﬀect of the overall R&D eﬀort
on export performance. In addition, in Table A.2.13 available in the appendix we provide
a further robustness check only using the EAE dataset as a source for the R&D investment
variable and sequentially dropping the possible outliers. As previously explained, when com-
paring the two datasets it can be noted that some ﬁrms reporting investment in R&D in a
given year in the EAE dataset were not included in the R&D survey or vice-versa due to
misreporting or because their investment in innovation did not reach the threshold required
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to be included in the R&D survey. Thus, we dropped from the sample all the observations
in which ﬁrms report an investment in R&D in the EAE dataset but which were not present
in the R&D survey and as well the observations included in the R&D survey which did not
reported any investment in innovation in the EAE dataset. In Table A.2.13 we compare the
eﬀect of using the two diﬀerent sources of data and we analyse the variations in the results
when dropping from the whole sample the observations with incoherent information from the
two diﬀerent datasets. We ﬁnd that the R&D investment variable from the EAE dataset is
generally consistent with the results we ﬁnd when using the R&D survey data, and it is ro-
bust across speciﬁcations sequentially pulling out from the sample the diﬀerent combinations
of incoherent observations.
This ﬁrst set of results has stressed the importance of using a disaggregated analysis at
the trade margin level in order to fully evaluate the comprehensive eﬀect of R&D on ﬁrms'
export performance otherwise unobservable at the aggregate level. In the next section we
will analyse the eﬀect of innovating activities on the intensive and extensive margins of trade
at the ﬁrm-level.
2.5.2 Trade Margins
In the second stage of our analysis we disentangle the impact of innovation on the intensive
and extensive margins of trade. As discussed earlier, we decompose the extensive margin
into the number of products exported, the number of destinations served by each ﬁrm and
the average number of products exported to each foreign market. The intensive margin is
instead measured as the average value of a ﬁrm's shipments. In Table 2.15 we estimate the
eﬀect of innovation on the intensive margin.
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Table 2.15 shows that R&D investment positively aﬀects just the average value of exports
(the intensive margin) for large enterprises. In addition, while product innovation does not
seem to play any signiﬁcant role in increasing ﬁrm intensive margin, the introduction of new
process innovation has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the value of shipments exported
abroad. Note that this eﬀect is particularly important for small and large enterprises, while
medium-size ﬁrms are not aﬀected. These results stress the key role played by process in-
novation in increasing the average value of exports as pointed out in the previous literature
(Parisi et al. 2006; Caldera 2010; Becker and Egger 2013). In particular in developed coun-
tries, new production processes might help ﬁrms to increase the value and the quality of
products exported and to become more eﬃcient reducing in this way the average cost of
exports and more generally of production.
When we consider the country and the product extensive margins we use a poisson ﬁxed-
eﬀect regression model given the count structure of the data. Results are presented in Table
2.16 for product extensive margins and Table 2.17 for country extensive margins. Innovative
activities seem to have contrasting eﬀects on the two extensive margins and across the dif-
ferent categories of ﬁrms. For instance, investment in R&D seems to have a negative eﬀect
on the number of products exported by domestic ﬁrms, while it increases the number of
products exported by foreign and large enterprises. Table 2.17 shows that total R&D has
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the number of foreign markets served, again an eﬀect
driven mainly by large and foreign-owned ﬁrms. In fact, foreign and large enterprises seem
to be more likely to invest in R&D activities, ﬁrstly to introduce new products, and secondly
in order to exploit the knowledge acquired from this investment in order to enter new markets.
As expected, product innovation has a signiﬁcant impact on the number of products
exported by ﬁrms, while process innovation signiﬁcantly aﬀects the number of products ex-
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON TRADE MARGINS 182
Table 2.15: The impact of innovation on ﬁrm level intensive margin of trade.
Intensive Margin (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00256 0.00260 0.00312 -0.00243 0.00150 0.00567**
(0.00205) (0.00269) (0.00311) (0.00566) (0.00300) (0.00270)
ProductInn.t -0.0129 -0.0180 -0.00126 -0.0659 -0.00713 -0.00336
(0.0154) (0.0198) (0.0242) (0.0482) (0.0222) (0.0214)
ProcessInn.t 0.0370** 0.0326 0.0321 0.0851** 0.00467 0.0437**
(0.0162) (0.0211) (0.0249) (0.0427) (0.0234) (0.0216)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.223*** 0.198*** 0.295*** 0.198*** 0.223*** 0.137***
(0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0286) (0.0305) (0.0253) (0.0315)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0587** 0.0633** 0.00906 0.0921** 0.0213 0.0367
(0.0230) (0.0273) (0.0445) (0.0357) (0.0377) (0.0573)
TFP t−1 0.0700*** 0.0622*** 0.0863*** 0.0723*** 0.0544*** 0.0773***
(0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0187) (0.0241)
Cash− flowt−1 0.106*** 0.00762 0.424*** -0.0194 0.237*** 0.0778
(0.0344) (0.0402) (0.0676) (0.0484) (0.0679) (0.0759)
ForeignGroupt 0.00705 -0.00856 0.0171 -0.0364
(0.0173) (0.0327) (0.0249) (0.0572)
FrenchGroupt -0.0296** -0.0292** -0.0178 -0.0396** -0.0286
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0542)
Observations 102,894 85,617 17,277 57,042 34,566 11,286
No.F irms 21,832 19,483 3,850 14,507 7,522 2,146
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and
2007. The estimator used is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable intensive margin
of trade is the log of the average value of ﬁrm shipments abroad including all the intra-EU shipments
over e 100,000 and all the extra-EU over e 1,000 as collected by the French Custom Agency. The
main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to
1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey.
As control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average
salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number of
employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007)
approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and
French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group
and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged
one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst
column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms
which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign
business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees <
50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large
ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
ported just for foreign ﬁrms, corroborating previous ﬁndings on the role played by process
innovation in improving large foreign-owned ﬁrms' export performance (Huergo and Jauman-
dreu 2004; Parisi et al. 2006; Mairesse 2008). In terms of the number of foreign countries
supplied, note that the introduction of new products does not improve access to new foreign
markets, while process innovation is particularly relevant for small ﬁrms which need to be-
come more eﬃcient and to reduce their production costs in order to serve a larger number
of foreign markets. However, Table 2.18 shows that ﬁrm R&D activities do not have any
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Table 2.16: The impact of innovation on the product extensive margin.
Product Ext. Margin (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 -0.0007 -0.00384*** 0.00216** 0.000369 0.000129 0.00221***
(0.0006) (0.000824) (0.00101) (0.00215) (0.00110) (0.000836)
ProductInn.t 0.0144*** 0.00830 0.0155** 0.0315** 0.0138* 0.0129**
(0.00475) (0.00658) (0.00722) (0.0158) (0.00827) (0.00641)
ProcessInn.t 0.00542 0.00559 0.0213*** -0.00168 0.000174 0.00922
(0.00487) (0.00676) (0.00733) (0.0182) (0.00869) (0.00638)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.333*** 0.317*** 0.367*** 0.235*** 0.285*** 0.391***
(0.00562) (0.00697) (0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.0101)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.160*** 0.0755***
(0.00884) (0.0108) (0.0170) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0188)
TFP t−1 0.00412 0.0169*** -0.0205*** 0.0359*** 0.00435 -0.0348***
(0.00401) (0.00504) (0.00707) (0.00719) (0.00731) (0.00699)
Cash− flowt−1 0.101*** 0.161*** -0.0320 0.0631** 0.127*** 0.144***
(0.0134) (0.0168) (0.0244) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0221)
ForeignGroupt 0.0127* -0.00381 0.00879 0.0830***
(0.00691) (0.0149) (0.0105) (0.0184)
FrenchGroupt 0.0158*** 0.0111* -0.00898 0.0149* 0.0789***
(0.00532) (0.00577) (0.00835) (0.00823) (0.0176)
Observations 74,414 58,309 15,397 34,527 28,345 10,533
No.F irms 12,705 10,476 2,835 6,748 5,045 1,754
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
The estimator used is a panel Poisson model with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable product extensive margin
is a count variable reporting the number of products exported by a ﬁrm in a year taking into account all
the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 and the extra-EU exports over e 1,000 as registered by the French
Custom Agency. The main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy
variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the
R&D survey. As control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees,
average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number
of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) ap-
proach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French
group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 oth-
erwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while
foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all
ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign
business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6
report the results of the estimation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (em-
ployees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the average number of products exported to the diﬀerent foreign markets.
The results found so far are generally conﬁrmed by the estimation of innovation's impact
on ﬁrm export performance done using a random-eﬀects model and a dynamic system GMM
model presented in Tables A.2.14 and A.2.15 of the appendix. Focusing on the random-
eﬀects model in Table A.2.14 it is possible to notice that both R&D investment and product
innovations have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm total exports and the probability
of being an exporter. Conversely, the intensive margin is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by ﬁrm
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Table 2.17: The impact of innovation on the country extensive margin.
Country Ext. Margin (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00189*** 0.000706 0.00321*** 0.00161 0.00114 0.00293***
(0.000627) (0.000843) (0.000983) (0.00205) (0.00103) (0.000895)
ProductInn.t 0.00427 0.00637 -0.000182 -0.00821 0.00884 0.00513
(0.00476) (0.00643) (0.00742) (0.0146) (0.00760) (0.00696)
ProcessInn.t 0.00429 0.00235 0.00709 0.0363** 0.00613 0.000983
(0.00489) (0.00666) (0.00751) (0.0164) (0.00791) (0.00691)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.228*** 0.212*** 0.222*** 0.217***
(0.00600) (0.00763) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0104) (0.0114)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0702*** 0.0809*** 0.0332* 0.0725*** 0.0676*** 0.0356*
(0.00957) (0.0120) (0.0172) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0208)
TFP t−1 0.0221*** 0.0175*** 0.0342*** 0.0272*** 0.0233*** 0.00168
(0.00425) (0.00537) (0.00742) (0.00744) (0.00736) (0.00809)
Cash− flowt−1 0.0222* 0.0592*** -0.0403* 0.0253 0.0469* 0.0265
(0.0135) (0.0161) (0.0243) (0.0219) (0.0256) (0.0256)
ForeignGroupt 0.00896 0.0168 0.00540 -0.00863
(0.00697) (0.0147) (0.0101) (0.0227)
FrenchGroupt 0.0175*** 0.0163*** 0.00933 0.0186** -0.0127
(0.00547) (0.00598) (0.00846) (0.00828) (0.0217)
Observations 74,414 58,309 15,397 34,527 28,345 10,533
No.F irms 12,705 10,476 2,835 6,748 5,045 1,754
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
The estimator used is a panel Poisson model with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable country extensive margin
is a count variable reporting the number of foreign markets served by a ﬁrm in a year taking into account all
the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 and the extra-EU exports over e 1,000 as registered by the French
Custom Agency. The main regressors are the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy
variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the
R&D survey. As control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of employees,
average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour cost over total number
of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) ap-
proach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French
group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 oth-
erwise. Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while
foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all
ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign
business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6
report the results of the estimation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (em-
ployees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
R&D activities corroborating the results found applying the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. Innova-
tion instead has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the extensive margins of trade, especially with the
introduction of new products which positively aﬀects the number of countries served and
the number of products exported. These results are conﬁrmed when applying a dynamic
system GMM instrumenting the possible endogenous variables - the innovation measures -
with their three-periods lagged values plus the total amount of public resources used to fund
their R&D activities. Again, note in Table A.2.15 that R&D investment and product in-
novations improve ﬁrm total exports and the probability of being an exporter. In addition
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Table 2.18: The impact of innovation on the product-country extensive margin.
Prod-Cod. Ext. Margin (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 -0.000519 -0.000873 -0.000196 -0.000243 -0.000467 -0.000317
(0.000677) (0.000880) (0.00106) (0.00178) (0.00104) (0.000980)
ProductInn.t 0.00526 0.00371 0.00702 0.0116 0.00252 0.00771
(0.00486) (0.00615) (0.00797) (0.0112) (0.00726) (0.00759)
ProcessInn.t 0.000783 0.00673 -0.00656 -0.00267 0.00241 -0.00291
(0.00512) (0.00654) (0.00822) (0.0125) (0.00765) (0.00767)
Tot.Employmentt−1 0.0965*** 0.0913*** 0.116*** 0.0421*** 0.0925*** 0.156***
(0.00429) (0.00498) (0.00908) (0.00728) (0.00762) (0.0109)
Av.Salaryt−1 0.0553*** 0.0563*** 0.0334** 0.0388*** 0.0644*** 0.0191
(0.00685) (0.00780) (0.0151) (0.00922) (0.0126) (0.0207)
TFP t−1 0.00321 0.00611* -0.00229 0.00408 0.00965* 0.0179**
(0.00314) (0.00366) (0.00631) (0.00435) (0.00569) (0.00795)
Cash− flowt−1 0.0241** 0.0325*** -0.00348 0.00740 0.0364* 0.0586**
(0.00999) (0.0114) (0.0215) (0.0128) (0.0209) (0.0265)
ForeignGroupt 0.00608 0.0131 0.0100 0.0141
(0.00505) (0.00854) (0.00776) (0.0194)
FrenchGroupt 0.00428 0.000676 -0.00423 0.0197*** 0.0108
(0.00312) (0.00331) (0.00402) (0.00555) (0.0182)
Observations 102,894 85,617 17,277 57,042 34,566 11,286
No.F irms 21,832 19,483 3,850 14,507 7,522 2,146
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
The estimator used is a panel OLS model with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable product-country extensive mar-
gin is a continuous variable reporting the average number of products exported by a ﬁrm to each foreign
markets served in a year, taking into account all the intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 and the extra-EU
exports over e 1,000 as registered by the French Custom Agency. The main regressors are the one-year lags
of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has introduced product or process
innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As control variables we included total employ-
ment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as
the ratio of total labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity
calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net
income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part
of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total employment, average salary,
TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the
dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate
the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are
part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small
(employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and
large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
product innovation plays a key role in increasing the number of products exported and the
number of countries served, while we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of innovation on the
intensive margin of exports. To evaluate the overall goodness of ﬁt of the GMM models we
report the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions and we test for the presence of ﬁrst
and second order serial autocorrelation. We can notice that almost all our speciﬁcations
passed these robustness tests except for the total export (EAE) speciﬁcation in which the
Hansen test rejected the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, we should not be too worried about
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this fact given that when samples with a very large dimension are used in estimation, the
Sargan and Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions tend to over-reject the null hypothe-
sis of instrument validity (Blundell and Bond 2000; Bo and Jagadeesh 2010; Ding et al. 2013).
2.5.3 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation
Although our results are generally consistent with the previous literature, we now examine
the impact of the decision to start innovating on the diﬀerent margins of trade. In fact, we
are aware of the possible endogeneity problem aﬀecting this analysis and, to properly identify
the causal link connecting innovation and export performance, we make use of a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DID) propensity score matching (PSM) technique in a multiple treatment
approach. In this way we will be able to compare the export performance of ﬁrms before
and after they start innovating with respect to non-innovators (the ATT eﬀect). Matching
methods allow to mitigate the endogeneity bias thanks to the construction of valid control
groups based on the observable diﬀerences between innovators and non-innovators. In Table
A.2.16 in the appendix we report some brief statistics about the scale, strategies and export
performance of ﬁrms included in the diﬀerent treated and control groups. It is possible to
notice that most of the ﬁrms in our DID analysis (31,714) have never performed any R&D
activity and will be part of our control group. Looking at the treated ﬁrms, note that a large
part of them (more than 1,800) have introduced jointly a product and a process innovation
as a result of their ﬁrst year of R&D activity, followed by a lower number of ﬁrms which
have instead just introduced a product or a process innovation or have just invested in R&D
activities without any result in terms of innovative output. Finally, these statistics show that
ﬁrms that have jointly introduced a product and a process innovation outperform all the
other categories in terms of all the indicators of productivity, scale and export performance.
On the contrary, non-innovators are characterised, as expected, by the worst performance in
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terms of productivity, scale of operation and export performance according to all indicators.
This preliminary evidence stresses even more the relevance of a propensity score matching
technique in order to select from the sample of untreated ﬁrms a control group for which the
distribution of observed characteristics in the pre-innovation period is as similar as possible
to the distribution of treated ﬁrms.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis slightly diﬀers from the previous ﬁxed-eﬀect esti-
mations mainly because of the way the treatments have been deﬁned. In fact, to properly
identify the ATT eﬀect we considered as treated observations only those ﬁrms who have im-
plemented one of the innovation treatments for the ﬁrst time (investing in R&D, introducing
a product innovation, a process innovation or jointly introducing a product and a process
innovation), in other words just the innovation switchers, and we compared them against a
control group of untreated companies, excluding in this way from our analysis the persistent
innovators. On the contrary, in the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations we have included all the ﬁrms
part of our sample, estimating the eﬀect of R&D activities on the export performance for
innovating switchers, persistent innovators and non-innovating ﬁrms. In addition, while in
the ﬁxed-eﬀect analysis we took into account the magnitude of ﬁrm investment in R&D ac-
tivities, in the DID estimation we observe just the eﬀect of starting to invest in R&D, not
considering the overall value of the investment though. These methodological diﬀerences
might lead to slightly diﬀerent results between the ﬁxed-eﬀect and the DID estimations.
Table 2.19 presents the ATT eﬀects of the four possible treatments on the export per-
formance after the ﬁrst time a ﬁrm started innovating and for the following 2 years. In
particular in this table we focus on ﬁrms total exports and on the probability of starting
to export as reported in the EAE dataset. Diﬀerently from the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation, in
the DID analysis we consider the diﬀerence in ﬁrm exporting status before and after the
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implementation of the innovative treatment, thus estimating ﬁrm probability of starting to
export abroad. The number of treated and untreated observations for each treatment case
and in the diﬀerent sub-samples depends on the number of treated ﬁrms in the remaining
cases, on the persistence of ﬁrms in our sample over the years and as well on the persistence
of observations in the common support based on the matching technique used, resulting in a
sample size decreasing as t increases. Consistent bootstrapped standard errors are reported
below the ATT estimates.
Table 2.19: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's export performance - ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Total Exports (EAE) Prob. Exporting (EAE)
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.309*** 0.285*** 0.474*** 0.0428*** 0.0510*** 0.0520***
b.s.e. (0.0824) (0.0941) (0.126) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0178)
Treated 497 472 352 497 472 352
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.262*** 0.249*** 0.477*** 0.0420*** 0.0494*** 0.0713***
b.s.e. (0.0671) (0.0825) (0.0978) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0152)
Treated 665 663 544 665 663 544
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.203** 0.142 0.284** 0.0326** 0.0300* 0.0199
b.s.e. (0.0933) (0.110) (0.144) (0.0147) (0.0166) (0.0217)
Treated 338 314 236 338 314 236
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.405*** 0.0382*** 0.0388*** 0.0539***
b.s.e. (0.0638) (0.0750) (0.0915) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0155)
Treated 1572 1489 1196 1572 1489 1196
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score
Kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included
in the treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables total exports
and the probability of starting to export have been built as previously described using
the EAE dataset. We report the ATT eﬀects of the four possible treatments of investing
in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation (Pd), a process innovation (Pc) or to
jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having inno-
vated at all for the following three years after the treatment.
First, we ﬁnd that after starting to invest in R&D ﬁrms experience a steady growth in
total exports in the following 3 years relative to similar ﬁrms in the same industry which did
not invest in R&D, accounting on average for 30% increase in total export in 3 years. We ﬁnd
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a comparable eﬀect for ﬁrms who have introduced for the ﬁrst time a product innovation,
while the eﬀect of introducing a process innovation seems to be smaller both in terms of
growth and of statistical signiﬁcance. Similarly, ﬁrms have an higher probability of starting
to export in the next 3 years once they start innovating, on average 5% more than other
competitors in the same industry. These eﬀects seem to be robust across all the diﬀerent
form of innovation, both for innovative input and output, conﬁrming the causal link between
R&D and trade performance and the key role played by innovation both in increasing ﬁrms'
propensity to export and their intensity of total sales registered in foreign markets.
Table 2.20: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's total exports (CA) and intensive margin - ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Total Exports (CA) Intensive Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.177* 0.469*** 0.801*** 0.162* 0.374*** 0.787***
b.s.e. (0.0967) (0.119) (0.152) (0.0870) (0.106) (0.136)
Treated 392 373 275 392 373 275
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.132 0.450*** 0.777*** 0.149* 0.375*** 0.668***
b.s.e. (0.0917) (0.113) (0.140) (0.0833) (0.100) (0.124)
Treated 554 530 443 554 530 443
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.126 0.163 0.562*** 0.154 0.214 0.499***
b.s.e. (0.132) (0.165) (0.178) (0.123) (0.147) (0.153)
Treated 258 236 179 258 236 179
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.147 0.347*** 0.620*** 0.109 0.276** 0.462***
b.s.e. (0.101) (0.125) (0.166) (0.0934) (0.114) (0.150)
Treated 1267 1214 985 1267 1214 985
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data
between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tech-
nique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard
errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the treated and control groups is re-
ported. The dependent variables total exports and the intensive margin of trade
have been built as previously described using the Custom Agency data. We report
the ATT eﬀects of the four possible treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), intro-
ducing a product innovation (Pd), a process innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce
a product and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having innovated at all for
the following three years after the treatment.
In Table 2.20 we focus our attention on the treatment eﬀect on the intensive margin and
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on total exports using the Custom Agency data. It is interesting to note that as in the pre-
vious case ﬁrms who start investing in R&D activities are also able to improve the average
value of their shipments, with an average growth rate of more than 40% in the following
three years. We ﬁnd a similar, but smaller, impact when analysing the eﬀect of introducing
a new product innovation which could be used by exporters to increase the value of future
exports. Process innovation instead seems to bring a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
contribution to exports value just 3 years after the introduction of a new process, probably
due to the time needed by ﬁrms to introduce and adapt new productive processes and the
costs connected with this.
Similarly, using the Custom Agency data on total exports we ﬁnd a positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant impact of newly introduced product innovation and R&D investment on
foreign sales, similar in magnitude to the eﬀect estimated previously when using the EAE
data, in particular a few years after the beginning of the innovative activity. As some theoret-
ical literature has anticipated, the introduction of new innovations could result in a disruptive
process of transformation for a manufacturing ﬁrm, especially regarding the introduction of
new products and processes. Following the Schumpeterian idea of "creative destruction"
(Schumpeter 1942) a recent study suggests that the creation and development of new tech-
nologies might initially reduce the value of domestic and foreign sales, mainly due to the
costs of adaptation and production shift (Conley et al. 2012). Hence, ﬁrms would still ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to innovate and introduce new varieties, since rational customers would prefer
the new products rather than the old version. This phenomenon is particularly relevant in
the initial periods after the introduction of innovations, explaining why in most of the cases
we identify an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of R&D activities at time t = 0 on export performance,
turning instead to a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect just in a later stage.
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Finally, in Table 2.21 we present the treatment eﬀect of starting innovative activities on
the extensive margins of trade. Looking at the extensive margins note that the growth in
total exports related to R&D activity seems to be mainly driven by a growth in the number
of products exported and of foreign markets served. Firms increase the number of products
exported and the destinations once they start investing in R&D. Investing in R&D and intro-
ducing new products in fact help ﬁrms in improving their international performance, mainly
through the penetration of new markets and by introducing especially designed tailor-made
goods, exploiting the innovative knowledge to enter potentially diﬃcult markets. In addition,
R&D activities increase as well the average number of products exported to the diﬀerent for-
eign markets served by French ﬁrms.
Table 2.21: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's extensive margins - ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Country Ext. Margin Product Ext. Margin Prod-Cod. Ext. Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.379* 0.724** 1.983*** 0.502 1.959*** 2.820*** 0.0191 0.0510*** 0.114***
b.s.e. (0.207) (0.308) (0.438) (0.416) (0.543) (0.7830) (0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0248)
Treated 392 373 275 392 373 275 392 373 275
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.543** 1.412*** 1.858*** 0.749** 0.750*** 0.508*** -0.0126 0.0306* 0.0485**
b.s.e. (0.223) (0.307) (0.409) (0.347) (0.140) (0.111) (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0197)
Treated 554 530 443 554 530 443 554 530 443
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.242 0.459 1.731*** -1.269** -1.647** -0.0960 -0.0198 -0.0397 0.00955
b.s.e. (0.240) (0.384) (0.562) (0.476) (0.666) (0.923) (0.0165) (0.0198) (0.0240)
Treated 258 236 179 258 236 179 258 236 179
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.393** 0.618*** 1.792*** -0.228 0.741 0.581 0.0215 0.0543*** 0.0773***
b.s.e. (0.170) (0.230) (0.320) (0.388) (0.446) (0.589) (0.0133) (0.0161) (0.0209)
Treated 1267 1214 985 1267 1214 985 1267 1214 985
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect
estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped
standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of
ﬁrms included in the treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables country, product and product-
country extensive margins have been built as previously described using the Custom Agency data. We report the ATT
eﬀects of the four possible treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation (Pd), a process
innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having innovated at all
for the following three years after the treatment.
After 3 years, ﬁrms investing in R&D activities seem to export on average to 2 countries
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more than comparable non-innovating companies and they are able to improve as well their
product-mix by exporting on average 3 more products with an overal positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the average number of products exportde to diﬀerent foreign markets. Introducing
new innovative products has a similar impact on both the number of countries served and the
number of products exported, particularly large in the case of foreign markets served, with
a signiﬁcantly larger impact on the extensive margins of trade in particular at time t = 0.
This result is related to the previous evidence about the need of time in order to exploit com-
mercially an innovative activity such as R&D investment and process innovations. On the
contrary, the introduction of new innovative products might have a quicker positive impact
on ﬁrm export performance thanks to the immediate commercial exploitation of this type of
innovation also in foreign markets.
Surprisingly, the introduction of new innovative process seems to have a signiﬁcant and
negative impact on the number of products exported. As previously shown, a low-cost busi-
ness policy might negatively aﬀect the value of goods and their attractiveness on the foreign
markets. At the same time, an eﬃciency-seeking strategy could push ﬁrms towards a ra-
tionalization of supply, reducing the number of varieties oﬀered and focusing just on the
most added-value intensive products in which ﬁrms hold a comparative advantage. On the
contrary, the joint introduction of product and process innovations seem to have an increas-
ing eﬀect over time but just on the country extensive margin of trade. We ﬁnd that three
years after the introduction of both new product and process innovations ﬁrms penetrate on
average almost two new foreign markets more than non-innovators.
Overall, we ﬁnd that investment in R&D and the introduction of new products positively
aﬀect ﬁrms' international trade performance, mainly exporting new products to new foreign
markets and marginally improving the average value of exports. Thus, the positive eﬀect of
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R&D on a ﬁrm export performance appears to be mainly driven by an improvement in the
extensive margins of trade, both in terms of products exported and countries served.
We further developed our analysis by looking at the treatment eﬀect of the introduc-
tion of R&D activities on the export performance of French ﬁrms diﬀerentiating between
their size and according to their ownership. From Tables 2.22 and 2.23 note that it is only
medium-sized new innovators who experience an increase of their total exports or a higher
probability of becoming an exporter after the introduction of new innovation. In addition,
we ﬁnd evidence of a similar phenomenon just for domestic ﬁrms, while multinational enter-
prises based in France do not seem to improve their export performance after the beginning
of R&D activities. These results are in line with our previous ﬁndings from the ﬁxed-eﬀect
model in which we estimated a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of innovation in particular for
domestic-owned and SMEs. On the one side ﬁrms might need a certain size, in terms of in-
ternal resources, in order to exploit the economies of scale related to R&D activities. For this
reason, small ﬁrms might ﬁnd it diﬃcult in the ﬁrst place to start innovating and secondly
to exploit commercially the results of their innovative eﬀorts due to their size constraints.
On the other side, French ﬁrms that are part of a foreign multinational group might be unaf-
fected by their innovative output given that MNEs are usually larger in size, multi-product
manufacturers and already exporting to diﬀerent foreign markets. For these reasons, a new
innovative activity might not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect in improving their total export or
the probability of becoming an exporter given that most of them already sell their products
abroad.
We ﬁnd slightly diﬀerent evidence when estimating the eﬀect of innovation on the trade
margins of ﬁrms across diﬀerent size and ownership categories. First, from Table 2.24 we
see that the introduction of product or of jointly product and process innovations have a
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positive eﬀect on the trade margins of small ﬁrms as well as medium sized ﬁrms. In par-
ticular, introducing both a product and a process innovation helps small ﬁrms to increase
not only the average value of their exports, but also to export more products (2 more on
average in respect to non-innovating ﬁrms) and to a larger number of countries (one foreign
market more) at a later stage, with an average positive eﬀect of almost 50% growth in total
exports in the following 3 years. Secondly, from Tables 2.25 and 2.27 it is possible to notice
that medium and domestic ﬁrms proﬁt the most from investment in R&D activities and from
the introduction of innovative products, in particular improving the average value of their
shipments and increasing the overall number of countries served, with an export performance
improvement in the following 3 years similar in magnitude to the previously discussed general
sample. Finally, Tables 2.26 and 2.28 conﬁrm the previous results not ﬁnding any signiﬁcant
eﬀect of new R&D activities on the trade margins of large and foreign-owned ﬁrm. This evi-
dence seems to corroborate the hypothesis that R&D activities could play an essential role in
improving the export performance of medium-sized and domestic-owned ﬁrms, in particular
increasing the likelihood of their participation to international markets and by increasing the
number of products exported and of foreign markets served in respect to non-innovators. On
the contrary, small ﬁrms might not have the suﬃcient resources required in order to exploit
in the international markets the positive externalities related to R&D activities, while large
and foreign-owned companies might not depend on innovation in order to boost their export
performance, given their possibility to exploit economies of scale and the positive spillovers
of being part of multinational business groups.
As previously discussed in the methodological section, we have performed a series of ro-
bustness checks in order to verify the goodness of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. In
particular, in Tables A.2.27-A.2.29 in the appendix we have ﬁrstly estimated the previous
model but considering separately the four diﬀerent treatments as individual activities which
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are not correlated with each other and estimating a single separate propensity score for each
of the four treatments. Secondly, we have replicated our results applying diﬀerent match-
ing algorithms, among which one-to-one with and without replacement, nearest-neighbour,
caliper and radius using as well diﬀerent measures of matching bandwidth. In Tables A.2.17-
A.2.26 in the appendix we present these results using a nearest-neighbour matching technique
with a conservative matching range of 5 nearest observations. Finally, we have re-estimated
our model not forcing the matching between treated and control observations to be within
industry and year cohorts, but just based on the basic propensity score estimated with the
multinomial logit as explained above. Our main results are consistent with all the speciﬁca-
tions previously used, once again conﬁrming the robustness of our analysis in terms of the
goodness of methodologies applied and of the accuracy of ﬁndings.13
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have exploited four unique and detailed datasets to investigate the impact
of the innovating activities of French ﬁrms on their trade margins for the period 1999-2007.
Our main contribution to the existing literature is the decomposition of this eﬀect on the
extensive and intensive margins of trade. For the ﬁrst time, we established at the ﬁrm
level whether innovation activities improve exporters' performance creating new trade links,
enriching ﬁrms' product mix and opening new export markets, or if they support the inten-
siﬁcation of existing ﬂows. In addition, we assessed the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of innovation
on export performance, by simultaneously taking into account both innovation input and
output measures. Controlling for ﬁrm characteristics across diﬀerent industries, the general
result is that R&D has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on export performance.
13The results of these additional robustness checks are available upon request.
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First, we found a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of past investment in R&D on exports
that is particularly robust and consistent across all diﬀerent measures of trade performance
and the diﬀerent estimation techniques. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) propensity
score matching (PSM) technique in a multiple treatment approach we have been able to
compare the export performance of ﬁrms before and after they start innovating with respect
to non-innovators, providing estimations robust to possible endogenity concerns, and ﬁnding
a particularly relevant dynamic eﬀect on export performance in the years following the inno-
vative activity.
First, innovation increases by 5% on average the probability of French ﬁrms to participate
in the international markets, helping them to face the pressure of foreign competitors and
experiencing a steady growth of more than 30% in total exports in the following years in
respect to similar ﬁrms which do not innovate. Overall, we found that both investment in
R&D and the introduction of new products positively aﬀect ﬁrms' international trade per-
formance, while process innovation seems to play a marginal role in improving ﬁrm exports.
Most importantly, we disentangled the eﬀect of innovating activities on the diﬀerent mar-
gins of trade in order to identify the role played by speciﬁc R&D activities across the diﬀerent
components of ﬁrms' export performance. Generally, we found that R&D activities positively
aﬀect ﬁrms' international trade performance, mainly exporting new products to new foreign
markets and marginally improving the average value of exports. Thus, dissecting the impact
on the trade margins we found that the growth in total exports related to R&D activity
seems to be mainly driven by a growth in the number of products exported and of foreign
markets served. Investing in R&D and introducing new products in fact help French ﬁrms
to export on average to 2 more new markets and by introducing 3 more products on average
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than non-innovators, using especially designed varieties and exploiting the innovative knowl-
edge to enter potentially diﬃcult markets.
We further exploited our data by analysing the treatment eﬀect of the introduction of
R&D activities on export performance of French ﬁrms diﬀerentiating between their size and
according to their ownership. Our results corroborate the hypothesis that R&D activities
play an essential role in improving the export performance of medium-sized and domestic-
owned ﬁrms, in particular increasing the likelihood of their participation to international
markets and by increasing the number of products exported and of foreign markets served
in respect to non-innovators. In fact, small ﬁrms might not have the suﬃcient resources
required in order to exploit in the international markets the positive externalities related to
R&D activities, while large and foreign-owned companies might not depend solely on innova-
tion in order to boost their export performance, given their possibility to exploit economies
of scale and the positive spillovers of being part of multinational business groups.
Overall, innovation plays a key role in developed and mature economies as France, prepar-
ing ﬁrms to face international competition, upgrading their knowledge of foreign markets and
introducing tailor-made goods designed to penetrate distant and diﬃcult countries. However,
we also found some evidence that innovation is a dynamic, time-consuming and resources-
intensive process, with a "creative destruction" eﬀect of new innovations on ﬁrm performance,
leading to an initial insigniﬁcant or even negative impact of R&D on exports due to the costs
of adaptation, production shift and the time needed in order to commercially exploit new
technologies especially in foreign markets. Nevertheless, although a negative or zero impact
in the short-run, returns to R&D investment seem to pay back in the long-run with a twofold
impact on economic growth, both as a mean of developing new technologies but also boosting
export performance with potential welfare gains in terms of production and employment.
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To conclude, our analysis has identiﬁed for the ﬁrst time at the ﬁrm-level the precise
impact of several innovating activities on export performance, dissecting this impact across
the diﬀerent margins of trade. It helped as well to identify the main channels linking R&D
activities and exports, establishing through which trade margins innovation drives ﬁrm ex-
port performance. We deem this investigation on the dynamic eﬀect of R&D activities across
the diﬀerent trade margins particularly relevant in order to elaborate the appropriate policies
to be used to support and foster this relationship, and in turn to boost economic recovery
encouraging international trade, R&D investment and employment.
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Appendix A2
Table A.2.1: Variables Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Observations Firms
Tot. Employment 137.34 1047.32 20 115,968 192,697 35,583
Av. Salary 25,444 9,534 500 760,458 192,697 35,583
log(TFP) 4.446 0.617 -1.840 8.901 192,697 35,583
Tot. Sales 3,676,280 3,781,990 1 44,500,000 192,697 35,583
Cash-ﬂow 0.0414 0.1160 -6.243 11.616 192,697 35,583
Tot. Investment 1,050,059 1,550,118 -2,146,786 30,372,891 192,697 35,583
Foreign Group 0.15 0.36 0 1 192,697 35,583
French Group 0.43 0.49 0 1 192,697 35,583
Foreign Ownership 0.14 0.34 0 1 192,697 35,583
Tot. R&D 710,668 14,128 0 1,628,152 192,697 35,583
R&D Intensity 0.005 0.16 0 5.42 192,697 35,583
Product Inn. 0.0643 0.2454 0 1 192,697 35,583
Process Inn. 0.0526 0.2232 0 1 192,697 35,583
R&D Public Funds 1,078 14,192 0 474,383 192,697 35,583
Tot. Exports (EAE) 1,109,188 1,926,680 0 27,100,000 192,697 35,583
Export Intensity 0.16 0.23 0 1 192,697 35,583
Pr. Exporter 0.72 0.44 0 1 192,697 35,583
Tot. Exports (CA) 1,390,000 1,300,000 3 15,100,000 102,924 18,421
Intensive Margin 200,304 901,215 3 77,700,000 102,924 18,421
Country Ext. Margin 14.90 18.10 1 174 102,924 18,421
Product Ext. Margin 16.40 30.77 1 840 102,924 18,421
Prod-Country Ext. Mar. 2.85 3.55 1 152 102,924 18,421
Note: Statistics based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data, average from year 1999
to 2007. Employment calculated as average number of full-time employees (EAE data). Average salary
represents average annual salary of full-time employees in Euro (EAE data). Total sales calculated as
average total sales (domestic+foreign) (EAE data). Total investment calculated as average of ﬁrm total
investment in ﬁxed tangible assets (EAE data). Productivity calculated as log of total factor productivity
following the De Loecker (2007) approach (EAE data). Cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net
income and total sales (EAE data). Export intensity calculated as the ratio of ﬁrm total exports over total
sales (EAE data). Foreign and French group are dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign
or French business group and 0 otherwise (EAE data). Foreign ownership represents the share of partici-
pation in the company capital by foreign ﬁrms (EAE data). Total R&D investment includes all positive
investment of ﬁrm in R&D activities (R&D Survey data). R&D intensity calculated as average ratio of
ﬁrms total investment in R&D over total sales (R&D Survey data). R&D public funding calculated as the
average funds received by French, foreign and international public authorities to stimulate private ﬁrms
innovative activities (R&D Survey data). Product and Process Innovation reports the average frequency
of the introduction of new product or process innovations in French ﬁrms during the period of interest
(R&D Survey data). Total exports (EAE) equal to ﬁrms foreign sales in each year as reported in the
EAE dataset. Total exports (CA) includes data on all intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 and extra-EU
over e 1,000 collected by the French Custom Agency. Intensive Margin calculated as average value of
ﬁrms shipments abroad (CA data). Product extensive margin calculated as average number of products
exported by French ﬁrms each year (CA data). Country extensive margin calculated as average number of
foreign markets served by French ﬁrms each year (CA data). All monetary values deﬂated using OECD
production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline.
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Table A.2.2: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Pr. Exporter Dummy variable for export status equals to 1 if ﬁrm i at time t has positive
export sales and 0 otherwise (EAE Data).
Tot. Exports (EAE) Firm i total export sales at time t according to the EAE dataset.
Export Intensity Ratio of ﬁrm i total exports over total sales at time t according to the EAE
dataset.
Tot. Exports (CA) Firm i exports about intra-EU shipments over e 100,000 and extra-EU over
e 1,000 according to the French Custom Agency data.
Intensive Margin Average value of ﬁrm i shipments abroad (Custom Data).
Product Extensive Margin Count variable for the number of products exported by each ﬁrm (Custom
Data).
Country Extensive Margin Count variable for the number of foreign markets served by each ﬁrm (Custom
Data).
Product-Country Extensive Margin Average number of products exported to each foreign market by each ﬁrm
(Custom Data).
Tot. Employment Size of ﬁrm i measured as the log of total employees (EAE Data).
Av. Salary The log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour payments
over total labour (EAE Data).
Total Sales The log of of ﬁrm i total sales (domestic+foreign) at time t (EAE data).
Total Investment The log of of ﬁrm i total investment in ﬁxed tangible assets at time t (EAE
data).
Cash-ﬂow The ratio between ﬁrm i net income and total sales (EAE Data).
TFP The log of total factor productivity calculated following the De Loecker (2007)
approach. We have used value added as a proxy for output, including in the
estimation total wages as measure for labour, export dummy, the total costs
of intermediate input as costs of production and total investment in tangible
and intangible assets (EAE Data).
Foreign Group Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i is part of a foreign-owned group or 0
otherwise (LiFi Data).
French Group Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i is part of a French group or 0 otherwise
(LiFi Data).
Foreign Ownership Variable measuring the share of ownership of ﬁrm i by individuals and com-
panies which are not based in France (LiFi Data).
Tot. R&D The log of ﬁrm i total investment in R&D activities at time t− 1 both inter-
nally and externally (R&D Data).
R&D Intensity Ratio of ﬁrm i total investment in R&D activities over total sales at time t
according to the EAE dataset and the R&D Survey.
Product Innovation Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has introduced a new product innovation
thanks to its R&D activity and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
Process Innovation Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has introduced a new process innovation
thanks to its R&D activity and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
R&D Public Funds The log of total funds received by ﬁrm i from public authorities to support
ﬁrm's R&D activities (R&D Data).
Rd Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has started investing in R&D activities
for the ﬁrst time and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
Pd Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has introduced a new product innovation
for the ﬁrst time and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
Pc Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has introduced a new process innovation
for the ﬁrst time and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
PdPc Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i has introduced both a new process and
a new product innovation for the ﬁrst time and 0 otherwise (R&D Data).
Ind Industrial sector at the NACE 2-digit-level of disaggregation (EAE Data).
Year Year ﬁxed eﬀect (EAE Data).
Domestic Dummy variable equals to 1 if ﬁrm i is owned for less than 10% by a foreign
company and 0 otherwise following the INSEE guidelines (LiFi Data).
SmallEC Dummy variable equals to 1 if the total labour force of ﬁrm i at time t is
smaller than 50 employees following the European Commission guidelines
(EAE Data).
MediumEC Dummy variable equals to 1 if the total labour force of ﬁrm i at time t is larger
than 50 and smaller than 250 employees following the European Commission
guidelines (EAE Data).
LargeEC Dummy variable equals to 1 if the total labour force of ﬁrm i at time t
is larger than 250 employees following the European Commission guidelines
(EAE Data).
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Figure A.2.1: Density distribution of propensity scores for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups for each diﬀerent treatment.
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Note: Propensity scores for the 4 treatments (investing in R&D, introducing a product innovation, introducing a process
innovation, introducing jointly a product and a process innovations) estimated using a multinomial logit.
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Figure A.2.2: Median, 25th and 75th percentile and conﬁdence interval of the propensity scores for ﬁrms in the treated and
control groups for the 4 diﬀerent treatments.
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Note: Propensity scores for the 4 treatments (investing in R&D, introducing a product innovation, introducing a process
innovation, introducing jointly a product and a process innovations) estimated using a multinomial logit.
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Table A.2.4: Matching propensity average balancing test for Rd propensity score
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Reduct Bias t p>|t| variance residuals
Tot. Employment Unmatched 4.661 3.805 88.5 24.6 0.000 1.04
Matched 4.657 4.465 19.89 77.59 2.96 0.850 0.85
Av. Salary Unmatched 3.277 3.189 30.8 7.32 0.000 0.97
Matched 3.277 3.262 5.3 82.8 0.9 0.365 0.98
TFP Unmatched 4.695 4.3369 57.7 14.62 0.000 1.23
Matched 4.695 4.640 8.9 84.6 1.39 0.166 0.89
Export Unmatched 0.916 0.662 65.59 12.96 0.000 0.45**
Matched 0.9165 0.846 17.89 72.59 3.7 0.729 0.64*
Tot. Investment Unmatched 5.693 4.276 71.59 17.64 0.000 0.86
Matched 5.6892 5.277 20.8 71 3.41 0.480 0.87
Cash-ﬂow Unmatched 5.194 2.570 25.9 5.45 0.000 0.55*
Matched 5.188 3.653 15.2 41.5 2.79 0.005 0.72*
Foreign Group Unmatched 0.255 0.115 36.70 10.46 0.000 1.90*
Matched 0.256 0.227 7.6 79.2 1.17 0.242 1.05
French Group Unmatched 0.588 0.401 38.1 9.16 0.000 1.22
Matched 0.588 0.592 -0.8 97.9 -0.140 0.890 1
Sample Stat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med.Bias B R
Unmatched 0.124 727.49 0.000 42.2 37.4 120.8* 0.77
Matched 0.22 35.94 0.000 10.19 8.30 25.2 0.76
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the multinomial logit estimation before and after and the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of
the matching procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of ﬁrms in the matched sample
compared to those in unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of
the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present a summary of statistics
regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw
or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In
addition, we present the mean and median bias as summary indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally,
the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched
non-treated groups, while the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index.
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Table A.2.5: Matching propensity average balancing test for Pd propensity score
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Reduct Bias t p>|t| variance residuals
Tot. Employment Unmatched 4.797 3.805 104.1 33.65 0.000 0.9
Matched 4.793 4.676 12.3 88.1 2.11 0.350 0.78
Av. Salary Unmatched 3.322 3.189 49.3 13.1 0.000 0.76*
Matched 3.321 3.313 2.9 94.1 0.59 0.558 0.71*
TFP Unmatched 4.7923 4.3369 72.5 21.89 0.000 1.22
Matched 4.788 4.789 -0.2 99.7 -0.04 0.970 0.75*
Export Unmatched 0.938 0.662 73.5 16.7 0.000 0.37**
Matched 0.937 0.885 13.9 81.09 3.74 0.010 0.68*
Tot. Investment Unmatched 6.018 4.276 92.5 25.69 0.000 0.69*
Matched 6.011 5.752 13.8 85.1 2.62 0.089 0.75*
Cash-ﬂow Unmatched 4.837 2.570 21 5.56 0.000 0.73*
Matched 4.803 3.534 11.8 44 2.57 0.010 0.88
Foreign Group Unmatched 0.311 0.115 49.2 17.14 0.000 2.14**
Matched 0.310 0.314 -1 98 -0.17 0.862 0.99
French Group Unmatched 0.545 0.401 29.1 8.33 0.000 1.17
Matched 0.547 0.530 3.3 88.7 0.66 0.509 1
Sample Stat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med.Bias B R
Unmatched 0.169 1300.14 0.000 50.2 49.3 138.9* 0.74
Matched 0.170 37.72 0.000 6.7 4.5 30.3* 0.8
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the multinomial logit estimation before and after and the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of
the matching procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of ﬁrms in the matched sample
compared to those in unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of
the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present a summary of statistics
regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw
or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In
addition, we present the mean and median bias as summary indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally,
the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched
non-treated groups, while the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index.
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Table A.2.6: Matching propensity average balancing test for Pc propensity score
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Reduct Bias t p>|t| variance residuals
Tot. Employment Unmatched 4.713 3.805 94.2 21.85 0.000 1.04
Matched 4.712 4.464 25.7 72.7 3.23 0.343 0.99
Av. Salary Unmatched 3.290 3.189 36.5 6.97 0.000 0.83
Matched 3.289 3.254 12.5 65.7 1.86 0.063 0.94
TFP Unmatched 4.632 4.3369 45.8 10.03 0.000 1.39*
Matched 4.6311 4.536 14.7 67.90 1.94 0.052 1.02
Export Unmatched 0.916 0.662 65.59 10.82 0.000 0.44**
Matched 0.916 0.825 23.5 64.09 3.9 0.008 0.74*
Tot. Investment Unmatched 5.956 4.276 88.1 17.51 0.000 0.75*
Matched 5.955 5.372 27.6 65.3 4.17 0.075 0.87
Cash-ﬂow Unmatched 4.411 2.570 15.7 3.18 0.001 1.06
Matched 4.435 3.746 5.9 62.6 0.88 0.378 1.25*
Foreign Group Unmatched 0.267 0.115 39.4 9.49 0.000 1.89*
Matched 0.266 0.232 8.6 78.3 1.09 0.276 1.10
French Group Unmatched 0.572 0.401 34.70 6.99 0.000 1.18
Matched 0.573 0.545 5.9 83.1 0.83 0.407 1.01
Sample Stat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med.Bias B R
Unmatched 0.134 584.17 0.000 45.3 37.9 128.5* 0.8
Matched 0.290 32.47 0.000 12.9 10.5 40.1* 0.63
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the multinomial logit estimation before and after and the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of
the matching procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of ﬁrms in the matched sample
compared to those in unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of
the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present a summary of statistics
regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw
or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In
addition, we present the mean and median bias as summary indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally,
the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched
non-treated groups, while the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index.
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Table A.2.7: Matching propensity average balancing test for PdPc propensity score
Mean Bias Equality of Means Ratio of
Variable Sample Treated Control Std. Bias Reduct Bias t p>|t| variance residuals
Tot. Employment Unmatched 5.005 3.805 113.8 58.08 0.000 1.01
Matched 4.999 5.022 -2.20 98.1 -0.54 0.587 0.84
Av. Salary Unmatched 3.346 3.189 56.8 22.63 0.000 0.83
Matched 3.345 3.348 -1.00 98.2 -0.3 0.766 0.81
TFP Unmatched 4.790 4.336 70.40 31.67 0.000 1.37*
Matched 4.790 4.797 -1.10 98.5 -0.280 0.777 0.83
Export Unmatched 0.952 0.662 79 25.97 0.000 0.31**
Matched 0.951 0.907 12.1 84.6 5.26 0.010 0.84
Tot. Investment Unmatched 6.270 4.276 99.9 42.78 0.000 0.74*
Matched 6.260 6.043 10.8 89.1 2.98 0.003 0.83
Cash-ﬂow Unmatched 5.235 2.570 24.7 9.59 0.000 0.75*
Matched 5.258 3.851 13.1 47.2 4.08 0.000 0.78*
Foreign Group Unmatched 0.330 0.115 53.4 27.00 0.000 2.15**
Matched 0.330 0.341 -2.8 94.7 -0.72 0.470 0.97
French Group Unmatched 0.540 0.401 28.1 11.74 0.000 1.14
Matched 0.540 0.520 4.00 85.80 1.19 0.234 0.98
Sample Stat. R2 LRchi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med.Bias B R
Unmatched 0.241 3422.42 0.000 56.3 55.1 151.8* 0.92
Matched 0.149 77.48 0.000 5.5 3.9 25.1 0.73
Note: in the second column we diﬀerentiate between the sample before and after the implementation of the matching technique.
Columns 3 and 4 present the mean value of each control variable for ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the
implementation of the matching technique. In columns 5 and 6 we display the median standard bias across all the covariates
included in the multinomial logit estimation before and after and the percentage reduction in the bias after the application of
the matching procedure. Columns 7 and 8 report the t-tests for the equality of the mean values of ﬁrms in the matched sample
compared to those in unmatched sample. Columns 9 and 10 show the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to linear index of
the propensity score in treated group over non-treated group. Finally, in the bottom two rows we present a summary of statistics
regarding the whole sample. First, we include the pseudo R2 from the probit estimation of the treatment on covariates on raw
or matched samples and the corresponding χ2 statistic and p-value of likelihood-ratio test of joint signiﬁcance of covariates. In
addition, we present the mean and median bias as summary indicators of the distribution of bias across the samples. Finally,
the Rubin's B shows the absolute standardized diﬀerence of means of linear index of propensity score in treated and matched
non-treated groups, while the Rubin's R is the ratio of treated to matched non-treated variances of the propensity score index.
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Figure A.2.3: Propensity scores regressors bias between ﬁrms in the treated and control groups before and after the application
of the kernel matching technique.
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Note: Propensity scores for the 4 treatments (investing in R&D, introducing a product innovation, introducing a process
innovation, introducing jointly product and process innovations) estimated using a multinomial logit. Kernel matching technique
applied with a 0.01 bandwidth and imposing a common support condition, matching ﬁrms part of the same industry and which
performed the treatment in the same year. Treated ﬁrms are in the common support if their propensity score is lower than the
maximum and higher than the minimum score of the control units.
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Table A.2.8: The impact of innovation on trade margins of ﬁrms exporting just within the EU (CA data).
Only Intra-EU Exports
Intensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0411* 0.0567** -0.0290 -0.00651 0.0611 0.110*
(0.0240) (0.0265) (0.0656) (0.0422) (0.0382) (0.0605)
ProductInn.t 0.115 0.133 0.357 0.0616 0.225 -0.0902
(0.151) (0.165) (0.445) (0.255) (0.244) (0.383)
ProcessInn.t 0.0155 0.0623 -0.669 -0.254 0.146 0.463
(0.178) (0.189) (0.614) (0.280) (0.281) (0.538)
Observations 7,594 6,686 908 5,016 2,277 301
No.ofF irms 2,593 2,332 346 1,775 857 114
Country Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 -0.00810 -0.00978 0.00236 0.00610 -0.00877 -0.0514
(0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0465) (0.0326) (0.0249) (0.0394)
ProductInn.t -0.0244 -0.0407 -0.0395 0.0380 -0.00126 -0.192
(0.107) (0.117) (0.329) (0.191) (0.163) (0.253)
ProcessInn.t -0.0463 -0.0394 -0.0729 -0.0692 -0.0755 -0.0402
(0.122) (0.129) (0.419) (0.202) (0.184) (0.339)
Observations 6,701 5,852 771 4,360 1,946 260
No.ofF irms 1,700 1,498 209 1,119 526 73
Product Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 -0.0150 -0.0137 0.0162 -0.0400 -0.0158 0.00429
(0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0446) (0.0271) (0.0179) (0.0314)
ProductInn.t 0.183* 0.170* 0.571* -0.203 -0.255 -0.0287
(0.0937) (0.100) (0.304) (0.169) (0.174) (0.174)
ProcessInn.t 0.0951 0.0752 0.470 0.0836 0.0840 0.0854
(0.115) (0.122) (0.371) (0.187) (0.198) (0.256)
Observations 6,701 5,852 771 4,360 1,946 260
No.ofF irms 1,700 1,498 209 1,119 526 73
Product-Country Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00159 -0.00421 0.0107 0.0122*** 0.00460 -0.00227
(0.00273) (0.00294) (0.0100) (0.00458) (0.00512) (0.00598)
ProductInn.t -0.0194 -0.0318 -0.0867 -0.0450 -0.00676 -0.0296
(0.0190) (0.0194) (0.107) (0.0316) (0.0350) (0.0473)
ProcessInn.t 0.0242 0.0188 0.150 0.0355 0.0192 0.0530
(0.0210) (0.0209) (0.126) (0.0322) (0.0373) (0.0605)
Observations 6,701 5,852 771 4,360 1,946 260
No.ofF irms 1,700 1,498 209 1,119 526 73
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between
1999 and 2007. The estimator used for the intensive margin and product-country extensive
margin of trade is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects, while for country and prod-
uct extensive margins is a Poisson model with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The main regressors are
the one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm
has introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey.
As unreported control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of
employees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total
labour cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productiv-
ity calculated following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio
between ﬁrm net income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy
variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise.
Control variables total employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year
while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The
ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect
just for ﬁrms which are not part of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that
are part of a foreign business group only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the esti-
mation for small (employees < 50, turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250,
turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
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Table A.2.9: The impact of innovation on trade margins of ﬁrms exporting just outside the EU (CA data).
Only Extra-EU Exports
Intensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0635** 0.0405 0.166*** 0.0639* 0.0319 -0.00644
(0.0256) (0.0289) (0.0623) (0.0357) (0.0465) (0.0994)
ProductInn.t 0.0227 -0.00595 0.247 -0.0387 -0.137 0.597
(0.144) (0.156) (0.405) (0.193) (0.285) (0.566)
ProcessInn.t 0.196 0.103 0.936** 0.239 0.418 -1.005
(0.155) (0.169) (0.423) (0.219) (0.257) (0.651)
Observations 7,439 6,843 596 5,365 1,831 243
No.ofF irms 2,829 2,637 247 2,122 740 101
Country Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.0460*** 0.0009 0.0910*** -0.00452 -0.00952 0.0103
(0.0154) (0.0200) (0.0295) (0.0258) (0.0297) (0.0341)
ProductInn.t 0.154 0.190* -0.139 0.246* 0.00755 -0.190
(0.0946) (0.106) (0.214) (0.129) (0.170) (0.415)
ProcessInn.t -0.00405 -0.0303 0.112 0.112 -0.199 -0.365
(0.101) (0.112) (0.244) (0.149) (0.160) (0.431)
Observations 6,329 5,792 487 4,487 1,529 197
No.ofF irms 1,719 1,586 138 1,244 438 55
Product Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00994 -0.0184 0.0703*** -0.0196 -0.00545 0.00681
(0.0129) (0.0161) (0.0252) (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0430)
ProductInn.t 0.217*** 0.236*** -0.182 0.393*** 0.0098 -0.344
(0.0765) (0.0866) (0.180) (0.110) (0.130) (0.335)
ProcessInn.t 0.0511 0.0446 0.161 0.311** -0.160 -0.122
(0.0774) (0.0914) (0.155) (0.128) (0.107) (0.353)
Observations 6,329 5,792 487 4,487 1,529 197
No.ofF irms 1,719 1,586 138 1,244 438 55
Product-Country Extensive Margin
General Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large
Tot.R&Dt−1 0.00296 0.000818 0.00768 0.00447 -0.000331 0.00712
(0.00315) (0.00361) (0.00717) (0.00497) (0.00536) (0.00737)
ProductInn.t 0.00507 -0.00178 -0.0524 0.0816*** 0.0640* 0.0760
(0.0210) (0.0225) (0.0645) (0.0316) (0.0370) (0.0542)
ProcessInn.t 0.00119 0.00119 0.0148 0.0484 -0.0465 -0.0808
(0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0665) (0.0339) (0.0343) (0.0654)
Observations 6,329 5,792 487 4,487 1,529 197
No.ofF irms 1,719 1,586 138 1,244 438 55
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between
1999 and 2007. The estimator used for the intensive margin and product-country extensive
margin of trade is a panel OLS with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects, while for country and prod-
uct extensive margins is a Poisson model with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The main regressors are the
one-year lags of total R&D investment, and of two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm has
introduced product or process innovation or 0 otherwise as reported in the R&D survey. As
unreported control variables we included total employment as the log of the numbers of em-
ployees, average salary is the log of wage per employee calculated as the ratio of total labour
cost over total number of employees, TFP is the log of the total factor productivity calculated
following the De Loecker (2007) approach, cash-ﬂow calculated as the ratio between ﬁrm net
income and total sales, while foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1
if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total
employment, average salary, TFP and cash-ﬂow are lagged one year while foreign and French
group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column includes all ﬁrms
in our sample. In the second column we estimate the eﬀect just for ﬁrms which are not part
of a foreign business group. Column 3 includes ﬁrms that are part of a foreign business group
only. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the estimation for small (employees < 50,
turnover ≤ EUR 10 million), medium (employees ≤ 250, turnover ≤ EUR 50 million) and
large ﬁrms (employees > 250, turnover > EUR 2 million).
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Table A.2.17: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's export performance - ATT eﬀects with nearest-neighbour matching.
Total Exports (EAE) Prob. Exporting
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.229*** 0.263*** 0.560*** 0.0455*** 0.0513*** 0.0642***
b.s.e. (0.0771) (0.0968) (0.126) (0.0112) (0.0131) (0.0159)
Treated 585 472 352 585 472 352
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.243*** 0.270*** 0.548*** 0.0376*** 0.0442*** 0.0745***
b.s.e. (0.0617) (0.0799) (0.0930) (0.00925) (0.0112) (0.0123)
Treated 819 665 545 819 665 545
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.171* 0.176 0.258* 0.0379*** 0.0381** 0.0119
b.s.e. (0.0917) (0.119) (0.151) (0.0138) (0.0173) (0.0216)
Treated 406 315 236 406 315 236
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.310*** 0.0367*** 0.0318*** 0.0392***
b.s.e. (0.0541) (0.0638) (0.0767) (0.00816) (0.00899) (0.0107)
Treated 1811 1492 1200 1811 1492 1200
Untreated 22849 22849 19999 22849 22849 19999
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score
applying a nearest neighbour matching 1-to-1 procedure without replacement. Boot-
strapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the treated and control
groups is reported. The dependent variables total exports and the probability of starting
to export have been built as previously described using the EAE dataset. We report the
ATT eﬀects of the four possible treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a
product innovation (Pd), a process innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product
and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having innovated at all for the following
three years after the treatment.
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Table A.2.18: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's total exports (CA) and intensive margin - ATT eﬀects with nearest-neighbour
matching.
Total Exports (CA) Intensive Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.239** 0.508*** 0.750*** 0.235*** 0.442*** 0.601***
b.s.e. (0.0957) (0.111) (0.140) (0.0843) (0.0972) (0.123)
Treated 468 374 275 468 374 275
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.0790 0.310*** 0.574*** 0.134* 0.265*** 0.450***
b.s.e. (0.0790) (0.101) (0.122) (0.0699) (0.0863) (0.104)
Treated 668 530 443 668 530 443
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.0448 0.0439 0.523*** 0.105 0.101 0.442***
b.s.e. (0.123) (0.168) (0.185) (0.112) (0.148) (0.156)
Treated 314 236 178 314 236 178
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.0541 0.223** 0.507*** 0.0840 0.223*** 0.434***
b.s.e. (0.0720) (0.0893) (0.124) (0.0651) (0.0801) (0.110)
Treated 1485 1221 995 1485 1221 995
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data
between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences tech-
nique with propensity score applying a nearest neighbour matching 1-to-1 procedure
without replacement. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms in-
cluded in the treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables total
exports and the intensive margin of trade have been built as previously described
using the Custom Agency data. We report the ATT eﬀects of the four possible treat-
ments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation (Pd), a process
innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc)
against not having innovated at all for the following three years after the treatment.
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Table A.2.19: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's extensive margins - ATT eﬀects with nearest-neighbour matching.
Country Ext. Margin Product Ext. Margin Prod-Cod. Ext. Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT -0.0799 0.184 0.987** -0.232 0.965 0.644 0.0135 0.0412** 0.0583**
b.s.e. (0.204) (0.325) (0.472) (0.422) (0.597) (0.909) (0.0158) (0.0186) (0.0258)
Treated 468 374 275 468 374 275 468 374 275
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.0126 0.989*** 1.849*** 0.0956 1.127*** 2.159*** -0.00830 0.0366** 0.0625***
b.s.e. (0.230) (0.328) (0.440) (0.362) (0.446) (0.590) (0.0136) (0.0160) (0.0194)
Treated 668 530 443 668 530 443 668 530 443
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.0318 0.459 1.735*** -0.864* -1.058 0.142 -0.0127 -0.0331 0.00266
b.s.e. (0.242) (0.407) (0.597) (0.461) (0.697) (0.889) (0.0172) (0.0214) (0.0272)
Treated 314 236 178 314 236 178 314 236 178
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.0403** 0.268 1.265*** -0.284 0.588 0.260 0.00570 0.0458*** 0.0563***
b.s.e. (0.172) (0.240) (0.351) (0.401) (0.514) (0.722) (0.0116) (0.0124) (0.0156)
Treated 1485 1221 995 1485 1221 995 1485 1221 995
Untreated 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462 16907 16907 14462
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect
estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score applying a nearest neighbour matching 1-to-1
procedure without replacement. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the treated and control groups is reported. The dependent
variables country and product extensive margins have been built as previously described using the Custom Agency data.
We report the ATT eﬀects of the four possible treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation
(Pd), a process innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having
innovated at all for the following three years after the treatment.
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Table A.2.27: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's export performance (EAE) - single treatment ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Total Exports (EAE) Prob. Exporting (EAE)
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.133** 0.105 0.334*** 0.0238** 0.0307** 0.0330*
b.s.e. (0.0648) (0.0781) (0.107) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0175)
Treated 1282 1211 942 1282 1211 942
Untreated 24726 24726 21692 24726 24726 21692
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.247*** 0.263*** 0.382*** 0.0416*** 0.0418*** 0.0484***
b.s.e. (0.0547) (0.0663) (0.0782) (0.00914) (0.0107) (0.0120)
Treated 1127 1082 887 1127 1082 887
Untreated 25060 25060 22000 25060 25060 22000
Process Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.157** 0.174* 0.210* 0.0324** 0.0354** 0.0166
b.s.e. (0.0755) (0.0899) (0.113) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0167)
Treated 527 485 378 527 485 378
Untreated 25734 25734 22639 25734 25734 22639
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.223*** 0.281*** 0.383*** 0.0355*** 0.0356*** 0.0478***
b.s.e. (0.0571) (0.0671) (0.0792) (0.00965) (0.0110) (0.0130)
Treated 1572 1489 1197 1572 1489 1197
Untreated 24198 24198 21205 24198 24198 21205
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007.
ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score
Kernel matching procedure in a single treatment framework. Bootstrapped standard
errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the treated and control groups is reported. The
dependent variables total exports and the probability of starting to export have been
built as previously described using the EAE dataset. We report the ATT eﬀects of the
four possible single treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product inno-
vation (Pd), a process innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process
innovation (PdPc) against not having innovated at all for the following three years after
the treatment.
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Table A.2.28: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's total exports (CA) and intensive margin - single treatment ATT eﬀects with Kernel
matching.
Total Exports (CA) Intensive Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.0211 0.228* 0.981*** 0.0581 0.201* 0.852***
b.s.e. (0.107) (0.130) (0.181) (0.0983) (0.117) (0.163)
Treated 1008 963 748 1008 963 748
Untreated 18395 18395 15831 18395 18395 15831
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.0267 0.215** 0.754*** 0.0657 0.191** 0.605***
b.s.e. (0.0773) (0.0944) (0.110) (0.0707) (0.0848) (0.0983)
Treated 914 882 736 914 882 736
Untreated 18641 18641 16065 18641 18641 16065
Process Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.0313 0.159 0.504*** 0.104 0.225* 0.448***
b.s.e. (0.104) (0.137) (0.154) (0.0962) (0.121) (0.133)
Treated 415 380 299 415 380 299
Untreated 19214 19214 16602 19214 19214 16602
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.153* 0.362*** 0.631*** 0.114 0.276** 0.449***
b.s.e. (0.0857) (0.105) (0.138) (0.0790) (0.0960) (0.124)
Treated 1269 1216 987 1269 1216 987
Untreated 17910 17910 15374 17910 17910 15374
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data
between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect estimated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure in a single treatment
framework. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the
treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables total exports and
the intensive margin of trade have been built as previously described using the Cus-
tom Agency data. We report the ATT eﬀects of the four possible single treatments
of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation (Pd), a process
innovation (Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc)
against not having innovated at all for the following three years after the treatment.
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON TRADE MARGINS 242
Table A.2.29: Impact of innovation on ﬁrm's extensive margins - single treatment ATT eﬀects with Kernel matching.
Country Ext. Margin Product Ext. Margin Prod-Cod. Ext. Margin
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
Only R&D vs Non-innovator
ATT -0.177 -0.0998 0.872** -1.530*** -0.568 -0.571 -0.0230 0.0221 0.0637***
b.s.e. (0.198) (0.280) (0.414) (0.413) (0.579) (0.833) (0.0143) (0.0171) (0.0240)
Treated 1008 963 748 1008 963 748 1008 963 748
Untreated 18395 18395 15831 18395 18395 15831 18395 18395 15831
Product Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT 0.279 0.808*** 1.354*** -0.353 0.134*** 0.634*** -0.0169 0.00688 0.0511***
b.s.e. (0.188) (0.252) (0.340) (0.339) (0.027) (0.236) (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0154)
Treated 914 882 736 914 882 736 914 882 736
Untreated 18641 18641 16065 18641 18641 16065 18641 18641 16065
Process Innovation vs Non-innovator
ATT -0.630** -0.539 0.483 -1.368** -1.506** -0.855 -0.0188 -0.0220 0.0305
b.s.e. (0.236) (0.337) (0.457) (0.505) (0.683) (0.788) (0.0140) (0.0176) (0.0205)
Treated 415 380 299 415 380 299 415 380 299
Untreated 19214 19214 16602 19214 19214 16602 19214 19214 16602
Product & Process Innovation vs Non-Innovator
ATT 0.493*** 0.925*** 1.731*** 0.848** 1.249*** 1.865*** 0.0201* 0.0470*** 0.0792***
b.s.e. (0.165) (0.225) (0.306) (0.341) (0.443) (0.574) (0.0116) (0.0140) (0.0178)
Treated 1269 1216 987 1269 1216 987 1269 1216 987
Untreated 17910 17910 15374 17910 17910 15374 17910 17910 15374
Note: estimation based on EAE dataset, Custom Agency and R&D survey data between 1999 and 2007. ATT eﬀect esti-
mated using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique with propensity score Kernel matching procedure in a single treatment
framework. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. The number of ﬁrms included in the treated and control groups is reported. The dependent variables extensive
margins of trade have been built as previously described using the Custom Agency data. We report the ATT eﬀects of the
four single possible treatments of investing in R&D (R&D), introducing a product innovation (Pd), a process innovation
(Pc) or to jointly introduce a product and a process innovation (PdPc) against not having innovated at all for the following
three years after the treatment.
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Abstract
Globalization and the fragmentation of production have contributed to the creation
of internationally integrated innovation networks. The rapid rate of technological
adoption combined with an increased competition in international markets have
made external R&D activities a core corporate strategy in order to foster ﬁrm
productivity and internationalisation. In this chapter we estimate the impact of
outsourced R&D activities on ﬁrms' export performance. We take into account
several measures of ﬁrms' external R&D activities, outsourced both domestically
or internationally and within or outside group boundaries. After controlling for
self-selection we ﬁnd that outsourcing R&D if combined with internal capabilities
tend to have a signiﬁcant impact on export performance. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd
that outsourced innovative activities have diﬀerent eﬀects on total exports and
on the destinations where those goods are exported. Taken together these results
show clearly that outsourced R&D can play a signiﬁcant role in improving ﬁrm's
participation in global networks if properly supported by internal innovating
activities, increasing foreign sales and improving ﬁrms' ability to access new foreign
markets.
JEL classiﬁcation: D22, D24, F14, F23, F61, O31, O33
Keywords: ﬁrm heterogeneity, innovation, international trade, productivity,
R&D outsourcing
A draft of this chapter had previously been submitted to the ISGEP workshop 2015, the 2015
Doctoral Workshop in Economics of Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge and the European
Trade Study Group Conference 2014.
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3.1 Introduction
Globalization along with the development of new information technologies (IT) and the
reduction of distances and cultural barriers have not only fostered the international frag-
mentation of production, but have contributed to the expansion of R&D transactions and
the creation of internationally integrated innovation networks. Cross-border collaborations
between research centres are a wide-spread phenomenon, mainly due to the increasing de-
gree of specialisation of laboratories around the world which have became research leaders
in high-tech and high-added value niches. In particular, private ﬁrms have gradually evolved
from closed innovation systems to open and networked structures, as shown by the increasing
share of external innovating activities both in developed and developing countries, leading to
a new global distribution of R&D as suggested by Chesbroughs' "open innovation" paradigm
(Arora et al. 2001b; Chesbrough 2006; Ernst 2004).
Multinational ﬁrms are playing a key role in this global creation of knowledge, driving
the internationalisation of ﬁrms and increasingly performing their R&D activities overseas
or outside their corporate boundaries (OECD 2008). Moreover, the fast rate of new technol-
ogy adoption combined with the increasing pressure on ﬁrms to remain competitive in the
international markets have made external R&D activities an important corporate strategy to
foster ﬁrms productivity and their international performances (Jabbour and Zuniga 2015).
As an example, in the last 20 years the total value of external R&D activities in the EU has
grown 20 times faster than R&D spending in general, with some companies conducting less
than 10% of their R&D in-house, becoming "hunters and gatherers" rather than originators
of technology (Leifer 2000). Nowadays, more than 70% of European ﬁrms have outsourced
part of their R&D activities, opening collaborations not only with organizations located in
countries at the edge of the technological frontier, but increasingly oﬀshoring towards de-
veloping countries (Santos-Paulino 2011; Dachs et al. 2013). Foreign R&D investment by
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European ﬁrms so far have been mostly concentrated in the US (10% of the total share of
R&D activities outside the EU), Canada (7%) and Japan (2%), but investment has been
rapidly redirected towards a small number of developing countries such as China (4%), India
(1.5%) and other rapidly emerging economies, mainly because of their low-cost and well-
trained researchers, their increasing domestic markets and the proximity to suppliers (Sun,
2007; European Commission, 2014).
A large strand of the literature has investigated the motives driving this phenomenon,
analysing the characteristics of outsourced tasks and the speciﬁc strategies followed by ﬁrms.
In particular, the majority of research has been focused on the impact of external R&D on
ﬁrms' performance in terms of productivity and innovation output, identifying a trade oﬀ
between the costs and beneﬁts and studying the complementarity between internal and ex-
ternal activities (Arora and Bokhari 2007; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2012; Garcia-Vega
and Huergo 2013; Bertrand and Mol 2013; Krzeminska and Eckert 2015).
In general, the innovation capability of the manufacturing sector is becoming an increas-
ingly important issue in high-wage developed countries and is considered as one of the main
drivers of the economic recovery and as a way to improve the comparative advantage and
the international performance with respect to newly emerging countries. Most of the policy
attention on this topic has focused on a speciﬁc subcategory of manufacturing ﬁrms, mainly
dynamic innovators in the high-tech industries dedicating large resources to internal R&D
projects (Pisano and Shih 2009). However, recently a growing literature has questioned this
research focus, stressing the relevance of the evolving industrial re-organisation taking place
in low-tech manufacturing industries. These ﬁrms may not be at the edge of the technological
frontier, but are actually dedicating an increasing amount of resources to the development
of R&D projects in order to challenge the competition from low-cost countries, in particular
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progressively outsourcing these activities to specialised providers of external knowledge even
across borders and business groups boundaries (Hansen and Winther 2014).
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the empirical literature by assessing the
impact of external R&D activities on ﬁrms export performance. As we will summarise in the
literature review, so far this topic has received little attention from theoretical and empirical
researchers. We consider externalised R&D to be a key strategy for internationalized ﬁrms,
undertaken to achieve both supply-driven and demand-driven objectives. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical contribution to provide evidence on the relationship
between external R&D activities and ﬁrms' export performance, looking both at domestic
and foreign owned companies, both in the high and in the low-tech industries.
The creation of external knowledge and the internationalisation processes of ﬁrms form
an interconnected and complex relationship between innovation openness, internal knowledge
capabilities and internationalisation performance. External R&D activities may complement
the already existing internal knowledge base and inﬂuence positively the outcome of ﬁrms
internationalisation, but ﬁrms international experience in turn may increase the likelihood
of outsourcing R&D activities and the search for potential R&D collaboration and other
external knowledge sources. External R&D activities could aﬀect ﬁrms' export performance
in a number of diﬀerent ways, for instance by optimizing ﬁrms' resources or allowing them
to acquire speciﬁc knowledge and to improve their ability to respond to global market needs,
with diﬀerent implications for the volume and the foreign destinations of exported goods.
Outsourcing R&D activities abroad allow ﬁrms to be closer to potential customers and to
adapt their products to the local market needs, acquiring the skills to penetrate new mar-
kets and to speed up the response to demand shifts. At the same time, the fragmentation
of R&D processes could negatively inﬂuence ﬁrms ability to exploit economies of scale and
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scope, leading to an increase of the marginal costs of production and aﬀecting foreign sales.
In addition, by outsourcing R&D activities outside group boundaries to third agents, ﬁrms
could be exposed to leakage of key technologies and to the involuntary diﬀusion of corporate
knowledge, hollowing out in this way the result of innovation activities and decreasing the
value of exported goods.
Using French ﬁrm-level data over a period of 10 years, we take into account several mea-
sures of ﬁrms external R&D activities, considering both tasks outsourced within or outside
the group boundaries, both domestically and internationally, and we ﬁnd that external R&D
activities are signiﬁcantly interrelated with ﬁrms export performance. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
analyse ﬁrms endogenous self-selection into R&D outsourcing, using a 2-step Heckman model
to identify the main drivers of ﬁrms propensity to externalize R&D activities and their ex-
tent. After obtaining ﬁrms expected value of outsourcing R&D from the Heckman estimates,
we use them as a measure of outsourced R&D in a system of simultaneous equations which
models the impact of external R&D activities on export performance while controlling for
the possible reverse causality between outsourced innovation and international performance.
First, we are interested in studying whether outsourced activities substitute or are com-
plementary to the eﬀect of internal R&D on exports, analysing the sustainability of innovative
external eﬀorts and ﬁrms' internal resources. Secondly, we examine the diﬀerent eﬀects of
outsourced R&D activities on several indicators of ﬁrms export performance in order to assess
the role played by each external innovation activity in increasing the value of total exports
and in improving ﬁrms market access. We want to test whether external R&D have a dif-
ferent eﬀect on the value of ﬁrms exports and on the destinations where French goods are
shipped depending on the market-seeking or resource-optimization strategy followed by ﬁrms.
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We will show how complementarity does take place between internal and external R&D
activities, demonstrating how in-house capabilities still persist once ﬁrms start externalizing,
and how this joint eﬀect helps ﬁrms to improve their export performance. In addition, we
ﬁnd that oﬀshoring R&D activities abroad and outside the group boundaries is a particularly
relevant strategy in order to improve ﬁrms terms of trade, speciﬁcally increasing the value
of total exports and pushing ﬁrms towards more diﬃcult markets. These results seem to
be particularly relevant for domestic ﬁrms in low-tech industries, which might use external
knowledge not available in-house provided by foreign agents at the edge of the technological
frontier in order to increase total exports and their presence in foreign and distant mar-
kets. Taken together these results show clearly how external R&D plays a signiﬁcant role
in improving ﬁrm's participation in global networks, demonstrating how these strategies are
mainly driven by market-demand factors such as customizing products to foreign markets'
needs or increasing ﬁrms' global footprint.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the previous
literature on this topic and presents the theoretical predictions. A brief description of the
datasets used follows, presenting some preliminary evidence and statistics. Section 4 de-
scribes the principal methodologies and the econometric models employed. In section 5 we
discuss and interpret the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes with a sum-
mary of the main results and discusses the policy implications.
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Predictions
In the previous literature, the term external R&D usually refers to innovating activities lo-
cated outside ﬁrm's boundaries. It could be located domestically in the "home" country,
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or oﬀshored overseas, and a distinction is made between external R&D activities conducted
in-house within the group boundaries - insourcing - or at arm's-length, outsourcing particular
tasks to extra-group agents (Pain and Welsum 2004; Yeaple 2006; Grossman et al. 2006).
The economics and business literatures have widely studied the geographical fragmentation
of innovative processes, mainly in order to understand the factors driving this phenomenon
and to analyse the consequences for R&D capabilities in-house, the output of innovating
activities and the performance of outsourcing ﬁrms. In the next sections we will present the
main theoretical frameworks which explain the reasons driving the externalisation of R&D
activities. We will then analyse the consequences of outsourced innovation for internal R&D
capabilities and for ﬁrms performances more generally. Finally, based on the previous the-
oretical and empirical contributions, we will develop our hypothesis and predictions on the
eﬀect of outsourced R&D on export performance which we will test in the empirical analysis.
3.2.1 External R&D Driving Factors
The main reasons given for the increasing externalisation of innovation are closely related
to the more general phenomena of value chains global fragmentation, since by outsourcing
some R&D activities ﬁrms could improve their productivity and performance in a number of
diﬀerent ways (Timmer et al. 2014). A recent strand of the literature has identiﬁed the main
forces driving ﬁrms' R&D internationalisation which could be grouped into supply-driven
factors and demand-driven factors (Reddy 2000; Criscuolo 2005; Santos-Paulino et al. 2014).
According to the supply-driven theory, the rising cost of R&D, its increasingly multidis-
ciplinary character and the uncertainty of the results push ﬁrms to optimize their resources
by outsourcing the most standardized R&D activities overseas - e.g. to developing countries
- cutting down the overall costs and speeding up the development process (Antras 2005;
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Cesaroni 2004; Squicciarini 2008). Several studies demonstrate that the codiﬁcation of R&D
processes facilitate their segmentation and dispersion, helping ﬁrms to enhance their produc-
tivity, specializing on more valuable innovation-intense tasks and being more ﬂexible in the
management of their portfolio of R&D activities (Narula 2001; Puga and Treﬂer 2005). For
instance, Acemoglu et al. (2003) in their model show how ﬁrms organization changes as the
technology frontier approaches. In fact, in vertically integrated ﬁrms managerial capabilities
are overloaded since they should be focused both on production and innovation activities,
creating organisational ineﬃciencies and discouraging innovation. Firms could mitigate the
managerial overload by outsourcing some of these activities, but this might create new hold-
up problems related to the dissipation of internal resources to suppliers. Their model predicts
that far from the technology frontier imitation activities are more important and thus ver-
tical integration is preferred. On the contrary, closer to the frontier the value of innovation
activities increases, encouraging ﬁrms to outsource to a larger extent.
The externalisation of R&D activities, however, is not limited only to standardized tasks,
but is carried out in order to access speciﬁc knowledge or specialized facilities not available
in-house, as predicted in the science-based versus market-based taxonomy (Gerybadze and
Reger 1999). According to several studies the geographical delocalization of R&D follows
diﬀerent types of innovative and managerial strategies, based on speciﬁc ﬁrms characteristics
and goals. For instance, knowledge-exploitation R&D activities are usually outsourced in
locations with superior innovative capabilities such as top universities and research labora-
tories. Thanks to this strategical proximity ﬁrms are able to enrich their innovative process
and to internalise external spillovers derived from research collaborations and the exposure
to research centres and other companies at the edge of the technological frontier (Kuemmerle
1999; Florida 1997; Arora et al. 2001a).
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Integration into business networks and clusters has always been a key tactic of inter-
national outsourcing, often more important than exploiting central economies of scale, and
became an even more important strategy for the creation of internationalised R&D networks
(Cantwell and Piscitello 2005). Building on rich ﬁrm-level data between 1978 and 2000, Quin-
tas et al. (2008) analyse the geographical dispersion of international technology networks.
First, the authors show that the number of countries hosting international technological ac-
tivities is continuously increasing. Secondly, by looking at the business characteristics they
explain this emergent phenomenon. As a matter of fact, R&D internationalisation is higher
for multinational corporations (MNCs), showing a greater technological diversiﬁcation and a
wider presence in international markets. Similarly, Athreye and Cantwell (2007) using new
indexes measuring technology inﬂuence study the causal relationship between globalisation
and the emergence of new countries as contributors to technology generation. Their ﬁnd-
ings suggest an important role played by higher level of patenting competitiveness and by
technology generation as factors increasing the attractiveness of a country as host of foreign
direct R&D investment.
In addition, R&D activities could be undertaken abroad because of demand-driven factors
as well. Decentralising R&D facilities close to potential customers, suppliers or partners it
is a key strategy for internationalized ﬁrms which could improve their ability to respond to
global demand shifts, speciﬁcally exploiting local R&D centres to adapt their products to
diﬀerent markets' needs and speeding up the penetration of new foreign markets which are
particularly diﬃcult to access (Thursby et al. 2007; Yoshida and Ito 2006). For instance,
Lewin et al. (2009) study the determinants of ﬁrms decision to oﬀshore product develop-
ment activities abroad. Using survey data on US ﬁrms the authors relate the probability of
product development oﬀshoring to strategic market-access objectives, previous experiences
and other environmental factors. Their results show that oﬀshored product development is
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still partially explained by shortage of high skilled technical talent and cost savings opportu-
nities, but stress as well how market access and the increasing speed of time to market1 are
becoming major reasons underlying R&D oﬀshoring decisions.
3.2.2 External R&D and Firm Performance
Regardless of the main reasons and strategies driving innovation outsourcing, external R&D
activities could have a complex and somehow contradicting impact on global corporate oper-
ations and more generally on ﬁrms performance. The overall implications of outsourced R&D
have been widely analysed by the literature investigating transaction costs, incomplete con-
tracts and organization strategy usually linked with globalization. As previously discussed,
on the one hand external R&D activities may constitute a source of competitive advantage
fostering specialization and eﬃciency gains, but on the other hand it could generate negative
spillovers undermining internal capabilities, dissipating key resources and deprecating ﬁrms
innovation and performance (Gorg et al. 2008; Amiti and Wei 2009; Santos-Paulino et al.
2014). For instance, segmenting and dispersing R&D activities could negatively aﬀect ﬁrms'
performance and the terms of trade, mainly due to the possible leakage of key technologies,
the presence of high co-ordination and operational costs and possible diseconomies of scale
and scope (Criscuolo and Narula 2005).
The previous literature highlights how the costs and beneﬁts of external R&D activities
depend mainly on the strategy followed, the nature of the knowledge outsourced and other
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics (Garcia-Vega and Huergo 2013). Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) for instance demonstrate that international R&D outsourcing could be more produc-
1In the business literature, time to market (TTM) is the length of time needed from a product being
conceived until its being available for sale. TTM is particularly important in industries where new products
are outmoded quickly (Chen et al. 2005; Kahn 2013).
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tive than national outsourcing for multinational ﬁrms, although it involves higher hidden
costs related to monitoring and adapting the development processes in diﬀerent countries. In
addition, the costs related to leakage of key technologies could be particularly high when out-
sourcing R&D activities outside ﬁrms boundaries, disclosing possible product developments
to competitors in the national and global markets (Cesaroni 2004). Moreover, although by
outsourcing part of their R&D ﬁrms can focus on their more productive core knowledge-
intensive tasks, this practice could also be detrimental, crowding out the internal capabilities
that support ﬁrm's absorptive capacity (Geroski 2005; Griﬃth et al. 2004; Grimpe and
Kaiser 2010). In the next sections we will summarise the main empirical evidence on the
consequences of outsourced innovation for internal R&D capabilities and for ﬁrms perfor-
mances more generally.
Complementarity of internal and external R&D
The identiﬁcation of trade-oﬀs related to outsourced innovation is an important part of the
previous literature that investigates the compatibility and complementarity between internal
and external R&D eﬀorts and the overall eﬀect on ﬁrms' performance and innovativeness.
The phenomenon of complementarity between internal and external R&D activities have
been theoretically explained with the beneﬁts deriving from knowledge creation and the risks
related to its transfer. The theoretical predictions supporting the existence of complementar-
ity mainly relate to beneﬁts of knowledge creation through absorptive capacity, economies of
scope, and knowledge spillovers. Absorptive capacity refers to ﬁrm ability to recognize, as-
similate and use external knowledge based on its own pre-existing internal capabilities (Cohen
and Levinthal 1990; Tsai and Wang 2009). As a matter of fact, by complementing internal
with external R&D, ﬁrms could improve their innovating outcomes through learning about
new technologies and research methods adopted from third agents (Schmiedeberg 2008). In
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addition, economies of scope could occur when two or more ﬁrms share their research infras-
tructures and personnel for diﬀerent R&D activities and projects (Panzar and Willig 1981;
Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). Moreover, by exploiting both internal and external inno-
vating capabilities, knowledge spillovers allow cross-fertilization across diﬀerent projects, in
particular regarding research joint-ventures between diﬀerent industries and public-private
partnerships (Henderson and Cockburn 1996; Ornaghi 2006).
Empirically, however, the business and economic literature that investigates R&D com-
plementarity yields mixed results. The ﬁrst strand of the literature only tests for the co-
occurrence of internal and external R&D activities, leaving out any consideration about the
possible consequences of this complementarity (e.g. Arora and Gambardella 1990; Cassiman
and Veugelers 2002). Starting from these seminal papers, a number of diﬀerent studies anal-
yse the implications of R&D complementarity for ﬁrm innovativeness and more generally for
its performance, ﬁnding mixed results and sometimes even suggesting that these strategies
could be substitutes.2 Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Blonigen and Taylor (2000) for
example estimate two contrasting results of this interaction between external and internal
R&D when diﬀerentiating between high and low-tech industries. The ﬁrst authors ﬁnd that
internal and external R&D tend to be substitutes in low-technology industries but comple-
ments in high-technology sectors, characterized by a higher propensity towards knowledge
spillovers and towards research collaborations with other ﬁrms part of the same clusters. In
contrast, Blonigen and Taylor (2000) using a panel of US high-tech ﬁrms ﬁnd a substantial
negative correlation between internal R&D intensity and ﬁrm propensity to acquire external
knowledge. Similarly, Kantor and Whalley (2014) look at the spillover eﬀects from university
research activities to the economic growth of local communities using an instrumental vari-
able strategy. The authors ﬁnd that these eﬀects are signiﬁcantly larger when local ﬁrms are
2See for instance: Basant and Fikkert 1996; Fernandez-Bagues, 2004; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006;
Schmiedeberg 2008; Parmigiani and Mitchell 2009; Ennen and Richter 2010.
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technologically close to universities and when industries adjust to the core research of local
higher-education institutions.
A second strand of the literature instead investigates the eﬀects of combined internal and
external R&D strategies on ﬁrms' performance, identifying a positive relationship between
R&D complementarity, ﬁrm productivity and the introduction of new innovations (Bonte
2003; Griﬃth et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2015). For instance, using a dynamic panel data model
Lokshin et al. (2008) take into consideration both economies of scale and of scope while
analysing R&D activities, estimating a positive impact of external R&D sourcing on ﬁrms'
productivity only in the case in which suﬃcient R&D resources have been allocated also
internally. In addition, studying Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms, Beneito (2006) investigates
the complementarity between internal and external R&D and its eﬀects on incremental inno-
vations and on more radical product innovations (e.g. patents) ﬁnding evidence of positive
and statistical signiﬁcant impact just for more radical innovations.
Schmiedeberg (2008) instead looks at the role played by complementarity in increasing
both the innovative output performance and new products total sales, ﬁnding only a weak ef-
fect on the former. Similarly, Bertrand and Mol (2013) using a panel of French ﬁrms estimate
through an Heckman model the diﬀerent role played by cognitive distances and absorptive
capacity in the case of domestic or oﬀshored R&D. The authors ﬁnd that the absorptive ca-
pacity of internal R&D plays a key role in determining the success of foreign outsourcing. In
addition, if properly managed, oﬀshored activities seem to have a stronger positive eﬀect on
innovation outcome than domestic R&D outsourcing, demonstrating how knowledge acquired
abroad might be more eﬀective in increasing the probability of introducing new innovations
at home.
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Several papers look at the eﬀect of complementarity on the introduction of process inno-
vations. For instance, Reichstein and Salter (2006), Ganotakis and Love (2012) and Naudé
et al. (2011) show that both internal and external R&D activities increase the probability
of engaging in both product and process innovations. Krzeminska and Eckert (2015) instead
using cross-sectional ﬁrm-level data on German manufacturers test directly the existence of
complementarity eﬀect for product and process innovations. Their results conﬁrm the pre-
vious evidence, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of complementarity on the likelihood
of introducing product innovations but limited evidence for process innovations.
Summarising the previous literature, ﬁrms with a higher internal R&D intensity would be
more reactive to spillovers from outsourced innovating activities, and will be able to exploit
external knowledge from distant and heterogeneous oﬀshore suppliers thanks to their larger
internal absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006).
Based on this evidence, it is possible to predict that the positive interconnection between
internal and external knowledge inputs would not aﬀect just ﬁrms productivity and the like-
lihood to introduce new product and process innovations. In fact, we expect that the inter-
action between internal research capabilities and external R&D contribution could positively
aﬀect also ﬁrms export performance more generally, by internalising the positive spillovers
linked to the complexity of outsourced R&D tasks and proﬁting by the international expo-
sure to foreign competition and to R&D collaboration with external agents (Salomon and
Jin 2010):
Hypothesis 1: the larger are the internal R&D capabilities of a ﬁrm, the greater would be
the eﬀect of external innovating activities on ﬁrm export performance.
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External R&D, Firms Characteristics and Export Performance
As previously discussed, ﬁrm characteristics might play a key role in aﬀecting the impact of
external innovating activities on ﬁrms performance and innovativeness, given the interconnec-
tion between R&D internationalization and the diﬀerent business strategies (Fu et al. 2012).
In this regard, ﬁrm exporting status plays a key role in reducing the transaction costs associ-
ated with external R&D activities, and in determining the success of international transfers of
knowledge thanks to exporters previous experience in foreign markets (Yoshida and Ito 2006;
Cusmano et al. 2009; Criscuolo et al. 2010; Garcia-Vega and Huergo 2013). Several studies
show how internationalized ﬁrms devote larger resources to assimilate foreign knowledge and
to absorb innovative spillovers from foreign customers, suppliers and competitors (Criscuolo
et al. 2010; Altomonte et al. 2013). For instance, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) while
analysing the complementarity between internal and external innovation activities identify
other ﬁrm characteristics which aﬀect this relationship. The authors ﬁnd that exporting
status strengthens the complementarity between internal and external innovation activities,
mainly because of the competitive environment in which exporters are used to compete and
the previous experience they have in international markets.
Similarly, Garcia-Vega and Huergo (2011) investigate the main determinants behind exter-
nal R&D, focusing particularly on the role played by international trade. Given the very high
transaction costs related with the management of outsourced R&D, exporting ﬁrms, by ex-
ploiting their eﬃciency advantages, will be less ﬁnancially constrained than non-exporters in
carrying out their external innovating activities. However, some studies show how exporters
are also more exposed to technology leakage when oﬀshoring their R&D activities abroad,
highlighting the key role played by information asymmetries, institutional environment and
the management of knowledge spillovers in determining the outcome of R&D activities ex-
ternalised in international markets (Chu and Lai 2009; Lu et al. 2012).
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In a recent work, Garcia-Vega and Huergo (2013) analyse the relationship between exter-
nal R&D activities and international trade, investigating the diﬀerent eﬀects of international
and domestic outsourced R&D on ﬁrm innovativeness distinguishing between exporters and
non-exporters. The authors demonstrate that R&D outsourcing increases ﬁrms innovative-
ness, positively aﬀecting the introduction of new product innovations especially in the case
of domestic outsourcing, while international outsourcing seems to play a key role only in
improving ﬁrms productive processes. Most importantly, their results show how all kinds
of externalised innovating activities have a stronger impact on the likelihood of introducing
new innovations for exporting ﬁrms, while non-exporters seem to beneﬁt only from R&D
activities outsourced domestically.
Moreover, Jabbour and Zuniga (2015) using French ﬁrms' data demonstrate how ﬁrms en-
gaged in R&D oﬀshoring are usually more oriented towards exports. First of all, their results
show that SMEs not belonging to a larger group seem to be more active in the international
networks of innovation. Secondly, the authors ﬁnd evidence that the main motivation behind
external R&D activities is technological sourcing rather than the reduction of innovation
costs, hence much more related with export-oriented strategies such as upgrading or intro-
ducing new products to access new foreign markets. Foreign ownership as well seems to play
a key role especially with regard to market-oriented external R&D activities. Belonging to a
multinational group could facilitate the integration of ﬁrms in the global networks of inno-
vation, exploiting the resources and the linkages oﬀered by the headquarters and other sister
companies. In addition, foreign ownership might be particularly relevant for exporters, which
could foster the adoption of market-speciﬁc knowledge and the introduction of new products
tailored for foreign markets thanks to the access provided by group aﬃliates into new coun-
tries (Santangelo 2002; Naghavi and Ottaviano 2010; Guadalupe et al. 2012; Tamayo and
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Huergo 2015).
Recently, Antonelli and Fassio (2015) investigate the heterogeneity of the sources of ex-
ternal knowledge and their diﬀerent eﬀects on process and product innovations. Their results
show how upstream vertical sources of external knowledge from suppliers play a strong and
positive role on the introduction of process innovations, whereas horizontal and downstream
vertical sources from competitors and customers have stronger eﬀects on product innovations.
In particular, these results stress the importance for a ﬁrm of being integrated in the inter-
national networks of knowledge, highlighting the diﬀerences between upstream/downstream
and vertical/horizontal sources of external knowledge, and suggesting the relevance of strate-
gic decisions about the sources of external knowledge to exploit in relation to the innovation
objectives which the ﬁrm would like to achieve.
However, the direct relationship between ﬁrm R&D outsourcing and internationalisation
strategies has been mostly neglected by previous literature. Starting from existing theoreti-
cal frameworks analysing ﬁrms internationalisation processes and open knowledge networks,
only a few empirical studies look at the role played by open innovation activities as a key
condition for the implementation of successful internationalisation strategies (Leonidou et al.
1998; Dyer and Singh 1998; Stöttinger and Holzmüller 2001). For instance, Calantone et al.
(2006) investigate whether ﬁrms that are open to external innovations are more likely to
improve their export performance. The authors develop a cross-country model considering
the US, Korea and Japan incorporating internal and external factors as antecedents to ﬁrms
export performance, considering product adaptation as a key connecting strategy. Their re-
sults show that external inputs and product adaptation strategies are positively associated
with export performance and the choice of exporting markets, highlighting as well the reverse
role played by export dependence as an important antecedent of product adaptation.
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 261
Summarising the previous literature, externalised R&D is considered to be a key strategy
for internationalized ﬁrms, undertaken to achieve both supply-driven and demand-driven
objectives. To improve their international performance exporters might adopt several ex-
ternal R&D activities, outsourcing innovating tasks outside or inside the group boundaries,
both domestically and internationally. The theoretical and empirical literature shows how
external R&D activities could aﬀect ﬁrms' performance in a number of diﬀerent ways, for
instance by optimizing ﬁrms' resources or allowing them to acquire speciﬁc knowledge and to
improve their ability to respond to global market needs. Based on the previous evidence, we
expect external innovating activities to aﬀect ﬁrms export performance, in particular with
diﬀerent implications of international and domestically outsourced R&D activities on ﬁrms
international performance, aﬀecting both the volume and the foreign markets destinations
of exported goods. The impact of externalised R&D activities on export performance would
rely as well on ﬁrms strategy and on the push-factors which lead ﬁrms to externalize their
R&D, if they are supply or demand-driven, or whether ﬁrms follow a science-based or a
market-based strategy when internationalizing their innovating activities.
Previous theoretical contributions predict that outsourced R&D may have diﬀerent and
somehow contrasting eﬀects on ﬁrms performance, inﬂuenced by their strategies, character-
istics and the costs and beneﬁts related to R&D internationalisation (Dachs et al. 2013).
Speciﬁcally, internationalised R&D activities may create on the one hand several potential
opportunities for exporters but they could as well raise concerns about the possible risks
undermining ﬁrms export performance. For example, Dachs et al. (2013) analysing the
demand-driven determinants of external R&D show how outsourcing R&D activities abroad
allow ﬁrms to be closer to potential customers and to adapt their products to the local market
needs, acquiring the skills to penetrate new markets and to speed up the response to demand
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shifts. At the same time, the fragmentation of R&D processes could negatively inﬂuence ﬁrms
ability to exploit economies of scale and scope, leading to an increase of the marginal costs
of production and aﬀecting foreign sales. In addition, by outsourcing R&D activities outside
group boundaries to third agents, ﬁrms could be exposed to leakage of key technologies and
to the involuntary diﬀusion of corporate knowledge, hollowing out in this way the result of
innovation activities and deprecating the value of exported goods (Moncada-Paterno-Castello
et al. 2011):
Hypothesis 2: demand-driven external R&D activities improve exporters performance and
their market-access to new foreign markets, through the introduction of new products and
tailoring existing goods according to foreign markets needs.
At the same time, following the determinants of R&D internationalisation conceptualised
in supply-side theory, innovating activities may be externalized mainly for two reasons. First,
innovative activities could be outsourced abroad or in the home country in order to access
highly skilled personnel or speciﬁc technologies in renowned universities and private R&D
laboratories. In this way, exporters might be able to develop brand new innovative products
in order to improve their competitiveness in the international markets and to increase the
volume of exported goods. Secondly, ﬁrms might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀshore part of their
R&D activities abroad in order to access a low cost supply of R&D, especially externalizing
the most standardized innovative processes to R&D centres based in developing countries
and characterized by low costs of personnel and more ﬂexible environmental and safeguard
requirements (Criscuolo et al. 2005). This kind of strategy could have a conﬂicting eﬀect
on total exports: on the one hand, it could help exporters to reduce the marginal cost of
innovations, optimising resources and reshaping export patterns in order to introduce new
technological products to dynamic appealing markets. On the other hand, by externalizing
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such key activities to low-cost destinations, exporters may decrease the overall quality of
products exported, especially negatively aﬀecting the value of exports towards high-income
and developed countries.
Hypothesis 3: supply-driven R&D internationalisation from ﬁrms in developed countries
at the edge of the technological frontier would be mainly oriented towards the reduction of the
costs of innovation and the rationalization of R&D activities. For these reasons, supply-side
external R&D activities might reduce the costs of innovations with possible mixed eﬀects on
the overall value of exports and on ﬁrms' market-access.
However, as previously discussed, the creation of external knowledge and the interna-
tionalisation processes of ﬁrms seem to be interconnected, creating a complex relationship
between innovation openness, internal knowledge capabilities and internationalisation perfor-
mance. Several studies in the previous literature ﬁnd mixed results, suggesting the existence
of an endogenous self-selection and two-way causality relationship between exporting and
R&D activities (Aw et al. 2008; Harris and Li 2009). Speciﬁcally, external R&D activities
may complement the already existing internal knowledge base and inﬂuence positively the
outcome of ﬁrms internationalisation. However, ﬁrms international experience in turn may
increase the likelihood of outsourcing R&D activities and the search for potential R&D col-
laboration and other external knowledge sources (Becker and Dietz 2004; Kafouros et al.
2008). Furthermore, innovating activities, and more speciﬁcally outsourced R&D, might in-
ﬂuence ﬁrms export performance by diversifying their products and distinguishing themselves
from competitors creating in this way a new source of international competitive advantage.
Arvanitis et al. (2014) for instance demonstrate the complexity of the relationship between
open innovation and exports, highlighting the endogenous link connecting these activities.
Employing a structural equation model on a cross-section of surveyed Greek manufacturing
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ﬁrms, the authors test the reciprocal impact of ﬁrms internal knowledge base, export per-
formance and R&D openness, ﬁnding partial evidence of complementary and substitution
eﬀects on ﬁrms innovation performance.
Hence, summarising the previous empirical ﬁndings it could be suggested that internal
and external R&D are endogenously related with ﬁrms internationalisation strategies, consid-
ering the self-selection of more productive ﬁrms into these activities and the two-way causal
link connecting ﬁrms internal and external knowledge and their export performance:
Hypothesis 4: After ﬁrms self-select into external R&D activities and international mar-
kets, a two-way causal link exists between export performance and innovation outsourcing,
since external R&D activities complementing internal resources aﬀects ﬁrms exports and the
international experience in turn increase the likelihood of R&D outsourcing.
In the next sections we will test empirically the above mentioned hypothesis at the ﬁrm
level, showing how external R&D might have a signiﬁcant impact on export performance
and investigating more in depth the contrasting eﬀect of diﬀerent outsourced R&D activities.
The overall impact on total exports would be the sum of the separate eﬀects, depending on
whether external R&D activities mainly aﬀect the intensive (export value) or the extensive
margin (markets served) of ﬁrms engaged in international markets and global networks of
knowledge.
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3.3 Data Description
3.3.1 Data Sources
We will test the above mentioned hypothesis on French ﬁrms using two comprehensive
datasets for the period 1999-2007. We focus our attention on innovating ﬁrms using as a
main dataset the annual survey on the resources devoted to R&D activities (Enquête an-
nuelle sur les moyens consacrés à la R&D) collected by the French Ministry of Education
and Research. This dataset provides exhaustive information for over 12,000 ﬁrms performing
R&D activities. The construction of the survey sample is partially based on the structure
of the previous surveys conducted and it consists of four diﬀerent strata. Three of these
strata are exhaustive and form the principle component of the survey. Thus, the survey
addresses with a general questionnaire all the ﬁrms with an internal R&D expenditure above
e2 million, while an exhaustive "short" questionnaire has been submitted to all French ﬁrms
investing more than e350,000 on innovation, or to all the ﬁrms which have been included in
the survey sample for the ﬁrst time. In addition, a fourth strata of the survey is composed of
a sample of remaining companies which dedicate a smaller amount of resources to R&D. The
sample of the fourth strata is renewed every year, keeping half of the previous year sample
and including as a second half other innovating ﬁrms not included in the previous survey.
This is a unique dataset and provides a good representation of the innovating activities
carried out by the 12,000 French ﬁrms which engage in R&D. In particular, the survey in-
cludes detailed information on the R&D activities of ﬁrms, reporting more than just the
total resources dedicated to innovation. For instance, the data provides information about
the internal resources devoted to innovation as well as external activities such as R&D out-
sourced domestically and abroad, or about the resources received by third parties to ﬁnance
innovation, both from public and private actors. In addition, also available from this survey
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are data on the number of employees working in the R&D department, the number and the
average salary of researchers, the main domain of the research (whether it is mainly theo-
retical or more focused on biotechnologies, environment, information technologies, materials
or social sciences) and the funds and support received by public authorities (international
organisations, national government, regions or educational institutes). The dataset also pro-
vides information on the outcome of the research eﬀorts of French ﬁrms, reporting whether
the ﬁrm has introduced a new product or process innovation in the last year, and the number
of patents registered at the diﬀerent levels (at the national, European or US Patent Oﬃce).
Finally, this database includes detailed data about ﬁrms characteristics such as total em-
ployment, total sales, foreign ownership, industrial classiﬁcation at the NACE rev.1.1 4-digit
level and ﬁrms participation to a French or a foreign group.
Secondly, we analyse exporters' activity using transaction-level export data collected by
French Customs Agency which provides information about destination country, HS 8-digit-
level product classiﬁcation, value and weight of manufacturing exporters. The information
are available for all manufacturing exporters which export at least e 100,000 within the EU
or above e 1,000 outside the European Union, covering more than 90% of French total man-
ufactured goods exported.3 Since the Custom Agency collects detailed export data just for
trade in goods, we focus our analysis just on the manufacturing industry in order to carry
out a comprehensive investigation of the eﬀect of external R&D across diﬀerent measures
of export performance. Merging these two datasets together, our ﬁnal sample has almost
16,000 observations and contains comprehensive data about the R&D external activities of
4,500 innovating ﬁrms over 9 years providing as well detailed information in terms of export
3During this period the threshold for intra-EU exports has changed considerably. Initially, it was equal to
almost e 38,000 euros until 2001 when it has been increased to e 100,000. Finally, it was moved to e 150,000
in 2006. For extra-EU exports the threshold has not been changed during our period. Nevertheless, these
threshold changes do not aﬀect the quality of our analysis since it has been demonstrated in the previous
literature that small exporters account for a relatively small share of the overall French exports (Mayer and
Ottaviano 2007).
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strategies for approximately 3,500 ﬁrms of them which are exporters.
France devotes signiﬁcant resources to research and development activities (approximately
e 48 billion in 2014 which represents 2.26% of its GDP) ranking at the second place in the
EU as total investment in R&D and sixth as share of GDP (Eurostat, 2015). In partic-
ular, more than 55% of total investment is carried out by the private sector, investing in
2014 around e 31 billion and employing in the R&D departments 1.5% of the national total
labour force, ranking third among all European countries. Considering innovation outcomes,
France ranked eighth worldwide for the number of patents issued, with a total ﬁgure of 43,060
patents granted in 2013 (WIPO, 2015).
In addition, France is particularly open to foreign investment and the internationaliza-
tion of R&D activities, providing an open business environment for the development of R&D
networks, mainly thanks to its key technology industries, the top quality of public educa-
tion and research laboratories and the compelling compliance of government policies towards
R&D and innovation (IFA 2012). For instance, almost 29% of corporate R&D expenditure
in France has been made by foreign-owned subsidiaries over the period of interest 1999-2007,
while between 2008 and 2012 an additional 200 new R&D investment projects were con-
ﬁrmed in France by foreign companies, eﬀectively sustained by the most generous R&D tax
treatment for companies in Europe. In addition, the total value of external R&D activities
grew by over 600% in the last twenty years, indicating that R&D outsourcing in France has
grown 20 times faster than R&D investment in general (Ministry for Higher Education and
Research, 2012).
Our data provides detailed information on external R&D activities at the ﬁrm level. In
the database each ﬁrm indicates its total expenditure for innovation, diﬀerentiating between
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 268
internal and external R&D activities. In particular, ﬁrms are asked whether they have out-
sourced part of their R&D activities domestically to other French actors or if they have
oﬀshored abroad. In addition, within each category ﬁrms should detail the suppliers of these
outsourced activities, specifying respectively the total amount outsourced to universities and
public-owned research labs, or to other domestic and foreign private ﬁrms, speciﬁcally diﬀer-
entiating between aﬃliates part of the same business group or outside group boundaries.
3.3.2 Firm External R&D Activities
The following ﬁgures and tables present some preliminary summary statistics for the main
variables of interest for this chapter, regarding the engagement of French innovating ﬁrms
into the networks of knowledge exchange, the extent of external R&D and the trends in these
activities over the last decade diﬀerentiating by industrial sector and ﬁrm characteristics.
First, we diﬀerentiate between R&D activities performed within the ﬁrm or outsourced ex-
ternally. In this regard, the variable external R&D collects the whole ﬁrm expenditure in
outward research, including tasks outsourced to public authorities and labs, to governmental
agencies and ministries, to the defence department, to professional and technical centres, to
international organizations, to higher education institutions based both in France or abroad
and to other private domestic or foreign ﬁrms. We are able then to diﬀerentiate between
R&D activities outsourced domestically or abroad dissecting the previous variable into two
new variables "oﬀshored R&D" and "domestic outsourced R&D". Secondly, it is possible to
focus just on external R&D activities outsourced to other private ﬁrms. In this respect, we
built four diﬀerent measures of corporate external innovation, considering where the tasks
have been outsourced, in France (domestic outsourced) or abroad (oﬀshored), and whether
the supplier is a sister company part of the same corporate group (IN) or not (OUT).
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As previously discussed, the internationalization of R&D activities is a relatively recent
phenomenon, as demonstrated by the trend of French ﬁrms' external R&D activities over the
period 1999-2007 shown in Figure 3.1. There are two apparent trends. First, looking at total
and external R&D expenditure it appears that during this period French ﬁrms have increas-
ingly externalised their innovating activities, while total investment in R&D have decreased
in the later years of the period. This trend conﬁrms the anecdotal evidence of increasingly
open international networks of knowledge exchange, not conﬁned within the group perime-
ters, but gradually based on external and occasional partnerships with foreign third parties.
In addition, the data seem to follow in part what recent theories predicted on the new global
distribution of overseas R&D expenditure linked to the erosion of the domestically outsourced
R&D activities (Dachs and Peters 2014).
Nevertheless, as stressed in the previous literature, complementarity between internal and
external R&D activities is crucial for internationalised companies in order to beneﬁt from
external knowledge and to reduce the risks related to its transfer. Keeping a relevant part
of the innovating activities in-house might enable ﬁrms to develop the indispensable absorp-
tive capacity needed to assimilate and use external knowledge and the related spillovers,
to learn and understand new technologies and research methods and to exploit economies
of scope when sharing research infrastructure and personnel from diﬀerent R&D projects.
In Figure 3.2 we present the distribution of internal, domestically outsourced and oﬀshored
R&D investment in log value across French manufacturing industries between 1999 and 2007.
From Figure 3.2 it is possible to observe that even industries characterised by a high
propensity towards externalised R&D maintained in-house a predominant share of their in-
novating activities. As suggested by the previous theories, this strategy might be followed by
ﬁrms in order to keep at a close distance the core R&D activities needed to internalise exter-
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Figure 3.1: Trend of French Firms Internal and External R&D between 1999 and 2007.
Note: Based on R&D survey data, yearly growth rate between year 1999 to 2007 normalised to 1 based on year 1999. All
monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Total
R&D measured as the average total expenditure of ﬁrms in both internal and external R&D activities. External R&D measured
as the average total expenditure of ﬁrms in R&D activities outsourced both domestically or abroad to third agents.
nal knowledge spillovers or to protect the most key crucial steps of the innovating processes
more prone to technological leakage. In addition, Figure 3.2 shows the manufacturing indus-
tries which are more likely to externalise R&D activities domestically or abroad, highlighting
again the complementarity between internal and external resources. Note that in particular
the coke and nuclear fuel industry, the chemical sector and the manufacturers of transport
equipments have a higher R&D intensity than average, externalising a larger part of their
innovating activities in particular abroad. Some other industries, despite showing a lower
level of R&D investment, dedicate a relatively important part of their resources to external
R&D activities, in particular the sectors producing electrical machineries, communication
equipments and motor vehicles. However, all these industries despite outsourcing huge R&D
resources to third agents still preserve most of their innovating activities internally, providing
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Figure 3.2: Complementarity between Internal and External R&D across French Industries.
Note: Based on R&D survey data, average values from year 1999 to 2007 for all French manufacturing sectors according to
the NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at
the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Internal R&D measured as the log of the average expenditure of ﬁrms in
internal R&D activities. Domestic outsourced R&D measured as the log of the average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D
activities not carried out by the ﬁrm but by other public or private agents. Oﬀshored R&D measured as the the log of the
average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents.
a ﬁrst evidence of innovative complementarity and of the importance of in-house R&D to
exploit the positive spillovers deriving from externalised activities.
In Figure 3.3 we show how it is possible to further disaggregate this analysis by looking
at the distribution of externalised R&D activities across industries, diﬀerentiating between
tasks outsourced domestically or abroad, within or outside the business group, or externalised
to domestic and international public organisations and universities. We focus our attention
in particular on the main industries which are involved in externalized R&D, namely the
production of petroleum products and nuclear fuel (NACE rev.1.1 2-digit code 23), chemi-
cal products (24), the manufacture of machinery and electrical equipment (29 and 33) and
manufacture of transport equipment (35).
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of External R&D Activities across French Industries (mean value)
Note: Elaboration based on R&D survey data, average between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing sectors according
to the NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price indexes
at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Shares calculated as percentage of total expenditure in external R&D.
Variable French public organisations measures the total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by French
public authorities, ministries, state-owned labs except for public universities. Variable International organisations measures
the total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by International public organisations. Variable Foreign
Intra-Group measures the total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same
business group. French Intra-Group measures the total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic
aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group. Variable French Universities measures the total expenditure
of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by French private and public universities. French Extra-Group measures the
total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same
business group. Variable Foreign Extra-Group measures the total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by
private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same business group. Variable Other External R&D measures the
total expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other private or public agents not included in the previous
categories (professional bodies, high-schools, NGOs etc.).
From Figure 3.3 it can be observed how producers of chemicals and of transport equip-
ments are particularly involved in international networks of knowledge exchange, devoting
signiﬁcantly larger resources to oﬀshored R&D activities. In terms of international partner-
ships, the chemical industry seems to be the most open in France to research collaborations
with third foreign parties outside the group boundaries, probably due to the complexity of
innovating processes and the increasing resources required to carry on research in this ﬁeld
(Arora and Gambardella 1990). On the contrary, transport equipment producers seem to
rely mainly on internationalized but internalized exchange of knowledge, dedicating most of
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their external R&D resources to other foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group. In-
terestingly, the manufacturers of motor vehicles and of coke and nuclear fuel instead seem to
oﬀshore abroad a signiﬁcant share of their external R&D activities but outside the business
group boundaries. These sectors following an arm's-length outsourcing strategy are probably
involved in joint partnerships for R&D projects with other international competitors, suppli-
ers or customers, a phenomenon particularly frequent especially for the main motor vehicles
manufacturers.
Finally, in Table 3.1 we present some descriptive statistics about the engagement of French
innovating ﬁrms into the diﬀerent external R&D activities and their extent during the pe-
riod 1999-2007, diﬀerentiating between exporters and non-exporters. From Table 3.1 we can
observe that more than half of the ﬁrms in our sample have been involved in external R&D
activities during the 1999-2007 period, with a slightly higher participation rate for exporters.
Most of the ﬁrms have kept their external R&D activities in France, mainly outsourcing part
of their innovating eﬀorts to other ﬁrms not part of the same French group (36.27% of the
total sample). In contrast, only a small share of the general sample have decided to carry on
external R&D activities abroad. In particular, exporters in this case seem to have a slightly
higher propensity to oﬀshore R&D, with 17% of exporters in the sample who have oﬀshored
part of their knowledge abroad against 13% of non-exporters. As stressed in the previous
literature, exporters might be facilitated in managing oﬀshored R&D activities abroad given
their experience in foreign markets and the direct knowledge of local suppliers and facilities.
Interestingly, both in the case of domestic and foreign outsourced R&D, French ﬁrms seem to
be more oriented towards externalising their R&D activities outside group boundaries rather
than within, mainly following a strategy oriented towards the access of new knowledge and
facilities not available in house or the purpose of outsourcing the most standardized R&D
tasks to specialized providers, possibly suggesting an extended network of international ex-
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change of knowledge which goes beyond multinational groups boundaries.
Table 3.1: Share and extent of French ﬁrms participation to external R&D activities by export status
Total Exporters Non-Exporters
value share value share value share
No. Firms 4,523 100% 3,380 74.72% 1,143 25.28%
Internal R&D 6857.36 100% 7106.96 100% 5698.42 100%
(37177.1) (35311.23) (44824.02)
External R&D 1797.52 52.63% 2159.57 53.29% 1719.55 49.60%
(13817.38) (21058.91) (11684.32)
Oﬀshored R&D 490.52 16.03% 516.28 16.53% 484.97 13.65%
(5748.44) (5237.65) (5852.79)
Dom. Outsourced R&D 1364.36 51.09% 1302.05 51.75% 1653.72 47.97%
(11949.64) (9604.56) (19429.58)
Oﬀshored R&D IN 204.89 7.66% 215.03 7.81% 202.7 6.95%
(2555.57) (2801.01) (2499.67)
Oﬀshored R&D OUT 193.81 9.08% 233.46 9.42% 185.27 7.52%
(3415.63) (3497.62) (3398.4)
Dom. Outs. R&D IN 270.24 10.45% 181.85 10.4% 289.25 10.66%
(3561.87) (1816.91) (3834.93)
Dom. Outs. R&D OUT 1151.17 36.27% 1104.51 37.05% 1367.83 32.56%
(13633.12) (11988.33) (19534.64)
Note: Based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data, average between year 1999 and
2007 for all French manufacturing ﬁrms according to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation.
All monetary values in thousands of Euro deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the
industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Shares represent the number of ﬁrms in our sample
in each category which have undertaken a particular R&D activity over the total number of ﬁrms.
Firms which have registered positive foreign sales in the period of interest according to the Customs
Agency dataset have been included in the category Exporters or in the category Non-Exporters
otherwise. Internal R&D measured as the average expenditure of ﬁrms in internal R&D activities.
External R&D measured as the average total expenditure of ﬁrms in R&D activities outsourced
both domestically or abroad to third agents. Domestic outsourced R&D measured as the average
expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents based
in France. Oﬀshored R&D measured as the average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities
carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents. Variable Oﬀshored R&D IN measures
the average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of
the same business group. Dom. Outs. R&D IN measures the average expenditure of ﬁrms in exter-
nal R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business
group. Dom. Outs. R&D OUT measures the average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activi-
ties carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group. Variable
Oﬀshored R&D OUT measures the average expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried
out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same business group.
Concentrating on the extent of outsourced innovation we can observe that it is domesti-
cally outsourced R&D that has attracted the largest resources. In particular, most of these
resources have been outsourced mainly to other French extra-group ﬁrms, specialized research
centres and labs. There are a number of interesting ﬁndings when diﬀerentiating by export
status. First, is worth noting how exporters do not outperform in terms of external R&D
value in comparison to non-exporters, but on the contrary the two categories seem to follow
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diﬀerent strategies. Although exporters register a higher ratio between external and inter-
nal R&D, exporters tend to focus most of their resources to oﬀshored innovating activities
abroad, proﬁting from their international experiences, while non-exporters dedicate a larger
share of their resources into domestic networks of knowledge transfer.
In addition, it seems that non-exporters are much more focused on outsourcing part of
their innovating activities outside ﬁrms' boundaries. This dichotomy could have important
implications. From the preliminary statistics it appears that exporters prefer to develop new
technologies in-house within group boundaries, highlighting a strong dependency in terms
of R&D collaborations between headquarters and subsidiaries, while non-exporters on the
contrary tend to rely more on external R&D providers and labs, investing larger resources in
acquiring external technologies. This evidence shows how the internal development of new
technologies and products is a key strategy for successful exporters aiming to improve their
international competitiveness.
3.3.3 External R&D and International Trade
As previously discussed in the literature review, the exchange of knowledge within global
networks and the international trade of services and commodities are closely linked, suggest-
ing a complementarity between these two corporate strategies. For instance, export status
plays a key role in reducing the transaction costs associated with outsourced R&D, and at
the same time international innovating activities could positively aﬀect ﬁrms performance in
particular in terms of exports. Table 3.2 presents statistics analysing the export performance
of French ﬁrms and distinguishing companies according to the R&D outsourcing activity.
We present diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm export performance not only considering total ex-
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Table 3.2: Export Performance of French innovators and R&D Outsourcers.
General (4,523) Only Internal R&D (2,142)
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total Exports 51,400 306,000 29,400 163,000
Unit Value 536.55 7568.93 371.80 1923.20
Country Ext. Margin 27 26 24 24
Product Ext. Margin 30 51 25 44
Export Tech. Intensity 2.98 1.54 2.92 1.58
Foreign Market Potential 8.002 5.294 8.372 5.746
Exports extra-EU OECD 17.77 21.24 17.52 21.73
Exports non-OECD 8.66 14.11 8.17 13.66
Dom.Outs.R&D (2,310) Oﬀshored R&D (925)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total Exports 39,600 114,000 156,000 670,000
Unit Value 519.93 2470.56 1210.98 18008.16
Country Ext. Margin 27 25 37 33
Product Ext. Margin 30 46 50 76
Export Tech. Intensity 3.04 1.47 3.13 1.45
Foreign Market Potential 8.005 4.867 6.524 3.161
Exports extra-EU OECD 17.41 21.19 17.96 19.28
Exports non-OECD 8.96 15.21 10.32 14.50
Note: Based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data, average between year
1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing ﬁrms according to the NACE rev.1.1
industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values in thousands of Euro deﬂated using
OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline.
Firms which have dedicated resources only to internal R&D activities in the period
of interest according to the R&D survey dataset have been included in the category
Only Internal R&D. Firms which have dedicated resources to external R&D activities
based in France but not abroad in the period of interest according to the R&D survey
dataset have been included in the category Dom.Outs.R&D. Firms which have dedi-
cated resources to external R&D activities abroad in the period of interest according
to the R&D survey dataset have been included in the category Oﬀshored R&D. To-
tal exports includes all intra-EU shipments over e100,000 and extra-EU over e1,000
as reported by the French Custom Agency (CA). Unit value calculated as the aver-
age ratio between ﬁrm shipments value and weight or pieces as reported in the CA
dataset. Product extensive margin calculated as average number of products exported
by French ﬁrms. Country extensive margin calculated as average number of foreign
markets served by French ﬁrms. Export tech. intensity measured at the ﬁrm-level as
the average value of skill and technology content of each product exported by French
ﬁrms at the HS-6 digit level, based on the UNCTAD classiﬁcation of products into 5
diﬀerent categories: primary goods, resource-intensive commodities, low, medium and
high-tech (Basu and Das 2011). Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index measured as
explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the Head and Mayer (2004) approach, aver-
aging the FMP index of all the countries served by each exporter and weighting it by
the total value of ﬁrm's shipments towards each foreign market. Extra-EU OECD Ex-
ports measured as the average log of French ﬁrms exports to non-EU OECD members
(Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzer-
land, Turkey, USA) as reported in the CA dataset. Exports non-OECD measured as
the average log of French ﬁrms exports to all countries non-OECD members.
ports. For instance, we look carefully at the characteristics of products exported, including
the unit value as a proxy of quality calculated as the ratio between shipments' value and
weight, the product extensive margins registering the number of products exported by a ﬁrm
per year, and the technological intensity of exports. In order to measure the technological
intensity of exports we followed the UNCTAD classiﬁcation system of products by skill and
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technology content at the most disaggregated HS 6-digit level into ﬁve diﬀerent categories:
mineral fuels and primary commodities, resource-intensive manufactures, low, medium and
high skill and technology-intensive manufacturing goods (Basu and Das 2011).
After categorising products accordingly, we calculated an average exports tech-intensity
for each exporter per year. In addition, we focus on the export destinations, analysing the
country extensive margin calculated as the number of countries served by each exporter per
year, diﬀerentiating between exports towards extra-EU OECD and non-OECD countries, and
proposing the Foreign Market Potential index as a measure of market access for each exporter.
From Table 3.2 we can see that R&D outsourcers outperform non-outsourcers both in
terms of total exports and unit value of exported goods. However, when diﬀerentiating
between domestic and foreign outsourcing it is evident that oﬀshorers show a better perfor-
mance than domestic outsourcers according to the diﬀerent measures of export performance.
In particular, it is worth to note that ﬁrms that oﬀshore part of their R&D activities abroad
export signiﬁcantly more products, that are also more technologically advanced and have a
higher unit value.
In addition, looking at the export destinations, ﬁrms conducting R&D abroad seem to
be able to access more foreign markets. In particular, we are able to analyse which foreign
markets are mostly targeted by R&D outsourcers. First, we diﬀerentiate between exports
to extra-EU OECD and to non-OECD countries, in order to analyse whether external R&D
activities help French ﬁrms to access diﬃcult and far-away markets rather than developed
countries. Interestingly, the share of total exports shipped to extra-EU OECD countries seems
to be steady across the diﬀerent groups, highlighting no particular relationship between R&D
outsourcing and export to distant but highly developed countries. On the contrary, total ex-
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ports to non-OECD members are signiﬁcantly larger for R&D oﬀshorers than for the rest of
the innovators, suggesting a possible link between internationalised R&D activities and the
access to distant, diﬃcult but quickly growing markets. The previously discussed phenom-
ena seem to be corroborated by the analysis of the Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index in
Table 3.2.4 We have used this index to build a weighted measure of market access for each
exporter, averaging the FMP index of all the countries served by each exporter and weighting
it by the total value of ﬁrm's shipments towards each foreign market. The new ﬁrm-level
index represents the ﬁrm's strategy in international markets: ﬁrms with very high scores
export mainly to close EU countries or other high-income OECD members which are usually
the main trading partners of France. On the contrary, ﬁrms with a low FMP index tend to
export on average to distant and diﬃcult markets which are not the usual trade partners,
mainly characterized by cultural and trade barriers. From the summary statistics in Table
3.2 it seems that R&D oﬀshorers register on average a signiﬁcantly lower score in respect
to other categories, suggesting that these ﬁrms are able to export to more diﬃcult or far
away markets with a lower foreign market potential index, highlighting a possible connection
between oﬀshored innovating activities and market-access to diﬃcult and distant countries
as stressed in some previous studies.
In order to further analyse the relationship between external R&D and exports we report
in Figure 3.4 the distribution of exported goods technological intensity across manufacturing
industries in France. Thanks to the transaction-level dataset for all shipments provided by
4This index proposes an accurate estimate of each country's proximity to world markets, synthesizing the
evolution of countries economic geography in international trade (Mayer 2009). As further explained in the
appendix A.3.1, using a gravity model we have calculated this index for each country trading with France
following the Head and Mayer (2004) approach, taking into consideration the sum per capita expenditure of
all countries, weighted by bilateral trade costs and adjusting it to take into account the impact of national
borders on trade ﬂows. As shown in Figure A.3.1.1 in the appendix, countries which are closer to France,
with very low trade barriers and a large internal potential market for French ﬁrms rank at the top of the
FMP index, while distant and less attractive markets with high barriers to trade which are more diﬃcult to
access register very low scores in the FMP index.
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the French Custom Agency we estimated the technological intensity of exports at the ﬁrm-
level and then at the industry-level, by classifying all the products exported by French ﬁrms
into 5 diﬀerent categories (primary goods, resource-intensive commodities, low, medium and
high-tech) according to the classiﬁcation system of skill and technology content of products
at the HS 6-digit level provided by Basu and Das (2011).
Figure 3.4: Technological Intensity of Exports across French Industries (mean value)
Note: Elaboration based on R&D survey and French Customs data, average between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manu-
facturing sectors according to the NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD
production price indexes at the industry-level for France in 2000 as a baseline. Shares calculated as percentage of ﬁrms total
exports as reported in the Custom Agency dataset. Technological intensity of exports measured for each product exported
by French ﬁrms at the HS-6 digit level then aggregated at the industry-level based on the UNCTAD classiﬁcation of skill and
technology content of products into 5 diﬀerent categories: primary goods, resource-intensive commodities, low, medium and
high-tech (Basu and Das 2011).
In particular, from Figure 3.4 notice that the manufacturing sectors with relatively higher
technological intensity of exports are the same industries which have shown in Figure 3.2
to have a higher propensity towards externalised R&D activities, namely coke and nuclear
fuel, chemicals, computers, electrical and optical machineries, communication equipment and
transport equipment. In Figure 3.5 we further conﬁrm this evidence by plotting the relation-
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ship between diﬀerent measures of export performance and external R&D activities at the
NACE rev.1.1 2-digit industry level.
Figure 3.5 corroborates the previous ﬁndings presenting a visual representation of the
relationships linking export performance and external R&D activities at the industry level.
In particular, it is possible to observe an extremely precise linear relationship between ex-
ternal R&D and ﬁrms' total exports. Industries externalizing a larger share of their R&D
activities such as electronic devices, machineries and chemicals export more on average than
other industries with lower levels of external R&D such as the food and textile industries.
A similar relationship seems to arise when comparing external R&D and the technological
intensity of goods exported abroad: also in this case, the more an industry is exposed to
external R&D the higher is the tech-intensity of exports, especially in the case of computers,
chemicals, plastic and metal goods. Finally, it is particularly interesting to note a negative
linear relation between externalized R&D and the average market potential of exporters at
the industrial level. As previously discussed, this index represents the proximity of a country
to France as potential foreign market, providing an accurate measure of the attractiveness
of a country as a foreign market in terms of its potential and of the diﬃculty of access: the
higher is the ranking, the more open and attractive is the market to French ﬁrms. From
Figure 3.5 it is evident that industries more prone to externalize R&D activities register
on average a lower foreign market potential index, meaning that ﬁrms in these sectors tend
to export on average to more diﬃcult and distant markets not usually served by the vast
majority of French exporters.
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 281
Figure 3.5: External R&D and Export Performance
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Note: Linear correlation between industry-level external R&D and export performance. Elaboration based on R&D survey and
French Customs data, average between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing sectors according to the NACE rev.1.1
2-digit level industrial classiﬁcation. All monetary values deﬂated using OECD production price indexes at the industry-level for
France in 2000 as a baseline. Total exports includes all intra-EU shipments over e100,000 and extra-EU over e1,000 as reported
by the French Custom Agency (CA). Unit value calculated as the average ratio between ﬁrm shipments value and weight or
pieces as reported in the CA dataset. Export technological intensity measured at the ﬁrm-level as the average value of skill and
technology content of each product exported by French ﬁrms at the HS-6 digit level based on the UNCTAD classiﬁcation of
products into 5 diﬀerent categories: primary goods, resource-intensive commodities, low, medium and high-tech (Basu and Das
2011). Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index measured as explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the Head and Mayer (2004)
approach, averaging the FMP index of all the countries served by each exporter and weighting it by the total value of ﬁrm's
shipments towards each foreign market. External R&D measured as the average total expenditure of ﬁrms in R&D activities
outsourced both domestically or abroad to third public or private agents. 5% conﬁdence interval reported as the shadowed area.
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 283
3.4 Methodology
In this chapter we are going to test empirically for the ﬁrst time the above mentioned hy-
pothesis at the ﬁrm level, investigating not only the eﬀect of the complementarity between
internal and external R&D activities on export performance, but also focusing on the impact
of outsourced R&D on the total value of exports and on the destinations served by each
exporter.
There are signiﬁcant challenges posed by this empirical investigation, in particular in re-
lation to the econometric estimation of the relationship between outsourced innovation and
exports. The previous economic literature on this topic have identiﬁed two major problems,
namely selectivity bias and simultaneity bias.
First, the selectivity problem arises from the fact that not all ﬁrms engage in innovation
and even fewer decide to outsource part of their R&D activities. As previously stressed, our
data focus on a group of French innovating ﬁrms not randomly drawn from a representative
sample, but selected for a survey based on the total resources dedicated to innovative ac-
tivities. In addition, as we have previously observed, only a small percentage of the French
innovative ﬁrms are involved in the outsourcing of R&D activities, and even fewer of these
participate in the international network of knowledge exchange. Therefore, R&D outsourcing
could be considered to be endogenous, since ﬁrms decide whether to engage in these activities
and then decide the extent of the resources dedicated to outsourced innovation according to
the business strategies followed, their productivity and a number of other unobserved char-
acteristics.
Related to this previous point, a second possible source of bias might arise, given that ﬁrms
export performance might be endogenously related not only with the decision to outsource
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part of the innovating activities but also with the extent of these operations, creating thus a
problem of simultaneity between exporting and R&D outsourcing strategies. As stressed in
the previous literature, exporters might have a higher propensity towards outsourcing, dedi-
cating more resources also to externalised R&D activities, generating a two-way causal link
between these strategies. Previous theoretical and empirical studies have anticipated how
exporters are more likely to undertake external R&D operations given their experience in the
international markets, their higher productivity and the connections they might have with
external suppliers of manufactured and innovation inputs (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006;
Garcia-Vega and Huergo 2011; Garcia-Vega and Huergo 2013; Arvanitis et al. 2014). As a
result, the estimators of the eﬀect of external R&D on export performance would be corre-
lated with the endogenous decision of outsourcing R&D activities and with the participation
to international markets.
A seminal work by Crepon et al. (1998) provides an econometric approach for the so-
lution of the joint selectivity and simultaneity bias by introducing a 4-stage model which
considers the innovative process a series of diﬀerent sequential stages with a causality link
running from the decision to innovate, the extent of the innovative activities, the innovation
output and ﬁnally its eﬀect on ﬁrms' performance, but also considering the reverse causal-
ity. Using an asymptotic least square estimator and assuming the disturbance terms to be
correlated across all diﬀerent stages, the authors provide consistent estimates that corrects
for both kind of bias. Building on this methodology, Loof and Heshmati (2006) implement a
slightly diﬀerent structural model that does not assume that all disturbances are correlated
but separating instead the four-stages into two distinct parts, the selection equations which
use an Heckman selection estimator and the analysis on the relationship between innovation
and performance estimated using a three-stage least squares model.
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Following the above mentioned econometric framework we address both the selectivity
and simultaneity bias implementing a 3-stage model which takes into account ﬁrst the ﬁrm
R&D externalisation decision before analysing the relationship linking outsourced innovating
activities and export performance. For the ﬁrst part of our analysis we adopt an Heckman
selection model in order to take into consideration ﬁrms' self-selection into R&D internation-
alization.
To solve for the ﬁrst source of bias Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) suggest to replace the
endogenous variables aﬀected by self-selection in the model, such as the extent of external
R&D activities in our case, with their predicted values which take into account the unob-
served latent characteristics aﬀecting the decision to undertake outsourced R&D.5 In order
to correct for this selection bias, in the ﬁrst step of the Heckman model we estimate the
decision of ﬁrm i to outsource part of its R&D activities to external agents:
ψit = α0 + α1Zit−1 + kj + kt + Eit (3.1)
where ψit is an unobserved latent variable measuring the predicted utility of engaging in
R&D outsourcing, Zit−1 is a vector of ﬁrm-level characteristics at time t − 1 and kj and kt
are vectors of industry and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Since we only observe the value of externalised
R&D activity as reported by French ﬁrms, we estimate the following selection equation us-
ing a probit model to describe the probability of R&D outsourcing conditional on a set of
exclusion variables ψit−1 which aﬀects ﬁrm's outsourcing decision but not the extent of R&D
activities externalized, in other words identifying the main determinants of R&D outsourcing,
5A number of diﬀerent empirical papers use this econometric methodology in order to provide consistent
estimators which consider the selectivity and simultaneous bias in the analysis of innovation and other
empirical topics. See for instance: Crepon et al. (1998); David et al. (2000); Griﬃth et al. (2006); De Jong
and Kemp (2003); Loof and Heshmati (2006); Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008); Hashi and Stojcic (2013); Yu
(2014); Feenstra et al. (2014); Siedschlag and Zhang (2015).
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and where Φ(.) is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution (Cameron and
Trivedi 2005):
Pr (yit = 1) = Φ (α0 + α1Zit−1 + α2ψit−1 + kj + kt + Eit) (3.2)
We explain the propensity of ﬁrms to outsource R&D activities as a function of diﬀerent
ﬁrm characteristics ψit−1 which aﬀect the likelihood of outsourcing but not its extent.
Following the previous literature, we use a diﬀerent set of exclusion variables for each
possible outsourcing activity, in order to identify the strategy followed and the main deter-
minants of externalized R&D activities (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Cantwell and Zhang
2011; Castelli and Castellani 2013; Dosso and Vezzani 2015). As factors driving R&D out-
sourcing we use ﬁrms share of domestic and foreign sales measured with respect to total sales
to represent market seeking strategies, and the participation of a ﬁrm to domestic or foreign
group to explain R&D cooperation with other French or foreign aﬃliates in addition to the
standard control variables. In addition, we include public funds received to sustain the in-
novative eﬀorts and the distance from the technological frontier, calculated as the diﬀerence
between ﬁrms total patents and the average number of patents in the related industry, in
order to detect any supply-driven strategy. In particular, when analysing the probability
of outsourcing R&D activities domestically we use as a set of exclusion variables, the R&D
funds received by public authorities, the participation in a French group, the share of domes-
tic over total sales, and the distance from the industry-speciﬁc technological frontier. When
considering the probability of oﬀshoring R&D activities abroad we take into account the
participation in a foreign-owned group, the share of foreign over total sales and the distance
from the industry-speciﬁc technological frontier. Zit−1 represents a set of control variables
at the ﬁrm level such as total employment, average salary of researchers, the log of labour
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productivity measured as the ratio between total sales and number of employees and the
internal investment in R&D. All the regressors in the selection model have been lagged by
one period to alleviate the potential endogeneity concerns and industry kj and year dummies
kt have been included to control for any other macroeconomic shock.
Second, we move further by estimating in the second stage of our model the extent of
R&D outsourcing Eit conditional on the externalisation decision. To do so, we include the
inverse Mills ratio obtained in the ﬁrst stage in this following step as an additional regressors
in order to properly estimate the expected extent of ﬁrms external R&D activities:
Eit =
 y
∗
it = β1Zit−1 + λ
(
βˆ2E
′
it−1
)
+ kj + kt + µit if yit = 1,
0 if yit = 0.
where βˆ2 is obtained from the ﬁrst-step probit regression of yit on Eit−1 and λ
(
βˆ2E
′
it−1
)
=
φ
(
βˆ2E
′
it−1
)
/Φ
(
βˆ2E
′
it−1
)
is the estimated inverse Mills ratio. Thus, estimating the previous
equation with a generalised Tobit model we are able to implement an Heckman two-step
selection procedure which provides the expected values of the ﬁrms extent of outsourcing E¯it,
after controlling for the endogenous selection of ﬁrms into outsourced R&D activities, which
will be consequently used to replace the actual measures of ﬁrms external R&D activities in
the following estimation steps.
In the third stage of the estimation we analyse the relationship between externalised R&D
activities and ﬁrm export performance. First, we are interested in understanding whether out-
sourced R&D substitutes for ﬁrms internal innovating capabilities or if instead both activities
are needed to fully exploit the spillover eﬀect to boost export performance. We test directly
this complementarity hypothesis by estimating the eﬀect of the interaction between internal
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Iit and external R&D activities E¯it on the diﬀerent measures of export performance, using
the ﬁtted values for both innovating activities outsourced in France or oﬀshored abroad. By
estimating the following export function we should be able to test whether internal R&D ca-
pabilities are needed in order to internalize the positive externalities deriving from outsourced
innovations and to check for the joint and complementary eﬀect of these two activities Iit∗E¯it
on ﬁrms export performance Xit:
Xit = γ0 + γ1Iit ∗ E¯it + γ2Zit + kj + kt + EXit (3.3)
Xit represents the diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm i export performance we consider at time
t, namely the value of total exports and the Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index. As
previously stressed, we include all the main covariates of interest in E¯it which identiﬁes the
diﬀerent expected values of ﬁrm i outsourced R&D activities estimated from the previous 2-
step Heckman model. In particular, we are interested in dissecting the impact of externalized
R&D diﬀerentiating between activities outsourced in France or oﬀshored abroad, and distin-
guishing as well between those activities carried out within the business group boundary or
outsourced to third external agents. The previous literature on this topic in fact show how
corporate characteristics and strategies aﬀect the outcome of outsourced activities, especially
in the case of R&D (e.g. Santangelo 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Criscuolo et al.
2010; Fu et al. 2012). For this reason, we further dissect the eﬀect of externalised R&D activ-
ities on exports by diﬀerentiating between ﬁrms that are part of domestic or foreign-owned
groups and according to the industry technological intensity as deﬁned by the UNCTAD
classiﬁcation (Basu and Das 2011). In this way, it is possible to identify the eﬀect of external
R&D on exports according to the diﬀerent ﬁrm-level characteristics and the strategies fol-
lowed after controlling for a set of standard ﬁrm-level control variables Zit and year-industry
ﬁxed eﬀects kt and kj.
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Second, as stressed in the previous literature, the decision and the extent of R&D out-
sourcing may be explained by the international activities of ﬁrms, since exporters might
exploit their experience in the international markets, their higher productivity and the con-
nections they have with external suppliers in order to proﬁt the most from externalised R&D
activities. We test this simple linear relationship by estimating the eﬀect of several measures
of export performance Xit such as total exports and the FMP index on the expected value of
diﬀerent external R&D activities E¯it outsourced in France or abroad, within or outside the
group boundaries:
E¯it = γ0 + γ1Xit + γ2Iit + γ3Zit + kj + kt + EEit (3.4)
Also in this case we control for the contribution of internal R&D resources Iit to the in-
novation outsourcing process and for a set of standard ﬁrm-level control variables Zit such as
total employment, researchers average salary, labour productivity and aﬃliation to a French
or a foreign group. Year kt and NACE rev.1.1 2-digit-level industry kj ﬁxed eﬀects are in-
cluded to control for time and industry speciﬁc shocks.
In the model by Crepon et al. (1998) the authors assume the existence of full correlation
between the error terms of the four stages of estimation of the innovation process. Loof and
Heshmati (2006) in their model relax this condition by assuming just a partial correlation
between disturbance terms. Our estimation strategy is based on this latter, assuming that
the disturbance terms from the ﬁrst two stages, the decision to outsource R&D activities and
its extent, are correlated with each other on the basis of unobservable characteristics of ﬁrms.
For this reason, we estimate jointly the ﬁrst two steps using a generalised tobit. Nevertheless,
a second potential endogeneity problem in our model is due to the two-way causality link
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connecting externalised R&D activities and export performance since the explanatory vari-
ables might be jointly determined with the dependent variable. In this case the assumption
about the absence of correlation between disturbances and explanatory variables E(Xit, EEit)
and E(E¯it, EXit) will be violated and will not be exogenously determined, leading to biased
and inconsistent OLS estimators due to the violation of the non-autocorrelation assumption
cov(EEit , EXit) 6= 0.
For this reason, in the ﬁnal stage of our estimation strategy equations 3.3 and 3.4 will be
part of a system of simultaneous equations in which export-performance at the ﬁrm level will
appear as a dependent variable in the ﬁrst equation but will be considered as an independent
variable in explaining the extent of outsourced R&D in the second equation and vice versa,
under the condition that ﬁrm i is externalising part of its R&D activities.
There are two main methods of estimation for systems of simultaneous equations, least
squares and maximum likelihood models. Both three-stage least squares (3SLS) and full
information maximum likelihood (FIML) system methods use information concerning the
endogenous variables present in a system and take into account the error covariances across
equations, hence providing estimators which are asymptotically eﬃcient in the absence of
speciﬁcation error. In addition, SUR methods can also be used in order to improve the
eﬃciency of parameter estimates. Like the OLS estimator, SUR methods assume that all
the regressors are independent variables, but are able to improve the regression eﬃciency by
estimating the matrix of contemporaneous correlation among error terms across equations
using OLS residuals.
For the main set of results we estimate our model using both full information maximum
likelihood and three-stage least squares methodologies. The least squares simultaneous equa-
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tions framework applied to the ﬁnal stage of our model allows us to overcome the simultaneity
bias problem and to derive consistent estimators of the eﬀect of external R&D on export per-
formance, controlling for potential reverse causality with proper instruments (Hornstein and
Greene 2012). The 3SLS method combines the features of least squares and SUR methods.
As in other least squares estimators, the 3SLS method uses Yˆ instead of Y for endogenous
regressors, resulting in consistent estimates. As with SUR methods, the 3SLS approach
takes the cross-equation error correlations into account to improve large sample eﬃciency
(Wooldridge 2010). The three-stage least squares method requires three diﬀerent steps. In
the ﬁrst-stage regression the model gets the predicted values for the endogenous regressors.
In the second step a two-stage least squares is applied to get the residuals to estimate the
cross-equation correlation matrix which is then used in the ﬁnal 3SLS estimation step. In
contrast to the 3SLS, the FIML method involves the minimization of the determinant of the
covariance matrix associated with residuals of the system of equations. The maximum like-
lihood methods assume that the errors are normally distributed and the likelihood function
is maximized subject to restrictions on all of the parameters in the system, not just those
in the equation being estimated (Heckman 1979). The standard errors are bootsrapped in
order to correct for the bias induced by the inclusion of predicted regressors from the pre-
vious two-steps of the Heckman selection model and clustered to consider the panel nature
of our data. In the next section, we present as main set of results the estimation of the
full information maximum likelihood. In addition, as alternative methods, Tables A.3.2.1-
A.3.2.12 of the appendix present the results estimating the ﬁnal stage of our model using
the three-stage least squares (3SLS) and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approaches
to test the robustness of our main results and to demonstrate the necessity of taking into
account the interdependence between externalised R&D activities and export performance
to derive consistent and unbiased estimators.
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Finally, Tables A.3.2.13-A.3.2.15 of the appendix report the results of the estimation of
the systems of equations considering the relationship between external R&D and total ex-
ports using a FIML model using a survey data analysis framework. As previously explained,
the R&D dataset we use for our analysis is based on an annual survey partially based on
the structure of the previous surveys conducted and consists of four diﬀerent strata. Three
of these strata are exhaustive and form the principle component of the survey (all the ﬁrms
with an internal R&D expenditure above e350,000), while a fourth strata of the survey is
composed of a sample of remaining companies which dedicate a smaller amount of resources
to R&D. The sample of the fourth strata is renewed every year, keeping half of the previous
year's sample and including as a second half other innovating ﬁrms not included in the previ-
ous survey. Survey data usually diﬀer from comprehensive datasets in terms of the design and
details of the data collection procedure. For these reasons, in order to ﬁnd robust estimators
in our model we should take into account the sampling weights which measure the diﬀerent
probability of selection for each observation, the cluster sampling applied to consider that
individuals are not sampled independently and the stratiﬁcation of the data collection. Using
a survey data analysis approach we are able to get point estimates corrected by the sampling
weights, and considering the weighting, clustering, and stratiﬁcation of the survey design
it is possible to estimate more precisely the standard errors given the overall sample size
(Heeringa et al. 2010). However, by using only the R&D survey data we restrict our anal-
ysis just to total exports, the only export performance variable provided in the R&D dataset.
3.5 Results
In this section we present the estimation results for the relationship connecting outsourced
R&D activities and export performance at the ﬁrm level, investigating the impact of the
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complementarity between internal and external R&D activities on export performance, and
carefully analysing the eﬀect of external R&D on the total value of exports and on the des-
tinations served by each exporter. For this study we take into consideration both R&D
activities externalised domestically and abroad, within the group boundaries or outsourced
at the arm's-length. In addition, in our analysis we distinguish between domestic and foreign
owned ﬁrms to study the joint role played by foreign ownership in ﬁrms participation in
knowledge exchange networks and in export activities, and diﬀerentiating as well between
ﬁrms in high and low-tech industries to analyse the diﬀerent strategies followed by inno-
vating leaders and laggards. In order to tackle the selectivity and simultaneity bias posed
by the econometric analysis of the relationship between outsourced innovation and export
performance we have built a system of equations in which, after controlling for self-selection
into knowledge exchange networks, the two-way causality is modelled as export activities
aﬀecting the likelihood of R&D outsourcing, and conversely external innovations improving
or deprecating the export performance of ﬁrms.
We start our analysis by looking at the estimation results of the 2-step Heckman selec-
tion model in Table 3.3 used to estimate the expected values of externalised R&D activities
taking into account the self-selection bias. Diﬀerent sets of regressors have been used as ex-
clusion variables in the bivariate sample-selection estimations for R&D outsourced in France
or abroad that are expected to aﬀect ﬁrms decisions to externalise R&D but not the extent
of these activities in the second step. In the case of R&D activities oﬀshored abroad we
included in the ﬁrst-step the aﬃliation to a foreign group, the share of total sales to foreign
markets and the distance from the industrial technological frontier. In this way we should be
able to identify the main drivers of R&D internationalization, in order to understand whether
these activities are inﬂuenced by market or supply-driven factors. From the ﬁrst-step probit
estimations we can observe that oﬀshored R&D activities are mainly market-driven, since
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the share of foreign markets over total sales has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the probability of externalizing innovative activities abroad, in particular in panel C when
outsourcing outside the group boundaries. In addition, the aﬃliation to a foreign group does
play a role in promoting international R&D cooperation and the creation of knowledge net-
works in particular with other aﬃliates within the same group. On the contrary, the distance
of ﬁrms from the industrial technological frontier in terms of patents does not appear to aﬀect
the internationalization of R&D activities, suggesting that French ﬁrms do not oﬀshore R&D
abroad due to supply-driven factors such as the need to access more advanced technologies
from renowned laboratories and R&D centres in foreign countries.
For R&D activities domestically outsourced in France in panel D, E and F we have in-
cluded as exclusion variables in the ﬁrst-step the share of domestic sales, the aﬃliation to a
French group, the distance from the industrial technological frontier and the total amount
of public funds received to support corporate R&D eﬀorts. From the ﬁrst-step probit esti-
mations in columns 7, 9 and 11 of Table 3.3 observe that public funds have a positive eﬀect
on the probability of outsourcing R&D activities in France, highlighting the key role played
by public resources and subsidies in promoting cooperation and innovative joint-ventures
between French ﬁrms, public authorities and private laboratories. The aﬃliation to a French
group increases the probability of externalizing R&D activities in France to other aﬃliates
that are part of the same group in column 9, while domestic sales do not have any signiﬁcant
eﬀect in determining the likelihood of outsourcing R&D domestically, suggesting how these
activities do not seem to be driven by domestic-market-factors. Interestingly, in column 11
the distance from the technological frontier has a positive eﬀect on the probability of exter-
nalizing R&D activities at the arm's-length to other French extra-group agents. This suggests
that French ﬁrms lagging behind in the innovative race might outsource R&D activities to
other domestic ﬁrms in order to access particular key technologies not available in-house,
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Table 3.3: Estimation of propensity and extent of R&D outsourcing using a Heckman two-step bivariate selection model.
Heckman two-step (A) Oﬀshoring R&D (B) Oﬀshoring R&D IN (C) Oﬀshoring R&D OUT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Step 2nd Step 1st Step 2nd Step 1st Step 2nd Step
Employmentit−1 0.105** 0.129*** 0.212*** 0.755*** 0.0300 0.0807***
(0.0437) (0.0334) (0.0582) (0.0889) (0.0494) (0.0220)
Av.Salaryit−1 -0.0623 -0.125*** -0.0439 -0.199*** 0.0159 -0.0429
(0.0812) (0.0443) (0.113) (0.0390) (0.0979) (0.0345)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.418*** 1.459*** 0.117** 0.153***
(0.0516) (0.0426) (0.0720) (0.167) (0.0563) (0.0346)
InternalR&Dit−1 0.273*** 0.354*** 0.246*** 0.918*** 0.287*** 0.415***
(0.0381) (0.0462) (0.0490) (0.0944) (0.0434) (0.0631)
ForeignSalesit−1 0.0128* 0.00722 0.0148*
(0.00726) (0.00908) (0.00824)
ForeignGroupit 0.282*** 0.617*** 2.045***
(0.0798) (0.1000) (0.242)
Tech.Frontierit−1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
InverseMillsRatio 0.329* 3.356*** 0.898***
(0.172) (0.414) (0.235)
Observations 11,178 11,173 11,178 11,109 11,178 11,173
No.F irms 3,069 3,067 3,069 3,043 3,069 3,067
Heckman two-step (D) R&D Outsourced France (E) R&D Outs. France IN (F) R&D Outs. France OUT
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1st Step 2nd Step 1st Step 2nd Step 1st Step 2nd Step
Employmentit−1 0.129*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 0.0112 0.102*** 0.124***
(0.0329) (0.0345) (0.0479) (0.0261) (0.0325) (0.0348)
Av.Salaryit−1 -0.125** -0.212*** 0.0710 -0.0758** -0.0994* -0.260***
(0.0573) (0.0571) (0.0944) (0.0380) (0.0578) (0.0575)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.170*** 0.176*** 0.268*** 0.00146 0.102*** 0.186***
(0.0379) (0.0398) (0.0580) (0.0350) (0.0378) (0.0385)
InternalR&Dit−1 0.134*** 0.416*** 0.0905** 0.0927*** 0.185*** 0.471***
(0.0309) (0.0350) (0.0446) (0.0236) (0.0306) (0.0475)
R&DPublicFundsit−1 0.0984*** 0.0782*** 0.0605***
(0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0121)
DomesticSalesit−1 -0.153 -0.152 -0.00877
(0.117) (0.163) (0.116)
FrenchGroupit 0.0557 0.550*** 0.0682
(0.0576) (0.0784) (0.0657)
Tech.Frontierit−1 0.0004 0.0001 0.0008*
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
InverseMillsRatio -0.673*** -0.467*** 0.596**
(0.190) (0.109) (0.254)
Observations 11,156 11,156 11,156 11,151 11,156 11,156
No.F irms 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,062 3,064 3,064
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French
manufacturing innovators according to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation. The estimator used is a Heckman
two-step bivariate selection model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. First-step estimated using
a panel probit model, second-step using a panel tobit model. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but note reported. The dependent variables in
the ﬁrst-steps are dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm reports positive expenditure in the speciﬁc external R&D activity
and 0 otherwise. In the second-steps the dependent variables are measured as the log value of ﬁrm expenditure in each
speciﬁc external R&D activity. R&D outsourced France measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities car-
ried out by other public or private agents based in France. Oﬀshoring R&D measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external
R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents. Oﬀshoring R&D IN measures the expenditure
of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group. R&D Outs. France
IN measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and
part of the same business group. R&D Outs. France OUT measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities
carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group. Oﬀshoring R&D OUT measures
the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of
the same business group. As independent variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees,
average salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio
between ﬁrms total output and number of employees, internal R&D measures the ﬁrm total expenditure in internal R&D
activities, R&D public funds is the log value of the total resources received from French, foreign and international public
authorities to stimulate private ﬁrms innovative activities, domestic and foreign sales are the log values of ﬁrms total
sales in France or abroad, technological frontier is calculated as the diﬀerence between ﬁrms total patents and the aver-
age number of patents in the related industry, the inverse Mills ratio is the ratio of the probability density function to
the cumulative distribution function of a distribution estimated in the ﬁrst-step, while foreign and French group are two
dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. Control variables total
employment, average salary, labour productivity, internal R&D, domestic and foreign sales, R&D public funds and tech-
nological frontier are lagged one year while foreign and French group dummies refer to time t like the dependent variable.
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probably to private-owned R&D labs at the edge of the technological frontier. These results,
together with the previous evidence, show that while R&D activities oﬀshored abroad seem to
be mainly driven by market-driven factors such as the increase in foreign sales, domestically
outsourced innovations instead are mainly oriented towards more supply-driven exigencies,
such as the access to specialised and more advanced technologies or the intra-group reorgan-
isation and rationalisation of R&D activities.
After estimating the probability of externalising R&D activities domestically and abroad,
within or outside the group, we include the computed inverse Mills ratio obtained in the
ﬁrst-step probit estimations in the second-step of the Heckman model as additional regres-
sor. In this way, we are able to properly estimate the expected extent of ﬁrms external
R&D activities after controlling for the endogenous self-selection of ﬁrms into outsourced
R&D activities. The tobit estimations of the second-step in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12
conﬁrm the previous results, since the estimated coeﬃcients are consistent in magnitude and
statistical signiﬁcance with the previous ones from the ﬁrst-step and the inverse Mills ratios
estimated in the ﬁrst-step are always statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, after controlling for the
endogenous self-selection of ﬁrms into R&D outsourcing, we obtain the ﬁtted values of ﬁrms
extent of outsourcing, both domestically or abroad and within or outside the group, which is
used in the following systems of equations in order to replace the measures of ﬁrms' actual
extent of outsourcing R&D and is interacted with the value of resources dedicated to internal
innovating activities in order to analyse their joint and complimentary impact on ﬁrms ex-
port performance. For the main set of results we use a full information maximum likelihood
model (FIML) assuming that the errors are normally distributed and the likelihood function
is maximized subject to restrictions on all of the parameters in the system, not just those in
the equation being estimated.
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First, in Table 3.4 we investigate the complementary eﬀect of internal and external R&D
activities on ﬁrms total exports using a FIML model. In panel A we analyse the system
of equations considering both R&D activities oﬀshored abroad and domestically outsourced
and ﬁrms total exports. In the following 5 columns in panel B we break down oﬀshored and
domestically outsourced R&D in order to disentangle the relationship between total exports
and innovating activities outsourced within or outside the group boundaries both domesti-
cally or abroad. From a preliminary analysis of the main control variables our results are in
line with the previous empirical studies. In both panel A and B ﬁrms size and productivity
in terms of labour force matter both for externalised R&D activities and for total exports,
always positively aﬀecting their extent. Also internal R&D resources have a positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impact on the externalisation of innovating activities and on the value
of foreign sales, suggesting an interdependence between trade, internal and external R&D
resources. On the contrary, researchers average salary seems to have a positive and signiﬁ-
cant impact on the extent of the R&D externalisation, but does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
value of ﬁrms total exports in columns 3 and 8. Moreover, the aﬃliation to a foreign group
signiﬁcantly aﬀects the movement of R&D activities to foreign ﬁrms within the same group
in column 4, while by being part of a French group ﬁrms are more prone to externalise both
domestically and abroad. However, while foreign ownership positively aﬀects total exports
in column 8, the aﬃliation to a French business group seems to reduce ﬁrms participation
to international markets, with a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on foreign sales. Similarly,
total exports have a diﬀerent eﬀect on oﬀshored and domestically outsourced R&D activities.
On the one hand, foreign sales and the experience in international markets have a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the predicted extent of innovating activities outsourced abroad in
column 1, but with diametrically opposed impacts when disaggregating between activities
oﬀshored to other ﬁrms part of the same group or at the arm's-length outside the group
boundaries in columns 4 and 5. On the other hand, ﬁrms export activities are negatively
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 298
related with domestically outsourced R&D in column 2, in particular when externalised to
French ﬁrms not belonging to the same business group in column 7, possibly highlighting the
strategies driving ﬁrms internationalisation and the domestic externalisation of innovating
activities.
After correcting for both selectivity and simultaneity bias, it is possible to analyse the joint
impact of internal and externalised R&D activities on ﬁrms total exports in column 3 and 8
of Table 3.4. First, note in column 3 that the complementarity between internal and external
R&D has opposite eﬀects on total exports when considering innovating activities oﬀshored
abroad or outsourced domestically. In fact, the interaction between internal and oﬀshored
R&D positively aﬀects total exports, while domestically outsourced innovating activities seem
to decrease ﬁrms presence abroad. The results are even more interesting when disaggregating
oﬀshored and domestically outsourced R&D into activities externalised within or outside the
group boundaries in column 8. Column 8 shows a clear diﬀerence between R&D outsourced
to other aﬃliates or to external third agents. The interaction between internal and oﬀshored
R&D activities to foreign aﬃliates in fact has a signiﬁcantly negative impact on ﬁrms total
exports, while the complementarity between internal resources and R&D oﬀshored abroad to
external ﬁrms positively aﬀects the value of foreign sales. On the contrary, the complemen-
tarity with outsourcing domestically to extra-group French ﬁrms seems to negatively aﬀect
ﬁrms export performance but no signiﬁcant eﬀect has been detected when considering the
interaction between internal resources and R&D activities outsourced to French aﬃliates.
Finally, the covariances between the error terms of externalised R&D and total exports in
column 3 and 8 are always statistically signiﬁcant, except in the case of innovating activities
domestically outsourced to French aﬃliates. This result justiﬁes the adoption of the FIML
system of equations to take into account for the simultaneity between outsourced R&D and
ﬁrms export performance given that the non-autocorrelation assumption is violated and the
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of the total exports and external R&D system of equations using a FIML model.
TOTAL EXPORTS [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. Tot.Exports Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) Tot.Exports
Employmentit−1 0.324*** 0.464*** 2.017*** 0.214*** 0.164*** 0.178*** 0.473*** 0.950***
(0.00577) (0.0101) (0.0963) (0.00423) (0.00377) (0.00313) (0.00884) (0.0889)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0611*** 0.0386 0.215 0.0244*** 0.0565*** 0.0427*** 0.0364* -0.0502
(0.0136) (0.0261) (0.258) (0.00749) (0.00903) (0.00740) (0.0206) (0.229)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.210*** 0.227*** 1.736*** 0.173*** 0.0637*** 0.121*** 0.277*** 1.180***
(0.0110) (0.0210) (0.178) (0.00701) (0.00725) (0.00623) (0.0170) (0.158)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.048*** 2.403*** 3.319*** 0.514*** 0.562*** 0.615*** 1.893*** 3.566***
(0.0658) (0.114) (1.049) (0.0390) (0.0354) (0.0392) (0.0943) (0.919)
ForeignGroupit 0.0509*** 0.0135 -0.0819 0.101*** 0.000899 -0.00978 0.0370 0.572**
(0.0173) (0.0310) (0.317) (0.00962) (0.0111) (0.00913) (0.0262) (0.284)
FrenchGroupit 0.0400** 0.118*** -0.134 -0.000482 0.0337*** 0.297*** 0.0675*** -0.617**
(0.0166) (0.0294) (0.295) (0.00908) (0.0104) (0.00923) (0.0254) (0.264)
Tot.Exportsit−1 0.0301*** -0.0454*** -0.0238*** 0.00479*** 0.00102 -0.0250***
(0.00136) (0.00243) (0.000714) (0.000979) (0.000645) (0.00221)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 5.198***
(0.602)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -9.766***
(1.122)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 2.564**
(1.058)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -2.524***
(0.559)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 -5.216***
(0.853)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 19.36***
(1.686)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 1.019*
(0.606)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 -5.983***
(0.642)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 0.624
(0.675)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -21.33***
(1.787)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 -0.116
(0.547)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 8.847***
(0.667)
var(E) 0.103*** 0.353*** 6.989** 0.0326*** 0.0407*** 0.0315*** 0.247*** 7.722***
(0.00337) (0.0108) (3.404) (0.00137) (0.00142) (0.00109) (0.00767) (3.685)
cov(EOff ∗ ETE) -1.981***
(0.0585)
cov(EDom ∗ ETE) 3.216***
(0.0977)
cov(EOff.IN ∗ ETE) 0.312***
(0.0241)
cov(EOff.OUT ∗ ETE) -1.427***
(0.0436)
cov(EDom.IN ∗ ETE) -0.0084
(0.0114)
cov(EDom.OUT ∗ ETE) 2.335***
(0.101)
Observations 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators ac-
cording to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a FIML model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped
standard errors with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. Row var() indicates the variance of the error term in each equation, while cov(.) indicate
the covariances of error terms between external R&D and total exports equations. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant
term is included but note reported. As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the 2-step Heckman
model of the following variables: Total exports measuring all intra-EU shipments over e100,000 and extra-EU over e1,000 as reported by the French
Custom Agency (CA); Outs. Dom. measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents based in
France; Oﬀshored measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN)
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group; Dom.(IN) measures the
expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group; Dom. (OUT)
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group;
Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the
same business group. The independent variables of interest are Int ∗ Offsh.R&D, Int ∗ Outs.Dom.R&D, Int ∗ Offsh.(IN), Int ∗ Offsh.(OUT ),
Int ∗ Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int ∗ Outs.Dom.(OUT ) which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D activities estimated
from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we include total employ-
ment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log
value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number of employees, foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of
a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are lagged one year except for foreign and French group dummies which
refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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covariances of error terms between equations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
This evidence highlights a complex and comprehensive picture of the relationship between
ﬁrms total exports and externalised R&D activities. First, ﬁrms export performance seems to
positively aﬀect only the extent of innovating activities oﬀshored abroad to extra-group ﬁrms,
while it has negative or no signiﬁcant impact on domestically outsourced R&D. Secondly,
the interaction between internal R&D and outsourced innovating activities has contrasting
eﬀect on the value of total exports. On the one hand, despite keeping part of their innovating
activities in-house, ﬁrms outsourcing R&D domestically reduce the value of their exports,
in particular if externalising to extra-group French ﬁrms. On the other hand, ﬁrms total
exports seem to be positively aﬀected by the complimentary eﬀect of internal and oﬀshored
R&D activities, in particular when externalising to extra-group foreign ﬁrms. This is the
ﬁrst evidence to suggest that internal innovating capabilities still matter, allowing ﬁrms to
absorb the positive spillovers of the externalised activities. In addition, by oﬀshoring to a
group foreign partner ﬁrms might reduce their total exports. This might be due to the ratio-
nalisation and relocation of R&D resources and production processes to a foreign subsidiary
part of the same group, thus serving the foreign market with a local branch rather than
exporting. On the contrary, by exploiting foreign knowledge not available in-house or within
the group, French ﬁrms might be able to improve their exports value proﬁting from positive
knowledge spillovers from more specialized R&D centres or with an improved knowledge of
the foreign market. On the contrary, R&D domestically outsourced in France to extra-group
agents seems to have a negative impact on total exports probably because these activities are
mainly driven by domestic and supply-driven factors and by the possibility of reducing the
distance from the technological frontier as previously shown in the Heckman selection model
in Table 3.3.
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We further develop our analysis by investigating the relationship between ﬁrms exter-
nalised R&D and the Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index in Table 3.5, in order to assess
the role played by outsourced innovating activities in shaping ﬁrms international market
access strategies. In panel A we estimate the system of equations using a FIML model
considering the ﬁrm-level FMP index and both R&D activities oﬀshored abroad and domes-
tically outsourced, while in the following 5 columns in panel B we break down oﬀshored and
domestically outsourced R&D diﬀerentiating between innovating activities outsourced within
or outside the group boundaries both domestically or abroad.6
From a brief analysis of the covariates in the diﬀerent equations, observe that the sta-
tistical signiﬁcance and magnitude are consistent with Table 3.4, since ﬁrm size, labour
productivity, salaries paid and internal R&D activities are all important determinants of the
predicted extent of outsourced innovation. However, it is interesting to look at the foreign
market potential equations in column 3 and 8. In fact, labour productivity and internal R&D
have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrm-level FMP index. As explained
in appendix A.3.1, ﬁrms scoring a relatively lower FMP index tend to export on average a
larger share of their total foreign sales to more distant markets, which are not the usual trade
partners of France, and are more diﬃcult to access. Thus, productivity and the resources
dedicated to internal R&D seem to help ﬁrms to access unusual, far-away and diﬃcult foreign
markets. However, foreign ownership does not aﬀect ﬁrms FMP index, while being part of a
French group has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in column 8, meaning that French groups
tend to export to the usual high-income trade partners of France such as countries part of the
EU single market and other OECD members. Interestingly, foreign market-access strategies
seem to be signiﬁcantly related with ﬁrms R&D outsourcing activities. As we can see from
column 2, higher values of FMP index are positively related with R&D activities domesti-
6The number of observations in the FMP index analysis is slightly lower than the total exports regression
because it has not been possible to calculate a ﬁrm-level FMP index for all the ﬁrms in our sample.
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Table 3.5: Estimation results of the FMP index and external R&D system of equations using a FIML model.
FMP INDEX [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. FMPIndex Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) FMPIndex
Employmentit−1 0.276*** 0.557*** -0.115 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.469*** -0.387***
(0.00593) (0.0101) (0.0917) (0.00457) (0.00388) (0.00343) (0.00931) (0.0899)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0565*** 0.0447* 0.0670 0.0240*** 0.0501*** 0.0432*** 0.0468** -0.0996
(0.0137) (0.0254) (0.175) (0.00798) (0.00869) (0.00788) (0.0221) (0.166)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.176*** 0.341*** -0.248* 0.175*** 0.0829*** 0.131*** 0.287*** -0.494***
(0.0120) (0.0195) (0.138) (0.00726) (0.00756) (0.00662) (0.0173) (0.133)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.020*** 2.499*** -4.110*** 0.491*** 0.562*** 0.618*** 1.912*** -2.724***
(0.0623) (0.121) (1.011) (0.0369) (0.0375) (0.0406) (0.0958) (0.785)
ForeignGroupit -0.0674*** 0.0281 -0.348 0.0938*** -0.00287 -0.0126 0.0297 -0.266
(0.0173) (0.0302) (0.217) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.00986) (0.0269) (0.216)
FrenchGroupit 0.0635*** 0.117*** 0.324 0.00981 0.0405*** 0.305*** 0.0878*** 0.374*
(0.0165) (0.0290) (0.200) (0.00969) (0.0107) (0.00998) (0.0259) (0.196)
FMPIndexit−1 -0.0223*** 0.0461*** 0.0120*** -0.00978*** 0.000467 0.0336***
(0.00228) (0.00425) (0.00128) (0.00144) (0.00112) (0.00371)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 -8.267***
(1.610)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 4.386***
(0.851)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 3.978***
(1.507)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -2.890***
(0.787)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 4.557***
(1.002)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 -13.59***
(1.716)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 -0.177
(0.831)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 3.812***
(0.815)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 -1.781**
(0.721)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 13.75***
(1.733)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 0.126
(0.721)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -5.474***
(0.735)
var(E) 0.0824*** 0.301*** 42.75*** 0.0300*** 0.0331*** 0.0304*** 0.226*** 54.32***
(0.00278) (0.00992) (4.299) (0.00129) (0.00114) (0.00113) (0.00742) (5.510)
cov(EOff ∗ EFMP ) 1.311***
(0.0746)
cov(EDom ∗ EFMP ) -2.276***
(0.129)
cov(EOff.IN ∗ EFMP ) -0.160***
(0.0224)
cov(EOff.OUT ∗ EFMP ) 1.000***
(0.0573)
cov(EDom.IN ∗ EFMP ) 0.0171
(0.0150)
cov(EDom.OUT ∗ EFMP ) -2.069***
(0.127)
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators ac-
cording to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a FIML model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped
standard errors with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. Row var() indicates the variance of the error term in each equation, while cov(.)
indicate the covariances of error terms between external R&D and FMP index equations. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constant term is included but note reported. As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the
2-step Heckman model of the following variables: Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index measured as explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the
Head and Mayer (2004) approach, averaging at the ﬁrm-level the FMP index of all the countries served by each exporter and weighting it by the
total value of ﬁrm's shipments towards each foreign market; Outs. Dom. measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by
other public or private agents based in France; Oﬀshored measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries
by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same
business group; Dom.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part
of the same business group; Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France
but not part of the same business group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based
in foreign countries and not part of the same business group. The independent variables of interest are Int ∗ Offsh.R&D, Int ∗ Outs.Dom.R&D,
Int ∗Offsh.(IN), Int ∗Offsh.(OUT ), Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT ) which are interaction terms between the expected value of
each external R&D activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional
control variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher,
labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number of employees, foreign and French group are two
dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are lagged one year except
for foreign and French group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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cally outsourced in France, mainly driven by innovations externalised at the arm's-length as
suggested in columns 6 and 7. On the contrary, in the ﬁrst equation we estimated a negative
and signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm-level FMP index and oﬀshored R&D, highlighting
that ﬁrms exporting to high-income and easily accessible markets are less engaged in the ex-
ternalisation of innovating activities abroad. Looking at columns 4 and 5, this result seems to
be mainly driven by oﬀshoring innovating activities to foreign extra-group companies, while
the FMP index is still positively related with the externalisation of R&D to other foreign
aﬃliates that are part of the same group.
This relationship is reﬂected in the analysis of the impact of internal and external R&D
complementarity on the FMP index of ﬁrms in columns 3 and 8. In fact, oﬀshored R&D
combined with internal innovating activities has a negative impact on the FMP index, stress-
ing that by externalising R&D activities abroad French ﬁrms are able to access more diﬃcult
and distant foreign markets. On the contrary, domestically outsourced innovating activities
have a complementary positive impact on the index, pushing ﬁrms to exports towards closer
and developed foreign markets. This trend is conﬁrmed by the disaggregated analysis. In
fact, only R&D activities oﬀshored to extra-group ﬁrms have a negative impact on the FMP
index, while both activities externalised to foreign aﬃliates and to other domestic ﬁrms tend
to increase the FMP index of French exporters.
Indeed, the interaction between internal innovating capabilities and R&D activities oﬀ-
shored outside the group boundaries could not only help French exporters to access new
and diﬃcult markets by internalising the external spillovers and acquiring direct knowledge
about the taste and needs of local customers. It could help exporters as well in tailoring the
products exported for markets characterized by a lower-income demand. For instance, by oﬀ-
shoring the most standardized R&D processes abroad, French exporters could cut down the
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marginal cost of innovative exported products, adapting them to the local needs and quality
standards. As previously stressed, this activity might reduce the overall value of exports, but
at the same time it could open the doors of more distant and diﬃcult markets characterized
by very large unexploited potential, such as the newly developing countries of Asia and Latin
America, and improving the overall export performance of French ﬁrms. On the contrary,
by internalising new and more advanced technologies and process of production not available
in house from other domestic agents, French ﬁrms could scale up their products in order to
target high-income countries with a demand for relatively higher quality, thus resulting in a
larger ﬁrm-level FMP index.
After the general analysis of the relationship between ﬁrms export performance and ex-
ternalised R&D using the complete sample of French innovators, we deepen our investigation
by distinguishing between domestic and foreign owned ﬁrms and between companies part
of low-tech or high-tech sectors, following the Eurostat sectoral classiﬁcation at the NACE
rev.1.1 3-digit level on the basis of their R&D intensity. We expect ﬁrms that are part of a
French or a foreign group and in low or high-tech sectors to follow diﬀerent internationalisa-
tion and outsourcing strategies, externalising R&D activities because of disparate demand or
supply-driven factors, thus with contrasting eﬀects of outsourced innovations on their export
performance. Table 3.6 presents the results of the system of equations including externalised
R&D and total exports estimated for domestic-owned ﬁrms in panels A and B, and foreign-
owned ﬁrms in panels C and D.
Looking at the interaction terms between internal and external innovating activities, it is
possible to notice immediately a diametrically opposite eﬀect of the R&D complementarity
on ﬁrms total exports. In fact, although oﬀshored R&D has a negative eﬀect while domes-
tically outsourced R&D positively aﬀects total exports of domestic ﬁrms in column 3, for
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foreign-owned companies the eﬀect is reversed, since only innovating activities externalised
abroad signiﬁcantly increase ﬁrms total exports in column 11. However, when distinguishing
between R&D activities outsourced within the group or at the arm's-length in panels B and
D, the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign-owned companies is not that sharp. For both
groups of ﬁrms, innovating activities oﬀshored to foreign aﬃliates have a negative impact
of total exports in columns 8 and 16, suggesting probably a supply-driven strategy aimed
at the re-organisation of the R&D activities within the group boundaries as previously dis-
cussed. Moreover, only activities oﬀshored abroad at the arm's-length signiﬁcantly improve
ﬁrms total exports, both for domestic and foreign-owned ﬁrms. Looking at the aggregate
eﬀect, probably the positive impact of innovations oﬀshored outside the group boundaries
is stronger and prevalent for foreign-owned ﬁrms rather than for domestic ﬁrms due to the
connections and knowledge provided by their foreign group. On the contrary, we ﬁnd a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant complementary eﬀect on total exports of R&D activities outsourced to
domestic ﬁrms part of the same group only for French-owned companies in column 8, while
activities outsourced to extra-group French ﬁrms maintain a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on total exports both for domestic and foreign-owned companies. This evidence suggests the
relevance of the participation to French groups in exploiting the positive spillovers originated
in French subsidiaries, improving the knowledge base of domestic-owned ﬁrms and conse-
quently their total exports.
However, we do not detect any variability when analysing the eﬀect of externalised R&D
activities on the foreign market potential index of domestic and foreign-owned ﬁrms in Table
3.7. Consistent with the estimation for the general sample in Table 3.5, note that R&D ac-
tivities oﬀshored abroad have a negative and signiﬁcant complementary eﬀect together with
internal resources on ﬁrms FMP index both for domestic and foreign-owned companies, in
particular for activities oﬀshored to foreign extra-group companies in columns 8 and 16. On
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 307
T
a
b
le
3
.7
:
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
re
su
lt
s
o
f
th
e
F
M
P
In
d
ex
a
n
d
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
sy
st
em
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
a
F
IM
L
m
o
d
el
-
D
o
m
es
ti
c
v
s
F
o
re
ig
n
G
ro
u
p
s.
F
M
P
IN
D
E
X
D
o
m
e
st
ic
F
o
r
e
ig
n
[A
]
[B
]
[C
]
[D
]
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
O
f
f
sh
o
r
ed
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.
F
M
P
I
n
d
ex
O
f
f
sh
.(
I
N
)
O
f
f
sh
.(
O
U
T
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
I
N
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
O
U
T
)
F
M
P
I
n
d
ex
O
f
f
sh
o
r
ed
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.
F
M
P
I
n
d
ex
O
f
f
sh
.(
I
N
)
O
f
f
sh
.(
O
U
T
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
I
N
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
O
U
T
)
F
M
P
I
n
d
ex
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t i
t−
1
0
.2
7
6
*
*
*
0
.5
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
5
0
.1
9
4
*
*
*
0
.1
7
2
*
*
*
0
.1
8
2
*
*
*
0
.4
6
5
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
1
*
*
*
0
.2
7
5
*
*
*
0
.5
7
0
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
3
*
0
.2
2
5
*
*
*
0
.1
6
7
*
*
*
0
.1
8
2
*
*
*
0
.4
7
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.1
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
2
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
A
v
.S
a
la
r
y
it
−
1
0
.0
6
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
6
5
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
2
3
0
.0
2
1
4
*
*
0
.0
5
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
4
8
7
*
*
*
0
.0
5
8
1
*
*
-0
.2
3
3
0
.0
5
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
1
4
0
0
.2
3
6
0
.0
3
9
1
*
*
*
0
.0
4
8
7
*
*
*
0
.0
3
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
6
0
.1
2
2
(0
.0
1
6
5
)
(0
.0
3
1
2
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
9
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.0
2
3
5
)
(0
.0
4
0
9
)
(0
.2
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
5
)
(0
.2
6
5
)
L
a
b.
P
r
o
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
it
−
1
0
.1
7
2
*
*
*
0
.3
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.2
1
6
0
.1
5
7
*
*
*
0
.0
8
1
1
*
*
*
0
.1
2
7
*
*
*
0
.2
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.5
4
2
*
*
*
0
.1
8
4
*
*
*
0
.3
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.2
9
7
0
.1
9
9
*
*
*
0
.0
8
7
8
*
*
*
0
.1
3
7
*
*
*
0
.2
9
3
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
7
*
*
(0
.0
1
6
6
)
(0
.0
2
5
9
)
(0
.1
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
3
1
)
(0
.1
8
1
)
(0
.0
1
6
3
)
(0
.0
2
9
2
)
(0
.1
8
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
1
)
(0
.0
2
5
8
)
(0
.1
8
7
)
I
n
te
r
n
a
lR
&
D
it
−
1
1
.0
0
5
*
*
*
2
.4
1
6
*
*
*
-3
.3
0
9
*
*
0
.4
1
5
*
*
*
0
.5
5
4
*
*
*
0
.6
5
5
*
*
*
1
.8
5
7
*
*
*
-1
.9
4
8
*
*
1
.0
2
8
*
*
*
2
.5
9
8
*
*
*
-4
.5
6
9
*
*
*
0
.5
9
8
*
*
*
0
.5
6
6
*
*
*
0
.5
4
6
*
*
*
1
.9
8
1
*
*
*
-2
.7
7
0
*
*
(0
.0
8
7
7
)
(0
.1
7
2
)
(1
.3
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
4
)
(0
.0
5
2
1
)
(0
.0
5
9
4
)
(0
.1
3
5
)
(0
.9
8
5
)
(0
.0
7
9
3
)
(0
.1
5
2
)
(1
.6
5
6
)
(0
.0
5
3
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
6
)
(0
.0
4
6
8
)
(0
.1
2
4
)
(1
.3
2
2
)
F
r
en
ch
G
r
o
u
p
it
0
.0
6
1
8
*
*
*
0
.1
1
0
*
*
*
0
.3
5
0
0
.0
2
3
0
*
*
0
.0
3
8
1
*
*
*
0
.3
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
8
4
0
*
*
*
0
.3
7
9
*
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
3
3
8
)
(0
.2
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
(0
.2
1
1
)
F
M
P
I
n
d
ex
it
−
1
-0
.0
2
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
3
9
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
9
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
4
2
0
0
.0
2
6
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
6
1
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
5
0
0
.0
4
8
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
9
)
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.R
&
D
it
−
1
-7
.8
2
6
*
*
*
-8
.2
5
4
*
*
*
(2
.3
8
2
)
(1
.5
4
3
)
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.R
&
D
it
−
1
4
.0
5
7
*
*
*
4
.4
0
7
*
*
*
(1
.2
4
3
)
(0
.8
9
6
)
O
f
f
sh
.R
&
D
it
−
1
2
.3
9
5
5
.2
2
3
*
*
*
(2
.2
2
0
)
(1
.3
7
9
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.R
&
D
it
−
1
-2
.0
5
9
*
-3
.4
0
2
*
*
*
(1
.1
3
8
)
(0
.8
0
7
)
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.(
I
N
) i
t−
1
6
.8
9
8
*
*
*
2
.9
9
8
*
*
(1
.6
8
8
)
(1
.3
0
6
)
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.(
O
U
T
) i
t−
1
-1
3
.3
7
*
*
*
-1
3
.5
9
*
*
*
(2
.3
3
1
)
(2
.5
1
6
)
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
I
N
) i
t−
1
0
.2
7
0
-1
.9
3
8
(1
.1
5
9
)
(1
.2
9
1
)
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
O
U
T
) i
t−
1
3
.0
5
7
*
*
*
4
.4
4
0
*
*
*
(1
.1
2
3
)
(1
.0
8
4
)
O
f
f
sh
.(
I
N
)R
&
D
it
−
1
-2
.6
5
5
*
*
-1
.9
9
7
*
(1
.3
2
6
)
(1
.0
2
7
)
O
f
f
sh
.(
O
U
T
)R
&
D
it
−
1
1
4
.1
4
*
*
*
1
3
.1
2
*
*
*
(2
.3
3
1
)
(2
.5
4
0
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
I
N
)R
&
D
it
−
1
-0
.4
5
7
1
.9
1
5
*
(1
.0
4
6
)
(1
.1
4
2
)
O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
O
U
T
)R
&
D
it
−
1
-5
.2
0
2
*
*
*
-5
.2
2
0
*
*
*
(1
.0
1
4
)
(1
.0
0
9
)
v
a
r
(E
)
0
.0
8
5
5
*
*
*
0
.3
1
3
*
*
*
5
1
.3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
2
7
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
3
*
*
*
0
.2
3
3
*
*
*
6
8
.8
6
*
*
*
0
.0
7
5
3
*
*
*
0
.2
7
5
*
*
*
2
9
.6
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
9
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
5
0
*
*
*
0
.2
0
8
*
*
*
3
7
.2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
1
3
3
)
(5
.7
9
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(7
.6
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
8
)
(0
.0
1
3
7
)
(5
.8
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(7
.4
0
1
)
co
v
(E
O
f
f
∗E
T
E
)
1
.4
6
8
*
*
*
1
.0
4
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
5
1
)
(0
.1
1
4
)
co
v
(E
D
o
m
∗E
T
E
)
-2
.5
3
1
*
*
*
-1
.8
2
5
*
*
*
(0
.1
6
5
)
(0
.1
9
7
)
co
v
(E
O
f
f
.I
N
∗E
T
E
)
-0
.2
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
9
2
*
*
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
8
1
)
co
v
(E
O
f
f
.O
U
T
∗E
T
E
)
1
.1
6
2
*
*
*
0
.7
6
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
5
2
)
(0
.0
8
1
7
)
co
v
(E
D
o
m
.I
N
∗E
T
E
)
0
.0
2
4
3
0
.0
2
7
8
(0
.0
2
1
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
2
)
co
v
(E
D
o
m
.O
U
T
∗E
T
E
)
-2
.2
7
7
*
*
*
-1
.7
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
6
0
)
(0
.2
1
3
)
O
bs
er
v
a
ti
o
n
s
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
3
,9
8
4
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
2
,6
2
6
N
o
te
:
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
b
a
se
d
o
n
R
&
D
su
rv
ey
a
n
d
F
re
n
ch
C
u
st
o
m
s
A
g
en
cy
d
a
ta
b
et
w
ee
n
y
ea
r
1
9
9
9
a
n
d
2
0
0
7
fo
r
a
ll
F
re
n
ch
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
in
n
ov
a
to
rs
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
to
th
e
N
A
C
E
re
v
.1
.1
in
d
u
st
ri
a
l
cl
a
ss
iﬁ
ca
ti
o
n
u
si
n
g
a
F
IM
L
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
y
ea
r
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
in
cl
u
d
ed
b
u
t
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
ed
.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
w
it
h
5
0
0
re
p
et
it
io
n
s
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
R
ow
v
a
r
(
)
in
d
ic
a
te
s
th
e
va
ri
a
n
ce
o
f
th
e
er
ro
r
te
rm
in
ea
ch
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
,
w
h
il
e
co
v
(.
)
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
co
va
ri
a
n
ce
s
o
f
er
ro
r
te
rm
s
b
et
w
ee
n
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
n
d
F
M
P
in
d
ex
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
:
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
te
rm
is
in
cl
u
d
ed
b
u
t
n
o
te
re
p
o
rt
ed
.
In
se
ct
io
n
D
o
m
es
ti
c
w
e
es
ti
m
a
te
th
e
eﬀ
ec
t
ju
st
fo
r
ﬁ
rm
s
w
h
ic
h
a
re
n
o
t
p
a
rt
o
f
a
fo
re
ig
n
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
.
In
se
ct
io
n
F
o
re
ig
n
in
st
ea
d
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
o
n
ly
ﬁ
rm
s
th
a
t
a
re
p
a
rt
o
f
a
fo
re
ig
n
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
.
A
s
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
in
th
e
sy
st
em
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
s
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
va
lu
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
2
-s
te
p
H
ec
k
m
a
n
m
o
d
el
o
f
th
e
fo
ll
ow
in
g
va
ri
a
b
le
s:
F
o
re
ig
n
M
a
rk
et
P
o
te
n
ti
a
l
(F
M
P
)
in
d
ex
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
ex
p
la
in
ed
in
th
e
a
p
p
en
d
ix
A
.3
.1
fo
ll
ow
in
g
th
e
H
ea
d
a
n
d
M
ay
er
(2
0
0
4
)
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
,
av
er
a
g
in
g
a
t
th
e
ﬁ
rm
-l
ev
el
th
e
F
M
P
in
d
ex
o
f
a
ll
th
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
se
rv
ed
b
y
ea
ch
ex
p
o
rt
er
a
n
d
w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
it
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
va
lu
e
o
f
ﬁ
rm
's
sh
ip
m
en
ts
to
w
a
rd
s
ea
ch
fo
re
ig
n
m
a
rk
et
;
O
u
ts
.
D
o
m
.
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
o
th
er
p
u
b
li
c
o
r
p
ri
va
te
a
g
en
ts
b
a
se
d
in
F
ra
n
ce
;
O
ﬀ
sh
o
re
d
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
in
fo
re
ig
n
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
b
y
p
ri
va
te
o
r
p
u
b
li
c
a
g
en
ts
;
O
ﬀ
.(
IN
)
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
fo
re
ig
n
a
ﬃ
li
a
te
s
p
a
rt
o
f
th
e
sa
m
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
;
D
o
m
.(
IN
)
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
d
o
m
es
ti
c
a
ﬃ
li
a
te
s
b
a
se
d
in
F
ra
n
ce
a
n
d
p
a
rt
o
f
th
e
sa
m
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
;
D
o
m
.
(O
U
T
)
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
p
ri
va
te
ﬁ
rm
s
b
a
se
d
in
F
ra
n
ce
b
u
t
n
o
t
p
a
rt
o
f
th
e
sa
m
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
;
O
ﬀ
.
(O
U
T
)
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
o
f
ﬁ
rm
s
in
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
b
y
p
ri
va
te
ﬁ
rm
s
b
a
se
d
in
fo
re
ig
n
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
n
o
t
p
a
rt
o
f
th
e
sa
m
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
.
T
h
e
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
o
f
in
te
re
st
a
re
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.R
&
D
,
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.R
&
D
,
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.(
I
N
),
I
n
t
∗O
f
f
sh
.(
O
U
T
),
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
I
N
)
a
n
d
I
n
t
∗O
u
ts
.D
o
m
.(
O
U
T
)
w
h
ic
h
a
re
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
te
rm
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
va
lu
e
o
f
ea
ch
ex
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
es
ti
m
a
te
d
fr
o
m
th
e
2
-s
te
p
H
ec
k
m
a
n
m
o
d
el
a
n
d
th
e
re
so
u
rc
es
d
ed
ic
a
te
d
to
in
te
rn
a
l
in
n
ov
a
ti
n
g
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
A
s
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
w
e
in
cl
u
d
e
to
ta
l
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
a
s
th
e
lo
g
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
o
f
em
p
lo
y
ee
s,
av
er
a
g
e
sa
la
ry
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
av
er
a
g
e
w
a
g
e
p
a
id
p
er
re
se
a
rc
h
er
,
la
b
o
u
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
lo
g
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
ﬁ
rm
s
to
ta
l
o
u
tp
u
t
a
n
d
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
em
p
lo
y
ee
s,
fo
re
ig
n
a
n
d
F
re
n
ch
g
ro
u
p
a
re
tw
o
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
s
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
ﬁ
rm
is
p
a
rt
o
f
a
fo
re
ig
n
o
r
F
re
n
ch
b
u
si
n
es
s
g
ro
u
p
a
n
d
0
o
th
er
w
is
e.
A
ll
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
la
g
g
ed
o
n
e
y
ea
r
ex
ce
p
t
fo
r
fo
re
ig
n
a
n
d
F
re
n
ch
g
ro
u
p
d
u
m
m
ie
s
w
h
ic
h
re
fe
r
to
ti
m
e
t
li
k
e
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 308
the contrary, R&D outsourced domestically, in particular to extra-group French companies,
positively aﬀect the FMP index of French exporters. This evidence is similar to the previous
results, and shows that there is no diﬀerence between domestic and foreign-owned companies
in the use of externalised R&D activities to access international markets. In particular, these
results stress once more the importance of R&D activities outsourced at the arm's-length
as tools of ﬁrms internationalisation strategies, exploiting oﬀshored R&D activities to access
more diﬃcult and distant markets, while using domestically outsourced innovations to export
to high-income and mature economies.
In the ﬁnal part of our analysis we examine the relationship between externalised R&D
and export performance for ﬁrms in low-tech and high-tech industries. Industries are divided
into low-tech (panels A and B) and high-tech (panels C and D) following the Eurostat sec-
toral classiﬁcation at the NACE rev.1.1 3-digit level on the basis of the R&D intensity of
economic activities measured as R&D expenditures in relation to value added.7 Tables 3.8
and 3.9 present the results of the system of equations estimating the relationships between ex-
ternalised R&D activities and the export performance of ﬁrms in high and low-tech industries.
The complementarity between internal and external R&D activities seems to have a com-
pletely diﬀerent impact on total exports and the FMP index for ﬁrms in high-tech and
low-tech industries. From Table 3.8 we observe that oﬀshored R&D activities tend to have a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on total exports only for ﬁrms in low-tech industries in column
7Eurostat classiﬁes industries at NACE rev.1.1 3-digit level in high-technology, medium-high, medium-
low and low-tech according to the R&D intensity of ﬁrms in each sector. We then aggregate high and
medium-high sectors as high-tech industries, while low and medium-low as low-tech sectors. According to
this aggregation, high-tech industries include: pharmaceutical products, computer and optical products, air
and spacecraft equipments, chemicals, weapons and ammunition, electrical equipment, machinery, motor
vehicles, medical instruments and other transport equipment excluding ships. Low-tech industries instead
include: media recording equipment, coke and reﬁned petroleum products, rubber and plastic products,
non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, metal products except machineries and weapons, ships, food
and beverage, tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather, wood, paper, furniture and other manufacturing
medical instruments.
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3, while it reduces foreign sales of high-tech sectors in column 11. On the contrary, domes-
tically outsourced activities seem to stimulate companies sales abroad for ﬁrms in high-tech
manufacturing sectors, with a negative impact instead in low-tech industries. This result is
explained by a more disaggregated analysis of R&D activities outsourced within or outside
the group boundaries. Regarding oﬀshored activities both in low and high-tech industries
we estimate a positive impact of arm's-length activities on total exports while a negative
eﬀect of R&D activities carried on by foreign aﬃliates in columns 8 and 16. On the contrary,
the positive complementary eﬀect of R&D activities domestically outsourced on exports in
high-tech industries seems to be mainly driven by a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of inno-
vating activities outsourced to French aﬃliates in column 16, while in low-tech industries
prevails the negative mpact of R&D outsourced to extra-group French ﬁrms in column 8.
Similarly, we estimate a comparable relationship between external R&D activities and ﬁrms
FMP index in low-tech and high-tech industries in Table 3.9. Again, the complementarity
between internal and oﬀshored R&D seems to help ﬁrms in low-tech industries to export
to more distant and diﬃcult foreign markets in panels A and B, especially in the case of
activities oﬀshored at the arm's-length, while domestically outsourced activities push these
ﬁrms towards more developed countries in column 8. On the contrary, in high-tech industries
in panels C and D, oﬀshored R&D activities improve the access to high-income and easily
accessible markets, while ﬁrms outsourcing domestically to French aﬃliates are more prone
to export towards distant and diﬃcult foreign markets in column 16. These results high-
light a dichotomy between R&D outsourcing strategies in high-tech and low-tech industries,
showing how oﬀshored and domestically outsourced innovating activities are used by ﬁrms
in order to achieve diﬀerent market-driven objectives depending on their innovating intensity.
We also undertook additional robustness checks. In the appendix we present several alter-
native estimation methods to show the consistency of our methodology and the robustness
CHAPTER 3. OUTSOURCED R&D AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 312
of our results. Tables A.3.2.1-A.3.2.6 present the results estimating the ﬁnal stage of our
model using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model, while Tables A.3.2.7-A.3.2.12 apply-
ing a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Finally, Tables A.3.2.13-A.3.2.15 in the appendix
report the results of the estimation of the systems of equations using a FIML model in the
framework of a survey data analysis. Even using diﬀerent econometric techniques to address
the interdependence between externalised R&D activities and ﬁrms export performance and
considering the weighting, clustering, and stratiﬁcation of the survey data, the results of our
main estimations using a FIML model are consistent with all the robustness checks in the
appendix, corroborating the consistency and unbiasedness of our estimators.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have investigated empirically the relationship between external R&D ac-
tivities and ﬁrms export performance for a representative sample of French innovators. To
the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst empirical study analysing not only the eﬀect of
ﬁrms internationalisation on the externalisation of innovation, but also the reverse impact of
outsourced R&D on ﬁrms export performance. Following the previous literature, we tested
several theoretical predictions about the diﬀerent and somehow contrasting eﬀects that out-
sourced R&D might have on trade performance, looking at the value of exports and at the
destinations served, conditional on ﬁrms strategy, the beneﬁts and costs of R&D interna-
tionalisation. First, we tested the complementary eﬀect of internal and external R&D on
export performance, expecting that larger internal R&D capabilities might amplify the ef-
fect of external innovating activities on ﬁrm export performance. Secondly, we would expect
that demand-driven external R&D activities might improve exporters performance and their
market-access to new foreign markets, through the introduction of new products and tailoring
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existing goods according to foreign markets needs. On the contrary, we would assume that
supply-driven R&D internationalisation would be mainly oriented towards the reduction of
the costs of innovation and the rationalization of R&D activities within groups. For these
reasons, supply-side external R&D activities might reduce the costs of innovations with pos-
sible mixed eﬀects on the overall value of exports and on ﬁrms market-access.
To test our hypothesis, we have considered several measures of ﬁrms external R&D activ-
ities, taking into account both tasks outsourced domestically or abroad, both within group
boundaries or at the arm's-length. First, we have adopted a 2-steps Heckman model to
take into consideration ﬁrms self-selection into R&D internationalization, analysing as well
the main determinants of external R&D activities for French ﬁrms, whether they have been
undertaken to achieve supply or demand-driven objectives. Secondly, using the predicted
value from the Heckman selection model, we have built a system of simultaneous equations
which tackles the two-way causality bias connecting externalised R&D activities and export
performance. In this way we have modelled the complementary eﬀect of internal and external
R&D activities on ﬁrms export performance, while acknowledging that exporters might have
a higher propensity towards R&D outsourcing, dedicating more resources both to internal
and externalised R&D activities, given their experience in the international markets, their
higher productivity and the connections they might have with external suppliers of manu-
factured and innovation inputs.
First, our results have demonstrated the two-way causality linking externalised innovation
and export performance, in particular when analysing R&D activities oﬀshored abroad. Sec-
ondly, we have shown that complementarity between internal and external R&D signiﬁcantly
aﬀects ﬁrms export performance, highlighting the key role played by internal capabilities in
internalising the positive spillovers deriving from external innovating activities outsourced
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in France or abroad. Moreover, we have found that market-driven activities, such as R&D
oﬀshored abroad to extra-group ﬁrms, are the major strategies improving ﬁrms export per-
formance, in particular helping exporters to access more diﬃcult and less attractive markets
and increasing the total value of exports. R&D activities outsourced domestically instead
seem to negatively aﬀect ﬁrms total exports in general, but helping French companies to
target high-income markets such as the nearby EU single market and other OECD members,
probably upgrading exports quality and the technological intensity. In addition, R&D ac-
tivities externalised at the arm's-length seem to be particularly beneﬁcial in terms of export
performance, suggesting a market-driven factor behind these strategies, while outsourcing
within the group appears to be mainly dictated by rationalisation and supply-driven pur-
poses, with an overall negative impact on exports. Moreover, as expected, foreign-owned
companies proﬁt the most from oﬀshored R&D, while domestic ﬁrms export performance is
mainly aﬀected by innovating activities outsourced to other French ﬁrms. Finally, we have
found a diametrically opposed eﬀect of outsourced R&D on the export performance of ﬁrms
in high-tech or low-tech industries. On the one hand, companies in low-tech industries are
able to improve their export performance thanks to R&D activities oﬀshored at the arm's-
length, in particular by exporting to more diﬃcult and distant markets. On the other hand,
high-tech ﬁrms by oﬀshoring R&D abroad tend to reduce their total exports, proﬁting the
most instead from innovating activities outsourced domestically to other French ﬁrms and
thus exporting to more diﬃcult markets.
Taken together these results show clearly the interdependence between internationalisa-
tion strategies and outsourced innovation, highlighting the signiﬁcant role played by external
R&D in improving French ﬁrms participation to global networks, demonstrating how these
strategies are mainly driven by market-demand factors, such as accessing new diﬃcult mar-
kets and customizing their exports for foreign markets needs. Previous theoretical contribu-
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tions have predicted how external R&D activities could aﬀect ﬁrms productivity and trade
performance in a number of diﬀerent ways, for instance optimizing ﬁrms resources, allowing
them to acquire speciﬁc knowledge or improving their ability to respond to global market
needs. Our empirical analysis has identiﬁed the main factors driving ﬁrms to externalize
their R&D, evaluating the overall interdependence between externalised innovative strategies
and export performance.
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Appendix A3
A.3.1 FMP Index Estimation
We analyse the internationalisation strategies followed by French ﬁrms in terms of market
access based on the estimation of the Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index. This index
represents an accurate measure of countries proximity to world markets, synthesizing the
evolution of countries economic geography in international trade (Mayer 2009). In fact, the
FMP index allows to estimate the attractiveness of countries as foreign markets for the rest
of trade partners.
The gravity trade literature highlights how proximity to large markets shapes interna-
tional trade patterns. Based on the "new economic geography" models, empirical studies
propose several estimation methods to measure countries' proximity to world markets, usu-
ally deﬁned as market potential. Redding and Venables (2004) propose an indicator of market
potential measured as the sum of expenditure of all countries in the world, weighted by bilat-
eral trade costs and other geographical determinants. Also Head and Mayer (2004) introduce
a related but alternative methodology, adjusting the market potential measurement to take
into account the impact of national borders on trade ﬂows and the real per capita income of
foreign markets.
To develop a ﬁrm-level measure of market access, we have calculated ﬁrst this index for
each country trading with France following the Head and Mayer (2004) and Disdier and Head
(2008) approaches, taking into consideration the sum per capita expenditure of all trade part-
ners of France, weighted by the bilateral trade costs and adjusting it to take into account the
impact of national borders on trade ﬂows between France and the rest of the world.
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The derivation of this model makes use of gravity equations which explain the pattern
of bilateral trade ﬂows between country pairs. Considering an exporting country i and an
importing country j, the total expenditure for foreign goods Xj should be allocated between
all the diﬀerent exporting countries, identifying in this way Πij as the proportion of income
allocated to each country i. In order to derive a gravity equation we need to express Πij in
the following multiplicatively separable form:
Πij =
Aiφij
Φj
(A.3.1.1)
where Ai represents the capabilities of exporter i, in our case France, 0 ≤ φij ≤ 1 rep-
resents the ease of access to market j for exporters in i, and Φj measures the degree of
international competition in that market. By imposing the standard micro-foundations re-
quirements, we could deﬁne sXj =
Xj
X
as country j share of world expenditure and then:
Φ∗i =
∑
j
φijs
X
j
Φj
(A.3.1.2)
which provides an expenditure-weighted average of relative market access to individual
foreign markets. We are able then to express bilateral trade between two countries as:
Xij = Aiφij
Xj
Φj
(A.3.1.3)
We estimate this equation using a bilateral trade dataset and specifying a vector of trade
costs composing φij and absorbing exporter capabilities Ai as a ﬁxed eﬀect for the exporting
country i and importer's speciﬁc characteristics as ﬁxed eﬀect for the importing country j
identifying in this way an index of foreign market potential given by:
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FMPij = φ̂ijexp(F̂Eij) (A.3.1.4)
To empirically estimate this foreign market potential index we run a ﬁxed eﬀect gravity
model which requires bilateral trade ﬂows between France and its trading partners over the
period of interest, obtained from the UN COMTRADE database, and a vector of trade im-
pediments and facilitators for each country pair obtained from the CEPII database. We take
into consideration geographical distances, common borders, language, past colonial history,
population, GDP per capita, and dummies for participation to common regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs), currency unions (CUs) and membership to the WTO:
Xij =β0 + β1Distijt + β2Colonyijt + β3GDPcapjt + β4∆GDPjt + β5Popjt + β6Contigijt
+ β7Langijt + β8WTOjt + β9RTAijt + β10Lexijt + β11CUijt + kij + kt
(A.3.1.5)
The results of the estimation presented in table A.3.1.1 are in line with the previous liter-
ature. For instance, the coeﬃcient for distance is very close to -1 and also the other control
variables such as common language, RTA and GATT membership have comparable eﬀects.
This gravity equation enables a computation of the foreign market potential index for
all trade partners of France over the 1999-2007 period as shown in ﬁgure A.3.1.1. From
a ﬁrst glance of the FMP index distribution across France trade partners some interesting
evidence emerge. First, it is quite clear the existence of a strong relationship between market
potential, distance and income per capita. Larger countries which are closer to France, with
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Table A.3.1.1: Estimation of the Foreign Market Potential index using a gravity model
Bilateral
Exports
Distanceijt -0.846***
(0.112)
Colonyijt 0.929***
(0.229)
GDP (capita)jt -0.147
(0.235)
∆GDPjt 1.119***
(0.240)
Populationjt -0.275
(0.299)
Contiguityijt -0.273
(0.289)
Languageijt 0.706***
(0.253)
WTOijt 0.0370
(0.0872)
RTAijt 0.0317
(0.0789)
Lexijt 0.400***
(0.148)
CurrencyUnionijt 0.0141
(0.0623)
Observations 1,590
No. of Pairs 184
Note: Estimation based on UN COMTRADE and the CEPII Gravity database for the period 1999-2007 using a ﬁxed
eﬀect gravity model following the Head and Mayer (2004) approach. The dependent variable is the log value of the
export ﬂows between France and its trading partners over the period of interest from the UN COMTRADE database.
As covariates we include from the CEPII Gravity database the following variables: Distanceijt a weighted measure of
distance between France and each trade partner estimated by (Mayer and Zignago 2011) and based on bilateral dis-
tances between the biggest cities of two countries weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population;
Colonyijt a dummy variable equal to 1 if France has ever been the colonizer of country j and 0 otherwise; ∆GDPjt
measuring the growth rate of real GDP and GDP (capita)jt dividing the real GDP by the Population of country j as
reported in the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI); Contiguityijt a dummy variable indicating whether the
two countries are contiguous; Languageijt a dummy variable equal to 1 if France and country j share the same common
language (French) and 0 otherwise; Lexijt a dummy variable equal to 1 if France and country j share the same legisla-
tive system and 0 otherwise; WTOijt, RTAijt and CurrencyUnionijt if France and country j are jointly part of the
WTO, regional trade agreements and currency unions as reported by the WTO website. Year dummies and constant
term included but not reported. Clustered standard errors at the country-pair level reported in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
very low trade barriers and a large potential internal market for French ﬁrms rank at the top
of the FMP index. This is the case in particular of large trade partner within the EU such
as Germany, Italy or the UK which are the top markets in terms of FMP for French ﬁrms
because of their advantageous location, their internal demand and the common membership
to the EU single market.
Income per capita is particularly relevant, as shown by the high score of far-away rich
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Figure A.3.1.1: Foreign Market Potential Index distribution across countries.
Note: Elaboration based on UN COMTRADE and the CEPII Gravity database for 2007. Foreign Market Potential (FMP)
index measured as explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the Head and Mayer (2004) approach, using a ﬁxed eﬀects gravity
model taking into account bilateral trade ﬂows between France and its trading partners, the sum per capita expenditure of all
countries, weighted by bilateral trade costs and adjusting it to take into account the impact of national borders and a vector of
trade impediments and facilitators for each country pair such as geographical distances, common borders, language, past colonial
history, population, GDP per capita, and dummies for participation to common regional trade agreements (RTAs), currency
unions (CUs) and membership to the WTO. FMP index distribution across countries classiﬁed in 15 quantiles according to
natural breaks and represented with darker or lighter intensities of green and red according to the higher or lower value of
the index. Red shaded countries scored a bilateral FMP index lower than the average, while green shaded countries scored a
bilateral FMP index above the average.
economies such as the USA, Canada and Japan and other OECD countries, all at the top of
the FMP distribution. China and India are another good example for developing countries.
Both have a quite high FMP index despite the long distance from France, the lack of colo-
nial ties and common culture, and the relatively lower income per capita. Nevertheless, the
market potential index of these two countries has continuously increased during the period
for French exporters mainly because of the very large internal population and the increas-
ing pace of economic growth experienced in the last decades. Interestingly, also the group
of North-African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia score a very high FMP index,
again thanks to the proximity of these markets to French exporters and to the cultural and
colonial ties between these countries and France. On the contrary, distant and less attractive
markets with high cultural and economic barriers which are more diﬃcult to access register
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as expected very low scores in the FMP index, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South-America
and some Central and East-Asian countries.
We then use the FMP index to build a ﬁrm-level weighted measure of market access for
each French exporter. To do so, we weight the FMP index for all countries served by each
French exporter by the total value of ﬁrm shipments towards each foreign market, averaging
per ﬁrm and year. Thus, the new ﬁrm-level FMP index represents the company exporting
strategy in the international markets. Firms with very high FMP index export mainly to-
wards close EU countries or other high-income markets which are usually the main trading
partners of France. On the contrary, ﬁrms with relatively lower FMP index tend to export
to distant and diﬃcult markets which are not the usual French exporting markets, mainly
characterized by cultural and trade barriers, such as extra-EU, African, South-American and
central Asian countries.
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A.3.2 Additional Test and Robustness
Table A.3.2.1: Estimation results of the total exports and external R&D system of equations using a 3SLS model.
TOTAL EXPORTS [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. Tot.Exports Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) Tot.Exports
Employmentit−1 0.291*** 0.521*** 1.578*** 0.213*** 0.185*** 0.178*** 0.442*** 1.744***
(0.00297) (0.00552) (0.111) (0.00221) (0.00191) (0.00180) (0.00481) (0.0576)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0639*** 0.0338** 0.534*** 0.0245*** 0.0547*** 0.0427*** 0.0390*** 0.899***
(0.00826) (0.0161) (0.174) (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00498) (0.0134) (0.0960)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.175*** 0.288*** 1.691*** 0.172*** 0.0862*** 0.121*** 0.243*** 1.344***
(0.00644) (0.0121) (0.131) (0.00484) (0.00438) (0.00436) (0.0115) (0.0950)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.021*** 2.450*** 2.377 0.513*** 0.580*** 0.616*** 1.868*** 0.847
(0.0317) (0.0648) (1.824) (0.0224) (0.0207) (0.0222) (0.0549) (0.742)
ForeignGroupit 0.0590*** 0.0275 -0.921*** 0.101*** 0.00610 -0.00969 0.0292* 1.359***
(0.00883) (0.0171) (0.204) (0.00576) (0.00597) (0.00595) (0.0157) (0.123)
FrenchGroupit 0.0472*** 0.105*** -0.242 -0.000320 0.0291*** 0.297*** 0.0744*** -1.269***
(0.0102) (0.0195) (0.189) (0.00627) (0.00646) (0.00674) (0.0170) (0.127)
Tot.Exportsit−1 0.00442*** 0.000934 -0.0232*** 0.0117*** -0.000327 0.000747*
(0.000919) (0.00170) (0.000494) (0.000481) (0.00121) (0.000444)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 2.802*
(1.637)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -3.981
(2.974)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 -1.553***
(0.292)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 7.384***
(1.601)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 -1.490***
(0.358)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 6.161**
(2.512)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 0.714
(1.023)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 2.123**
(0.969)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 -3.145***
(1.194)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -37.39***
(2.454)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 2.133**
(0.896)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 15.02***
(0.955)
Observations 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860
R2 0.783 0.775 0.214 0.811 0.787 0.834 0.770 0.750
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators according
to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a 3SLS model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard er-
rors with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but note reported.
As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the 2-step Heckman model of the following variables:
Total exports measuring all intra-EU shipments over e100,000 and extra-EU over e1,000 as reported by the French Custom Agency (CA); Outs. Dom.
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents based in France; Oﬀshored measures the ex-
penditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group; Dom.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D
activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group; Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of
ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same business group. The independent vari-
ables of interest are Int∗Offsh.R&D, Int∗Outs.Dom.R&D, Int∗Offsh.(IN), Int∗Offsh.(OUT ), Int∗Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )
which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources
dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average
salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number
of employees, foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All
independent variables are lagged one year except for foreign and French group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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Table A.3.2.2: Estimation results of the FMP index and external R&D system of equations using a 3SLS model.
FMP INDEX [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. FMPIndex Offsh.(IN) Offsh.(OUT ) Outs.Dom.(IN) Outs.Dom.(OUT ) FMPIndex
Employmentit−1 0.293*** 0.529*** -0.883*** 0.204*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.451*** -1.213***
(0.00297) (0.00555) (0.0940) (0.00215) (0.00180) (0.00174) (0.00465) (0.0808)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0635*** 0.0335* -0.275** 0.0243*** 0.0542*** 0.0434*** 0.0395** -0.501***
(0.00898) (0.0174) (0.121) (0.00568) (0.00604) (0.00570) (0.0159) (0.112)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.190*** 0.319*** -0.748*** 0.175*** 0.0913*** 0.132*** 0.272*** -0.993***
(0.00703) (0.0130) (0.0995) (0.00457) (0.00424) (0.00412) (0.0114) (0.109)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.035*** 2.474*** 1.235 0.491*** 0.571*** 0.619*** 1.896*** 1.561**
(0.0338) (0.0692) (0.870) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0513) (0.727)
ForeignGroupit -0.0625*** 0.0203 0.125 0.0939*** 0.0003 -0.0124** 0.0246 -0.583***
(0.0101) (0.0195) (0.140) (0.00609) (0.00619) (0.00626) (0.0163) (0.129)
FrenchGroupit 0.0592*** 0.124*** 0.199 0.00967 0.0379*** 0.305*** 0.0923*** 0.523***
(0.0104) (0.0200) (0.138) (0.00648) (0.00661) (0.00687) (0.0174) (0.142)
FMPIndexit−1 0.00427** 0.00348 0.0128*** 0.00609*** 0.00138 0.00579**
(0.00181) (0.00332) (0.00104) (0.00106) (0.000966) (0.00273)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 -0.449
(1.439)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -0.478
(0.745)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 4.090***
(1.423)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -1.192
(0.740)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 -1.121
(2.065)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 -2.776***
(0.910)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 0.867
(0.916)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 7.876***
(1.014)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 0.974
(0.828)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 14.55***
(2.139)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 -1.124
(0.775)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -5.012***
(0.887)
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
R2 0.788 0.779 0.125 0.820 0.794 0.838 0.776 0.213
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators according to the
NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a 3SLS model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 rep-
etitions reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but note reported. As dependent variables in
the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the 2-step Heckman model of the following variables: Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index
measured as explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the Head and Mayer (2004) approach, averaging at the ﬁrm-level the FMP index of all the countries served by
each exporter and weighting it by the total value of ﬁrm's shipments towards each foreign market; Outs. Dom. measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D
activities carried out by other public or private agents based in France; Oﬀshored measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign
countries by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business
group; Dom.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business
group; Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business
group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same
business group. The independent variables of interest are Int ∗ Offsh.R&D, Int ∗ Outs.Dom.R&D, Int ∗ Offsh.(IN), Int ∗ Offsh.(OUT ), Int ∗ Outs.Dom.(IN)
and Int ∗ Outs.Dom.(OUT ) which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and
the resources dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average
salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number of employees,
foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are
lagged one year except for foreign and French group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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Table A.3.2.7: Estimation results of the total exports and external R&D system of equations using a SUR model.
TOTAL EXPORTS [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. Tot.Exports Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) Tot.Exports
Employmentit−1 0.291*** 0.521*** 1.578*** 0.213*** 0.185*** 0.178*** 0.442*** 1.744***
(0.00297) (0.00552) (0.111) (0.00221) (0.00191) (0.00180) (0.00481) (0.0576)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0639*** 0.0338** 0.534*** 0.0245*** 0.0547*** 0.0427*** 0.0390*** 0.899***
(0.00826) (0.0161) (0.174) (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00498) (0.0134) (0.0960)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.175*** 0.288*** 1.691*** 0.172*** 0.0862*** 0.121*** 0.243*** 1.344***
(0.00644) (0.0121) (0.131) (0.00484) (0.00438) (0.00436) (0.0115) (0.0950)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.021*** 2.450*** 2.377 0.513*** 0.580*** 0.616*** 1.868*** 0.847
(0.0317) (0.0648) (1.824) (0.0224) (0.0207) (0.0222) (0.0549) (0.742)
ForeignGroupit -0.0590*** 0.0275 -0.921*** 0.101*** 0.00610 -0.00969 0.0292* 1.359***
(0.00883) (0.0171) (0.204) (0.00576) (0.00597) (0.00595) (0.0157) (0.123)
FrenchGroupit 0.0472*** 0.105*** -0.242 -0.000320 0.0291*** 0.297*** 0.0744*** -1.269***
(0.0102) (0.0195) (0.189) (0.00627) (0.00646) (0.00674) (0.0170) (0.127)
Tot.Exportsit−1 -0.00442*** 0.000934 -0.0232*** -0.0117*** 0.000747* -0.000327
(0.000919) (0.00170) (0.000494) (0.000481) (0.000444) (0.00121)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 3.981
(2.974)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -2.802*
(1.637)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 -15.53***
(2.921)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 7.384***
(1.601)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 -14.90***
(1.358)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 6.161**
(2.512)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 0.714
(1.023)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 -2.123**
(0.969)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 -3.145***
(1.194)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -37.39***
(2.454)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 2.133**
(0.896)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 15.02***
(0.955)
Observations 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860 7,860
R2 0.783 0.775 0.214 0.811 0.787 0.834 0.770 0.750
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators according
to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a SUR model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard er-
rors with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but note reported.
As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the 2-step Heckman model of the following variables:
Total exports measuring all intra-EU shipments over e100,000 and extra-EU over e1,000 as reported by the French Custom Agency (CA); Outs. Dom.
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents based in France; Oﬀshored measures the ex-
penditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group; Dom.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D
activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group; Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of
ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same business group. The independent vari-
ables of interest are Int∗Offsh.R&D, Int∗Outs.Dom.R&D, Int∗Offsh.(IN), Int∗Offsh.(OUT ), Int∗Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )
which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources
dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average
salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number
of employees, foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All
independent variables are lagged one year except for foreign and French group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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Table A.3.2.8: Estimation results of the FMP index and external R&D system of equations using a SUR model.
FMP Index [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. FMPIndex Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) FMPIndex
Employmentit−1 0.293*** 0.529*** -0.883*** 0.204*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.451*** -1.213***
(0.00297) (0.00555) (0.0940) (0.00215) (0.00180) (0.00174) (0.00465) (0.0808)
Av.Salaryit−1 0.0635*** 0.0335* -0.275** 0.0243*** 0.0542*** 0.0434*** 0.0395** -0.501***
(0.00898) (0.0174) (0.121) (0.00568) (0.00604) (0.00570) (0.0159) (0.112)
Lab.Productivityit−1 0.190*** 0.319*** -0.748*** 0.175*** 0.0913*** 0.132*** 0.272*** -0.993***
(0.00703) (0.0130) (0.0995) (0.00457) (0.00424) (0.00412) (0.0114) (0.109)
InternalR&Dit−1 1.035*** 2.474*** 1.235 0.491*** 0.571*** 0.619*** 1.896*** 1.561**
(0.0338) (0.0692) (0.870) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0513) (0.727)
ForeignGroupit -0.0625*** 0.0203 0.125 0.0939*** 3.04e-05 -0.0124** 0.0246 -0.583***
(0.0101) (0.0195) (0.140) (0.00609) (0.00619) (0.00626) (0.0163) (0.129)
FrenchGroupit 0.0592*** 0.124*** 0.199 0.00967 0.0379*** 0.305*** 0.0923*** 0.523***
(0.0104) (0.0200) (0.138) (0.00648) (0.00661) (0.00687) (0.0174) (0.142)
FMPIndexit−1 0.00427** 0.00348 0.0128*** 0.00609*** 0.00138 0.00579**
(0.00181) (0.00332) (0.00104) (0.00106) (0.000966) (0.00273)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 -0.449
(1.439)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -0.478
(0.745)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 4.090***
(1.423)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -1.192
(0.740)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 7.876***
(1.014)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 -2.776***
(0.910)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 0.867
(0.916)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 -1.121
(2.065)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 0.974
(0.828)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 14.55***
(2.139)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 -1.124
(0.775)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -5.012***
(0.887)
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
R2 0.788 0.779 0.125 0.820 0.794 0.838 0.776 0.213
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey and French Customs Agency data between year 1999 and 2007 for all French manufacturing innovators
according to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial classiﬁcation using a SUR model with year and industry dummies included but not reported. Bootstrapped
standard errors with 500 repetitions reported in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but
note reported. As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected value estimated from the 2-step Heckman model of the
following variables: Foreign Market Potential (FMP) index measured as explained in the appendix A.3.1 following the Head and Mayer (2004) ap-
proach, averaging at the ﬁrm-level the FMP index of all the countries served by each exporter and weighting it by the total value of ﬁrm's shipments
towards each foreign market; Outs. Dom. measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents
based in France; Oﬀshored measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents;
Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group; Dom.(IN)
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group;
Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same
business group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries
and not part of the same business group. The independent variables of interest are Int ∗ Offsh.R&D, Int ∗ Outs.Dom.R&D, Int ∗ Offsh.(IN),
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT ), Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT ) which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D
activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we
include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees, average salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity
calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output and number of employees, foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal
to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are lagged one year except for foreign and French
group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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Table A.3.2.13: Estimation results of the total exports and external R&D system of equations using a FIML model in a survey
data framework.
TOTAL EXPORTS [A] [B]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Offshored Outs.Dom. Tot.Exports Off.(IN) Off.(OUT ) Dom.(IN) Dom.(OUT ) Tot.Exports
Employmentit−1 1.316*** 1.306*** 2.185*** 1.807*** 1.694*** 1.044*** 0.955*** 1.236***
(0.0255) (0.0308) (0.0922) (0.0399) (0.0349) (0.0247) (0.0177) (0.0739)
Av.Salaryit−1 -15.30*** -4.411** 0.331 -21.26*** -16.30*** -22.13*** -6.269*** -2.230
(1.964) (1.989) (3.610) (2.588) (3.293) (1.371) (1.864) (3.463)
Lab.Productivityit−1 1.994*** 1.208*** 1.592*** 3.048*** 2.366*** 1.570*** 0.734*** 1.557***
(0.0553) (0.0667) (0.190) (0.0982) (0.0892) (0.0551) (0.0385) (0.166)
InternalR&Dit−1 -4.657*** 0.971*** 3.465*** -10.20*** -6.829*** -7.780*** -0.923*** 2.017*
(0.215) (0.230) (1.203) (0.378) (0.321) (0.249) (0.146) (1.107)
ForeignGroupit 0.540*** 0.0254 -0.0936 2.937*** 0.488*** -0.712*** -0.0883 -1.125***
(0.0771) (0.0815) (0.213) (0.127) (0.110) (0.0778) (0.0564) (0.226)
FrenchGroupit 0.484*** 0.724*** 0.787*** 0.909*** 0.523*** 4.414*** 0.397*** 0.232
(0.0861) (0.0895) (0.228) (0.143) (0.121) (0.0837) (0.0634) (0.222)
Tot.Exportsit−1 0.106*** -0.319*** 0.274*** -0.300*** 0.00143 0.0132***
(0.00971) (0.0163) (0.0111) (0.0142) (0.00528) (0.00474)
Int ∗Offsh.R&Dit−1 0.282**
(0.123)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -0.466**
(0.191)
Offsh.R&Dit−1 0.249*
(0.140)
Outs.Dom.R&Dit−1 -1.317***
(0.208)
Int ∗Offsh.(IN)it−1 -0.857***
(0.0803)
Int ∗Offsh.(OUT )it−1 1.126***
(0.168)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(IN)it−1 0.0690*
(0.0370)
Int ∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )it−1 -0.0620
(0.151)
Offsh.(IN)R&Dit−1 -0.0742
(0.0690)
Offsh.(OUT )R&Dit−1 -0.287**
(0.143)
Outs.Dom.(IN)R&Dit−1 -0.0869***
(0.0313)
Outs.Dom.(OUT )R&Dit−1 0.291**
(0.129)
var(E) -20.88*** -8.975*** -4.331** -34.48*** -20.07*** -16.58*** -9.085*** -5.065***
(0.397) (0.439) (1.722) (0.705) (0.633) (0.435) (0.282) (1.387)
cov(EOff ∗ ETE) -3.559***
(0.314)
cov(EDom ∗ ETE) 13.34***
(0.565)
cov(EOff.IN ∗ ETE) 13.66***
(0.534)
cov(EOff.OUT ∗ ETE) -18.07***
(0.405)
cov(EDom.IN ∗ ETE) -0.0666
(0.0923)
cov(EDom.OUT ∗ ETE) 0.862***
(0.144)
Observations 5,725 5,725 5,725 5,700 5,700 5,700 5,700 5,700
Note: Estimation based on R&D survey data between year 1999 and 2007 for French manufacturing innovators according to the NACE rev.1.1 industrial
classiﬁcation applying a FIML model with year and industry dummies (included but not reported) in a survey data framework considering the sampling
weights, clustering and stratiﬁcation of the survey design using the STATA command "SVY". Row var(E) indicates the variance of the error term in
each equation, while cov(.) indicate the covariances of error terms between external R&D and total exports equations. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but note reported. As dependent variables in the system of equations we include the expected
value estimated from the 2-step Heckman model of the following variables: Total exports measured as the log value of ﬁrms foreign sales; Outs. Dom.
measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by other public or private agents based in France; Oﬀshored measures the ex-
penditure of ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out in foreign countries by private or public agents; Oﬀ.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by foreign aﬃliates part of the same business group; Dom.(IN) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in external R&D
activities carried out by domestic aﬃliates based in France and part of the same business group; Dom. (OUT) measures the expenditure of ﬁrms in
external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in France but not part of the same business group; Oﬀ. (OUT) measures the expenditure of
ﬁrms in external R&D activities carried out by private ﬁrms based in foreign countries and not part of the same business group. The independent vari-
ables of interest are Int∗Offsh.R&D, Int∗Outs.Dom.R&D, Int∗Offsh.(IN), Int∗Offsh.(OUT ), Int∗Outs.Dom.(IN) and Int∗Outs.Dom.(OUT )
which are interaction terms between the expected value of each external R&D activities estimated from the 2-step Heckman model and the resources
dedicated to internal innovating activities. As additional control variables we include total employment as the log of the numbers of employees,
average salary is the log of average wage paid per researcher, labour productivity calculated as the log value of the ratio between ﬁrms total output
and number of employees, foreign and French group are two dummy variables equal to 1 if ﬁrm is part of a foreign or French business group and 0
otherwise. All independent variables are lagged one year except for foreign and French group dummies which refer to time t like the dependent variables.
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Conclusions, Limitations and Future
Research
Over the previous few decades, both developed and developing countries have experienced
increasing ﬂows of international trade and capital and, to a smaller extent, population mi-
gration and cultural interconnections. In particular, the development of new IT and the
reduction of distance and cultural barriers have not only fostered the international fragmen-
tation of production, but have contributed to the expansion of complex networks of goods,
services and knowledge transactions.
Increased globalization has stimulated unprecedented economic growth across the globe
by creating jobs, reducing prices and decreasing the income gap between developed and de-
veloping countries. However, the same phenomenon, and especially international trade, has
also brought economic, political, and social disruption in diﬀerent regions. Globalization
has triggered an ongoing shift in balance in the world economy, changing the distribution of
exports and FDI across countries, with a relative decline of developed countries and the rise
of developing economies. At a time of economic diﬃculties in most developed countries, with
high level of unemployment and ﬁscal austerity, complaints of unfair international competi-
tion and claims for rising trade protectionism and reversing the globalization patterns have
started to emerge.
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However, the response to deeper globalization should not be a move back to economic
protectionism. On the contrary, in order to maximize the beneﬁts related with globalization,
ﬁrms should be pro-actively engaged in internationalization and innovation strategies, open-
ing new foreign markets thanks to the introduction of new innovative products and processes,
replacing and destroying the old products and industrial productive processes. Hence, in this
thesis we have tested this predictions looking at the particular case of European countries,
which are particularly suitable given the lively debate about the consequences of globalisa-
tion and free-trade and their role in the ampliﬁcation of the economic recession, the loss of
jobs and the erosion of salaries and the welfare state. Continuous investment in technologies
and knowledge, and not trade protectionism, will help mature economies to fully specialise
in high-tech and high-end industries, positively internalizing the externalities linked to glob-
alization and the global value chains of production and R&D, with a continuous creation of
new "revolutionary" internationally competitive advantage.
In this thesis we analysed ﬁrst the eﬀectiveness of protectionism in developed coun-
tries, particularly looking at EU anti-dumping measures on Chinese products, investigating
whether they constitute a curse or a blessing for European ﬁrms. Using product, sector
and ﬁrm-level data from the EU and France we provided a comprehensive analysis of this
trade-defence instrument, considering the impact on EU trade ﬂows, on protected European
industries and on the performance of French import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms.
Taken together, our results suggest that EU anti-dumping measures successfully target
Chinese dumped products, leading to an increase in the level of prices and decreasing import
volumes from China which are in turn substituted by a larger domestic production and by im-
ported goods from other extra-EU countries. European producers seem to be more protected
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from the unfair dumping competition, experiencing a higher employment growth and larger
domestic production. At the same time, larger European importers are negatively aﬀected
by AD measures, forced to divert their imports to other extra-EU countries at higher prices,
and losing productivity with a consequent negative impact on total employment, export per-
formance and survival rate. The aggregate impact of EU anti-dumping measures against
Chinese products on European import-dependent and import-competing ﬁrms is mixed, def-
initely bringing a temporary beneﬁt for domestic producers, but with a negative eﬀect on
importers and the overall productivity of European ﬁrms. This highlights the large degree
of politicization in the management of this trade defence instrument.
Secondly, we investigated the impact of innovating activities on ﬁrms export performance
to evaluate the role played by R&D and knowledge-based strategies in improving the inter-
national competitiveness of ﬁrms from mature economies. First, we have established at the
ﬁrm level whether innovation activities improve exporter performance creating new trade
links, enriching the ﬁrms product mix and opening new export markets, or if they support
the intensiﬁcation of existing ﬂows. In addition, we assessed the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of
innovation on export performance, by simultaneously taking into account both innovation
input and output measures.
We found a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of R&D activities on exports. Innovation
increases the probability of ﬁrms to participate in international markets, helping them to
face the pressure of foreign competitors and experiencing a steady growth of total exports.
R&D activities positively aﬀect ﬁrms international trade performance, mainly exporting new
products to new foreign markets and marginally improving the average value of exports.
Dissecting the impact on the trade margins we found that the growth in total exports re-
lated to R&D activity seems to be mainly driven by a growth in the number of products
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exported and of foreign markets served. Innovation plays an essential role in improving the
export performance of medium-sized and domestic-owned ﬁrms, in particular increasing the
likelihood of their participation in international markets and by increasing the number of
products exported and of foreign markets served in respect to non-innovators.
Overall, we have shown that innovation plays a key role in developed and mature economies,
preparing ﬁrms to face international competition, upgrading their knowledge of foreign mar-
kets and introducing tailor-made goods designed to penetrate distant and diﬃcult countries.
However, we also found some evidence that innovation is a dynamic, time-consuming and
resources-intensive process, with a "creative destruction" eﬀect of new innovations on ﬁrm
performance, leading to an initial insigniﬁcant or even negative impact of R&D on exports
due to the costs of adaptation, production shift and the time needed in order to commercially
exploit new technologies especially in foreign markets. Nevertheless, although a negative or
zero impact in the short-run, returns to R&D investment seem to pay back in the long-run
with a twofold impact on economic growth, both as a mean of developing new technologies
but also boosting export performance with potential welfare gains in terms of production
and employment.
Finally, we investigated the relationship between external R&D activities and ﬁrms export
performance, to analyse the increasing degree of R&D specialisation of mature economies and
the impact on their comparative advantages in the global markets. We tested several the-
oretical predictions about the diﬀerent and contrasting eﬀects that outsourced R&D might
have on trade performance, looking at the value of exports and at the destinations served,
conditional on ﬁrms strategy, the beneﬁts and costs of R&D internationalisation.
Our results demonstrated the two-way causality linking externalised innovation and ex-
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port performance, in particular when analysing R&D activities oﬀshored abroad. We have
shown that complementarity between internal and external R&D signiﬁcantly aﬀects ﬁrms
export performance, highlighting the key role played by internal capabilities in internalis-
ing the positive spillovers deriving from external innovating activities outsourced in France
or abroad. Moreover, we have found that market-driven activities, such as R&D oﬀshored
abroad to extra-group ﬁrms, are the major strategies that improve ﬁrms export performance,
in particular helping exporters to access more diﬃcult and less attractive markets and in-
creasing the total value of exports. R&D activities outsourced domestically instead seem to
negatively aﬀect ﬁrms total exports in general, but helping French companies to target high-
income markets such as the nearby EU single market and other OECD members, probably
upgrading exports quality and the technological intensity.
In addition, R&D activities externalised at the arm's-length seem to be particularly beneﬁ-
cial in terms of export performance, suggesting a market-driven factor behind these strategies,
while outsourcing within the group boundaries appears to be mainly dictated by rationali-
sation and supply-driven purposes, with an overall negative impact on exports. Moreover,
as expected, foreign-owned companies proﬁt the most from oﬀshored R&D, while domes-
tic ﬁrms export performance is mainly aﬀected by innovating activities outsourced to other
French intra and extra-group ﬁrms. Finally, we have found a diametrically opposed eﬀect of
outsourced R&D on the export performance of ﬁrms in high-tech or low-tech industries. On
the one hand, companies in low-tech industries are able to improve their export performance
thanks to R&D activities oﬀshored at the arm's-length, in particular by exporting to more
diﬃcult and distant markets. On the other hand, high-tech ﬁrms by oﬀshoring R&D abroad
tend to reduce their total exports, proﬁting the most instead from innovating activities out-
sourced domestically to other French ﬁrms and thus exporting to more diﬃcult markets.
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Our results show clearly the interdependence between internationalisation strategies and
outsourced innovation, highlighting the signiﬁcant role played by external R&D in improving
ﬁrms participation in global networks, demonstrating how these strategies are mainly driven
by market-demand factors, such as accessing new diﬃcult markets and customizing their ex-
ports for foreign markets needs. Our empirical analysis has identiﬁed the main factors driving
ﬁrms to externalize their R&D, evaluating the overall interdependence between externalised
innovative strategies and export performance and their eﬀect on the creation of competitive
advantage by optimizing ﬁrms resources, acquiring speciﬁc knowledge and improving the
ability of ﬁrms to respond to global market needs.
From this economic analysis of the changing patterns of international trade and the im-
pact on ﬁrms behaviour we have derived key policy implication on the possible ways to foster
the economic growth of mature European countries. European ﬁrms should be positively
engaged in innovating activities and international markets in order to face and challenge the
competitive pressure of developing countries, increasing the investment in human capital and
knowledge to boost productivity growth and the creation of new jobs. Only continuously
investing in R&D activities and expanding international operations European ﬁrms will be
able to follow a creatively destructive process, replacing the obsolete products and productive
processes and being completely open and integrated in the global value chains of knowledge
and production to fully exploit the beneﬁts deriving from globalization.
LIMITATIONS Although the main results presented in this thesis are in line with the
theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence has been corroborated by a large number
of robustness checks, our analysis could still suﬀer from a number of potential ﬂaws.
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One of the main concerns in the estimation methodology throughout the three chapters
is the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality which could potentially aﬀect our results. In
particular, in chapter 1 we have discussed the two diﬀerent sources of bias arising from the
selection bias in which the observations aﬀected by anti-dumping duties are endogenously
diﬀerent from those which have not been involved in these procedures, the endogenous polit-
ical decision of imposing the measures and the lack of a natural counterfactual for a robust
analysis.
In the second and third chapters the main endogeneity concern regards the simultaneity
between innovation and internationalization strategies, causing a two-way causality between
R&D activities and export performance. As stressed in the previous literature, ﬁrms invest-
ing in R&D activities might improve their export performance by introducing new innovative
products and decreasing the cost of production and of exporting thanks to their increased
stock of knowledge. At the same time, exporters are more likely to undertake R&D activ-
ities given their experience in the international markets, their higher productivity and the
connections they might have with external suppliers of innovation inputs. As a result, R&D
activities and internationalization strategies are endogenously correlated, resulting in biased
estimates of the eﬀect of R&D activities on export performance.
Throughout the thesis we have employed advanced econometric techniques to tackle the
diﬀerent endogeneity issues and we demonstrated the robustness of our results using a range
of alternative methods. Nevertheless, our analysis might still be aﬀected by diﬀerent sources
of bias diﬃcult to overcome given the current econometric methods available to us.
Another potential ﬂaw regards the data used to perform the empirical analysis. In partic-
ular, ﬁve diﬀerent data issues might create possible concerns of sample bias. First, in chapter
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1 the European Commission reports on anti-dumping cases do not provide all the informa-
tion required for all cases concerning China, due to sensitivity/privacy issues and because of
possible retaliation from China. As previously stressed, not all the case reports are publicly
available, and not always all the information is disclosed, such as the voting pattern of Mem-
ber States in the EU Council or data regarding the petitioners of AD measures. Second, in
order to carry out a micro analysis at the ﬁrm-level on importers and producers of aﬀected
products we had to restrict our investigation to French ﬁrms for which trade and balance
sheet data were available. Given that the anti-dumping policy is decided in Europe at the
EU level, an analysis including import-competing and import-dependent ﬁrms from all EU
countries would be preferable, but the lack of comprehensive, harmonized and coherent data
on EU ﬁrms is still a major problem hampering micro-level analysis at the EU level.
Another issue related with the French ﬁrm-level data regards the composition of these
datasets. First, the Custom Agency trade data include only exports and imports of manu-
facturing products, thus restricting the analysis to trade in goods neglecting the increasingly
relevant trade in services, and intra-EU shipments are accounted only if their value exceeds
the e250,000 threshold. Second, although the balance sheet dataset is particularly rich, in-
cluding exhaustive information about ﬁrms in the agricultural, manufacturing and service
sectors, it includes only ﬁrms with more than 20 employees, disregarding micro enterprises
which constitute an important part of the business demography in France. Moreover, the rich
R&D data used in chapters 2 and 3 is unfortunately available only for a relatively small group
of French innovating ﬁrms, oﬀering complete coverage of large investors in R&D but only
a partial representation of ﬁrms investing less than e350,000 which are randomly surveyed
every year. Finally, another weakness of the data regards the time period. Despite providing
a very large unbalanced panel data for almost 10 years, the sample period of the dataset is
relatively outdated, from 1999 to 2007, limiting our analysis to a 10 years old pre-crisis period.
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FUTURE RESEARCH The results of this thesis in many respects represent a starting
point for a research agenda which can be extended in a number of ways.
First, departing from the analysis of the EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese prod-
ucts, it would be interesting to look at the politicization of the EU anti-dumping mechanism,
analysing speciﬁcally the role played by lobby groups and national interests in the determi-
nation of the trade defence of the EU. Because of its characteristics, the EU anti-dumping
procedure is particularly prone to political and discretionary decisions motivated by pro-
tectionist pressures rather than technical aspects, especially when considering anti-dumping
duties on products imported from emerging countries which increase competitive pressure on
domestic industries. For these reasons, it would be extremely interesting to analyse the data
on the voting pattern of EU Member States in the EU Council on anti-dumping issues, in
order to analyse countries' political strategies and their impact on the industrial performance,
taking into account the partisanship of national governments and the industrial lobbies pe-
titioning for or opposing the imposition of anti-dumping measures.
Secondly, the estimation of the eﬀect of R&D activities on ﬁrms export performance
would not be complete without a comprehensive analysis of the impact of innovation on the
quality of exported products. In chapter 2 we have partially addressed this issue, looking
at the eﬀect on ﬁrms intensive margin of trade. However, a more in-depth analysis might
be needed given the importance of quality for the export performance of ﬁrms in mature
economies, and the complexity of the measurement of products quality, considering prices,
added-value, skills, human capital, technology intensity and creativity embedded.
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In addition, it might be worth investigating the relationship between R&D activities and
other aspects of ﬁrms internationalization, such as imports and foreign direct investment.
The relationship between ﬁrms innovation and imports has been partially analysed by the
previous empirical literature, especially looking at the eﬀect of outsourced intermediate in-
puts on ﬁrms innovativeness. The link between R&D and FDI instead has been mostly
neglected especially at the ﬁrms level, probably because of the lack of extensive data on ﬁrms
direct investment abroad. Such analysis might be particularly relevant in order to complete
our investigation of the relationship between internationalization, R&D activities and out-
sourced innovation. Moreover, this gap in the literature, together with the results of our
analysis in chapter 3, highlights the need of a micro-level theoretical model describing the
internationalization and innovation strategies of ﬁrms, in particular with regards to the main
drivers of outsourced R&D activities and the impact of external sources of knowledge on the
performance of ﬁrms in the international markets.
Finally, our analysis in chapters 2 and 3 has shown the relevance of publicly funded R&D
for improving ﬁrms innovativeness and export performance. France devotes signiﬁcant public
resources to research and development activities, ranking at the second place in the EU as
total investment in R&D. France provides an open business environment for the develop-
ment of R&D networks, thanks to its key technology industries, the top quality of public
education and research laboratories and the compelling compliance of government policies
towards R&D and innovation, eﬀectively sustained by the most generous R&D tax treatment
for companies in Europe. Given the relevance of R&D public funds and schemes in France, it
would be particularly interesting to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of public support in improving
the innovativeness of private ﬁrms, looking at the output of R&D activities supported by
public authorities and the overall eﬀect on ﬁrms productivity and international performance,
in order to shed a light on the "entrepreneurial" role played by states in the development of
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 347
new technologies and economic growth (Mazzucato 2013).
Appendix
AT.1 Total Factor Productivity Estimation
To measure ﬁrm-level productivity in chapters 1 and 2 we have estimated ﬁrms total factor
productivity (TFP) following the De Loecker (2007) approach which is an extension of the
standard Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology taking into consideration the heterogeneity in
terms of productivity between exporters and domestic ﬁrms. In this way, we allow the mar-
ket structure to be diﬀerent for exporting ﬁrms by introducing exports into the production
function, treating the decision to export as endogenous.
In fact, following the standard microeconomic literature and the Olley and Pakes (1996)
model, ﬁrms are considered to be risk-neutral and will maximize their expected value of prof-
its in function of capital and labour inputs according to the following production function:
yit = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3ωit + νit (AT.1.1)
where yit measures ﬁrm i total output at time t in terms of added value, while kit and lit
represent capital and labour input respectively and ωit is ﬁrm productivity. At the beginning
of each period t ﬁrms will ﬁrst decide whether to continue their operations or to quit the
market, and conditional on this they will decide the level of labour input and investment
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as a function of ﬁrm productivity. Capital is accumulated assuming that investment in the
current period t becomes productive in the following period t+1, and productivity is assumed
to be determined by past productivity shocks and the exit and investment decisions, which
in turn change the perception of market structure distribution.
The investment function is usually based on ﬁrms capital and productivity. Neverthe-
less, several studies have found that exporters have on average a higher productivity than
domestic ﬁrms, mainly related to the ability to access foreign markets and the exposure
to international competition which lead to possible "learning-by-exporting" eﬀects (Melitz
2003; Yeaple 2005; Bernard et al. 2006; De Loecker 2007). As a result, exporting ﬁrms
face diﬀerent market structures and factor prices when they take decisions on the levels of
investment and inputs to be used. For this reason the investment function iit, and conversely
the productivity function, should depend on the export status xit of the ﬁrm as well:
iit = i(kit, ωit, xit) (AT.1.2)
In addition, since data on both investment in tangible and intangible assets are available,
we have included all these information in order to consider ﬁrms investment in R&D as well,
and to account for any simultaneity issue between inputs and productivity shocks, while
using a selection equation to correct for the sample-selection bias. Nevertheless, previous
studies have highlighted how frequently reported measures of investment in the datasets are
equal to zero, given the cost and the time required for the adjustment of capital investment.
To tackle this problem of inﬂated observations with zero investment, Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) suggested an extension of the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology by using inter-
mediate inputs mit, such as materials and energy consumption, as a proxy to recover the
unobserved ﬁrm productivity instead of investment, given that intermediate inputs are less
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costly to adjust and might respond quicker to productivity shocks. The previous investment
function (AT.1.2) will then become:
mit = m(kit, ωit, xit) (AT.1.3)
By inverting this function to explicitly obtain the productivity shock ωit and then sub-
stituting it into the previous production function (AT.1.1) we ﬁnally have:
yit = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + ω(kit,mit, xit) + νit (AT.1.4)
In the ﬁrst stage, we apply an OLS regression model industry by industry, adding owner-
ship and year dummies to consistently estimate the labour parameter β2. In a second stage,
we estimate the capital coeﬃcient β1 by correcting the selection bias making the survival
decision ψit depending on ﬁrms export status through the productivity shock and the capital
accumulation process:
Pr(χit+1 = 1|Iit) = Pr(χit+1 = 1|ωit, ωit+1(kit+1, xit)) = ψit(kit,mit, xit) ≡ Pit (AT.1.5)
Thus, the estimation strategy is similar to Olley and Pakes (1996) except for the fact
that both the ﬁrst stage and the survival equation will now include the export status and all
the remaining terms will be interacted with it. This will improve the estimation in the next
stage of the capital coeﬃcient, assuming that export status will aﬀect the future productivity
distribution through a learning-by-exporting process (De Loecker 2007):
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yit+1 − β2lit+1 = β0 + β1kit+1 + g(Pit+1, ωit − βkit) + ξit+1 + ηit (AT.1.6)
A consistent coeﬃcient of capital is obtained estimating the last stage with a non-linear
least square regression model, where the coeﬃcient of labour is obtained from the ﬁrst stage
(AT.1.4), the survival probability Pit from equation (AT.1.5) and the error term νit is decom-
posed into the i.i.d. shock ηit and the news term in the Markov process ξit+1. In addition, by
using a semi-parametric method such as the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach, our estima-
tion of TFP will be less sensitive to measurement error and other sources of bias, as shown
by Van Biesebroeck (2007) comparing diﬀerent methods for estimating productivity. Finally,
once estimated and logged, we remove the top and bottom percentiles without any signiﬁcant
loss of observations, following the ISGEP (2008) approach in order to mitigate the eﬀect of
outliers on our analysis.
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